Global Glass Technologies, Inc. v. Research Frontiers, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

GLOBAL GLASS TECHNOLOGIES,

INC.,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 8:20-cv-02517-MSS-AEP

RESEARCH FRONTIERS, INC. and

GAUZY LTD.,

Defendants.

ORDER

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court for consideration of Defendants’ Motion

for Attorney’s Fees. (Dkt. 172) United States Magistrate Judge Anthony E. Porcelli

issued a Report and Recommendation, (Dkt. 198), which recommended as follows: (i)

Defendants’ Motion for Attorney’s Fees be granted in part and denied in part; (ii)

Defendants be awarded a Rule 11 sanction in the amount of $150,000.00; (iii) Peter

Ticktin and the Ticktin Law Group, P.A. (collectively “Ticktin”) be jointly and

severally liable for the $150,000.00 sanction award; and (iv) the sanction award be paid

within 45 days of the Court’s final order. (Id.) Defendants filed an Objection, (Dkt.

203), and Ticktin filed an Objection. (Dkt. 204) Thereafter, Ticktin filed a response to

Defendants’ Objection, (Dkt. 205), and Defendants filed a response in opposition

thereto. (Dkt. 206) Upon consideration of all relevant filings, case law, and being

otherwise fully advised, the Court SUSTAINS IN PART and OVERRULES IN

PART Defendants’ Objection, (Dkt. 203), OVERRULES Ticktin’s Objections, (Dkt.

204), and CONFIRMS IN PART and ADOPTS IN PART the Magistrate Judge’s

Report and Recommendation, (Dkt. 198), as set forth in this Order. Specifically, the

Court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation of a 50.2-hour reduction for

Defendants’ time spent before March 22, 2021, and a 40 percent reduction to account

for work associated solely with defending against the patent infringement claims.

However, the Court finds Attorney Woodrow Pollack’s reasonable hourly rate to be

$700.00. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to a sanctions award in the amount of

$320,819.88. The Court further finds that the lodestar amount should not be reduced

based on Mr. Ticktin’s claimed financial condition.

I. BACKGROUND

Judge Porcelli issued a Report and Recommendation, (Dkt. 198),

recommending that Defendants’ Motion for Attorney’s Fees be granted in part and

denied in part. (Dkt. 172) Judge Porcelli recommends that sanctions be awarded only

for work associated with defending against the patent infringement claims—based on

Mr. Ticktin’s failure to properly investigate these claims—for the period beginning

March 22, 2021, through January 31, 2024. (Dkt. 198 at 5–7). Judge Porcelli also

determines that the hourly rates requested by Defendants exceed those typically

awarded in the Middle District of Florida. (Id. at 13) Accordingly, he recommends

that reasonable hourly rates be set at $550 for Woodrow Pollack, Esq., $375 for Brian

Paul, Esq., and $160 for paralegal Katie Chambers. (Id. at 9–13) Applying these rates,

Judge Porcelli calculates a lodestar amount of $285,000.00, accounting for a 50.2-hour

reduction for time expended prior to March 22, 2021, and a 40 percent reduction for

work attributable solely to the patent infringement claims. (Id. at 15–16) In so finding,

Judge Porcelli rejects Ticktin’s argument that Defendants failed to mitigate their fees

after becoming aware of the Rule 11 violation and declined to further reduce the award

on that basis. (Id. at 16–18) Finally, in light of Mr. Ticktin’s claimed financial

condition, Judge Porcelli recommends reducing the lodestar amount to a final

sanctions award of $150,000.00, finding that this reduced amount is sufficient to deter

similar sanctionable conduct in the future. (Id. at 19–22)

Defendants object to the Report and Recommendation on five grounds. First,

they argue that the Report and Recommendation improperly limits the sanctions

award to work related solely to the patent infringement claims, even though all of

Plaintiff’s claims were frivolous. (Dkt. 203 at 2–4) Second, Defendants contend that

the sanctions period should include the entirety of the litigation, rather than being

limited to the period beginning on March 22, 2021. (Id. at 4–5) Third, they argue that

the Report and Recommendation improperly confines its analysis to Rule 11, despite

the Court’s prior Order, (Dkt. 174), which contemplated sanctions under Rule 11, 28

