O'Handly, D. v. Ruch, E.

J-S07032-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

DORIS J. O’HANDLY : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

EDWARD J. RUCH :

:

Appellant : No. 1094 MDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered July 3, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Civil Division at No(s):

2022-CV-07356-DV

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED: JULY 22, 2025

Appellant, Edward J. Ruch (“Husband”), appeals from the order entered

in the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas, which granted the petition

filed by Appellee, Doris J. O’Handly (“Wife”), to enforce the marital settlement

agreement (“MSA”) entered into by the parties. We affirm.

The trial court set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this

case as follows:

The parties … were married in 1979 and separated in

December 2018. Wife initiated this divorce action in

September 2022, which included a count seeking equitable

distribution. In November 2022, Cindy Conley was

appointed as the Divorce Hearing Officer (DHO) to address

the equitable distribution claims. She held a number of

settlement conferences culminating with one on February

29, 2024, at which the parties entered into the MSA.1

1 A Divorce Decree was entered on March 15, 2024.

[The MSA did not merge with the divorce decree.]

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Under MSA Paragraph 10(a) (Retirement Accounts and

Plans), the parties agreed that Husband would transfer

$361,126 to Wife from his Ameritas IRA, via a qualified

domestic relations order (QDRO). Under MSA Paragraph 6

(Division of Personal Property), Wife agreed to give Husband

all personalty remaining in the former marital residence

except for 56 items listed on MSA Exhibit A, which were

reserved for her. The MSA specified the manner in which

Wife could go to the former marital residence to obtain those

items including that the retrieval be done in front of a

constable and that Husband would not be present.

After the MSA was entered, Wife sought that Husband pay

her a QDRO of $368,126, which was the amount she claimed

the parties had negotiated and intended to be the amount

transferred to her from Husband, and not the $361,126 as

stated in the MSA, which she claimed was a scrivener’s

error. Husband would not agree to pay the higher figure.

The parties’ counsel reached out to DHO Conley to help

resolve the issue, and following a telephone conference,

Conley issued the following memorandum:

At the request of the attorneys, on March 29, 2024,

the Divorce Hearing Officer (DHO), spoke with the

attorney for Wife and the attorney for Husband via a

[t]elephone [c]onference…. During the [telephone

conference], the attorneys explained that when the

parties entered into their [MSA] on February 29,

2024, during a Settlement Conference, a mutual

mistake occurred via a typographical error.

Specifically, the MSA at paragraph 10(a) provides that

Wife is to receive a rollover from Husband’s Ameritas

IRA #2283 in the amount of $361,126 when both of

the parties’ attorneys acknowledge that the amount

agreed to be rolled over was in fact $368,126.

Husband’s attorney [Eric Winter, Esquire], in fulfilling

his ethical duties as an officer of the court,

acknowledged that the MSA contained a typographical

error that neither party noticed at the time the MSA

was signed. However, the correct number was clearly

displayed on the asset chart the parties were utilizing

during their discussions. Nevertheless, Husband

refuses to permit the rollover of the correct amount.

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* * *

Given Attorney Winter’s concurrence with [Wife’s

attorney,] Attorney Levin[,] that the number in the

agreement was in fact a t[y]pographical error, it is

hoped that Husband will allow the rollover to occur in

the correct amount without the necessity of any

further court action which, may include a request for

attorney’s fees.

(D.H.O. Tel. Conf. Mem., [dated] April 1, 2024)[.]

Husband thereafter refused to pay the higher QDRO figure

and also failed to exchange property with Wife under the

MSA. As such, on April 29, 2024, Wife filed a Petition to

Enforce the MSA alleging that Husband had breached MSA

¶ 6 by not allowing her to retrieve her property from the

marital residence as directed. Wife also alleged that

Husband breached MSA ¶ 10(a) by not issuing a QDRO to

her for $368,126.

In his Answer to the Petition to Enforce, Husband admitted

that after agreeing to a property exchange date of April 12,

2024, and after Husband obtained a constable to be present,

he advised Wife on April 9 that he would not comply with

MSA ¶ 6; instead, he told Wife, through counsel, that he

would agree to a property exchange if Wife removed some

property items from the agreed list and if Husband was

present at the exchange. Husband also admitted that after

Wife rejected his offer, he cancelled the property exchange.

Husband nevertheless denied he had breached MSA ¶ 6,

averring that he “believes that his behavior was neither

obdurate nor vexatious and he had good reason to act as he

did.”

