Junttila v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 24-CV-81296-ELFENBEIN

JOHAN PETER JUNTTILA,

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF

SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

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ORDER ON UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR

ATTORNEY’S FEES UNDER THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff Johan Peter Juntilla’s Unopposed Motion

for Attorney’s Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act (the “Motion”). See ECF No. [26]. In

the Motion, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s position was not “substantially justified” and Plaintiff

is the “prevailing party.” Id. at 1-3. Plaintiff asks the Court to award $9,550 in attorney’s fees and

he notes Defendant does not object to the number of attorney hours, counsel’s hourly rate, or the

total amount of attorney’s fees requested. Id. at 1. For the reasons explained below, the Motion,

ECF No. [26], is GRANTED.

I. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Entitlement to Costs and Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act

Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, the Court may award “a judgment for costs” to “the

prevailing party in any civil action brought” against “any agency or any official of the United

States acting in his or her official capacity.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1). The Court may also

“award reasonable fees and expenses of attorneys, in addition to the costs which may be awarded

pursuant to subsection (a), to the prevailing party in any civil action brought” against “any agency

or any official of the United States acting in his or her official capacity.” See id. § 2412(b); Pub.

L. No. 96-481 §§ 201, 204, 94 Stat. 2321 (1980). In fact, the authorizing statue provides that “a

court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses, in

addition to any costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a), incurred by that party in any civil action

(other than cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of agency action,

brought . . . against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the

court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special

circumstances make an award unjust.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added).

To receive costs and fees, a party “shall, within thirty days of final judgment in the action,

submit to the court an application for fees and other expenses which shows that the party is a

prevailing party and is eligible to receive an award under this subsection, and the amount sought,

including an itemized statement from any attorney or expert witness representing or appearing in

behalf of the party stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses

were computed. The party shall also allege that the position of the United States was not

substantially justified.” See id. § 2412(d)(1)(B).

A party is “prevailing” in a Social Security appeal if he wins “a remand order pursuant to

sentence four of [42 U.S.C.] § 405(g).” See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 300 (1993). A party

is “eligible to receive an award,” if his “net worth” does “not exceed $2,000,000 at the time the

civil action was filed.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B). And the “‘position of the United States’

means, in addition to the position taken by the United States in the civil action, the action or failure

to act by the agency upon which the civil action is based.” See id. § 2412(d)(2)(D). “Whether or

not the position of the United States was substantially justified shall be determined on the basis of

the record (including the record with respect to the action or failure to act by the agency upon

which the civil action is based) which is made in the civil action for which fees and other expenses

are sought.” See id. § 2412(d)(1)(B).

The Supreme Court has held that Equal Access to Justice attorney’s fee awards are payable

not to the lawyer but “to the litigant,” which means that any such award is subject to “a federal

administrative offset if the litigant has outstanding federal debts.” See Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S.

586, 593, 596 (2010); Rodriguez, 2023 WL 3852275, at *4. The litigant may, however, assign his

“rights in the fees award to the attorney,” see Astrue, 560 U.S. at 597, as long as the assignment

either complies with the Anti-Assignment Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3727(b), see Rodriguez, 2023 WL

3852275, at *4, or the government has waived the Anti-Assignment Act’s requirements, see Arthur

Pew Const. Co. v. Lipscomb, 965 F.2d 1559, 1576 (11th Cir. 1992). If the litigant “does not owe

a debt to the government and assigns the right to receive the fees to the attorney,” the government

will pay the award to the attorney directly. See Astrue, 560 U.S. at 597 (quotation marks omitted).

B. Calculating Attorney’s Fee Awards Generally

To calculate attorney’s fee awards, courts generally use the “lodestar” method. See

Norman v. Hous. Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 1988); Inj.

Treatment Ctr., 2022 WL 17325834, at *2. “The most useful starting point for determining the

amount of a reasonable fee” using the lodestar method “is the number of hours reasonably

expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. This calculation provides an

objective basis on which to make an initial estimate of the value of a lawyer’s services.” See

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983); ACLU of Ga. v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 427 (11th

Cir. 1999) (noting that the lodestar is “properly calculated by multiplying the number of hours

reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate” (quoting Blum v. Stenson,

465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984))). “[T]here is a ‘strong presumption’ that the lodestar is the reasonable

sum the attorneys deserve.” See Bivins v. Wrap It Up, Inc., 548 F.3d 1348, 1350 (11th Cir. 2008)

(quoting Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565–66

(1986)).

“The first step in the computation of the lodestar is determining the reasonable hourly rate.”

Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 781 (11th Cir. 1994). “A reasonable hourly rate is the

prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of

reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation.” Id. (quoting Norman, 836 F.2d at

1299). “The general rule is that the relevant market for purposes of determining the reasonable

hourly rate for an attorney’s services is the place where the case is filed.” Barnes, 168 F.3d at 437.

“The party seeking attorney’s fees bears the burden of producing satisfactory evidence that the

requested rate is in line with prevailing market rates,” which requires “more than the affidavit of

the attorney performing the work.” Loranger, 10 F.3d at 781 (citation and quotation marks

omitted). Of course, the court “is itself an expert on the question and may consider its own

knowledge and experience concerning reasonable and proper fees and may form an independent

judgment either with or without the aid of witnesses as to value.”1 Id. (quotation marks omitted).

To aid in determining what reasonable hourly rate applies in each case, the Eleventh Circuit

has approved of courts considering “the twelve factors discussed in Johnson v. Georgia Highway

Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974).” Id. at 781 n.6; see also Norman, 836 F.2d

1 Indeed, where “there is a lack of documentation or testimonial support the court may make the award on

its own experience. Where documentation is inadequate, the district court is not relieved of its obligation

to award a reasonable fee, but the district court traditionally has had the power to make such an award

without the need of further pleadings or an evidentiary hearing. Likewise, no additional evidentiary hearing

or pleadings are required where fee counsel fails to provide evidence on some factor which it contends the

court ought to take into account. It is perfectly proper to award attorney’s fees based solely on affidavits in

the record.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303 (footnote and citations omitted).

at 1299. “The twelve factors are: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of

the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of

employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the

fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the

amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the

attorneys; (10) the ‘undesirability’ of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional

relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430 n.3.

“The next step in the computation of the lodestar is the ascertainment of reasonable hours.”

Norman, 836 F.2d at 1301. “Counsel for the prevailing party should make a good faith effort to

exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary, just as a

lawyer in private practice ethically is obligated to exclude such hours from his fee submission.”

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. “In other words, the Supreme Court requires fee applicants to exercise

‘billing judgment.’” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1301 (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437). “This must

necessarily mean that the hours excluded are those that would be unreasonable to bill to a client

and therefore to one’s adversary irrespective of the skill, reputation or experience of counsel. If it

were otherwise, an inexperienced or unskillful attorney would face a double penalty. First, his

hourly rate would be lowered and second, his time reduced.” Id. (emphasis and citation omitted).

The “district court is charged with deducting for redundant hours. Redundant hours

generally occur where more than one attorney represents a client. There is nothing inherently

unreasonable about a client having multiple attorneys, and they may all be compensated if they are

not unreasonably doing the same work and are being compensated for the distinct contribution of

each lawyer.” Id. at 1301–02. The “district court must deduct time spent on discrete and

unsuccessful claims.” Id. at 1302. “When a district court finds the number of hours claimed is

unreasonably high, the court has two choices: it may conduct an hour-by-hour analysis or it may

reduce the requested hours with an across-the-board cut.” Bivins, 548 F.3d at 1350; see also

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436–37 (“There is no precise rule or formula for making these determinations.

The district court may attempt to identify specific hours that should be eliminated, or it may simply

reduce the award to account for the limited success.”).

As noted above, the “product” of the reasonable hourly rate and the number of hours

reasonably expended on the litigation “is the lodestar.” See Bivins, 548 F.3d at 1350. After

determining the lodestar amount, courts can “adjust the fee upward or downward, including [by

considering] the important factor of the results obtained.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 (quotation

marks omitted). “If the result was excellent, then the court should compensate for all hours

reasonably expended.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1302. “If the result was partial or limited success,

then the lodestar must be reduced to an amount that is not excessive.” Id.; see also Bivins, 548

F.3d at 1350–51 (“When the number of compensable hours and the hourly rate are reasonable, a

downward adjustment to the lodestar is merited only if the prevailing party was partially successful

in its efforts.”). “A reduction is appropriate if the relief, however significant, is limited in

comparison to the scope of the litigation as a whole.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1302. “Where all

theories derive from a common core of operative facts, the focus should be on the significance of

overall results as a function of total reasonable hours. It is improper to make the reduction based

on a simple ratio of successful issues to issues raised.” Id. (citation omitted).

“[T]he determination of fees should not result in a second major litigation.” Fox v. Vice,

563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011) (quotation marks omitted). “The essential goal in shifting fees (to either

party) is to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection. So trial courts may take into

account their overall sense of a suit, and may use estimates in calculating and allocating an

attorney’s time.” Id. Whatever the court decides, it must “provide a concise but clear explanation

of its reasons for the fee award. When an adjustment is requested on the basis of either the

exceptional or limited nature of the relief obtained by the plaintiff, the district court should make

clear that it has considered the relationship between the amount of the fee awarded and the results

obtained.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437.

