Coones v. Cogburn

Case: 24-10777 Document: 92-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/25/2025

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals

____________ Fifth Circuit

FILED

No. 24-10777 July 25, 2025

____________

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Cynthia Coones, Individually, and as Surviving Parent and

Representative of the Estate of Jace Coones, Deceased,

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Beverly Cogburn, Registered Nurse; Christi Baker, Licensed

Vocational Nurse; Edmundo Cueto, Warden; Jodi Hefner;

Regional Director of TDCJ Region V, In August 2020;

Bryan Collier; Mitchell County Hospital District;

Texas Tech University; Mitchell County, Texas;

Security Supervisor; John Does, Guards and Medical Staff;

Christine M. Heady, Registered Nurse; Jennifer A. Aguilar,

Licensed Vocational Nurse; Olivia Herrera, Registered Nurse; Susan

Boedeker, Licensed Vocational Nurse; Brad R. Baker, Medical

Doctor; Chad R. Morris; State of Texas; Texas

Department of Criminal Justice; FNU LNU, Security

Supervisor on duty at 16:51 on 8/28/2022,

Defendants—Appellees.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:22-CV-90

______________________________

Before Stewart, Dennis, and Haynes, Circuit Judges.

Case: 24-10777 Document: 92-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/25/2025

No. 24-10777

Per Curiam: *

The subject of this appeal has long been familiar in the Fifth Circuit—

the deadly impact of the Texas heat on inmates. Jace Coones died in a Texas

prison due to excessive heat exposure. The district court dismissed the suit

for failure to state a claim. As the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly acknowledged,

inmates have a right to be free from excessive heat. Accordingly, we

REVERSE in part, AFFIRM in part, and REMAND.

I. Background 1

Summers are fatal for many Texas inmates. Statewide, there have

been as many as 271 heat deaths in Texas prisons between 2001 and 2019—

30 times the national average. As summers continue to get hotter, the

problem continues to get worse. However, many Texas prisoners continue

to suffer the extreme heat without remedial measures such as air conditioning

or fans.

Coones was a prisoner in the custody of the Texas Department of

Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”) in Colorado City. He suffered from allergies

and asthma, both of which make it difficult to breathe, rendering him

especially susceptible to the stresses of extreme heat.

Like many cells in Texas, Coones’s cell did not have air conditioning.

In the summer, many parts of his unit reached temperatures in the 90s and

100s throughout the day. The unit did not use fans, ice water, or daily

showers to combat the heat.

The events in question took place in August 2020. Coones sought

medical care throughout the month. Coones visited Mitchell County

_____________________

*

This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

1

This appeal comes to us on a motion to dismiss, so we accept all well-pleaded

factual allegations as true and resolve all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor. See

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

2

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Hospital twice in early August, including a two-night stay for dehydration

from excessive heat.

On August 28, 2020, the temperature in Colorado City was over 100

degrees for more than seven hours, reaching a high of 106 degrees. Coones’s

cell was as hot or hotter than outside. That afternoon, Coones visited the

medical unit. He complained to Registered Nurse Beverly Cogburn that his

cell was too hot, he needed to cool off, and he wanted a shower.

Cogburn took his pulse and respiration rate. Coones’s resting pulse

was 103, and his respiration rate was 98 breaths per minute—much higher

than his typical pulse of 80 and respiration rate of 18. Cogburn noted that

Coones’s skin was warm and dry; a typical response to the heat would be to

sweat, which helps cool the body, but Coones’s dry skin suggested he was

significantly dehydrated. Cogburn allowed Coones to rest on a gurney for an

unspecified amount of time. At some point, Cogburn told Coones to leave,

but he refused because he feared returning to his overheated cell given how

it had hurt him. Cogburn did not allow him to stay despite the medical issues

he was having and instead called security to return Coones to his cell.