U.S.C. § 1927, and the Court’s inherent authority. (Dkt. 203 at 5–6) Fourth,

Defendants object to the reduction in counsel’s hourly rates, arguing that the Report

and Recommendation disregards key evidence and relies primarily on a single trial

court decision involving a trademark dispute. (Id. at 6–8) Fifth, Defendants object to

the reduction of the sanctions award based on Mr. Ticktin’s financial condition,

arguing that the record does not support such a reduction. (Id. at 9–10)

Ticktin also filed an Objection to the Report and Recommendation. (Dkt. 204)

First, Ticktin argues that sanctions are unnecessary because Mr. Ticktin “has learned

his lesson,” and therefore additional deterrence is unwarranted. (Id. at 2–4) Second,

Ticktin contends that the Report and Recommendation fails to consider Defendants’

duty to mitigate, as well as their delay in seeking sanctions—both of which, according

to Ticktin, contributed to increased costs associated with defending against the patent

infringement claims. (Id. at 5–9) Third, Ticktin requests that the Court reduce the

sanctions award to $25,000, asserting that any greater amount would impose a “great

hardship.” (Id. at 9)

Ticktin subsequently filed a response to Defendant’s Objection to the Report

and Recommendation. (Dkt. 205) In its response, Ticktin asserts that the Report and

Recommendation should be adopted, except to the extent otherwise addressed in its

Objection. (Id. at 4–7) Ticktin further argues that sanctions are not warranted under

either 28 U.S.C. § 1927 or the Court’s inherent power. (Id. at 7–8) Lastly, Ticktin

reiterates that Mr. Ticktin’s financial condition supports a further reduction in the

sanctions award. (Id. at 8–10) In response, Defendants object to the filing as

procedurally improper and state that they will not submit additional briefing unless

directed by the Court. (Dkt. 206)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In the Eleventh Circuit, a district judge may accept, reject, or modify the

magistrate judge's report and recommendation after conducting a careful and complete

review of the findings and recommendations. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Williams v.

Wainwright, 681 F.2d 732, 732 (11th Cir. 1982). A district judge “shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or

recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). This requires

that the district judge “give fresh consideration to those issues to which specific

objection has been made by a party.” Jeffrey S. v. State Bd. of Educ., 896 F.2d 507,

512 (11th Cir.1990) (quoting H.R. 1609, 94th Cong. § 2 (1976)). Absent specific

objections, there is no requirement that a district judge review factual findings de novo,

Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 779 n.9 (11th Cir. 1993), and the court may accept,

reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings and recommendations. 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(C). The district judge reviews legal conclusions de novo, even in the absence

of an objection. See Cooper-Houston v. Southern Ry., 37 F.3d 603, 604 (11th Cir.

1994).

III. DISCUSSION

Upon consideration of the Report and Recommendation, in conjunction with

an independent examination of the file and applicable case law, the Court ADOPTS

the Report and Recommendation to the extent it limits the sanctions award to conduct

and work specifically related to the patent infringement claims. However, the Court

DECLINES to adopt the Report and Recommendation with respect to the

determination of Mr. Pollack’s reasonable hourly rate and the total sanctions award.

The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s determination that at this point

in the litigation the sanctions award should be limited to work related to the patent

infringement claims from March 22, 2021, through January 31, 2024. The Court

previously found, among other things, that Mr. Ticktin directed pursuit of those

claims without conducting any reasonable pre-suit investigation or diligence. (See Dkt.

174 at 7) This finding is consistent with the record developed during the hearing on

the Motion for Summary Judgment and Sanctions. The Court further agrees that

March 22, 2021—the date Mr. Ticktin signed a stipulation agreeing to abandon the

frivolous patent infringement claims—appropriately marks the beginning of the

sanctions period. Although the Court found the contract claims lacked merit and were

unsupported by law or fact, those claims were not subject to the Rule 11 sanctions,

and Ticktin was not provided notice and an opportunity withdraw those claims. Thus,

the Court declines to award sanctions under its inherent authority with respect to those

claims.

