Benedict v. Smith

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

JOSHUA BENEDICT, Case No. 1:24-cv-948

Petitioner, DISTRICT JUDGE

DAVID A. RUIZ

vs.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE

WARDEN SHELBIE SMITH, JAMES E. GRIMES JR.

Respondent.

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Joshua Benedict filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Doc. 1. Benedict is in custody at the Belmont

Correctional Institution based on a judgment entry issued by the Crawford

County Court of Common Pleas, State v. Benedict, No. 19-CR-0022AB. The

Court referred this matter to a Magistrate Judge under Local Rule 72.2 for the

preparation of a Report and Recommendation. For the following reasons, I

recommend the Petition be dismissed.

Summary of Facts

In habeas corpus proceedings brought under 20 U.S.C. § 2254, factual

determinations made by the state courts are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(1). The petitioner has the burden of rebutting that presumption by

clear and convincing evidence. Franklin v. Bradshaw, 695 F.3d 439, 447 (6th

Cir. 2012).

The Ohio Court of Appeals, Third Appellate District, Crawford, County,

Ohio summarized the facts underlying Benedict’s conviction as follows:

[*P2] The genesis of this case is Benedict’s sexual

activity with a minor child, M.P. (in 2015), and his

taking of a digital image of her female genitalia with

his computer tablet. After M.P. disclosed Benedict’s

sexual abuse of her in 2018, an investigation

commenced and Benedict’s tablet was seized. An

analysis of that tablet by law enforcement yielded a

digital image of M.P.’s genitalia as well as additional

contraband (i.e., child pornography) involving minor

children.

State v. Benedict, 198 N.E.3d 979, 985 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2022).

Procedural Background

In January 2019, the Crawford County grand jury indicted Benedict on

the following 130 criminal charges: two counts of rape in violation of Ohio Rev.

Code § 2907.02(A)(1)(b) (counts 1 and 2), one count of gross sexual imposition

in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 2907.05(A)(4) (count 3), two counts of

pandering obscenity involving a minor in violation of Ohio Rev. Code §

2907.321(A)(3) (counts 4 and 5), and 125 counts of pandering sexually oriented

matter involving a minor in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 2907.322(A)(5) (count

6 through 130). See Doc. 6-1, at 6–47. Counts one through five occurred in 2015

and counts six through 130 occurred in 2018. Doc. 6-1, at 6, 8. Benedict pleaded

not guilty to all counts. Id. at 49.

1. Pre-trial motions

In March 2019, Benedict moved to sever counts 1 through 5 from the

remaining 125 counts. Id. at 51. In August 2019, after a hearing, the trial court

denied Benedict’s motion to sever. Id. at 62. In November 2019, Benedict

moved for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to sever. Id. at 65. In

January 2020, the trial court denied reconsideration. Id. at 77.

In April 2019, and again in September 2019, Benedict moved for a

“pretrial taint hearing to determine the reliability” of M.P., who was one of the

victims. Doc. 6-1, at 80–103. In October 2019, the trial court denied the motion

after a hearing. Id. at 105. In January 2020, the trial court denied

reconsideration. See id. at 107, 117.

In May 2019, Benedict filed a motion to suppress evidence and for a

Franks hearing.1 Id. at 169. Specifically, Benedict asserted that the affidavits

supporting relevant search warrants lacked probable cause and contained false

information. Id. In October 2019, after a hearing, the trial court denied both

Benedict’s motion to suppress and his motion for a Franks hearing. Id. at 193.

In March 2020, Benedict filed a notice of interlocutory appeal, in which

he disputed the trial court’s ruling that denied his motions to sever and for a

pre-trial reliability hearing. Id. at 120. The State opposed the interlocutory

appeal. Id. at 160. Later in March 2020, the court of appeals dismissed

Benedict’s appeal and held that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to

entertain the interlocutory appeal because the rulings Benedict sought to

appeal were not final orders. Id. at 167. Benedict did not appeal further.

1 A Franks hearing, named after the United States Supreme Court

decision Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), involves a challenge to the

validity of an affidavit underlying a search warrant.

In March 2021, Benedict filed a motion for a hearing under Ohio Rule of

Evidence 702 to challenge the testimony of task force officer Aaron Greenberg,

as it related to the extraction of pornographic images from Benedict’s device

and whether Greenberg’s report met the state evidentiary requirements for an

expert report. See id. at 196, 199. The State objected to the hearing. Id. at 204.

The court held the matter in abeyance while the parties conducted additional

discovery. Id. at 212. In April 2021, after supplemental briefing, Benedict

withdrew his motion. Id. at 487.

In April 2021, the State moved to dismiss counts 5, 13, 17–20, 37, 47,

51–53, 70 and 99–130. See id. at 490, 524. The same month State moved to

amend counts one through four to enlarge the date of the offenses and to amend

counts 71–98 regarding the digital-image evidence. See id. at 527, 560. Later

in April 2021, the trial court granted the State’s motions to dismiss and to

amend the indictment. Id. at 563–70.

In June 2021, after a jury found Benedict guilty of two counts of rape

(counts 1 and 2), one count of gross sexual imposition (count 3), one count of

pandering obscenity involving a minor (count 4), and 77 counts of pandering

sexual oriented matter involving a juvenile (counts 6–12, 14–16, 21–36, 38-46,

48–50, 54–69, and 71–98), the trial court sentenced Benedict to two consecutive

prison terms of 15 years to life plus 60 months with eligibility for parole after

a minimum of 35 years. Id. at 571.

2. Motion for a New Trial

In May 2021, before sentencing, Benedict moved for a new trial based

on allegedly newly discovered evidence. Doc. 6-2, at 5. The State opposed his

motion. Id. at 26. In June 2021, the trial court denied Benedict’s motion for a

new trial, reasoning that the newly found evidence was not relevant or

pertinent to the case. Id. at 42.