As to the QDRO issue, notably, Husband admitted in his

Answer that the QDRO figure in the MSA was a typographical

error. Specifically, he admitted to the following language as

alleged by Wife:

¶ 21. During the conference [with DHO Conley], the

parties negotiated the terms of the MSA wherein Wife

is to receive a rollover via [QDRO] from Husband’s

Ameritas IRA in the amount of $368,126. However, a

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typographical error occurred, and the amount of the

rollover entered into the MSA is $361,126. See MSA

page 11, paragraph 10a.

Husband further admitted, by his failure to specifically deny,

that:

¶ 24. Counsel for both parties concur that there was

a mutual mistake in the typographical error and the

Divorce Hearing Officer’s memorandum refers to the

[c]ourt’s ability to reform a contract in the event of

mutual mistake.

Finally, in his Answer with New Matter, Husband asserted

that he did not believe the MSA “was fair,” that “Wife has

claimed items that are rightfully his,” that he believes she

might “steal items” if permitted in the former marital

residence and that as such, he wants to be present at any

property retrieval, that Wife’s attorney “prepared the MSA”

and that the MSA “should be strictly construed against the

scrivener and an error by the scrivener should be binding on

the party the scrivener represents.”

A hearing was held before this [c]ourt on July 1, 2024, on

the Petition to Enforce. At that hearing, Husband agreed

that he signed the MSA at the February 29, 2024 settlement

conference but that he was pressed for time, “under

distress” and didn’t fully read it. He claimed that after he

got home he read it “and was sorry I signed it.” He agreed

that in the MSA, he gave a portion of his Ameritas IRA to

Wife. He denied, however, that he agreed to transfer

$368,126 to Wife but only to the figure in the MSA, of

$361,126.

Husband later testified that after Wife contested the amount

due under the QDRO, he decided that “I ought to be able to

contest these things [property items] that I don’t really—I

didn’t really feel good about.” He also believed Wife had

stolen other items from him. He went through the list of

items due Wife and identified a few he believed should

remain with him.

Wife testified that she had arranged with Husband, through

their respective attorneys, to make a property exchange on

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April 12, 2024, for the items to which she was entitled under

MSA Exhibit A, and which items she still seeks to retrieve.

She also testified and verified that she paid fees to her

attorney in order to enforce the MSA, which as of the

hearing date, totaled $3,510.35.

(Trial Court Opinion, dated 9/24/24, at 1-3) (some footnotes and record

citations omitted).

On July 3, 2024, the trial court issued an order finding that there was

an agreement of the minds as to the terms of the MSA, specifically, “that

Husband was to transfer $368,126 from his Ameritas IRA account ending in

number X2283 to an IRA account designated by [Wife]. Due to a scrivener’s

error that resulted in a mutual mistake, Paragraph 10(a) of the MSA provides

for the transfer of $361,126.” (Order, 7/3/24). Because the court concluded

that the error was not based on a lack of a meeting of the minds, it deemed

the MSA enforceable. The court also found that the parties agreed to the

exchange of personalty, and ordered that Husband shall arrange to have a

constable or counsel present in order to allow for the peaceful access and

transfer of the personal items listed in Exhibit A of the MSA. Finally, the court

awarded counsel fees in the amount of $3,510.35 to Wife.

Husband filed a timely notice of appeal on July 30, 2024. Pursuant to

the court’s order, Husband filed a concise statement of errors complained of

on appeal on August 23, 2024.

Husband raises the following three issues on appeal:

1. Whether the [trial] court erred in modifying the amount

in the MSA?

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2. Whether the [trial] court erred in ordering [Husband] to

comply with the exchange of personal property?

3. Whether the [trial] court erred in awarding [Wife]

attorney fees?

(Husband’s Brief at 4) (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

In his first issue, Husband argues that the trial court erred in reforming

the MSA to reflect that he must pay $368,126 to Wife. Initially, Husband

agrees that a typographical error occurred, and he acknowledges that such a

scrivener’s error may be the basis for reformation of a settlement agreement.

Nevertheless, Husband claims that the court may only reform the agreement

if the correct amount is established, and he insists that there was no

agreement as to what the amount should have been. Husband contends that

at the hearing on the petition to enforce the MSA, Wife offered no testimony

or evidence that the parties agreed for Husband to transfer Wife $368,126.

Husband concludes the trial court abused its discretion when it determined

that $368,126 was the correct amount the parties agreed to transfer in the

MSA, and this Court must grant relief. We disagree.

“It is well established that in Pennsylvania, a settlement agreement

between a husband and wife is governed by the law of contracts unless the

agreement itself provides otherwise.” Brower v. Brower, 604 A.2d 726, 730

(Pa.Super. 1992) (internal brackets, citation, and quotation marks omitted).