On the morning of August 30, after another 100+-degree day,

Licensed Vocational Nurse Christi Baker saw Coones in his cell, “rolling

around on the floor naked” and unable to verbalize. She noted that Coones

was surrounded by four untouched trays of food. Baker did not provide any

medical treatment and merely “encouraged [Coones] to get up and get on

with his day.” 2

_____________________

2

The entirety of Baker’s medical note is as follows:

Offender is in his cell rolling around on the floor naked. Offender

is not verbalizing pain and no respiratory distress is noted. Offender does

not verbalize to nursing or security but does respond to verbal stimuli. The

offender has been offered food from meal service and there are 4 full trays

in the cell on the floor that has not been touched. This nurse encouraged

the offender to get up and get on with his day without response to

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Coones was found dead in his cell the next morning. Rigor mortis with

mottling had set in, meaning that Coones had been dead for a significant

period. Coones had no food in his stomach, meaning he had not recently

eaten. His body weighed 24 pounds less than three days prior.

Plaintiff Cynthia Coones is the mother of Jace Coones. She asserts

Eighth Amendment, Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and

medical malpractice claims against three categories of defendants:

(1) Supervisory Defendants: Executive Director of TDCJ

Bryan Collier and Warden Jody Hefner.

(2) Care-Providing Defendants: RN Beverly Cogburn and

LVN Christi Baker, among other care providers. 3

(3) Entity Defendants: Mitchell County, Texas Tech

University, Mitchell County Hospital District, TDCJ, and Texas.

The district court dismissed the lawsuit for failure to state a claim.

Plaintiff appeals.

II. Standard of Review

We review a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss de novo.

Haase v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 748 F.3d 624, 630 (5th Cir. 2014). At

this early stage, a complaint survives a motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim when it contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

_____________________

suggestions. Security was advised to let medical know if the offenders

condition worsens or changes in any way.

(Capitalization removed.)

3

The remaining Care-Providing Defendants include Christine M Heady, RN,

Olivia Herrera, RN; Jennifer A. Aguilar, LVN; Susan Boedeker, LVN; Brad R. Baker,

MD; and Chad R. Morris.

4

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III. Discussion

A. Eighth Amendment Claim

Plaintiff asserts an Eighth Amendment claim against all Defendants.

The Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S.

Const. amend. VIII. To state an Eighth Amendment violation, Plaintiff

must plausibly allege (1) a sufficiently serious deprivation of rights (2) carried

out with “deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted).

Defendants assert that qualified immunity shields them from liability.

However, Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity if the alleged

actions violated a right that was “clearly established” at the time of the

violation. Baker v. Coburn, 68 F.4th 240, 245 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Saucier

v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200–01 (2001)).

We conclude that Plaintiff plausibly states a violation of clearly

established Eighth Amendment law against Executive Director of TDCJ

Bryan Collier, Warden Jodi Hefner, RN Beverly Cogburn, and LVN Christi

Baker. Plaintiff’s claims against the remaining Defendants fail.

1. Supervisory Defendants

Plaintiff alleges that Collier and Hefner violated the Eighth

Amendment by failing to maintain humane conditions. “[T]he Constitution

does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit inhumane

ones.” Ball v. LeBlanc, 792 F.3d 584, 592 (5th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation

marks omitted) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832). Prison officials “must

ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical

care, and must take reasonable measure to ensure the safety of the inmates.”

Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 332 (5th Cir. 2004).

The first element of an Eighth Amendment claim—requiring a

sufficiently grave deprivation—is satisfied. “It is well-established in our

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circuit that the Eighth Amendment guarantees inmates a right to be free from

exposure to extremely dangerous temperatures without adequate remedial

measures.” Yates v. Collier, 868 F.3d 354, 360 (5th Cir. 2017) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted); see Gates, 376 F.3d at 339–40

(affirming injunction directing prison to provide fans, ice water, and daily

showers when the heat index is 90 degrees or above); Smith v. Sullivan, 553

F.2d 373, 381 (5th Cir. 1977) (“If the proof shows the occurrence of extremes

of temperature that are likely to be injurious to inmates’ health[,] relief

should be granted . . . .”).

The second element is also satisfied—Defendants disregarded a

known substantial risk of serious harm “by failing to take reasonable

measures to abate it.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847. We can infer that Defendants

knew of the risk, given its open and obvious nature—the brutality of the

Texas heat is well known, and Defendants would have been reminded of it

every time they stepped outside. See Hinojosa v. Livingston, 807 F.3d 657, 667

(5th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he open and obvious nature of the dangerously hot

conditions would also support an inference of deliberate indifference.”).