3. Direct Appeal

Benedict, through counsel, appealed to the Third District Court of

Appeals. Id. at 46. He raised the following assignments of error:

1. The trial court erred in denying Appellant's

motion to sever Counts 1-5 from Counts 6-98 of the

Indictment for purposes of trial depriving him of his

constitutional right to a fair trial under the Fifth,

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the

Ohio Constitution.

2. Appellant’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to properly challenge the search warrants that

issued, which were based on affidavits that lacked

probable cause and contained false information.

3. The trial court erred and denied Appellant his

constitutional rights secured by the Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio

Constitution to cross-examine a witness on bias,

prejudice and motive to misrepresent the facts.

4. The trial court failed to hold a pre-trial taint

hearing resulting in the admission of unreliable

testimony that was a product of suggestive

interrogation, multiple interviews, prompting and

manipulation, in violation of Appellant's

constitutional rights secured by the Fifth, Sixth, and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution and Article I, Sections 10 and 16 of the

Ohio Constitution.

Id. at 70, 79, 82, 84. The State responded in opposition, id. at 157, and Benedict

filed a reply, id. at 226. In October 2022, the court of appeals affirmed the trial

court’s judgment. Id. at 248; see also Benedict, 198 N.E.3d at 996.

In October 2022, Benedict filed a motion for reconsideration of the court

of appeals’ decision. Id. at 277. In December 2022, the court of appeals denied

Benedict’s motion for reconsideration. Id. at 287.

In January 2023, Benedict filed a notice of appeal from the court of

appeals’ decision affirming his judgment and sentence with the Supreme Court

of Ohio. Id. at 289. Benedict raised the following three propositions of law:

1. A Criminal Defendant’s Constitutional Right to a

Fair Trial is Violated When He is Tried On Two

Groups of Charges and the Evidence is Not Simple

and Distinct Because it is Extremely Inflammatory

and Corroborative of the Other Charges And Would

Not Be Admissible As Other-Acts Evidence at

Separate Trials.

2. A Trial Court’s Refusal to Hold a Pre-trial Taint

Hearing Resulting in the Admission of Unreliable

Testimony That was a Product of Suggestive

Interrogation, Multiple Interviews, Prompting and

Manipulation, Violates a Defendant’s Rights

Secured by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution and

Article I, Sections 10 and 16 of the Ohio

Constitution.

3. When Trial Counsel Fails to Challenge a Search

Warrant Based on an Affidavit that Includes a

Broad Time Frame of the Alleged Crime and

Includes a Material False Statement as to the Place

Where Evidence Might Be Found, a Defendant is

Denied his Constitutional Right to Effective

Assistance of Counsel Under the Sixth Amendment

to the United States Constitution and Article I,

Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution.

Id. at 294. The State filed an opposition. Id. at 314. In April 2023, the Supreme

Court of Ohio declined under Rule 7.08(B)(4) of its rules of practice to exercise

jurisdiction over Benedict’s appeal. Id. at 322.

In April 2023, Benedict sought reconsideration of the Ohio Supreme

Court’s decision declining jurisdiction on Proposition of Law 1. Id. at 324. In

June 2023, the Supreme Court of Ohio denied reconsideration. Id. at 331.

4. Federal Habeas Corpus

In June 2024, Benedict, through counsel, filed a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Doc. 1. In his petition, Benedict

raises the following grounds for relief:

GROUND ONE: The Petitioner’s trial, wherein two

(2) separate and distinct issues, separated by a

period of approximately three (3) years and different

in subject matter was violative of the 5th, 6th and

14th Amendments.

GROUND TWO: The Petitioner’s 5th, 6th, and 14th

Amendment rights were violated when the trial

court refused to permit a pretrial taint hearing on

the reliability of the alleged victim’s statements.

GROUND 3: The Petitioner’s right to the effective

assistance of counsel, guaranteed by the Sixth

Amendment was violated when his trial counsel

failed to challenge an invalid search warrant.

See Doc. 1, at 5–8.

Legal Standard

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.

L. 104-132, § 104, 110 Stat. 1214 (AEDPA or the 1996 Act), habeas petitioners

must meet certain procedural requirements to have their claims reviewed in

federal court. Smith v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 463 F.3d 426, 430 (6th

Cir. 2006). “Procedural barriers, such as statutes of limitations and rules

concerning procedural default and exhaustion of remedies, operate to limit

access to review on the merits of a constitutional claim.” Daniels v. United

States, 532 U.S. 374, 381 (2001). Although procedural default is sometimes

confused with exhaustion, exhaustion and procedural default are distinct

concepts. Williams v. Anderson, 460 F.3d 789, 806 (6th Cir. 2006). Failure to

exhaust applies when state remedies are “still available at the time of the

federal petition.” Id. (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 125 n.28 (1982)).

But when “state court remedies are no longer available to a petitioner because

he or she failed to use them within the required time period, procedural default

and not exhaustion bars federal court review.” Id.

Exhaustion

A federal court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus unless the

petitioner has exhausted all available remedies in state court. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(b)(1)(A); Robinson v. Horton, 950 F.3d 337, 343 (6th Cir. 2020). To

exhaust his remedies, a state defendant with federal constitutional claims

must “fairly presen[t]” those claims to the state courts before raising them in

a federal habeas corpus action. Robinson, 950 F.3d at 343 (quoting Duncan v.

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995)); see also Fulcher v. Motley, 444 F.3d 791, 798

(6th Cir. 2006). A constitutional claim for relief must be presented to the state’s

highest court to satisfy the fair presentation requirement. See O’Sullivan v.

Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845–48 (1999); Caver v. Straub, 349 F.3d 340, 345 (6th

Cir. 2003). And a habeas petitioner must “present[] both the factual and legal

basis for [the] claims to the state courts.” Hanna v. Ishee, 694 F.3d 596, 606

(6th Cir. 2012). This means that the “‘petitioner must present his claim to the

state courts as a federal constitutional issue—not merely as an issue arising

under state law.’” Williams, 460 F.3d at 806 (quoting Koontz v. Glossa, 731

F.2d 365, 368 (6th Cir. 1984)). “‘[G]eneral allegations of the denial of rights to

a “fair trial” and “due process” do not “fairly present claims” that specific

constitutional rights were violated.’” Hand v. Houk, 871 F.3d 390, 418 (6th Cir.

2017) (quoting Slaughter v. Parker, 450 F.3d 224, 236 (6th Cir. 2006)).

Procedural default

Procedural default may occur in two ways. Williams, 460 F.3d at 806.

First, a petitioner procedurally defaults a claim by failing “to comply with state

procedural rules in presenting [the] claim to the appropriate state court.” Id.

In Maupin v. Smith, the Sixth Circuit directed courts to consider four factors

when determining whether a claim is barred on habeas corpus review due to a

petitioner’s failure to comply with a state procedural rule: (1) whether there is

a state procedural rule applicable to the petitioner’s claim and whether the

petitioner failed to comply with that rule; (2) whether the state court enforced

the procedural rule; (3) whether the state procedural rule is an adequate and

independent state ground on which the state can foreclose review of the federal

constitutional claim; and (4) whether the petitioner can demonstrate cause for

failing to follow the rule and actual prejudice by the alleged constitutional

error. 785 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir. 1986); see also Williams, 460 F.3d at 806 (“If,

due to the petitioner’s failure to comply with the procedural rule, the state

court declines to reach the merits of the issue, and the state procedural rule is

an independent and adequate grounds for precluding relief, the claim is

procedurally defaulted.”) (citing Maupin, 785 F.2d at 138).

Second, “a petitioner may procedurally default a claim by failing to raise

a claim in state court and pursue that claim through the state’s ‘ordinary

appellate review procedures.’” Williams, 460 F.3d at 806 (quoting O’Sullivan,

526 U.S. at 848); see Woolbright v. Crews, 791 F.3d 628, 631 (6th Cir. 2015)

(“When a petitioner has failed to fairly present … claims to the state courts

and no state remedy remains, [the] claims are considered to be procedurally

defaulted.”) (citing Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161–62 (1996)). While

the exhaustion requirement is technically satisfied in this circumstance

because state remedies are no longer available to the petitioner, see Coleman

v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732 (1991), a petitioner’s failure to have the federal

claims considered in the state courts constitutes a procedural default of those

claims that bars federal court review, Williams, 460 F.3d at 806.

To overcome a procedural bar, a petitioner must show “cause for the

default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law,”

or show that a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” will result if the

petitioner’s claims are not considered. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.

Merits review

If a state’s courts adjudicated the merits of a claim, a habeas petitioner

may obtain habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, if the petitioner can establish

one of two predicates. To establish the first predicate, the petitioner “must

identify a ‘clearly established’ principle of ‘Federal law’ that” has been

established by a holding of the Supreme Court. Fields v. Jordan, 86 F.4th 218,

231 (6th Cir. 2023) (en banc); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The petitioner must

then show that the state court’s adjudication “was contrary to,” or “involved an

unreasonable application of” that “clearly established” precedent. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(1); see Fields, 86 F.4th at 232.

To establish the second predicate, the petitioner must show that the

state’s court’s adjudication “resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the

writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the

[United States Supreme] Court on a question of law or” based on “a set of

materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412–13

(2000). “Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court

may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal

principle from th[e] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle

to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. “[A]n ‘unreasonable application

of’” the Court’s holdings is one that is “‘objectively unreasonable,’ not merely

wrong; even ‘clear error’ will not suffice.” White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 419

(2014) (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75–76 (2003)).

“[A] ‘clearly established’ principle of ‘Federal law’” refers to the

“holdings,” not “dicta,” of the Supreme Court’s decisions. Fields, 86 F.4th at

231 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and Woodall, 572 U.S. at 419). A state court

is not required to cite Supreme Court precedent or reflect an “awareness” of

Supreme Court cases, “so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the

state-court decision contradicts” such precedent. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8

(2002); see Lopez v. Wilson, 426 F.3d 339, 358 (6th Cir. 2005). If the Supreme

Court has not addressed the petitioner’s specific claims, a reviewing district

court cannot find that a state court acted contrary to, or unreasonably applied,

Supreme Court precedent or clearly established federal law. Carey v.

Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006); see White, 572 U.S. at 426 (“Section

2254(d)(1) provides a remedy for instances in which a state court unreasonably

applies this Court’s precedent; it does not require state courts to extend that

precedent or license federal courts to treat the failure to do so as error.”).

In determining whether the state court’s decision involved an

unreasonable application of law, the Court uses an objective standard.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 410. “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks

merit precludes federal habeas review so long as ‘fair-minded jurists could

disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter,

562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664

(2004)); see also Bray v. Andrews, 640 F.3d 731, 738 (6th Cir. 2011). “[A] state

prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented

in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well

understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fair-

minded disagreement.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103.

Discussion

1. Ground 1 is not cognizable and meritless.

As his Ground One, Benedict asserts that the trial court violated his due

process rights when it denied his motion to sever. Doc. 1, at 5. Benedict claims

that the court of appeals did not analyze whether the introduction during the

trial of certain evidence, that he claims constituted “other acts evidence,”

violated his due process rights. Doc. 10, at 14. He also asserts that the trial

court erred when it found that the evidence was simple and direct, Doc. 10, at

11–12, and takes issue with the introduction of “other acts evidence,” id. at 14.