Judge Porcelli determined that the reasonable hourly rates should be $550 for

Woodrow Pollack, Esq., $375 for Brian Paul, Esq., and $160 for paralegal Katie

Chambers. (Dkt. 198 at 13) Defendants object to these reduced rates, arguing that the

Report and Recommendation failed to consider the findings of competing fee experts,

counsel’s experience and pre-suit diligence, and the absence of Middle District

authority addressing market rates in patent infringement cases. (Dkt. 203 at 6–8)

Defendants instead request hourly rates of $721 for Mr. Pollack, $412 for Mr. Paul,

and $288 for Ms. Chambers. (Dkt. 175 at 1)

A reasonable hourly rate is the “prevailing market rate in the relevant legal

community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience,

and reputation.” Norman v. Housing Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299

(11th Cir. 1999). The movant must provide satisfactory evidence that the requested

rate comports with the prevailing market rate. Id. Satisfactory evidence “necessarily

must speak to rates actually billed and paid in similar lawsuits.” Id. However, “‘[t]he

court . . . is itself an expert on the question and may consider its own knowledge and

experience concerning reasonable and proper fees and may form an independent

judgment either with or without the aid of witnesses as to value.’” Id. at 1303 (quoting

Campbell v. Green, 112 F.2d 143, 144 (5th Cir. 1940)).1

In support of their request, Defendants filed a declaration of fee expert Jim

Matulis, Esq., a registered patent attorney with more than twenty-five years of

experience litigating complex patent cases in Florida. (Dkt. 172-5) Mr. Matulis asserts

that Mr. Pollack is a registered pattern attorney and is Board Certified as an expert in

Intellectual Property Law by the Florida Bar. (Id. at ¶ 24) According to the declaration,

Mr. Pollack has practiced exclusively in the field of intellectual property at Shutts &

Bowen since 2006 and has served as lead counsel in over 100 patent, copyright, and

trademark cases. (Id.) Mr. Matulis further asserts that Mr. Pollack’s billing rate ranged

1 See Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir.1981) (adopting as binding precedent all

decisions of the former Fifth Circuit issued on or before September 30, 1981).

from $600 per hour at the outset of this case to $750 per hour by the end of 2023, with

a current rate of $840 per hour. (Id. at ¶ 25) Mr. Matulis calculates Mr. Pollack’s

average hourly rate for work performed in this matter to be just over $721. (Id.)

As to Mr. Paul, Mr. Matulis states that he is an associate and registered pattern

attorney with nearly five years of experience in intellectual property litigation. (Id. at

¶ 26) Mr. Matulis calculates Mr. Paul’s average hourly rate in this matter to be just

over $412. (Id.) With respect to Ms. Chambers, Mr. Matulis asserts that she has more

than fourteen years of experience as a litigation paralegal and has worked alongside

Mr. Pollack in over 100 intellectual property matters. (Id. at ¶ 27) Her average hourly

rate in this case is calculated to be just over $288. (Id.)

Mr. Matulis acknowledges that the requested rates “are on the high end of the

market in this District,” but maintains they are justified. (Id. at ¶ 31) He asserts that

many partners at large firms in the District with comparable experience charge

between $600 and $950 per hour for intellectual property litigation. (Id.) He further

notes that professional rates have generally increased—sometimes substantially—over

the two years preceding this demand for fees; that Mr. Pollack controlled costs by

delegating work to lower-level professionals; and that Mr. Pollack’s requested rate of

$721 per hour is only 17% higher than Mr. Ticktin’s $650 hourly rate, despite Mr.

Ticktin’s lack of experience and qualifications in patent litigation. (Id. at ¶¶ 32–34)

In support of its response in opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Attorneys’

Fees, Plaintiff submitted the declaration of fee expert Richard Fee. (Dkt. 183-7) Mr.

Fee opines that the reasonable hourly rates in this case are $525 for Mr. Pollack, $375

for Mr. Paul, and $150 for Ms. Chambers. (Dkt. 183-7 at ¶ 45) In support, Mr. Fee

provides a summary of hourly rates awarded in intellectual property cases in the

Middle District from 2020 to the present. (Id. at 34–38) Notably, the summary includes

no cases from 2024, and most cited cases do not involve patent infringement claims.

