Smith v. Monroe County Correctional Facility

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JUSTYN SMITH,

Plaintiff CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-CV-01012

v. (MEHALCHICK, J.)

MONROE COUNTY CORRECTIONAL

FACILITY, et al.,

Defendants.

JUSTYN SMITH,

Plaintiff CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-CV-1347

v. (MEHALCHICK, J.)

MONROE COUNTY CORRECTIONAL

FACILITY,

Defendant

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Justyn Smith has filed two pro se complaints alleging that the Monroe County

Correctional Facility (“MCCF”) is restricting his religious practice by denying him access to

kosher meals. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a), the

Court will permit Smith to proceed on several claims in a consolidated complaint in cause

number 3:25-CV-01012, and close the case captioned 3:25-CV-01347.

I. BACKGROUND

Collectively, the complaints allege as follows: Smith is a practicing Orthodox Jew

incarcerated at the MCCF. “In the past,” the MCCF served Smith a kosher diet after he met

with a rabbi and “pass[ed] a test.” However, beginning in September 2024, he was served an

“alternate diet tray that does not follow kosher laws.” He has repeatedly requested a kosher

diet or a common fare1 diet but has been denied by Warden Phil Delberto and other staff.

Staff responding to Smith’s grievances indicated that “[w]e do not offer a kosher tray at this

facility” and “[t]he alternative meal is the only other option.”

In his earlier-filed complaint in cause number 3:25-CV-01012, Smith names three

defendants: Monroe County, the MCCF, and Delberto, and seeks monetary, declaratory, and

injunctive relief. In his later-filed complaint in caused number 3:25-cv-01347, he names only

the MCCF.

II. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A SCREENING

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is obligated, prior to service of process, to screen

a civil complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or

employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a); James v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 230 Fed.

App’x 195, 197 (3d Cir. 2007). The Court must dismiss the complaint if it fails to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1); Mitchell v. Dodrill, 696 F. Supp. 2d

454, 471 (M.D. Pa. 2010). The Court has a similar obligation with respect to actions brought

in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In performing this mandatory screening function,

a district court applies the same standard applied to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Mitchell, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 471; Banks v. Cty. of

Allegheny, 568 F. Supp. 2d 579, 588 (W.D. Pa. 2008).

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to move

to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

1 The term “common fare” generally refers to a diet that meets the requirements of

several different faiths. See Contant v. Lowe, 450 F. App’x 187, 189 n.3 (3d Cir. 2011); Jupiter

v. Johnson, No. 3:10-CV-01968, 2011 WL 4527803, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 2011).

12(b)(6). To assess the sufficiency of a complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must first

take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim, then identify mere conclusions

which are not entitled to the assumption of truth, and finally determine whether the

complaint’s factual allegations, taken as true, could plausibly satisfy the elements of the legal

claim. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011). In deciding a Rule

12(b)(6) motion, the court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the amended

complaint, as well as “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters

of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S.

308, 322 (2007).

After recognizing the elements that make up the legal claim, a court should “begin by

identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the

assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The plaintiff must provide

some factual ground for relief, which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Thus, courts

“need not credit a complaint’s ‘bald assertions’ or ‘legal conclusions’ . . . .” Morse v. Lower

Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory

Securities Litigation, 114 F.3d 1410, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor need the court assume that a

plaintiff can prove facts that the plaintiff has not alleged. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v.

California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

A court must then determine whether the well-pleaded factual allegations give rise to

a plausible claim for relief. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged.” Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sheridan v. NGK Metals

Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010). The court must accept as true all allegations in

the amended complaint, and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be

construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien &

Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). This “presumption of truth attaches only to those

allegations for which there is sufficient factual matter to render them plausible on their face.”

Schuchardt v. President of the United States, 839 F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation

and citation omitted). The plausibility determination is context-specific and does not impose

a heightened pleading requirement. Schuchardt, 839 F.3d at 347.

With these standards in mind, a document filed pro se is “to be liberally construed.”

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded,”

must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and can

only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can

prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Haines v. Kerner,

404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972). Further, the Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is

vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative

amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State

Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).

III. DISCUSSION

A. FIRST AMENDMENT

Although Smith does not specify a legal theory of relief, he checked boxes on both

complaint forms indicating an intent to proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the vehicle by which

private citizens may seek redress for violations of federal constitutional rights committed by

state officials. To succeed on a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the

defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the

United States Constitution. Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995).

Smith’s allegations implicate his First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion.

“Inmates clearly retain protections afforded by the First Amendment . . . including its

directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.” O’Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S.

342, 348 (1987). The belief must be “sincerely held” and “religious in nature.”

Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 251 (3d Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). However, a regulation

limiting prisoners’ religious exercise is constitutional if the record shows that it is “reasonably

related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).