When interpreting a marital settlement agreement, “the trial

court is the sole determiner of facts and absent an abuse of

discretion, we will not usurp the trial court’s fact-finding

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function. On appeal from an order interpreting a marital

settlement agreement, we must decide whether the trial

court committed an error of law or abused its discretion.

Stamerro v. Stamerro, 889 A.2d 1251, 1257 (Pa.Super. 2005) (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted). “It is well-settled that this Court is

bound by the trial court’s credibility determinations.” Lewis v. Lewis, 234

A.3d 706, 711 (Pa.Super. 2020). Furthermore, “[w]e observe that factual

statements by a ‘party in pleadings ... made for that party’s benefit, are

termed judicial admissions and are binding on the party.’ Judicial admissions

are automatically considered ‘true and cannot be contradicted by the

admitting party.’” Est. of Sacchetti v. Sacchetti, 128 A.3d 273, 283

(Pa.Super. 2015), appeal denied, 636 Pa. 678, 145 A.3d 728 (2016) (quoting

Cogley v. Duncan, 32 A.3d 1288, 1292 (Pa.Super. 2011)).

Contract interpretation is a question of law, for which our standard of

review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Stamerro, supra at

1257.

Marital settlement agreements are “private undertakings

between two parties, each having responded to the ‘give

and take’ of negotiations and bargained consideration.”

Brower[, supra at 731]. A marital support agreement

incorporated but not merged into the divorce decree

survives the decree and is enforceable at law or equity.

Gaster v. Gaster, 703 A.2d 513 (Pa.Super. 1997). “A

settlement agreement between [spouses] is governed by

the law of contracts unless the agreement provides

otherwise.” [Chen v. Chen, 840 A.2d 355, 360 (Pa.Super.

2003), appeal granted in part, 578 Pa. 433, 853 A.2d 1011

(2004).] The terms of a marital settlement agreement

cannot be modified by a court in the absence of a specific

provision in the agreement providing for judicial

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modification. Brower, supra at 730; 23 Pa.C.S.A. §

3105(c).

Stamerro, supra at 1258. “It has long been the law that courts of equity

have the power to reform a written instrument where there has been a

showing of fraud, accident or mistake.” Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. O’Hanlon,

968 A.2d 765, 770 (Pa.Super. 2009) (citing Giant Food Stores, LLC v. THF

Silver Spring Development, L.P., 959 A.2d 438, 449 (Pa.Super. 2008)).

We most commonly have allowed reformation of mistaken

contract provisions in cases of “scriveners’ errors,” where

the parties’ writing mistakenly failed to record their agreed-

upon intentions. In such situations, the court may reform

the contract document so that its language conforms to

what the parties intended.

Murray v. Willistown Twp., 169 A.3d 84, 91 (Pa.Super. 2017).

[M]istake of a scrivener in preparing a deed, will, or other

writing may be established by parol evidence and the

instrument reformed accordingly. [W]hether the mistake be

unilateral or bilateral, the quality of proof required to

establish the existence of the mistake is the same; that

proof of the mistake must be established by evidence that

is clear, precise, convincing, and of the most satisfactory

character.

In re Mihordin, 162 A.3d 1166, 1172 (Pa.Super. 2017), appeal denied, 645

Pa. 434, 180 A.3d 1212 (2018) (internal citations and quotation marks

omitted; brackets in original).

Instantly, in his answer to Wife’s petition to enforce the MSA, Husband

admitted that the parties negotiated that Wife would receive a rollover in the

amount of $368,126 from Husband’s Ameritas IRA, and he also admitted that

the amount of rollover stated in the MSA ($361,126) was a typographical

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error. Furthermore, as the DHO explained in the telephone conference

memorandum, counsel for both parties concurred during the conference that

there was a typographical error in Paragraph 10 of the MSA concerning the

IRA rollover amount. Following the telephone conference, the trial court

conducted a hearing on Wife’s petition to enforce the MSA. At the hearing,

Husband testified that he did not agree to transfer $368,126 to Wife. (See

N.T. Hearing, 7/1/24, at 11-12). After hearing testimony from the parties,

the trial court found:

[T]here was a meeting of the minds as to the terms of the

marital settlement agreement. The parties agreed that

Husband … was to transfer $368,126 from his Ameritas IRA

account … to an IRA account designated by [Wife].

Due to a scrivener’s error that resulted in a mutual mistake,

Paragraph 10(a) of the [MSA] provides for the transfer of

$361,126. By [o]rder of this [c]ourt, that number is

changed to $368,126.

(Id. at 33).

