holding that due process liberty interests created by prison regulations are “generally limited to freedom from restraint” that “imposes an atypical and significant hardship” on the prisoner “in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”
How later courts described this case
- holding that due process liberty interests created by prison regulations are “generally limited to freedom from restraint” that “imposes an atypical and significant hardship” on the prisoner “in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”
- holding that dismissal of a case originally filed in state court and then removed to federal court does not constitute a strike because the prisoner did not bring the action “in a court of the United States” as required by § 1915(g)
- no liberty interest in placement in particular facility
- explaining that absent Congressional intent “to create not just a private right but also a private remedy ... a cause of action does not exist”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA
BRION BROWN,
Plaintiff, Case No. 3:25-cv-00062-SLG
v.
MATT STANLEY and DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,
Defendants.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL UPON SCREENING
Defendants filed a Notice of Removal on March 27, 2015, removing this
case that was originally filed in state court by self-represented prisoner Brion
Brown (“Plaintiff”) to federal court.1 On April 22, 2025, at Docket 8, Plaintiff filed a
motion to file an amended complaint, and on April 28, 2025, at Docket 9, Plaintiff
filed a proposed amended complaint against the Alaska Department of Corrections
(“DOC”) and Assistant Superintendent Matt Stanley—who is also the Prison Rape
Elimination Act (“PREA”) coordinator (“Defendants”).
The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion at Docket 8 to file the Amended
Complaint at Docket 9, and will screen that complaint rather than the original
complaint. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that “around the year 2023”
he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment because Defendants housed
1 Docket 1. See also Brown, Brion v. Stanley, Matt et al., Case No. 3SW-24-00064CI.
Plaintiff “in the same housing module as the victim who filed a PREA complaint
against [Plaintiff], where he suffered verbal abuse from other prisoners.”2 He also
alleges that Defendants violated DOC policy and the PREA by housing him in the
same module as the PREA complainant.3 For relief, Plaintiff seeks an order
“relieving Matt Stanely of his duties as PREA coordinator and Assistant
Superintendent” and an order for “reinstating [Plaintiff] (1) year of good time back.”4
Plaintiff also filed a “Motion to Issue Evidence” requesting an order “demanding
the defendants to reply and answer to the witness interrogatory questions.”5
The Court has now screened Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint in accordance
with 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A and finds it fails to state a plausible claim
upon which relief could be granted. For the reasons explained below, amendment
is futile, and the Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice. But because this case
was originally filed in state court, this dismissal will not count as a “strike” under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(g).6
2 Docket 9 at 1.
3 Docket 9 at 1.
4 Docket 9 at 1.
5 Docket 6.
6 Harris v. Mangum, 863 F.3d 1133, 1141 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that dismissal of a case
originally filed in state court and then removed to federal court does not constitute a strike
because the prisoner did not bring the action “in a court of the United States” as required by §
1915(g)).
Case No. 3:25-cv-00062-SLG, Brown v. Stanley, et al.
SCREENING STANDARD
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court is required to screen
complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or
officer or employee of a governmental entity, even if the filing fee has been paid.7
In this screening, a court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines
that the action:
(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief.8
Before a court may dismiss any portion of a complaint, a court must provide
a plaintiff with a statement of the deficiencies in the complaint and an opportunity
to amend or otherwise address the problems, unless to do so would be futile.9
Futility exists when “the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged
pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.”10
7 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, 1915A.
8 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
9 See Gordon v. City of Oakland, 627 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Albrecht v. Lund,
845 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1988)).
10 See Schreiber Distributing Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir.
1986).
Case No. 3:25-cv-00062-SLG, Brown v. Stanley, et al.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff has filed multiple lawsuits in this Court that have been dismissed,
including other lawsuits involving housing module decisions in state correctional
facilities.11 In two of his cases before this Court, Plaintiff received a “strike”
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) after he failed to respond to the Court’s orders.12
I. Requirements to State a Claim
To determine whether a complaint states a valid claim on which relief may
be granted, a court considers whether the complaint contains sufficient factual
matter that, if accepted as true, “state[s] a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.”13 In conducting its review, a court must liberally construe a self-represented
plaintiff’s pleading and give the plaintiff the benefit of the doubt.14 Factual
allegations may not be speculative; rather, a plaintiff must plead “factual content
11 See Brown v. State of Alaska, Case No. 3:22-cv-00200-SLG, Docket 7 (Plaintiff alleged that
he was wrongfully denied housing in a mental health module at Spring Creek Correctional
Center.); Brown v. Milburn, et al., Case No. 3:23-cv-00038-JMK, Docket 10 (Plaintiff challenged
an unwritten rule that prisoners caught fighting were unable to return to the Lima Module.)
12 See Brown v. Alaska Parole Bd. & Dept. of Corrections, Case No. 3:23-cv-00101-JMK,
Docket 8; Brown v. Milburn, et al., Case No. 3:23-cv-00038-JMK, Docket 10.
13 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)).
14 Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026,
1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc)).
Case No. 3:25-cv-00062-SLG, Brown v. Stanley, et al.