Although the Court has not identified any recent patent infringement cases from

this division addressing reasonable hourly rates, it recognizes that patent litigation is a

specialized area of law that often commands higher rates due to the expertise required.

In the absence of other evidence specific to prevailing market rates in patent cases, the

Court relies on the declaration of Mr. Matulis, as well as the Court’s own knowledge

and experience to fill the gap. See Campbell, 112 F.2d at 144. The Court takes into

consideration that as of the date of Mr. Matulis’s certification, there were only 132

members of the Florida Bar (out of more than 80,000 Florida lawyers) who were Board

Certified in Intellectual Property Law. Mr. Pollack has served in a lead counsel role

for more than 100 patent, copyright, and trademark litigations, and taken numerous

intellectual property cases through final verdict at jury trials. A Martindale-Hubbell

AV rated attorney, Mr. Pollack has been recognized by Chambers and Partners, Best

Lawyers in America, Florida Super Lawyers, and Florida Trend’s Legal Elite. Best

Lawyer in America awards an accolade to the individual lawyer who has received the

highest peer feedback for a particular practice area and considering the complexity of

the case, counsel’s experience and qualifications, prevailing rates in the Tampa market

for similarly experienced attorneys, and all other relevant factors, the Court finds that

a reasonable hourly rate for Mr. Pollack is $700. This rate adequately accounts for Mr.

Pollack’s subject-matter expertise and credentials.

In reaching this determination, the Court also considers that Mr. Ticktin

appears to have charged an hourly rate of $650, despite lacking the requisite skills or

litigation experience in patent matters. The Court considers that Mr. Pollack’s

requested rate—approximately 17% higher than Mr. Ticktin’s—is not wholly

unreasonable. However, as stated above, the Court concludes that the rate of $700 is

more in line with prevailing rates at the time. Accordingly, the Court finds that an

hourly rate of $700 for Mr. Pollack is reasonable in light of Mr. Pollack’s expertise and

experience. As to the hourly rates for Mr. Paul and Ms. Chambers, the Court finds

Judge Porcelli’s recommended rates—$375 Mr. Paul and $160 for Ms. Chambers—

are reasonable based on their experience and the record developed in this case.

Neither party objects to the lodestar calculation methodology used by Judge

Porcelli in reviewing the time entries submitted by Defendants. (Dkt. 175-2)

Accordingly, the Court applies the adjusted hourly rate for Mr. Pollack to Judge

Porcelli’s recommended adjustments—a 50.2-hour reduction for time expended before

March 22, 2021, and a 40 percent reduction to account for work attributable solely to

the patent infringement claims—as follows:

Timekeeper Title Average Total Hours Total

Rate Billed Billed Billed

Woodrow Pollack, Esq. Shareholder $700 397.40 $278,180.00

Joseph Bain, Esq. Shareholder $825 0.80 $660.00

Jordan Lee, Esq. Shareholder $525 0.00 $0.00

Ryan Reinert, Esq. Shareholder $440 0.00 $0.00

Brian Paul, Esq. Associate $375 578.00 $216,750.00

Melodie Khosrovani, Esq. Associate $275 3.20 $880.00

Samuel Moore, Esq. Associate $320 6.20 $1,984.00

Katie Chambers Paralegal $160 159.70 $25,552.00

Ada R. Richey Paralegal $337 4.60 $1,550.20

Melanie Senosiain, Esq. Associate $312 23.80 $7,425.60

Alexander Schneider, Esq. Associate $409 2.00 $818.00

Brian Doney, Esq. Associate $375 2.40 $900.00

50.2 hours reduced before March 1178.10 $ 534,699.80

22, 2021

40% Reduction for Patent $ 213,879.92

Infringement only

Total $ 320,819.88

The Court also adopts Judge Porcelli’s recommendation that Defendants’ fee

award should not be reduced based on Ticktin’s duty to mitigate argument. A party

has the duty to mitigate its legal fees and expenses when defending against a frivolous

issue. See, e.g., Ro-Ro Enterprises, Inc. v. State Farm Fire and Casualty, 1996 WL

556928, *5 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 5, 1996) (“A party defending against a frivolous paper has

a duty under Rule 11 to mitigate its legal fees and expenses by resolving frivolous issues

quickly and efficiently”) (internal citations omitted). The Court finds that Defendants

made reasonable efforts to do so. Although Defendants recognized as early as April

2021 that Plaintiff’s patent infringement claims lacked merit, they did not file their

Motion for Sanctions until September 2023. (See Dkt. 129 at 15) In the interim,

however, Defendants sought dismissal of the case on three separate occasions. (See

Dkts. 30, 34, 41); See also In re Gen. Plastics Corp., 184 B.R. 1008, 1017 (Bankr. S.D.