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court further explained that the

amount set forth in Paragraph 10 of the MSA did not reflect the parties’ actual

intent at the time they entered into the contract. The court stated:

The record was clear that the higher figure was the

negotiated figure and intended by the parties as a term of

settlement. Husband’s testimony to the contrary was not

credible in light of his earlier explicit admissions in his

Answer to the Petition to Enforce that it was a “typographical

error” and “mutual mistake.” These admissions were in

addition to the concurrence of Husband’s attorney and DHO

Conley that a mutual mistake occurred.

(Trial Court Opinion at 6) (internal record citation omitted). Thus, the court

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concluded that “given the clear existence of a mutual mistake, it was proper

for this [c]ourt to reform the MSA terms to what the parties intended.” (Id.

at 7).

Upon review, we conclude that Wife provided sufficient evidence of a

mistake by way of a scrivener’s error to permit the trial court to reform the

MSA. See Murray, supra. The trial court based its findings of fact on the

admissions represented in the DHO’s telephone conference memorandum,

Husband’s answer to the petition to enforce, and on the testimony from the

July 1, 2024 hearing. See Sacchetti, supra. As the trial court observed,

Husband admitted in his answer to Wife’s petition to enforce that the parties

agreed Husband would rollover $368,126, and that the $361,126 amount

entered into the MSA was a typographical error. (See Answer, 5/13/24, at

¶¶ 21-23). The trial court accepted this admission, and rejected as incredible

Husband’s testimony at the July 1, 2024 hearing refuting the agreement

reached by the parties. We are bound by credibility decisions of trial court,

which are supported by the record. See Lewis, supra. The record supports

the trial court’s findings that the $361,126 amount stated in the MSA was a

scrivener’s error.1 See Stamerro, supra. We further conclude that Wife

____________________________________________

1 We note that the trial court referred to the typographical error in the MSA as

both a “scrivener’s error” and a “mutual mistake.” A “mutual mistake” “occurs

when the parties to the contract have an erroneous belief as to a basic

assumption of the contract at the time of formation” and therefore “the written

instrument fails to set forth the true agreement of the parties.” Murray,

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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presented sufficient evidence that the parties had intended the MSA to reflect

a rollover amount of $368,126. Therefore, the trial court appropriately

reformed the MSA to reflect the agreed-upon amount. See Murray, supra;

In re Mihordin, supra. Accordingly, Husband’s first issue is meritless.

In his second issue, Husband contends that the trial court erred when it

ordered him to facilitate the exchange of the personal property set forth in

Exhibit A of the MSA. Husband asserts that many of the items listed in Exhibit

A are highlighted in yellow, but some are not. Husband claims that because

of the highlighting he had “a feeling that [Wife] was not entitled to all the

property.” (Husband’s Brief at 9). Husband contends that because the MSA

does not clarify the highlighting, the contract was too vague to be enforced,

and this Court must grant relief. We disagree.

Preliminarily, we must discern whether Husband preserved this issue for

our review. It is well-settled that “[i]ssues not raised in the trial court are

waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).

Notably, “a theory of error different from that presented to the trial jurist is

waived on appeal, even if both theories support the same basic allegation of

error which gives rise to the claim for relief.” Carlino E. Brandywine, L.P.

____________________________________________

supra at 90 (quoting Voracek v. Crown Castle USA Inc., 907 A.2d 1105,

1107-08 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied, 591 Pa. 716, 919 A.2d 958

(2007)). Here, the evidence supports the trial court’s determination that the

MSA contained a scrivener’s error. (See N.T. Hearing, 7/1/24, at 33). We

affirm the order of the trial court based on the scrivener’s error.

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v. Brandywine Vill. Ass’n, 197 A.3d 1189, 1200-01 (Pa.Super. 2018)

(internal citation omitted).

Here, the trial court explained:

The reasons Husband testified to [for not complying with the

exchange of personal property] included his belief that,

because Wife contested the amount due under the QDRO,

he “ought to be able to contest [the property items] that I

don’t really – I didn’t really feel good about.” He also

refused to comply because he believed Wife had stolen

items from him.

(Trial Court Opinion at 7) (internal record citations omitted).

Our review of the record supports the trial court’s statements. Husband

did not present any argument in the trial court that the MSA was invalid

because of highlighting in the MSA. Specifically, Husband did not raise any

concern with the highlighting in his Answer to the petition to enforce or in his

testimony before the court on the hearing. Because Husband did not raise

this argument before the trial court, Husband’s second issue is waived. See

Carlino E. Brandywine, L.P., supra.