Although the open and obvious nature of the extreme heat is enough

to infer knowledge, this case presents more. There have been as many as 271

heat deaths in Texas prisons between 2001 and 2019. Supervisor Defendants

are also likely aware of the many lawsuits regarding the extreme heat in Texas

prisons. See Yates, 868 F.3d at 360 (“TDCJ officials are, or have been,

defendants in numerous other cases alleging Eighth Amendment violations

based on excessive heat in prison.”); Webb v. Livingston, 618 F. App’x 201,

204 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (considering case involving the “heat-

related deaths of five prisoners who died while housed in facilities operated

by [TDCJ]”); Valigura v. Mendoza, 265 F. App’x 232, 233–34 (5th Cir.

2008) (per curiam) (deciding appeal involving prisoner who alleged that

“temperatures in the bunk area reached into the nineties and hundreds due

to poor ventilation”). Indeed, Collier and another TDCJ official testified in

previous litigation that summer temperatures in prisons are so high that

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inmates are at serious risk of harm unless adequate measures are taken.

Order at 76–77, Tiede v. Collier, No. 1:23-CV-1004 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 26,

2025), ECF No. 202. Despite this knowledge, Collier and Hefner did not

implement remedial measures for the heat. The second element is thus

satisfied at this stage.

We note that the district court dismissed this claim by pointing to

TDCJ policy to provide fans, ice water, and daily showers. See Enhanced

Heat Protocols, TDCJ, https://www.tdcj.texas.gov/offender_

info/enhanced_heat_protocols.html [https://perma.cc/64F5-5QS7]. But

the mere presence of remedial measures is not a sufficient defense—remedial

measures must adequately ensure prisoners do not experience excessive heat

in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Yates, 868 F.3d at 360; Blackmon

v. Garza, 484 F. App’x 866, 871 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (holding that

despite remedial efforts by prison officials, inmates were still denied access

to adequate cooling measures). Regardless, neither the district court nor

Defendants indicate when TDCJ adopted the policy. If the policy did not

exist in August 2020, the policy is irrelevant to Coones’s case. The district

court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim at this stage, without further discovery,

was premature.

Further, Collier and Hefner are not entitled to qualified immunity.

We have repeatedly recognized that supervisory defendants’ failure to

provide adequate measures to remediate the Texas heat violates the Eighth

Amendment. E.g., Yates, 868 F.3d at 361. What’s more, in later stages of

litigation, “we have consistently found evidence sufficient in these cases to

support an Eighth Amendment violation, even when certain mitigating

measures were available.” Id. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s

dismissal of the Eighth Amendment claim against Collier and Hefner.

2. Care-Providing Defendants

Plaintiff next alleges that Care-Providing Defendants violated

Coones’s Eighth Amendment rights. “A prison official violates the Eighth

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Amendment when he shows deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious

medical needs, which equates to the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of

pain.’” Carlucci v. Chapa, 884 F.3d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Gregg

v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). “A serious medical need is one for

which treatment has been recommended or for which the need is so apparent

that even laymen would recognize that care is required.” Gobert v. Caldwell,

463 F.3d 339, 345 n.12 (5th Cir. 2006). “To prevail on a claim for deliberate

indifference, the plaintiff must show that a federal actor denied him

treatment, ignored his complaints, knowingly treated him incorrectly, or

otherwise evidenced a wanton disregard for his serious medical needs.”

Carlucci, 884 F.3d at 538.

We conclude that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Cogburn and

Baker committed a clearly established Eighth Amendment violation.

However, Plaintiff has not stated a plausible claim as to the remaining Care-

Providing Defendants.

a. Beverly Cogburn

Plaintiff alleges that Cogburn was aware of the hot conditions and that

Coones did not have air conditioning. She also knew that Coones was not

sweating, he was taking 98 breaths per minute, and his pulse was 103—all of

which are signs of severe dehydration. Cogburn allowed Coones to rest on a

gurney, although we do not know how long he was allowed to rest. Cogburn

then called security to escort him back to his overheated cell despite

Coones’s obvious need (at least based on the facts alleged in the complaint at

this stage) for medical care. 4 Coones died less than three days later.