Fla. 1995). Moreover, any effort to defend the patent infringement claims necessarily

implicated the merits of the case and thus required expenditure of time and resources.

Judge Porcelli recommended reducing the lodestar amount of $285,053.88 to a

final sanctions award of $150,000.00 as sufficient to deter future sanctionable conduct

in light of Mr. Ticktin’s financial condition. (Dkt. 198 at 19–22) Defendants object,

arguing that Mr. Ticktin’s representations about his financial condition are

inconsistent with his law firm’s financial records. (Dkt. 203 at 9–10) Mr. Ticktin, by

contrast, seeks a further reduction of the sanctions award to $25,000, arguing that any

greater amount would impose a “great hardship.” (Dkt. 204 at 9)

The Court finds that further reduction is not warranted. To determine the

appropriate amount of sanctions, the district court should consider the sanctioned

party’s financial ability to pay the sanctions. Baker v. Alderman, 158 F.3d 516, 528-29

(11th Cir. 1998) (“The law in this circuit is clear that ability to pay should be

considered in the award of attorney’s fees under § 1988” and extending the principle

to sanctions award). A party arguing that it is unable to pay has the burden to present

evidence of inability to pay. Id. at 528. Upon de novo review of the record and Mr.

Ticktin’s financial statements, (Dkt. 183), the Court is satisfied that the evidence of

record demonstrates that Ticktin and his firm have the ability to pay the full lodestar

total of $320,819.88. Profit and loss statements filed by Ticktin reflect that Ticktin Law

Group, P.A. generated a gross profit of nearly $6,000,000 between 2023 and 2024.

(Dkt. 183-6 at 4, 10) Moreover, the Court concludes that a lesser rate would not serve

to deter this flagrant conduct. Despite significant opportunities to stand down from the

challenged claims, Mr. Ticktin and the Ticktin Law Firm persisted in pursuing the

claims. The Court has considered the claims of financial hardship raised by Mr. Ticktin

and finds the claims unpersuasive and unsupported by the evidence. Consequently,

the Court finds that the lodestar amount adequately serves the deterrent purpose of

Rule 11 sanctions, and a lesser sanction would not suffice.

Certainly, reducing the sanctions to the nominal sum of $25,000, as Mr. Ticktin

requests, would fail to achieve the necessary deterrent effect demanded by the

abhorrent conduct reflected in this record. In fact, the Court finds that this request itself

illustrates a lack of appreciation for the significance and severity of the firm’s

misconduct. If the Court were to accept this proposal, it would effectively greenlight

this conduct in the future for firms, like the Ticktin Law group, which could simply

build a nominal sanction cost into the cost of doing business in this fashion. To impose

such a minimal sanction would risk trivializing the seriousness of the violations and

undermine the Courts responsibility to safeguard the integrity of the judicial process.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that:

1. The Report and Recommendation, (Dkt. 198), is CONFIRMED IN

PART and ADOPTED IN PART as stated herein.

2. Defendants’ Motion for Attorney Fees, (Dkt. 172), is GRANTED IN

PART and DENIED IN PART as stated herein.

3. Defendants are awarded a Rule 11 sanction in the amount of

$320,819.88.

4. Mr. Ticktin and the Ticktin Law Group, P.A. are jointly and severally

liable for the $320,819.88 sanction award.

5. Mr. Ticktin and Ticktin Law Group, P.A. shall have up to and including

thirty (30) days from the date of this Order to pay the sanction award.

DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, this 25th day of July 2025.

Vf a

MARYS SOREN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies furnished to:

Counsel of Record

Any Unrepresented Person