C. Calculating Attorney’s Fee Awards in Equal Access to Justice Act cases

When calculating an award of attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, the

“amount of fees . . . shall be based upon prevailing market rates for the kind and quality of the

services furnished.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). “[A]ttorney[’s] fees shall not be awarded in

excess of $125 per hour unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special

factor, such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies

a higher fee.” See id.

The Eleventh Circuit has recognized that the Equal Access to Justice Act “establishes a

two-step analysis for determining the appropriate hourly rate to be applied in calculating attorney’s

fees under the Act.” Meyer v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 1029, 1033 (11th Cir. 1992). “The first step in

the analysis” is “to determine the market rate for similar services provided by lawyers of

reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation,” id. (alterations adopted, quotation

marks omitted), which is the same first step used in the traditional lodestar analysis, see Loranger,

10 F.3d at 781; Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299. “The second step, which is needed only if the market

rate is greater than” $125 “per hour, is to determine whether the court should adjust the hourly fee

upward” to “take into account an increase in the cost of living, or a special factor.” See Meyer,

958 F.2d at 1033–34; 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A).

When performing this rate adjustment, courts in this District have found proposed hourly

rates reasonable when they have relied on cost-of-living increases in the Consumer Price Index.

See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Kijakazi, No. 21-22170-CIV, 2023 WL 3852275, at *3 (S.D. Fla. May 26,

2023), R.&R. adopted, No. 21-22170-CV, 2023 WL 3845131 (S.D. Fla. June 6, 2023) (Williams,

J.); Romero v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:21-CV-22246, 2022 WL 2289222, at *3 & n.3 (S.D.

Fla. June 14, 2022), R.&R. adopted, No. 21-22246-CIV, 2022 WL 2290578 (S.D. Fla. June 24,

2022).

II. DISCUSSION

As noted above, the Court must award costs and fees to a party who is prevailing and

eligible unless the United States’ position in the case was substantially justified or special

circumstances make an award unjust. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A)–(B). The Supreme Court has

recognized that a party is “prevailing” in a Social Security appeal if he wins “a remand order

pursuant to sentence four of [42 U.S.C.] § 405(g).” See Shalala, 509 U.S. at 300. And, by

definition, a party is “eligible to receive an award,” if his “net worth” does “not exceed $2,000,000

at the time the civil action was filed.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B). Moving to the final

requirement, Plaintiff must show that the position of the United States was not substantially

justified, as the statute mandates. See id. § 2412(d)(1)(B). The Court’s analysis of whether the

United States’ position was substantially justified is based on “the record (including the record

with respect to the action or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil action is based) which

is made in the civil action for which fees and other expenses are sought.” See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2412(d)(1)(B); id. § 2412(d)(2)(D) (noting that the United States’ position is both “the position

taken by the United States in the civil action” and “the action or failure to act by the agency upon

which the civil action is based”).

Here, the Court agrees that Plaintiff is the prevailing party because Defendant filed an

unopposed Motion to Remand, which the Court granted pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g) and it thereafter entered Final Judgment in Plaintiff’s favor. See ECF No. [23], ECF No.

[24], ECF No. [25]. Plaintiff also meets the financial qualifications as the Court has already

determined that he is indigent based on his Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, submitted under

oath, which reveals that his net worth was less than $2,000,000 at the time of the filing of the civil

action. See ECF No. [3]; ECF No. [4]. The record here further supports the last factor (that

Defendant’s position was not substantially justified) as Defendant itself requested the remand

pursuant to sentence four of § 405(g), see ECF No. [23]. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A)–(B). Also

supporting such a conclusion is the fact that Defendant failed to argue that its position was

substantially justified; instead, Defendant did not oppose the Motion. See ECF No. [26] at 1. On

the other hand, the record does not reveal any special circumstances that would make an award

unjust. See id. As a result, the Court finds that Plaintiff has met all the requirements for an award

of costs and fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act. See id. § 2412(a)(1), (b), (d)(1)(B).

The only remaining step, then, is for the Court to calculate the appropriate amount of

attorney’s fees. Fee awards under the Equal Access to Justice Act must be “based upon prevailing

market rates for the kind and quality of the services furnished.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A).

The hourly rate used to determine those fees cannot be more than “$125 per hour unless the court

determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor . . . justifies a higher fee.” See

id. Plaintiff seeks attorney’s fees for time billed by his lawyer, David B. Goetz,2 at a rate of $250

per hour. See ECF No. [26] at 1. To evaluate whether Goetz’s requested hourly rate is reasonable,

2 Plaintiff’s Motion provides information regarding Goetz’s experience and qualifications in the area of

social security disability law, which he has been practicing since 1994. See ECF No. [26] at 4-5. Mr. Goetz

explained that he “has been referenced in Westlaw for Social Security disability cases a total of 948 times

between 2007 through the date of this petition” and that from 2019 to 2025, he “has obtained 264 Voluntary

Remands from the Commissioner pertaining to cases initiated within various District Courts nationally.”