The court of appeals discussed these arguments after Benedict raised

them on direct appeal:

{¶16} On appeal, Benedict asserts that there are no

grounds to join the offenses against him at trial

under Crim.R. 8(A). Specifically, Benedict

challenges whether his acts constituted a common

scheme or plan. Therefore, we apply a de novo

standard of review for this portion of his argument,

as opposed to an abuse of discretion, which we

discussed above.

{¶17} In our de novo review, we conclude that

Benedict's offenses were not misjoined in

contravention of Crim.R. 8(A). As we have noted

previously, offenses may be joined in a single

indictment if they are of the same or similar

character, are based on the same act or transaction,

are based on two or more acts or transactions

connected together or constituting parts of a

common scheme or plan, or are part of a course of

criminal conduct. The phrase “of the same or similar

character” has been given a broad

definition. See Schaim, 65 Ohio St.3d at fn. 6, 600

N.E.2d 661 (rejecting Schaim's request for a narrow

definition in a case involving charges of forcible rape,

sexual imposition, and GSI against three different

victims.) Importantly, the offenses “need only be

similar in nature, ‘not identical in execution.’ ” State

v. Bennie, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-020497, 2004-

Ohio-1264, 2004 WL 535277, ¶ 17-18, quoting State

v. Echols, 128 Ohio App.3d 677, 708, 716 N.E.2d 728

(1st Dist.1998) (Gorman, J., dissenting). See

also State v. Bass, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-

622, 2013-Ohio-4503, 2013 WL 5595417, ¶

9 (concluding that distinctions in the victims,

locations, and times of the offenses “do not mean

that the [ ] offenses [are] of dissimilar character”).

Here, the record before us supports that all of

Benedict's charges are of a same or similar

character, i.e., sex offenses involving minor children.

Hence, we need not reach a determination as to

whether the offenses constitute parts of a common

scheme or plan. Thus, this portion of Benedict's

argument is without merit.

{¶18} Benedict next argues that the trial court erred

in denying his motion to sever the 2015 offenses

from the 2018 offenses under Crim.R. 14. In

particular, Benedict argues that he is prejudiced by

joinder due to the inflammatory nature of the

digital-image-and-video content in the 2018

offenses. To this portion of Benedict's argument our

standard of review is abuse of discretion, as opposed

to de novo.

{¶19} Significantly, the evidence used by the State to

establish the elements relating to the 2015 and 2018

offenses is simple and direct. Indeed, the crimes

charged involved different minor victims, factual

scenarios, and witnesses. Moreover, the factual

scenario of each set of crimes is easily understood,

straightforward, and capable of segregation. At trial,

the 2015 and 2018 incidents were presented in an

orderly, chronological manner. Even though the

crimes were investigated together by law

enforcement after the discovery of the child-

pornography offenses in 2018, there was very little

overlap between the two incidents, other than, the

use of the instrumentality itself, i.e., Benedict's

Samsung computer tablet. See State v. Echols, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102504, 2015-Ohio-5138, 2015

WL 8484088, ¶ 17. Hence, we conclude that the

evidence presented as to the two sets of offenses was

unlikely to confuse jurors or to be improperly

considered as corroborative of each grouping of

offenses.

…

{¶21} Since we have concluded that the evidence

used to establish the elements of Benedict's offenses

is simple and direct, we need not address the more

stringent “other acts” test. Franklin at 123, 580

N.E.2d 1. See also Lott at 163, 555 N.E.2d 293.

Consequently, Benedict cannot establish any

prejudice regardless of the admissibility of evidence

of other crimes, wrongs, or acts. See Valentine, 2019-

Ohio-2243, at ¶ 50. See also Lott at 163, 555 N.E.2d

293.

Benedict, 198 N.E.3d at 989–90.

As an initial matter, Benedict never raised this ground to Ohio’s courts

as a federal constitutional violation. Instead—aside from a vague reference in

his court of appeal brief to the “Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to

the United States Constitution,” Doc. 6-2, at 70—he explicitly relied only on

Ohio statutes and rules, id. at 70–79, 305–09. This means that Benedict failed

the fair presentment requirement. See Williams, 460 F.3d at 806; see also

Hand, 871 F.3d at 418 (“‘general allegations of the denial of rights to a “fair

trial” and “due process” do not “fairly present claims” that specific

constitutional rights were violated’”) (quoting Slaughter, 450 F.3d at 236.

Further, under Ohio’s res judicata rule, because Benedict could have

raised this issue on direct appeal, it is now too late for him to raise it now in

Ohio’s courts. State v. Szefcyk, 671 N.E.2d 233, 235 (Ohio 1996) (reaffirming

the rule from State v. Perry, 226 N.E.2d 104 (1967)). Ohio’s courts consistently

enforce this rule, see State v. Cole, 443 N.E.2d 169, 170–71 (1982), and the

Sixth Circuit has held that Ohio’s res judicata rule is an adequate and

independent state ground on which to procedurally bar review of a habeas

claim, see Coleman v. Mitchell, 268 F.3d 417, 427–32 (6th Cir. 2001); see also

Durr v. Mitchell, 487 F.3d 423, 432 (6th Cir. 2007). So even if this Court were

to construe Benedict’s first ground as raising an issue of constitutional

magnitude, the issue is procedurally defaulted. See Scott v. Houk, 760 F.3d

497, 505 (6th Cir. 2014).

Further, Benedict’s Ground One claim is also not cognizable because he

raises it as a state-law claim. Although he states that his rights under “the 5th,

6th and 14th Amendments” were violated, his petition provides nothing beyond

this assertion to demonstrate his Ground One claim is premised on a violation

of federal law. See Doc. 1, at 5 (discussing only the trial court’s denial of a

motion to sever and related findings by the state court under state evidentiary

standards). But simply saying that “due process” or “fair trial” rights were

violated is insufficient to raise a federal issue. See Hand, 871 F.3d at 418.