At this early stage of litigation, these facts state a plausible Eighth

Amendment claim. Plaintiff plausibly alleges that Cogburn was aware of the

_____________________

4

At this stage, based on the facts in the pleadings of how Cogburn acted, it is

arguable that her forcing him out despite his deep need to remain was much more than

negligent and knowingly and wantonly placed his life at risk.

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excessive risks to Coones’s health and safety—Cogburn knew about

Coones’s medical conditions that made him more susceptible to the heat,

that Colorado City was experiencing a hot summer, and that Coones was

exhibiting classic signs of significant dehydration from exposure to excessive

heat. Cf. Huffman v. Linthicum, 265 F. App’x 162, 163 (5th Cir. 2008) (per

curiam) (plaintiff alleging failure to treat tooth pain with dentures pleaded an

Eighth Amendment violation). As Plaintiff alleges, a nurse would know those

symptoms were signs of severe dehydration (especially when coupled with

Coones’s repeated complaints about the heat). These allegations give rise to

the inference that Cogburn subjectively knew that Coones faced a significant

risk of harm. See Ford v. Anderson County, 102 F.4th 292, 308 (5th Cir. 2024)

(per curiam) (explaining that basic knowledge of inmate’s condition gives

rise to such an inference).

Despite awareness of the excessive risk, Cogburn disregarded that risk

by failing to provide medical treatment other than allowing Coones to

temporarily rest on a gurney for some period of time. Although Coones was

scared to return to his cell and asked Cogburn to allow him further respite

from the heat or other remedial measures, Cogburn called a guard to take him

back to his cell. By denying him sufficient treatment despite repeated

complaints, Cogburn evidenced a wanton disregard for his needs, and thus,

at this point, Plaintiff established a plausible Eighth Amendment violation.

Several cases require our conclusion. In Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459

(5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam), the plaintiff had a heart condition, was

experiencing severe chest pain, and did not have his prescribed medication.

Id. at 463. The defendant told him to go to the pharmacy. Id. at 463. The

pharmacy was closed, so the defendant sent the plaintiff back to his cell

without providing any treatment. Id. at 463–64. We concluded that the

plaintiff stated a clearly established Eighth Amendment claim. Id. at 463–65.

Here, Cogburn sent Coones back to his cell with essentially no treatment,

despite Plaintiff’s plausible allegations that Cogburn knew the dire

consequences that could—and did—result from her inaction.

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In Austin v. Johnson, 328 F.3d 204 (5th Cir. 2003), we concluded that

a defendant’s two-hour delay in calling an ambulance after the plaintiff

became unconscious rose to the level of deliberate indifference. Id. at 210.

Because of “the serious medical consequences of dehydration, a reasonable

person would not have waited nearly two hours to call an ambulance.” Id.

We reached this conclusion even though defendants allowed the plaintiff to

cool off inside and provided first aid. Id. at 206. Similarly, Cogburn cannot

avoid liability because she allowed Coones to rest for some unspecified period

of time. See Ford, 102 F.4th at 308 n.7 (“Responding to a serious medical

issue with such a cursory level of care may still constitute deliberate

indifference.”); Lawson v. Dall. Cnty., 286 F.3d 257, 263 (5th Cir. 2002)

(providing minimal treatment did not preclude an deliberate indifference

claim); Stewart v. Murphy, 174 F.3d 530, 533 (5th Cir. 1999) (inadequate

medical care may rise to the level of deliberate indifference); Ledesma v.

Swartz, No. 97-10799, 134 F.3d 369, 1997 WL 811746, at *1 (5th Cir. Dec. 16,

1997) (per curiam) (unpublished) (treating broken jaw with only over-the-

counter pain medication and liquid diet could constitute deliberate

indifference); see also Mandel v. Doe, 888 F.2d 783, 789 (11th Cir. 1989)

(“When the need for treatment is obvious, medical care which is so cursory

as to amount to no treatment at all may amount to deliberate indifference.”).

