The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
OCALA DIVISION
HUNTER DWAIN DILLON,
Plaintiff, Case No.: 5:25-cv-00195-MMH-PRL
v.
PHOENIX HOUSE CITRA, FLORIDA,
Defendant,
___________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION1
Plaintiff Hunter Dwain Dillon, who is proceeding pro se, filed this action against
Phoenix House Citra, Florida, a rehabilitation facility, purporting to allege a claim for racial
discrimination pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. Plaintiff has moved to proceed in forma pauperis.
(Doc. 6). Noting various issues and deficiencies, the Court previously afforded Plaintiff an
opportunity to amend his complaint. (Doc. 7). Plaintiff, however, has not done so and his
deadline has passed. Accordingly, I submit that Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma
pauperis should be denied and his amended complaint should be dismissed.
I. Legal Standards
An individual may be allowed to proceed in forma pauperis if he declares in an
affidavit that he is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).
However, before a plaintiff is permitted to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court is obligated
1 Within 14 days after being served with a copy of the recommended disposition, a party may file
written objections to the Report and Recommendation’s factual findings and legal conclusions. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). A party’s failure to file
written objections waives that party’s right to challenge on appeal any unobjected-to factual finding
or legal conclusion the district judge adopts from the Report and Recommendation. See 11th Cir. R.
3-1.
to review the complaint to determine whether it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted[,] or ... seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief. Id. § 1915(e)(2). If the complaint is deficient, the Court is required
to dismiss the suit sua sponte. Id.
II. Amended Complaint (Doc. 5)
Plaintiff’s amended complaint is filed on a Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint Form.
(Doc. 5). Plaintiff alleges that he was “sentenced” to the rehabilitation program at the Phoenix
House by the State, but that he is “unsure if this facility is owned privately or by the State.”
(Doc. 5 at 4). He states that his claims arose while he was confined at the court-ordered
rehabilitation program. According to Plaintiff:
I feel as though I was racially discriminated against by a black employee named Ms.
Perry who works here at the rehab program I am at on multiple occasions. I have had
her say “make him do that” to other people who were doing something so that I would
have to do it. On one occasion a black person was washing dishes and she said “make
him do that” to him in a racist tone of voice and then I had to do it instead of sanitizing
them and putting them away like I was doing. The way she would say “make him do
that” and her tone of voice made me feel discriminated against and not like she just
wanted me to do something else. On another occasion I had just brought a trashcart
back from the dumpster and a black person had their hand on the next cart to take it
and she said “help him do that” to me and then I believe she said “make him do that”
and I fully remember having to take it to the dumpster by myself.
(Doc. 5 at 5).
Plaintiff alleges that as a result he has short term pain and suffering and feels degraded.
He notes that he “appear[s] to just not care about this anymore as much as I did but it may
cause me to feel degraded in the future and do not feel as though I will feel this way if I receive
a settlement from this.” Plaintiff seeks $5,000,000.00 in damages.
III. Discussion
Subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold issue in any case pending in a United States
district court. Indeed, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, which are “‘empowered
to hear only those cases within the judicial power of the United States as defined by Article
III of the Constitution,’ and which have been entrusted to them by a jurisdictional grant
authorized by Congress.” Univ. of So. Ala. v. American Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 409 (11th
Cir.1999) (quoting Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir.1994)). “[O]nce a court
determines that there has been no [jurisdictional] grant that covers a particular case, the court's
sole remaining act is to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.” Morrison v. Allstate Indem.
Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir.2000). Federal jurisdiction is based on either diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction or federal question jurisdiction.
Here, Plaintiff purports to assert a §1983 claim for racial discrimination. As a general
matter, § 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for
vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994)
(citations omitted). To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the
defendant deprived him of a right secured under the Constitution or federal law; and (2) that
such a deprivation occurred under the color of state law. Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1295
(11th Cir. 2015). “In the absence of a federal constitutional deprivation or violation of a federal
right, a plaintiff cannot sustain a §1983 cause of action against a defendant.” Allen v. John,
Case No. 3:18-cv-1310-J-32JBT, 2019 WL 13440551, at *3 (M.D. Fla. July 15, 2019). Here,
Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege either prong.
First, Plaintiff alleges that he was “sentenced” to the rehabilitation program at the
Phoenix House by the State, but that he is “unsure if this facility is owned privately or by the
State.” A private citizen nevertheless “may be viewed as a state actor under § 1983 ‘in rare
circumstances.’ ” Brown v. Lewis, 361 F. App'x 51, 54 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Harvey v.
Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1130 (11th Cir. 1992)). The Eleventh Circuit uses three tests to
determine whether a private citizen acts under color of state law for § 1983 purposes:
(1) the public function test, which asks whether the private actors were performing
functions “traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state;” (2) the state
compulsion test, which applies to situations where the government coerced or
significantly encouraged the unconstitutional actions at issue; and (3) the nexus/joint
action test, which applies where the state and the private party were joint participants
in the common enterprise.
Id. (quoting Focus on the Family v. Pinellas Suncoast Transit Auth., 344 F.3d 1263, 1277 (11th
Cir. 2003)).
As noted above, the amended complaint provides very limited factual allegations
regarding Phoenix House and its relationship with any state entities, such as the Florida
Department of Corrections. Without more information, the Court cannot determine whether
the amended complaint plausibly alleges that Phoenix House is a state actor.
Likewise, while Plaintiff, generally alleges that he was the victim of racial
discrimination, he fails to identify any specific right (constitutional or otherwise) that was
infringed. To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to assert an equal protection violation, he has
failed to allege a plausible claim. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides: “No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. To state a claim, a plaintiff must “demonstrate that (1)
he is similarly situated to others who received more favorable treatment; and (2) the state
engaged in invidious discrimination against him based on race, religion, national origin, or
some other constitutionally protected basis.” Sweet v. Sec'y Dep't of Corr., 467 F.3d 1311, 1318-
19 (11th Cir. 2006).
Here, Plaintiff simply alleges that on two occasions Ms. Perry spoke to him in a “racist
tone” and made him complete a task that an unidentified black individual had already been
doing. These limited allegations fail to establish that Plaintiff was treated differently from
specific similarly situated individuals or that he was treated differently on account of
“anvidious discrimination.” Indeed, “[a] mere demonstration of inequality is not enough; the
Constitution does not require identical treatment.” /d. at 1319 (quoting McQueary v. Blodgett,
924 F.2d 829, 835 (9™ Cir. 1991)). Further undercutting Plaintiffs claim is his assertion that
while these actions made him “feel degraded,” he does not “care about this anymore as much
as I did but it may cause me to feel degraded in the future and do not feel as though I will feel
this way if I receive a settlement from this.”
For these reasons, Plaintiff has failed to allege a plausible claim for racial
discrimination pursuant to §1983. Plaintiff does not assert any other basis for this Court to
exercise federal question jurisdiction, nor does he allege any facts suggesting that diversity
jurisdiction is applicable. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc.
6) should be denied and his amended complaint (Doc. 5) should be dismissed.
DONE and ENTERED in Ocala, Florida on June 24, 2025.
Le
PHILIP R. LAMMENS
United States Magistrate Judge