Benedict’s supporting facts make no explicit argument that the state

courts violated his federal constitutional rights. Instead, he simply asserts that

the “evidence as presented was not simpl[e] and direct, and independently the

materials presented would not have been admissible as Evid. 404(B) evidence.”

Doc. 1, at 5. So the face of Benedict’s petition, like his appellate briefs filed in

state court, does not demonstrate that he Ground One claim involves an

alleged violation of federal law.

Benedict’s responses to the Warden’s argument that his Ground One

claim is non-cognizable are unpersuasive. As illustrated above, his assertion

that “he validly presented a federal claim for review in the state court system”

is unfounded. See Doc. 10, at 14. Benedict also provides no support for his

assertion that the un-severed state court proceedings were fundamentally

unfair. See id. And to the extent that Benedict attempts to rely on his citation

to Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232 (1957), to support his argument

that he has raised a federal claim, see Doc. 10, at 14, his argument fails. First,

he didn’t cite Delli Paoli before Ohio’s courts. Second, the first time Benedict

cites Delli Paoli or argues that the trial court violated clearly established law,

is in his Traverse. It is now far too late for Benedict to introduce this argument,

even if the case were applicable––which it is not. See Tyler v. Mitchell, 416 F.3d

500, 504 (6th Cir. 2005) (claims raised for the first time in a traverse are

forfeited); see Rice v. Warden, Warren Corr. Inst., 786 F. App’x 32, 38 (6th Cir.

2019).

Even putting the above aside, however, federal courts considering a

habeas petition are obligated to defer to a relevant state’s court’s decision

unless a petitioner demonstrates one of two predicates. See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(1)–(2). First, he may overcome deference by showing that the state

court’s adjudication “was contrary to,” or “involved an unreasonable

application of” “clearly established” precedent. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see

Fields, 86 F.4th at 232. Second, he could demonstrate that the state’s court’s

adjudication “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

Benedict has not made either showing. Although Benedict uses some

language that might be reminiscent of the applicable statutory standard—he

says that “[t]he Court of Appeals was incorrect”—he does not develop any clear

argument that the court of appeals’ decision was either contrary to or an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or that the state

court’s decision was unreasonable based on the evidence presented. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2). Instead, Benedict’s arguments are generally a

recitation of the arguments he raised in his memorandum in support of

jurisdiction to the Ohio Supreme Court, complete with citation to that very

memorandum. See Doc. 10, at 12–14 (citing the state court record citation to

his state court briefing). This Court, however, does not act as another level of

appeal for Benedict to rehash claims rejected by the state courts. See Linger v.

Akram, 23 F. App’x 248, 252 (6th Cir. 2001) (“A federal habeas court does not

sit as a traditional appellate review with supervisory power to correct general

errors committed by a state authority; rather, it has power only to accord relief

for constitutional violations.”) (citing Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637,

642 (1974)).

Beyond his citation to state court briefing, Benedict cites one Supreme

Court case, Delli Paoli, which he claims was violated by the admission of video

and photographic evidence, which he calls “other acts evidence.” Doc. 10, at

14. Benedict’s reliance on Delli Paoli seems to indicate that his is trying to

show that the court of appeals’ decision is contrary to clearly established

federal law. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412–13 (“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause,

a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a

conclusion opposite to that reached by the [United States Supreme] Court on

a question of law or” based on “a set of materially indistinguishable facts.”)

(emphasis added). Benedict’s argument that the court of appeals violated

clearly established federal law fails, however, because Delli Paoli is

distinguishable in at least the following three respects.

First, Delli Paoli concerned a challenge brought by one defendant, out

of five defendants jointly tried in a single case, who contested the use of an

admission made by a separate defendant in that joint trial. See 352 U.S. at 233.

In Benedict’s case, by contrast, the trial court decided not to have separate

trials in a matter involving a single defendant who is charged with dozens of

counts, all concerning, to various degrees, “sexual abuse of minor children.” See

e.g., Doc. 10, at 12.

Second, in Delli Paoli, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s

decision to admit the co-conspirator’s admission because the trial court

properly instructed the jury about how it could appropriately consider that

admission to the extent that it mentioned the petitioner. 352 U.S. at 240–42.

Here, as the court of appeals recognized, “the record reveals that the trial judge

instructed the jury to consider each count, and the evidence applicable to each

count, separately.” Doc. 6-2, at 259. And, though Benedict makes no argument

that the jury failed to comply with the trial judge’s instruction, the court of

appeals explicitly found “no indication that the jury disregarded the trial

court’s instruction, or demonstrated confusion concerning the offenses and

evidence presented.” Id. So even setting aside the distinguishing facts between

Benedict’s case and Delli Paoli, the court of appeals’ decision illustrates that

the trial court did what the Supreme Court endorsed by giving a limiting

instruction to the jury. See 352 U.S. at 241–43.

Third, Delli Paoli says nothing about the use of video or photographic

evidence admitted to support some, but not all, charges against an individual

defendant in a single trial or that use of such evidence would mandate

severance of some counts. Delli Paoli, at best––at least in relation to Benedict’s

argument––held that the choice to sever trials is “a choice [that] turns on the

circumstances of the particular case and lies largely within the discretion of

the trial judge.” 352 U.S. at 243. So it is not clear why Benedict relies on it.

Indeed, it does not show that the court of appeals violated clearly established

federal law.

In sum, Benedict has not shown that there is clearly established federal

law applicable to his case, let alone that the court of appeals decision was

contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412–13.

For all of the reasons stated, Benedict’s Ground One claim should be

rejected.

2. Ground Two is procedurally defaulted, not cognizable, and meritless.

As his Ground Two claim, Benedict argues that he was entitled to a pre-

trial “taint” hearing to contest the reliability of the minor victim’s testimony.