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.”15
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instructs that a complaint
must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
[complainant] is entitled to relief[.]”16 While a complaint need not, and should not,
contain every factual detail, “unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation[s]” are insufficient to state a claim.17 A complaint is insufficiently plead
if it offers “naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.”18
II. Civil Rights Actions
To state a claim for relief under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege plausible
facts that, if proven, would establish (1) the defendant acting under color of state
law (2) deprived the plaintiff of rights secured by the federal Constitution or federal
statutes.19 To act under color of state law, a complaint must allege that the
defendant acted with state authority as a state actor.20 To be deprived of a right,
15 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
16 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 8(a)(2).
17 Id.
18 Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
19 Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986).
20 West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326
(1941)).
Case No. 3:25-cv-00062-SLG, Brown v. Stanley, et al.
the defendant’s action needs to either violate a right guaranteed by the Constitution
or an enforceable right created by federal law.21 Section 1983 does not confer
constitutional or federal statutory rights. Instead, it provides a mechanism for
remedying violations of pre-existing federal rights.22
A. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
In its prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishments,” the Eighth Amendment
places restraints on prison officials, who may not, for example, use excessive
physical force against prisoners.23 The Amendment also imposes duties on these
officials, who must provide humane conditions of confinement; including adequate
food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must “take reasonable measures to
guarantee the safety of the inmates[.]”24 To the extent that prison conditions are
restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay
for their offenses against society.25 A federal court grants deference to state prison
policies, protocols, and procedures and should be cautious when asked to
21 Buckley v. City of Redding, 66 F. 3d 188, 190 (9th Cir. 1995).
22 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989).
23 See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992).
24 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–527 (1984).
25 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).
Case No. 3:25-cv-00062-SLG, Brown v. Stanley, et al.
intervene in the operation of a state prison.26 Here, Plaintiff challenges the PREA
coordinator’s decision to house Plaintiff in the same housing unit as a prisoner who
filed a PREA complaint against him. He alleges that he has suffered verbal abuse
from other prisoners as a result of this placement.27
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint fails to state a cognizable claim for relief.
Neither the Eighth Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment endows prisoners
with a right to be housed in a particular part of the prison.28 Moreover, verbal
harassment or abuse generally does not violate a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment
Rights.29
B. Department of Corrections Policy 808.2011(a)
An alleged violation of a state regulation or prison policy does not, by itself,
give rise to a federal constitutional claim under Section 1983.30 Only if the events
26 See Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528-30 (2006); see also Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802,
807 (9th Cir. 1995).
27 Docket 9 at 1.
28 See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224–25 (1976) (no liberty interest in placement in
particular facility); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983) (holding there is no
constitutionally protected right to be housed in the institution of one's choice); Bjorlin v.
Hubbard, Case No. CIV s-09-1793 GEB GGH P., 2010 WL 457685, *1 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (prison
officials’ housing and classification decisions do not give rise to federal constitutional claims).
29 Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted) (“Verbal
harassment or abuse … is not sufficient to state a constitutional deprivation under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.”).
30 Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1070 (“There is no § 1983 liability for violating prison
policy. Plaintiff must prove that the official violated his constitutional right.”) (alterations and
citation omitted).
Case No. 3:25-cv-00062-SLG, Brown v. Stanley, et al.
complained of rise to the level of a federal constitutional violation, independent of
whether or not the events constitute a failure to adhere to a state prison regulation,
will they support a claim under Section 1983.31 Consequently, because Plaintiff’s
claims do not establish a federal constitutional violation, he cannot state a claim
under Section 1983 for an alleged violation of prison policy.
C. No Private Right of Action under PREA
PREA was enacted to address the issue of and establish national standards
for the detection, prevention, reduction, and punishment of prison rape.32 It does
not provide a private right of action that allows a prisoner to sue a correctional
officer for an alleged violation of PREA.33 Therefore, Plaintiff cannot state a claim
under the PREA.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim
upon which relief could be granted. Further, there is no additional facts consistent
31 Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483–84 (1995) (holding that due process liberty interests
created by prison regulations are “generally limited to freedom from restraint” that “imposes an
atypical and significant hardship” on the prisoner “in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison
life”).
32 34 U.S.C. § 30302(1) (“[The purpose of the Act is to] establish a zero-tolerance standard for
the incidence of prison rape in prisons in the United States[.]”).
33 See 34 U.S.C. § 30307 (explicitly directing the Attorney General to enforce compliance with
the PREA); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001) (explaining that absent
Congressional intent “to create not just a private right but also a private remedy ... a cause of
action does not exist”).
Case No. 3:25-cv-00062-SLG, Brown v. Stanley, et al.
with the Amended Complaint’s allegations that could cure this deficiency.
Moreover, as previously noted, Plaintiff has filed multiple lawsuits challenging
various prison officials’ decisions regarding his placement in housing units and has
received two “strikes” after he failed to comply with the Court’s orders. Therefore,
the Court finds amendment to be futile and must dismiss this case with prejudice.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1. The motion to file an amended complaint at Docket 8 is GRANTED.
2. The Amended Complaint at Docket 9 is DISMISSED for failing to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
3. This dismissal will not count as a “strike” against Plaintiff.
4. The “Motion to Issue Evidence” at Docket 6 is DENIED.
5. All other pending motions are DENIED as moot.
6. The Clerk of Court shall issue a final judgment and close this case.
DATED this 28th day of July, 2025, at Anchorage, Alaska.
/s/ Sharon L. Gleason
SHARON L. GLEASON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case No. 3:25-cv-00062-SLG, Brown v. Stanley, et al.