Mohamad v. Lawgical Insight

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

ORLANDO DIVISION

ANSARI MOHAMAD,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 6:24-cv-2354-JSS-LHP

CENTRAL FLORIDA TAX AND

ACCOUNTING, INC., ANEES

AHMAD TANOLI, LAWGICAL

INSIGHT, LLC, ANDREW BAUTA,

MICHAEL RUSSO,

ROTTENSTREICH FARLEY

BRONSTEIN FISHER POTTER

HODAS LLP, MELIZA MILLER,

RICHARD I. SEGAL, GRANT

HEMMINGWAY, and SIGMA TAX

PRO LLC,

Defendants.

___________________________________/

ORDER

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201, Defendants Rottenstreich Farley

Bronstein Fisher Potter Hodas LLP, Meliza Miller, and Richard I. Segal (the Lawyer

Defendants) move the court to take judicial notice of eight legal filings related to a

state court action. (Dkt. 83; see Dkts. 83-1 to 83-8.) Similarly, Defendants Sigma Tax

Pro LLC and Grant Hemmingway (the Sigma Defendants) move the court to take

judicial notice of three filings in that action. (Dkt. 85; see Dkt. 85-1.) Plaintiff, Ansari

Mohamad, opposes the motions for judicial notice. (Dkts. 86, 88.) Upon

consideration, for the reasons outlined below, the court grants the motions and takes

judicial notice of the state court filings.

BACKGROUND1

In the state court action, Defendant Central Florida Tax and Accounting, Inc.

(CFTAS) has sued non-party Akbar A. Ali, who does business as A.A. Ali C.P.A., for

the breach of a non-competition agreement. (Dkt. 22 ¶¶ 1, 4–6.) Defendant Anees

Ahmad Tanoli is “a licensed C.P.A. doing business as CFTAS.” (Id. ¶ 63.) The

Lawyer Defendants represent CFTAS in the state court action. (Id. ¶¶ 59–61.) The

Sigma Defendants provided electronic tax preparation services to Ali. (Id. ¶¶ 64–65,

118.) Defendant Lawgical Insight, LLC is an electronic discovery company that has

acted as a forensic examiner in the state court action pursuant to an Agreed Order

Regarding Forensic Examination. (See id. ¶¶ 7–11, 31, 36, 56.) Defendants Michael

Russo and Andrew Bauta are officers for Lawgical. (Id. ¶¶ 57–58.) Plaintiff is one of

Ali’s former clients and is not a party to the state court action. (Id. ¶¶ 25, 55.) He sues

on behalf of himself and a putative class derived from Ali’s current and former clients.

(Id. ¶ 1.)

Through eight counts, Plaintiff asserts violations of four statutes (the Electronic

Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–23; Stored

Communications Act (SCA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–13; Florida Security of

1 As this case is at the pleading stage, the court accepts as true the well-pleaded factual allegations in

the operative amended complaint (Dkt. 22). See Fisher v. PNC Bank, N.A., 2 F.4th 1352, 1354 (11th

Cir. 2021) (“Because this case has not advanced beyond the pleading stage, [the court] accept[s] the

factual allegations in [the] complaint as true and construe[s] them in the light most favorable to [the

plaintiff].”).

Communications Act (FSCA), Fla. Stat. §§ 934.01–.50; and the Florida Deceptive and

Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA), §§ 501.201–.213), alleges a privacy tort

(intrusion upon seclusion) and violations of privacy rights under the Florida

Constitution, and seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. (Dkt. 22 ¶¶ 78–174.) Plaintiff

generally complains that the state court lacked the authority to order the disclosure

and use of electronic communications containing his confidential tax return

information. (Id. ¶ 23.) According to Plaintiff, Defendants have violated his privacy

rights by disclosing and using his information without his consent for their own

financial benefit in connection with the state court action. (Id. ¶¶ 1–3, 23–29, 36.)

In motions to dismiss, the Lawyer and Sigma Defendants contend that their

good faith reliance on orders in the state court action defeats their liability in this case.

(Dkt. 26 at 6–8; Dkt. 85 at 15–16.) They request judicial notice of filings in the action

to support their positions. (Dkts 83, 85.) The Lawyer Defendants seek judicial notice

of the Agreed Order, as well as two earlier orders on motions to compel by CFTAS,

an order granting CFTAS’s amended motion to compel compliance with the Agreed

Order, Ali’s petition for writ of certiorari in the action and his motion to stay the order

granting the amended motion, an order staying the action pending resolution of the

petition, and a state appellate order dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

(Dkts. 83-1 to 83-8.) The Sigma Defendants move for judicial notice of a subpoena

duces tecum that CFTAS issued to Sigma, a notice by CFTAS of its deposition of

Sigma, and an affidavit showing that the subpoena was served on Sigma. (Dkt. 85-1.)