Additionally, Cogburn sent Coones back to his cell, despite knowing that

Coones would experience extreme temperatures in his cell; this would be

akin to telling the Austin plaintiff suffering from heat stroke to go back outside

to continue experiencing the heat. In sum, based on our caselaw, Plaintiff

plausibly states an Eighth Amendment claim against Cogburn at this stage of

litigation.

Further, these cases described above demonstrate that Cogburn is not

entitled to qualified immunity at this early stage of the litigation. “Since

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976), state officers have been on notice

that deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs violates the

Eighth Amendment.” Austin, 328 F.3d at 210. Cogburn’s decision to send

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Coones back to his overheated cell while she knew he was experiencing

symptoms of dehydration and potential heat exhaustion was a violation of

clearly established law. Accordingly, Cogburn is not entitled to qualified

immunity.

b. Christi Baker

The allegations against Baker are quite shocking. Plaintiff alleges that

the day before Coones was found dead, Baker saw Coones rolling around on

the ground naked, unable to talk, and surrounded by four untouched trays of

food. Instead of providing medical treatment, Baker merely encouraged

Coones to get on with his day.

Based on the complaint, Baker plausibly knew of the risk—she knew

that the prison was experiencing a hot summer in a state known for annual

heat-related illnesses and deaths and that Coones was in medical distress at

the time of her visit. Based on the allegations, even a layperson would have

identified the danger Coones was in and recognized that Coones needed

immediate medical attention. See Gobert, 463 F.3d at 345 n.12 (explaining

that serious medical needs include those “for which the need is so apparent

that even laymen would recognize that care is required”). However, Baker

disregarded that risk and provided no treatment, and Coones died within a

day. Plaintiff thus states a plausible claim against Baker.

The above-discussed cases illuminate that Baker is not entitled to

qualified immunity. Just like in Easter, Plaintiff plausibly alleges that Baker

knew of the inmate’s medical conditions and the severity of the inmate’s

symptoms yet refused to provide treatment. See 467 F.3d at 463. Further, in

Austin, the defendants at least provided first aid and eventually called an

ambulance. 328 F.3d at 206. Here, Baker did nothing—she did not call an

ambulance or provide any medical care, and it is reasonable to infer that she

never followed up on Coones. Baker could also tell that Coones had been

suffering a long time, given that there were four untouched trays of food

surrounding him. This also suggests that Coones’s heat-related illness was

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more dire than the plaintiff’s in Austin. See 328 F.3d at 206 (noting that

plaintiff drank two cups of Gatorade at lunch and ate part of his meal and

collapsed shortly afterward).

Based on these cases, Baker is not entitled to qualified immunity at

this stage because her alleged violation of the Eighth Amendment is contrary

to clearly established law.

c. Remaining Care-Providing Defendants

Plaintiff alleges that Coones informed the remaining Care-Providing

Defendants that he was suffering from extreme heat, that Coones sought

medical care from these Defendants, but that these Defendants sent Coones

back to his cell. 5

As the district court held, these accusations are conclusory and

collective, and do not plausibly state an Eighth Amendment claim. Plaintiff

does not allege facts regarding any specific interaction between Coones and

the remaining Care-Providing Defendants or whether they provided medical

attention. We therefore affirm as to the remaining Care-Providing

Defendants.

_____________________

5

The entirety of the factual allegations are as follows:

Christine M. Heady RN, Jennifer A. Aguilar L.V.N., Olivia

Herrera, R.N., Susan Boedeker L.V.N., Brad R. Baker M.D., and Chad R.

Morris all were aware of the extreme heat conditions at Wallace and that

Jace Coones was suffering from the heat as he had informed them and he

had presented several times complaining of the heat and showing symptom

of overheating to point of being dangerous to his life. Jace sought medical

care from each of these individual doctors and nurses, presented

increasingly worse and more worrying symptoms of the heat-induced

medical problems that ultimately resulted in his death, but was

consistently sent back into a cell that these Defendants knew was

overheated. The specific interactions between Jace and these Defendants

are unknowable at this time due to Jace’s death and Hefner’s refusal to

provide Jace’s medical records.

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3. Entity Defendants

We also affirm dismissal of the Eighth Amendment claim against the

Entity Defendants.