In his third issue, Husband argues that the trial court erred when it

awarded attorney’s fees to Wife. Husband contends that he did not commit

any wrongdoing in refusing to comply with the MSA because he believed that

the preceding issues had arguable merit. Husband insists that he had

reasonable cause to present these issues and his behavior was not designed

to harass or annoy. Husband concludes the court abused its discretion in

awarding attorney’s fees to Wife, and this Court must grant relief. We

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disagree.

“Appellate review of a trial court’s order awarding attorney’s fees to a

litigant is limited solely to determining whether the trial court palpably abused

its discretion in making a fee award.” Thunberg v. Strause, 545 Pa. 607,

614-15, 682 A.2d 295, 299 (1996).

An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment,

but if in reaching a conclusion, the law is overridden or

misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly

unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or

ill-will, as shown by the evidence of record. Review of the

grant of counsel fees is limited ... and we will reverse only

upon a showing of plain error.

Habjan v. Habjan, 73 A.3d 630, 642 (Pa.Super. 2013) (internal quotation

marks, citations, and brackets omitted). “Under the American Rule, applicable

in Pennsylvania, a litigant cannot recover counsel fees from an adverse party

unless there is express statutory authorization, a clear agreement of the

parties, or some other established exception.” Trizechahn Gateway LLC v.

Titus, 601 Pa. 637, 652, 976 A.2d 474, 482-483 (2009). See also McMullen

v. Kutz, 603 Pa. 602, 613-15, 985 A.2d 769, 776-77 (2009) (explaining that

“parties may contract to provide for the breaching party to pay the attorney

fees of the prevailing party in a breach of contract case”).

Instantly, Paragraph 19 of the MSA provides:

If either party breaches any provision of [the MSA], the

other party shall have the right, as his or her election, to

sue for damages for such breach or seek such other

remedies or relief as may be available to him or her, and

the party breaching this contract shall be responsible for

payment of legal fees and costs incurred by the other in

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enforcing their rights under [the MSA].

(MSA at ¶ 19). Paragraph 20 of the MSA further provides that, except in the

case of breach, each party to the MSA would otherwise be responsible for his

or her own attorney’s fees. (See MSA at ¶ 20).

Paragraph 6 of the MSA governs division of the parties’ personal

property. Therein, Husband agreed to transfer all personal property listed in

the attached Exhibit A to Wife. (See MSA at ¶ 6). Wife agreed to provide

three proposed dates in which she could retrieve the property, after which

Husband agreed to select a date and arrange for the presence of a constable

on the date and time Wife retrieves her personal property. (See id.)

At the hearing on Wife’s petition to enforce, Wife testified that she had

arranged with Husband, through their attorneys, to make a property exchange

on April 12, 2024; however, Husband did not permit her to go to the property

to get her belongings. (See N.T. Hearing, 7/1/24, at 15). Husband explained

that he was entitled to contest the property items that he did not “really feel

good about.” (Id. at 25). Husband then suggested certain items from the list

that he felt should be turned over to Wife, and items that he believed should

remain with him. (Id. at 27-28). At the close of the hearing, the trial court

found that Husband failed to comply with the property division agreed to by

the parties under Paragraph 6 of the MSA, gave Husband 30 days in which to

comply with the MSA and allow for the peaceful transfer of property, and found

that Husband was responsible for $3,510.35 in Wife’s attorney fees. (Id. at

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33-34).

In its opinion, the trial court further explained:

This [c]ourt found that Husband did not raise any fair or

legitimate arguments before the [c]ourt; instead, the

evidence overwhelmingly supported a finding of his breach

of MSA ¶¶ 6 and 10. MSA ¶ 20 permits a party to collect

attorney’s fees from the party who breaches the MSA. Wife

presented more than sufficient evidence of Husband’s

breaches, outlined above. In addition, Wife presented

sufficient testimony supporting the amount of fees she has

incurred. In addition, this [c]ourt held that Wife was entitled

to counsel fees under the Judicial Code due to Husband’s

obdurate and vexatious conduct.

(Trial Court Opinion at 7) (citations omitted).

Upon review, we find no error of law or abuse of discretion in the court’s

finding that Husband breached the MSA and is therefore responsible for

payment of Wife’s attorney’s fees incurred in enforcing her rights under the

MSA.2 See Trizechahn, supra; Habjan, supra. Thus, Husband’s third issue

merits no relief. Accordingly, we affirm.

Order affirmed.

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2 We note that the trial court also found that Husband’s “actions post marital

settlement agreement were obdurate and vexatious” and that the imposition

of counsel fees would also be appropriate on that basis. (See N.T. Hearing,

7/1/24, at 35).

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Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 07/22/2025

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