Sanders v. Grimes

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

CORDELL SANDERS, )

R41346, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 25-cv-1010-DWD

)

MICAH GRIMES, )

WHITE, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Cordell Sanders, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections

(IDOC) currently detained at Menard Correctional Center, brings this civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights at

Lawrence Correctional Center (Lawrence). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the

Defendants used excessive force when placing him in a segregation cell, and their

conduct was retaliation for a grievance Plaintiff filed against Sanders a year earlier. The

Complaint (Doc. 1) is now before the Court for preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner complaints to

filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b). Any portion of a

complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from

such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture, the factual

allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. Rodriguez v. Plymouth

Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff alleges that in June of 2023 when he was housed in the infirmary at

Lawrence, Defendant Grimes confiscated a tablet charger for no reason. He grieved the

issue, and when he was unsatisfied with the responses at the prison level, in April of 2024,

he appealed to the Administrative Review Board (ARB). Plaintiff alleges that just 4 days

after the grievance arrived at the ARB, on April 22, 2024, he was taken to solitary

confinement for an unrelated issue. (Doc. 1 at 3). Upon arrival to the seg building,

Defendant Grimes gave him an angry look, and Grimes and White then shackled him

behind his back to escort him to his cell.

Plaintiff alleges that after he was inside of the cell, White misused the ankle

shackles by attacking them to his handcuffs and using the two sets of restraints to

violently yank his arms and hands thru the hatch on his cell door. (Doc. 1 at 3). In the

process, his right index finger struck the hatch, and he sustained a half-inch cut that

immediately bled. With his arms thru the hatch, Grimes and White began to bend and

bang his arms against the door, causing bruising. With his arms still thru the door, they

deployed an entire can of pepper spray onto Plaintiff’s jumpsuit, without warning. He

alleges White also called him a monkey during the encounter.

Plaintiff alleges that the entire interaction was an act of retaliation for the grievance

against Grimes about the tablet charger. (Doc. 1 at 4). He further alleges that in an

attempt to cover up the retaliation, Grimes issued a false disciplinary ticket claiming that

Plaintiff grabbed White’s finger during the interaction on April 22, 2024. Plaintiff alleges

that he challenged the disciplinary ticket before the ARB, and the ARB found that he had

not committed the injury with assault offense alleged in the ticket.

Plaintiff attached supporting documents. He included a medical record from

April 22, 2024, that indicated he was seen by a nurse for a .5 inch scrape on his finger and

to decontaminate from “getting sprayed.” (Doc. 1 at 7). An ARB form indicated that the

disciplinary assault charge was reduced from assault with injury to plain assault. (Doc.

1 at 8). Plaintiff also included a few other grievance documents. Plaintiff seeks monetary

compensation and indicates a desire to proceed on First and Eighth Amendment claims.

Based on the allegations in the Complaint the Court designates the following

counts:

Claim 1: Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against

Defendants Grimes and White for their alleged conduct on

April 22, 2024, when placing Plaintiff in his segregation cell;

Claim 2: First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendants

Grimes and White for utilizing excessive force in response

to Plaintiff’s April 18, 2024, grievance appeal to the ARB

concerning his 2023 interaction with Grimes over his tablet

charger.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders

unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any claim that is mentioned

in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order is considered dismissed without

prejudice as inadequately pled under Twombly. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does

not plead “enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face”).

DISCUSSION

An Eighth Amendment excessive force claim requires an inquiry into “whether

force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or [whether it

was] applied maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S.

1, 7 (1992). The “core judicial inquiry” for an excessive force claim not the severity of the

injury, but whether the force used was ‘malicious and sadistic.’ Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S.

34, 37 (2010). Here, Plaintiff contends the Defendants used force that was entirely

unnecessary to place him in his cell. Specifically, he claims that once he was within the

cell, Defendants Grimes and White removed his ankle shackles and then attached the

chain to his handcuffs so that his arms could be pulled through the hatch of his door. He

also alleges that they deployed an entire can of pepper spray while his hands were held

thru the hatch, and he was inside of the cell. Although his injury is very minor, he alleges

the force was used completely without justification and was done as an act of retaliation

for grievance activity. These allegations are sufficient to proceed beyond initial review.

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants Grimes and White acted in retaliation for a

grievance that he appealed to the ARB about Grimes’ past conduct, just days before the

alleged excessive force encounter on April 22, 2024. Plaintiff claims that Grimes

referenced the grievance during the incident of force, and White called him a monkey. A

successful claim for First Amendment retaliation requires that a plaintiff show, “(1) he

engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation that

would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future; and (3) the First Amendment

activity was ‘at least a motivating factor’ in the Defendants’ decision to take the

retaliatory action.” Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Woodruff

v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 551 (7th Cir. 2008)). An inmate may meet the prima facie showing

by offering direct or circumstantial evidence that the defendant’s actions were motivated

by retaliation. See e.g., Kidwell v. Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957, 965-66 (7th Cir. 2012).

“Circumstantial evidence, however, is evidence from which a trier of fact may infer that

retaliation occurred. ‘Circumstantial evidence may include suspicious timing,

ambiguous oral or written statements, or behavior towards or comments directed at other

[individuals] in the protected group.’” Id.

Here, Plaintiff alleges that he engaged in protected speech by lodging a grievance

about an interaction with Defendant Grimes, followed by an appeal to the ARB on April

18, 2024. He claims that just four days after the appeal, Grimes and White used excessive

force against him and commented on the grievance. Plaintiff has circumstantial evidence

both in the form of suspicious timing, and in the form of the alleged comments that

actions were taken in relation to the grievance. Thus, at this juncture, his allegations

against Grimes and White are sufficient to proceed.

DISPOSITION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Claims 1 and 2 survive against Defendants

Micah Grimes and White.

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to prepare for Defendants White and Micah

Grimes: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons),

and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these

forms, a copy of the Complaint (Doc. 1), and this Memorandum and Order to Defendants’

place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the

Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the

forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on

Defendant, and the Court will require Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service,

to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

If a Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the

employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not

known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for

sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation

of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be

maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to

the Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).

Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 244, Defendants need only respond to the issues

stated in this Merits Review Order.

If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment

of costs under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs,

regardless of whether his application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).

Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to inform the Clerk

of Court and each opposing party of any address changes; the Court will not

independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later

than 14 days after a transfer or other change of address occurs. Failure to comply with

this order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in

dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter the standard HIPAA Order in this case

because it will involve the exchange of medical records.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 25, 2025

/s David W. Dugan

____________________________

DAVID W. DUGAN

United States District Judge

NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of your

lawsuit and serve them with a copy of your complaint. After service has been achieved,

the defendants will enter their appearance and file an Answer to the complaint. It will

likely take at least 60 days from the date of this Order to receive the defendants’ Answers,

but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days or more. When all of the defendants

have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order containing important

information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to wait until

counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to give the defendants

notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before defendants’

counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not

submit any evidence to the Court at his time, unless otherwise directed by the Court.

The Court wishes to remind the Plaintiff that litigation is often viewed a series of hurdles

that the Plaintiff must clear to get to another hurdle. Initial screening is such a hurdle, but

it is a very low one for the Plaintiff to clear. As noted above, surviving initial screening

only requires the bare statement of a claim that, if proven, could entitle Plaintiff to some

relief. At trial, he will need to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the facts alleged

actually occurred and that those facts satisfy the legal requirements for recovery. Trial is

the highest and most difficult of hurdles for any Plaintiff to clear.