Doc. 1, at 7. In support, opines that the victim’s testimony was unreliable,

based on risk of suggestibility from “repetitive questioning” by the victim’s

mother and a case worker. Id. Benedict also asserts that the victim did not

have “personal knowledge” of the subject of her testimony. Id. Generally, the

Warden’s responsive argument is that Benedict’s claim is procedurally barred

by Ohio’s contemporaneous objection rule. See Doc. 10, at 19.

Review of the court of appeals’ decision shows that, as the Warden

asserts, it applied Ohio’s contemporaneous-objection rule to this claim. See

Doc. 6-2, at 266–69. Ohio’s long-standing contemporaneous objection rule

requires a party to make a contemporaneous objection to an alleged trial error

to preserve the error for appellate review. See, e.g., State v. Murphy, 747 N.E.2d

765, 788 (Ohio 2001). When an Ohio court applies plain error review, it

enforces an independent and adequate state ground that precludes federal

habeas review. Scott v. Mitchell, 209 F.3d 854, 866–71 (6th Cir. 2000). And the

state court’s plain error review “does not constitute a waiver of the state’s

procedural default rules and resurrect the issue.” Wogenstahl v. Mitchell, 668

F.3d 307, 337 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Keith v. Mitchell, 455 F.3d 662, 673 (6th

Cir. 2006)).

In his Traverse, Benedict does not contest that the court of appeals

applied Ohio’s contemporaneous-objection rule or that it constitutes an

adequate and independent state law ground for denying review of a federal

constitutional claim. See Doc. 10, at 15. Nor could he. Instead, Benedict jumps

straight to arguing that he “is still entitled to the cause and actual prejudice

analysis relating to this claim, and he is more than able to demonstrate cause

and actual prejudice.” Doc. 10, at 16; see Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750 (explaining

that to overcome a procedural bar, a petitioner must show “cause for the

default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law,”

or show that a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” will result if the

petitioner’s claims are not considered). Oddly, however, Benedict makes no

attempt to show cause. See Doc. 10, at 16–18. So he has forfeited any argument

that he could show cause. And without a showing of cause, there is no need to

discuss prejudice. Bonilla v. Hurley, 370 F.3d 494, 497 (6th Cir. 2004) (”Since

both cause and prejudice must be shown to excuse a procedural default, the

failure to establish cause eliminates the need to consider prejudice.”).

Benedict seems to argue that he can avoid the state court’s application of

a procedural bar because he “is able to demonstrate his innocence[.]” Doc. 10,

at 16. But other than saying it, he provides no support for the assertion that

he is actually innocent, let alone the requisite “new reliable evidence.” See

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995) (explaining that a claim of actual

innocence “requires the petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional

error with new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific

evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that

was not presented at trial”); see also McCray v. Tanner, No. 18-2001, 2024 WL

3443413, at *9 (6th Cir. July 17, 2024) (“The ‘actual-innocence’ standard that

McCray must satisfy here is among the most demanding in federal law.”), cert.

denied, 145 S. Ct. 1203 (2025). As a result, Benedict fails to demonstrate that

his is “an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably

resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Murray v. Carrier,

477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986).

Even ignoring the above, Benedict’s argument would fail. The court of

appeals determined that his motion to the trial court amounted to a motion in

limine to determine the reliability of statements made in advance of trial. Doc.

6-2, at 266. As such state law required Benedict to contemporaneously object

to the challenged testimony during trial to preserve the issue for appeal, absent

plain error. See Doc. 6-1, at 80; Doc. 6-2, at 265–67. To this end, the court of

appeals explained:

{¶36} “ ‘A motion in limine is defined as “[a] pretrial

motion requesting [the] court to prohibit opposing

counsel from referring to or offering evidence on

matters so highly prejudicial to [the] moving party

that curative instructions cannot prevent [a]

predispositional effect on [the] jury.” ’ ” State v. Wild,

2d Dist. Clark No. 2009 CA 83, 2010-Ohio-4751,

2010 WL 3821852, ¶ 27, quoting State v. French, 72

Ohio St.3d 446, 449, 650 N.E.2d 887 (1995), quoting

Black's Law Dictionary 1014 (6th Ed.1990). “A

ruling on a motion in limine reflects the court's

anticipated treatment of an evidentiary issue at trial

and, as such, is a tentative, interlocutory,

precautionary ruling.” (Emphasis sic.) French at

450, 650 N.E.2d 887. “The established rule in Ohio

is that the grant or denial of a motion in limine is

not a ruling on the evidence.” State v. Thompson, 3d

Dist. Union Nos. 14-04-34 and 14-04-35, 2005-Ohio-

2053, 2005 WL 1004767, ¶ 26, citing State v. Grubb,

28 Ohio St.3d 199, 200-201, 503 N.E.2d 142 (1986).

“In deciding such motions, the trial court is at liberty

to change its ruling on the disputed evidence in its

actual context at trial.” Defiance v. Kretz, 60 Ohio

St.3d 1, 4, 573 N.E.2d 32 (1991). Accordingly,

“[f]inality does not attach when [a motion in limine]

is granted.” Id., citing Grubb at 201-202, 503 N.E.2d

142.

{¶37} In order to preserve for appeal any error in the

trial court's resolution of a motion in limine, the

objecting party must “seek the introduction of the

evidence by proffer or otherwise” at trial “to enable

the court to make a final determination as to its

admissibility.” Grubb at paragraph two of the

syllabus. See State v. Brown, 38 Ohio St.3d 305, 528

N.E.2d 523 (1988), paragraph three of the syllabus

(“A denial of a motion in limine does not preserve

error for review. A proper objection must be raised

at trial to preserve error.”). Then, “[a]n appellate

court will * * * review the correctness of the trial

court's ruling on the objection rather than the ruling

on the motion in limine.” Wild at ¶ 29, citing State v.