Smith’s complaints support a plausible inference that the denial of kosher meals

sufficiently burdens his religious practice as an Orthodox Jew to support a First Amendment

claim. See Norwood v. Strada, 249 F. App’x 269, 271-72 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[P]rison administrators

must provide an adequate diet without violating an inmate’s religious dietary restrictions in

order not to unconstitutionally burden free exercise rights.”). At the pleading stage, the

limited record does not indicate that this denial was reasonably related to a legitimate

penological interest. See, e.g., Wilson v. Wetzel, No. 3:12-CV-516, 2013 WL 4812497, at *8

(M.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 2013). Thus, Smith may proceed on First Amendment claims against

Warden Delberto, who allegedly denied Smith’s request, in his individual and official

capacity.

However, Smith’s First Amendment claim cannot proceed against Monroe County or

the MCCF. To state a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show a deprivation of a right by “a

person acting under color of state law.” Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002); see

42 U.S.C. § 1983. County jails, such as the MCCF, are not “persons” subject to suit under

Section 1983. See, e.g., Hayward v. Monroe Cnty. Corr. Facility, No. 3:18-CV-610, 2019 WL

407473, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2019).

As for the county, a municipality is not vicariously liable under Section 1983 for the

actions of its employees, but may be responsible when a municipal policy or custom itself

caused the violation in question. Stanley v. City of Pittsburgh, 467 F. App’x 132, 133 (3d Cir.

2012) (citing Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). Thus, to state a claim

against Monroe County, Smith would have to allege that the county itself was “the ‘moving

force’ behind the injury alleged” through a “direct causal link between the municipal action

and the deprivation of federal rights,” showing deliberate indifference to that deprivation. See

Stanley, 467 F. App’x at 133 (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404, 411

(1997)). Here, Smith has not alleged facts showing that the denial of a kosher diet was directly

caused by a county policy, as opposed to the discretionary decisions of the MCCF staff. Thus,

Smith’s First Amendment claim may proceed against Delberto only.

B. RLUIPA

Smith’s allegations also implicate the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized

Persons Act (“RLUIPA”).2 RLUIPA offers broader protection than the First Amendment.

See Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 361 (2015). The statute forbids the government from imposing

“a substantial burden” on a prisoner’s religious exercise unless the government “demonstrates

that imposition of the burden on that person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling

governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling

governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). A “government” is defined in RLUIPA as

“(i) a State, county, municipality, or other governmental entity created under the authority of

a State; (ii) any branch, department, agency, instrumentality, or official of an entity listed in

clause (i); and (iii) any other person acting under color of State law.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–

5(4)(a)(iii) (emphasis added). A substantial burden under RLUIPA exists where: (1) a follower

is forced to choose between following the precepts of his religion and forfeiting benefits

otherwise generally available to other inmates versus abandoning one of the precepts of his

religion to receive a benefit; or (2) the government puts substantial pressure on an adherent to

substantially modify his behavior to violate his beliefs. Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 280

(3d Cir. 2007). As with a First Amendment claim, the belief must be “sincerely held” and

religious in nature. Holt, 574 U.S. at 360-61.

Based on the allegations described above, Smith states RLUIPA claims against

Delberto (an official acting under color of state law), and the MCCF (a county “branch,

2 See Heleva v. Kramer, 214 F. App’x 244, 247 n.2 (3d Cir. 2007) (indicating that where

a plaintiff was permitted to proceed on a First Amendment claim, “the District Court should

evaluate it under RLUIPA as well”).

department, agency, [or] instrumentality”). Further, allegations that the enforcement of

county jail policies imposed a substantial burden on a plaintiff’s religious practice have been

found sufficient to sustain RLUIPA claims against the county itself. See, e.g., Pratt v. Ott, No.

1:20-CV-171, 2021 WL 1212587 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2021) (permitting RLUIPA claim

against Lebanon County based on the hairstyle policy at the Lebanon County Correctional

Facility); McGill v. Clements, No. 3:19-CV-01712, 2021 WL 232599, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 22,

2021) (same). Thus, Smith has plausibly asserted RLUIPA claims against all three

defendants.3

IV. CONCLUSION

Where multiple cases involve common questions of law or fact, the Court may

consolidate the cases or issue other just orders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 42(a); see also Fabics v. City of New Brunswick, 629 F. App’x 196, 198-99 (3d Cir. 2015)

(a duplicative complaint can be dismissed if non-futile claims can be raised in a surviving

complaint). Accordingly, the Court will (1) direct that the complaints in these two cases be

consolidated into a single complaint in cause number 3:25-CV-01012; (2) permit Smith to

proceed on First Amendment claims against Delberto and RLUIPA claims against all three

defendants in that action; and (3) close the case captioned 3:25-CV-01347. Appropriate orders

will issue in both cases.

3 The Court acknowledges likely redundancy among the claims against Delberto (in

his official capacity), the MCCF, and the County. Given the apparent ambiguity as to which

defendant(s) are responsible for the kosher meal policy, and that the damages available may

vary based on the named defendants, see McGill, 2021 WL 232599, at *3 n.2, no defendants

are dismissed on that basis at this stage.

Dated: July 24, 2025 s/ Karoline Mehalchick

KAROLINE MEHALCHICK

United States District Judge