Id.

the Court must first determine the market rate for similar services provided by lawyers of

reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation. See Meyer, 958 F.2d at 1033.

After reviewing hourly rates that courts in this District have found reasonable in recent

similar cases, see Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430 n.3, and in view of the Court’s own knowledge and

experience as a practitioner in this District for almost twenty years, see Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303,

the Court finds that the market rate is greater than $125 per hour. In a 2023 decision, for example,

Magistrate Judge Sanchez found reasonable an hourly rate of “$217.54 for 2021 and $234.95 for

2022 and 2023,” see Rodriguez, 2023 WL 3852275, at *2, and that finding was later adopted by

District Judge Williams, see Rodriguez, 2023 WL 384513, at *1. Similarly, in a 2022 decision,

then-Magistrate Judge Becerra found reasonable an hourly rate of “$217.54 for 2021 and $225.71

for 2022,” see Romero, 2022 WL 2289222, at *3 & n.3, and that finding was later adopted by

District Judge Martinez, see Romero, 2022 WL 2290578, at *1. Those findings support a

conclusion that the market rate for Social Security matters is greater than $125 per hour.

As a result, the Court moves to the second step of the analysis: determining whether to

adjust the hourly fee upward to account for a cost-of-living increase or another special factor. See

Meyer, 958 F.2d at 1033–34; 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). In evaluating adjustments of hourly

rates, courts in this District have found that using data from the Consumer Price Index is

appropriate, see, e.g., Rodriguez, 2023 WL 3852275, at *2; Romero, 2022 WL 2289222, at *3 &

n.3. Following that lead, the Court finds Goetz’s proposed hourly of $250 per hour reasonable

because it accurately reflects a factually warranted rate adjustment to the $125 statutory rate for

the increase in the cost of living based on the Consumer Price Index.

Moving to the second step in the lodestar analysis, which this Circuit uses to determine

attorney’s fee awards both generally, see Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299, and in the Equal Access to

Justice Act context, see Rodriguez, 2023 WL 3852275, at *3; Romero, 2022 WL 2289222, at *3

& n.3, the Court must determine the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation, see

Barnes, 168 F.3d at 427. Plaintiff notes that Goetz spent 38.2 hours on this case, see ECF No. [26]

at 1-2, and he includes a detailed breakdown of the tasks Goetz performed, when he performed

those tasks, and how long each task took, see ECF No. [26] at 1-2. The Court has reviewed Goetz’s

time entries, and based on its own knowledge and expertise, the Court finds that the 38.2 hours

Goetz expended in prosecuting this action are reasonable. See Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303;

Rodriguez, 2023 WL 3852275, at *3; Romero, 2022 WL 2289222, at *3.

The final step in the lodestar analysis is simply to multiply the number of hours Goetz

reasonably expended on the litigation by his reasonable hourly rate. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433;

Barnes, 168 F.3d at 427. Multiplying 38.2 hours by $250 per hour equals $9,550, which is the

lodestar. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433; Bivins, 548 F.3d at 1350; Barnes, 168 F.3d at 427. It is also

the attorney’s fees amount Plaintiff requests. See ECF No. [26] at 1. Although the Court can

adjust the lodestar amount upward or downward, see Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, the Court finds that

$9,550 is the reasonable sum Goetz deserves, see Bivins, 548 F.3d at 1350 (noting that there is a

strong presumption that the lodestar is the reasonable sum the attorneys deserve).

Plaintiff notes that he has assigned his award to Goetz, see ECF No. [26] at 1, 5-6, and

requests that payment be made directly to him, see ECF No. [26] at 6, which he is permitted to do,

see Astrue, 560 U.S. at 596–97. Because Defendant does not object to Plaintiff’s assignment or

request, the Court finds that Defendant has waived the requirements of the Anti-Assignment Act.

See Rodriguez, 2023 WL 3852275, at *4; Lipscomb, 965 F.2d at 1576.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion, ECF No. [26], is GRANTED. Plaintiff is AWARDED

$9,550 in attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act to be paid to Goetz, subject to

CASE NO. 24-CV-81296-ELFENBEIN

offset against any pre-existing debt that Plaintiff may owe to the United States.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Miami, Florida on July 23, 2025.

—_———F/ 7 Te

MARTY FOL EIRA ELFENBEIN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

cc: All Counsel of Record

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