White, 4th Dist. Gallia No. 95CA08, 1996 WL

614190, *3 (Oct. 21, 1996) and Wray v. Herrell, 4th

Dist. Lawrence No. 93 CA 08, 1994 WL 64293, *3

(Feb. 24, 1994).

{¶38} In our review of the record, we construe

Benedict's pretrial-taint motion to be the functional

equivalent of a motion in limine since Benedict

sought a pretrial-admissibility determination by the

trial court as to the reliability of M.P.’s testimony.

(See Doc. No. 50). Hence, given the nature of the

such a motion is tentative, interlocutory, or

precautionary, we review the record to determine if

there was “ ‘ “a contemporaneous objection at trial[

]” ’ ”. Bagley, 2014-Ohio-1787, at ¶ 53, quoting State

v. Hancock, 108 Ohio St.3d 57, 2006-Ohio-160, 840

N.E.2d 1032, ¶ 59, quoting State v. Hill, 75 Ohio

St.3d 195, 203, 661 N.E.2d 1068 (1996). Crucial to

Benedict's argument under this assignment of error

is the fact that the defense did not object

to any statements made by M.P.’s during her

testimony. (Apr. 28, 2021 Tr. at 576-623). Therefore,

our review of this assignment of error is limited to

plain error. See Crim.R. 52(B).

Benedict, 198 N.E.3d at 993.

Instead of demonstrating cause or prejudice to excuse his default,

Benedict provides a description of the facts he views as supporting his

position––only some of which are supported by record citation. See Doc. 10, at

16. From these factual assertions, Benedict asks the Court to accept the

proposition that: “[i]f [the victim] was fed or lead to specific answers, which

directly contributed to the convictions for Counts 1-4, and said answers were

tainted and should have been excluded, prejudice would have been

established.” Id. The Court declines Benedicts invitation to entertain what

amounts to a hypothetical, unsupported assertion, particularly because it is

not apparent why doing so would be appropriate. Indeed, Benedict has done

nothing to show that, putting his default aside, he could meet the standard in

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). And his failure to try must necessarily mean that he has

not carried his burden to show that the court of appeals decision ran afoul of

Section 2254(d).

So, Benedict’s Ground Two is procedurally barred.

Additionally, Benedict’s Ground Two claim is not cognizable. “[E]rrors in

application of state law, especially with regard to the admissibility of evidence,

are usually not cognizable in federal habeas corpus.” Walker v. Engle, 703 F.2d

959, 962 (6th Cir. 1983); see Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991) (a

federal habeas court does not “reexamine state-court determinations on state-

law questions,” including the admissibility of evidence). “When an evidentiary

ruling is so egregious that it results in a denial of fundamental fairness, it may

violate due process and thus warrant habeas relief.” Bugh v. Mitchell, 329 F.3d

496, 512 (6th Cir. 2003). To rise to the level of a due process violation, a state-

court evidentiary ruling must “offend[] some principle of justice so rooted in

the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”

Seymour v. Walker, 224 F.3d 542, 552 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Montana v.

Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43 (1996), in turn quoting Patterson v. New York, 432

U.S. 197, 202 (1977)).

Benedict apparently does not dispute the Warden’s position that his

Ground Two claim amounts to a non-cognizable, state court evidentiary ruling.

See Doc. 6, at 23. Instead, he argues that the denial of a pre-trial “taint

hearing” in his case was fundamentally unfair. See Doc. 10, at 17 (arguing that

a pre-trial hearing was required because Benedict disputed the reliability of

the witness’s testimony); see also Doc. 6, at 24 (arguing that there were

sufficient safeguards of fairness). Benedict claims that the victim was

previously questioned by the Sheriff after “discussing the matter repeatedly

with her parents in a leading fashion.” Id. While this is true, it does not support

his argument that it was fundamentally unfair for the trial court to deny his

motion for a pre-trial hearing. In fact, as the Warden indicated, the State

introduced a video recording of the victim’s interview with children’s services

and both the victim and the victim’s mother testified during the trial. See Doc.

6, at 24.

Benedict does not respond to the Warden’s assertion that there were

sufficient procedural safeguards to ensure the fairness of his trial. See Doc. 6,

at 24 (describing the “safeguards [that] ensures the fairness of the trial.”).

Likewise, Benedict points to no case or other support to show as a baseline that

the denial of a hearing on Benedict’s motion was fundamentally unfair.

Relatedly, the court of appeals addressed Benedict’s Confrontation Clause

argument and rejected it, reasoning that Benedict was able to cross-examine

the witness at trial. Doc. 6-2, at 268. Benedict makes no argument that the

court of appeals decision rejecting his Confrontation Clause argument was in

error. See Doc. 10, at 18. He also didn’t clearly include a Confrontation Clause

argument in his petition. See Doc. 1, at 7 (discussing facts only related to the

trial court’s failure to hold a pretrial hearing). Rather, this argument appears

for the first time in Benedict’s Traverse. See Doc. 10, at 18. His Traverse is not

an appropriate place, however, for Benedict to introduce new arguments. See

Tyler, 416 F.3d at 504.

For all of the stated reasons, Benedict’s Ground Two claim fails.

3. Ground Three is meritless.

As his Ground Three, Benedict asserts that his trial counsel was

ineffective based on failure to challenge an invalid search warrant. See Doc. 1,

at 8. Specifically, Benedict claims that the affidavit supporting the search

warrant didn’t include probable cause to search electronics and didn’t include

a time frame for when the pertinent images existed. Id. He also argues that

the affiant didn’t have appropriate experience or qualifications in area of child

pornography. Id. But, in his Traverse, Benedict withdraws all but one of his

Ground Three arguments. Doc. 10, at 19. The sole remaining argument that

Benedict advances in support of his Ground Three claim is thus that his trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress a search warrant that

was supported by an “unnecessarily broad” probable cause affidavit. Doc. 10,

at 18–19.