As to Mitchell County Hospital District, Plaintiff fails to allege any

facts that could support a claim against the Hospital. 6

As to Texas and Texas Tech, the district court correctly concluded

that these entities are not “persons” under § 1983, see Stotter v. Univ. of Tex.

at S.A., 508 F.3d 812, 821 (5th Cir. 2007), and Plaintiff fails to refute the

district court’s analysis on appeal, see Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224–25

(5th Cir. 1993) (an appellant “abandon[s] [her] arguments by failing to argue

them in the body of [her] brief.”).

Finally, as to Mitchell County, Plaintiff failed to plead factual

allegations against the County, and Plaintiff does not explain why the district

court’s decision is erroneous with respect to the County. See id.

We thus affirm as to Entity Defendants.

B. ADA Claims

Plaintiff alleges that Coones’s asthma and allergies made him

particularly susceptible to the extreme heat, and that Entity Defendants

failed to accommodate those disabilities. Under the ADA, “no qualified

individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded

from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or

activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such

entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Plaintiff states a failure-to-accommodate claim

if she alleges (1) Coones is a qualified individual with a disability, (2) the

_____________________

6

The only facts Plaintiff alleges are that “the nurses work by a contract between

TDCJ, Mitchell County Hospital District, and Texas Tech University,” and that Coones

visited Mitchell County Hospital on August 13, 2020. Plaintiff does not appear to allege

that anything went wrong during his hospital visit.

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covered entity knew about the disability and its consequential limitations, and

(3) the entity failed to make reasonable accommodations. See Neely v. PSEG

Tex., Ltd. P’ship, 735 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 2013); Ball, 792 F.3d at 596 n.9.

We affirm the district court’s dismissal of the ADA claim based on

the second element. Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that the entities

“underst[ood] the limitations [Coones] experienced as a result of his

disability.” Valentine v. Collier, 993 F.3d 270, 290 (5th Cir. 2021). Plaintiff

has the burden of identifying “the disability, the limitation, and to request an

accommodation in direct and specific terms.” Id. (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). Although Coones complained of the heat, Coones did

not connect his complaints to his disabilities or to Entity Defendants.

Accordingly, we must affirm.

C. Medical Malpractice Claim

Finally, Plaintiff asserts a state law medical malpractice claim against

the individual Care-Providing Defendants. However, under the Texas Tort

Claims Act, “only a governmental unit can be sued for a governmental

employee’s work-related tortious conduct.” Garza v. Harrison, 574 S.W.3d

389, 393–94 (Tex. 2019). Because the Care-Providing Defendants are sued

here as government employees acting in their official capacities, the district

court properly dismissed them. See DeHorney v. Talley, 630 S.W.3d 297, 302

(Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no pet.). Therefore, we affirm the district court’s

dismissal of the medical malpractice claim as to Care-Providing Defendants.

Plaintiff also asserts that Entity Defendants are also liable, but she

does not address the basis of the district court’s dismissal of Entity

Defendants.

Regarding Texas and Texas Tech, the district court concluded they

were entitled to sovereign immunity. “Absent waiver, neither a state nor

agencies acting under its control are subject to suit in federal court.”

Sherwinski v. Peterson, 98 F.3d 849, 851 (5th Cir. 1996). The Texas Tort

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Claims Act waives sovereign immunity in state court, but not federal court.

Id. at 852.

The district court then dismissed the claim against Mitchell County

Hospital District because hospital districts are “governmental unit[s]

immune from suit under the TTCA,” and Plaintiff failed to plead waiver.

Aguocha-Ohakweh v. Harris Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 731 F. App’x 312, 316 (5th Cir.

2018) (per curiam) (citing Martinez v. Val Verde Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 140

S.W.3d 370, 371 (Tex. 2004)).

And finally, the district court dismissed the claim against Mitchell

County because Plaintiff failed to allege any facts indicating a valid waiver of

governmental immunity.

Plaintiff fails to identify any error in the district court’s dismissal of

Entity Defendants, and we cannot find one. We thus affirm dismissal of the

medical malpractice claim.

IV. Conclusion

We REVERSE and REMAND as to the Eighth Amendment claim

against Collier, Hefner, Cogburn, and Baker; with respect to all other claims,

we AFFIRM.

15