APPLICABLE STANDARDS

Federal Rule of Evidence 201 authorizes a court to take judicial notice of

adjudicative “fact[s] that [are] not subject to reasonable dispute because [they] . . . can

be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably

be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). The “taking of judicial notice . . . is, as a

matter of evidence law, a highly limited process” because it “bypasses the

safeguards . . . involved with the usual process of proving facts by competent

evidence.” Shahar v. Bowers, 120 F.3d 211, 214 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc). However,

in general, “courts may take judicial notice of public records, such as a pleading filed

in another court, because such documents are ‘capable of accurate and ready

determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.’”

Navarro v. City of Riviera Beach, 192 F. Supp. 3d 1353, 1364 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (quoting

Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1278 (11th Cir. 1999)); accord United States

ex rel. Osheroff v. Humana, Inc., 776 F.3d 805, 811 n.4 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Courts may

take judicial notice of publicly filed documents, such as those in state court litigation,

at the [pleading] stage.”). “[A] court may take [judicial] notice of another court’s

order . . . for the limited purpose of recognizing the judicial act that the order

represents or the subject matter of the litigation.” United States v. Jones, 29 F.3d 1549,

1553 (11th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff maintains that the court should not judicially notice the requested state

court filings for three main reasons. (See Dkt. 86 at 5–8; Dkt. 88 at 16.) First, Plaintiff

argues, the filings “are irrelevant to resolving the core issues” of Plaintiff’s claims and

“were entered . . . without notice and due process to Plaintiff.” (Dkt. 86 at 5–6; accord

Dkt. 88 at 16.) Second, according to Plaintiff, the motions for judicial notice represent

a “selective[] present[ation]” of the state court pleadings that “fails to provide the

[c]ourt with sufficient context” to take judicial notice. (Dkt. 86 at 7.) Third, Plaintiff

claims that the pendency of the state court action means that information is still

“subject to change” and thus still “subject to reasonable dispute.” (Id. at 7–8.) These

arguments are not well-developed with supporting explanations and applications of

law to fact. (See id. at 5–8; Dkt. 88 at 16.) See Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs.,

Inc., 572 F.3d 1271, 1283 (11th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a party waives its arguments

when it fails to develop them). In any event, the court disagrees with them.

The filings are relevant to resolving Plaintiff’s claims because they pertain to

Defendants’ good faith reliance defense and related defenses, such as a litigation

privilege. (See, e.g., Dkt. 85 at 15–17.) See Tapley v. Collins, 211 F.3d 1210, 1213 & n.7

(11th Cir. 2000) (explaining that the ECPA “explicitly provides a complete defense to

any civil or criminal action brought under the statute where the defendant relied in

good faith upon” a court order); see also Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250,

1274 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Florida’s litigation privilege affords absolute immunity for acts

occurring during the course of judicial proceedings.”). The court does not address the

merits of these defenses in this order but takes judicial notice so that it can more fully

consider the defenses as presented in motions pending in this case. The court will

consider Plaintiff's assertion that he lacked notice of the state court action when it

resolves the motions. Further, if Plaintiff wishes to avoid a selective presentation of

the state court action, he may move for judicial notice of the filings he deems necessary

to provide context—particularly if developments in the action arguably change the

facts, as he posits. That said, the court judicially notices the filings for the acts they

represented when taken. See Jones, 29 F.3d at 1553. Because the state court filings

“can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot

reasonably be questioned,” the court judicially notices them. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2);

see Osheroff, 776 F.3d at 811 n.4; Navarro, 192 F. Supp. 3d at 1364.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly:

1. The Lawyer and Sigma Defendants’ motions for judicial notice (Dkts. 83, 85)

are GRANTED.

2. The court takes judicial notice of the state court filings, (see Dkts. 83-1 to 83-8,

85-1), and will consider the filings when it decides motions pending in this case.

ORDERED in Orlando, Florida, on July 24, 2025.

: he to

JULIE S. SNEED —_

Copies furnished to: UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Counsel of Record

Unrepresented Parties

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