A successful ineffective-assistance claim requires a petitioner to

demonstrate that: (1) “counsel’s performance was deficient”; and (2) “the

deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Jones v. Bradshaw, 46 F.4th

459, 487–88 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

687 (1984)). “The first prong is satisfied when a petitioner ‘show[s] that counsel

made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel”

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.’” Jones, 46 F.4th at 487

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). “The second prong is satisfied when the

petitioner ‘show[s] that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’”

Jones, 46 F.4th at 487–88. “‘A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient

to undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Jones, 46 F.4th at 488 (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). The combined effect of Strickland and 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d) is “‘doubly deferential’” review. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170,

190 (2011) (quoting Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009)). “When

2254(d) applies, the question is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable,”

but “whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied

Strickland’s deferential standard.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105; Foust v. Houk,

655 F.3d 524, 533–34 (6th Cir. 2011). “Or, in more concrete terms, a federal

court may grant relief only if every ‘“fairminded juris[t]”’ would agree that every

reasonable lawyer would have made a different decision.” Dunn v. Reeves, 594

U.S. 731, 739–40 (2021) (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101).

Strickland commands that a court “must indulge [the] strong

presumption” that counsel “made all significant decisions in the exercise of

reasonable professional judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689–690;

Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 196 (“[t]he Court of Appeals was required not simply to

‘give [the] attorneys the benefit of the doubt,’ but to affirmatively entertain the

range of possible ‘reasons Pinholster’s counsel may have had for proceeding as

they did’”) (citation omitted).

As noted, the single issue that Benedict raises in support of his Ground

Three is that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to

suppress a search warrant. Doc. 10, at 18–19. To this end, Benedict asserts

that there is clearly established law, Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 85

(1987), that establishes that search warrants must not be unnecessarily broad.

See Doc, 10, at 19.

The initial problem with this argument is that he didn’t raise it before

the court of appeals. Instead, he said in three different ways that the affidavit

did not provide “any time frame”: (1) “The Affidavit Failed to Provide A Time

Frame Regarding the Photograph”; (2) “An affidavit that ‘does not give any

time frame for the events it describes fails, as a matter of law, to demonstrate

probable cause, and a search warrant issued based solely on that affidavit is

invalid,’”; and (3) “Here, the affidavit does not provide any time frame for when

the alleged photograph was taken.” Doc. 6-2, at 80 (citations omitted). And he

backed up these assertions with citation to: State v. Lee, a case in which “the

affidavit … was devoid of any temporal reference,” 2008-Ohio-3157, 2008 WL

2553025, at *2–3 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008) (emphasis added); and State v.

Swearingen, a case in which a court of appeals remarked, “[t]he facts in this

case merely establish that on February 20, 1997, Detective Ross learned that

his informant was claiming she had repeatedly used drugs with Swearingen.

When this happened, no one knows.” 721 N.E.2d 1097, 1101 (Ohio Ct. App.

1999) (emphasis added).

Benedict then contradictorily said that the affidavit did contain a time

frame—“over the past ‘one to three years’”—before asserting that an issuing

magistrate can only draw inferences from the facts set out in an affidavit. Doc.

6-2, at 81. And from there, with reference to Swearingen, he said that “[i]t was

not reasonable for the magistrate to infer that the photograph was taken

during one of the alleged ‘sexual assaults’ involving M.P.” Id.

Faced with this presentation, the court of appeals cited the Strickland

standard, id. at 270–71, and then addressed Benedict’s repeated assertion that

the affidavit did not provide “any time frame,” id. at 271–72. Because the

affidavit did include a time frame, contrary to Benedict’s assertion, the court

of appeals rejected Benedict’s argument as meritless. Id. at 272.

Benedict, however, ignores the court of appeals’ decision and the manner

in which he presented this argument to that court. In doing so, he provides no

support for the argument he appears to make by his citation to Garrison: that

his trial counsel was ineffective by not arguing the search warrant was

unnecessarily broad. For instance, he does not claim that Garrison found a

warrant unnecessarily broad under “materially indistinguishable”

circumstances to his own or that the Supreme Court found trial counsel

ineffective for failing to object under similar circumstances. See Williams, 529

U.S. at 412–13. Instead, he offers his opinion that the warrant was overbroad

and asks the Court to agree. See Doc. 10, at 19. But this argument ignores 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Further, even assuming that Garrison provides clearly established law

on the issue of search warrant specificity, Benedict provides no argument

regarding the court of appeals’ decision rejecting his ineffective assistance

claim. See Doc. 10, at 19. For instance, he does not argue that the court of

appeals decision misapplied Strickland or any other standard when it

considered whether trial counsel was ineffective for his failure to file a motion

to suppress. Instead, Benedict attempts to litigate the merits of his underlying

argument based on a new argument––that the warrant was overbroad. Doc.

10, at 19. But this court does not act as another layer of appellate review for

claims rejected by the state courts, see Linger, 23 F. App’x at 252, particularly

when the basis for a petitioner’s argument was not raised before a state’s

courts.

Since Benedict has not shown the court of appeals’ decision was contrary

to or an unreasonable application of clearly established law, and has otherwise

expressly waived the majority of his Ground Three arguments, this claim

should be dismissed.

Conclusion

For all of the reasons stated, I recommend that Benedict’s petition be

dismissed.

Dated: July 23, 2025

/s/James E. Grimes Jr.

James E. Grimes Jr.

U.S. Magistrate Judge

OBJECTIONS

Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with

the Clerk of Court within 14 days after the party objecting has been served

with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Failure

to file objections within the specified time may forfeit the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. See Berkshire v. Beauvais, 928 F.3d 520, 530–31 (6th

Cir. 2019).