Opinion

The City of Dallas v. Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas

Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin)
Filed: Jul 17, 2025
Status: Published
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 38.1%

recognizing that party may plead itself out of court by pleading facts that affirmatively negate its cause of action

How later courts described this case

recognizing that party may plead itself out of court by pleading facts that affirmatively negate its cause of action
noting that party who challenges legal sufficiency of adverse finding on issue on which it did not have burden of proof must demonstrate on appeal that no evidence supports that adverse finding
holding that when governmental entity makes 2 good-faith request for clarification of unclear or overbroad public-information request, ten-day period to request AG opinion runs from date request is clarified

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-23-00433-CV

The City of Dallas, Appellant

Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE 200TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY

NO. D-1-GN-19-003589, THE HONORABLE JESSICA MANGRUM, JUDGE PRESIDING

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The City of Dallas appeals the district court’s final order granting the Attorney

General’s plea to the jurisdiction in the City’s suit under the Texas Public Information Act (PIA).

See Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 552.001-.376. The suit challenged the AG’s letters concerning

disclosure of information that the City had flagged as attorney-client privileged communications.

The AG’s plea contended that the City’s suit was untimely. See id. § 552.324(b) (stating that

governmental body seeking declaratory relief from compliance with AG’s decision must bring

suit under PIA against AG “not later than the 30th calendar day after the date the governmental

body receives the decision of the attorney general”). The City responded that (1) the AG did not

send the City his letter ordering release of the requested information for alleged noncompliance

with the PIA; (2) the AG did not review the representative sample of attorney-client privileged

communications that the City timely submitted in support of an exception to public disclosure;

and (3) there is a factual dispute about whether the City missed the suit’s filing deadline because

the City never received a decision from the AG on the City’s claimed exception for

attorney-client privileged communications, only a list of over 150 decisions that were posted to

the AG’s website, from which the City itself downloaded a May 17, 2018 letter ordering

disclosure. For the following reasons, we will vacate the district court’s final order granting the

plea to the jurisdiction and remand this cause for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

City requests AG decision on PIA exemption for privileged attorney-client communications

The City received a PIA request from Ruth Torres on February 26, 2018, seeking

all documents relating to certain housing-discrimination complaints. The City sought

clarification of Torres’s request, which she provided the next day. Anticipating that some of the

requested information was exempt from mandatory disclosure, the City asserted protection under

the PIA section applicable to privileged attorney-client communications, raised exceptions in

other sections of the PIA generally, and sought a decision from the AG. See Tex. Gov’t Code

§§ 552.107 (PIA exception for information that attorney of political subdivision is prohibited

from disclosing because of duty to client under Texas Rules of Evidence or Texas Disciplinary

Rules of Professional Conduct), .301 (establishing procedures for governmental body to request

AG’s decision about whether requested information is within statutory exception).

The City timely sent its request for the AG’s decision on March 13, 2018. See id.

§ 552.301(b) (requiring governmental body to request AG’s decision on claimed exception no

later than tenth business day after date written request is received); see also City of Dallas

v. Abbott, 304 S.W.3d 380, 384 (Tex. 2010) (holding that when governmental entity makes

good-faith request for clarification of unclear or overbroad public-information request, ten-day

period to request AG opinion runs from date request is clarified). Then on March 16, 2018, the

City timely submitted to the AG written comments explaining why some of Torres’s requested

information is excepted from public disclosure as privileged attorney-client communications,

along with a representative sample of the attorney-client communications contained in Torres’s

requested information. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.301 (stating that governmental body seeking

exception to public disclosure must, not later than 15th business day after receiving written

request, provide written comments stating reasons why stated exceptions apply and provide

representative samples of information if voluminous amount of information is requested).

However, the AG did not review the timely submitted written comments and representative

sample before making his decision regarding disclosure.

AG orders disclosure for alleged lack of written comments and representative sample

On May 17, 2018, an assistant AG in the Open Records Division “issued” the

AG’s letter ordering disclosure. See Tex. Att’y Gen. OR2018-11726. The letter faulted the City

for failing to submit written comments and a representative sample. Based on the alleged

omission of these items and a presumption in section 552.301 of the Government Code that the

information is public under such circumstances, the AG ordered the requested information

released for noncompliance with the PIA:

As of the date of this letter, you have not submitted for our review written

comments stating the reasons why the claimed exceptions apply, or a copy or

representative sample of the information requested. Consequently, we find the

city failed to comply with the requirements of section 552.301 of the

Government Code.

Pursuant to section 552.302 of the Government Code, a governmental body’s

failure to comply with the procedural requirements of section 552.301 results in

the legal presumption that the requested information is public and must be

released unless there is a compelling reason to withhold the information from

disclosure. [Citations omitted]. Although the city raises exceptions to disclosure,

because you have not submitted the requested information for our review, we

have no basis for finding any of the information excepted from disclosure. Thus,

we have no choice but to order the requested information released pursuant to

section 552.302. If you believe the information is confidential and may not

lawfully be released, you must challenge this ruling in court pursuant to section

552.324 of the Government Code.

(Emphasis added.)

In an April 1, 2019 letter, an assistant city attorney disputed the AG’s allegation

that the City had omitted written comments justifying the attorney-client privilege exception and

a representative sample of the requested information showing the attorney-client

communications within Torres’s PIA request. The City pointed out that it had timely submitted

its written comments and representative sample through the AG’s PIA electronic-filing system,

provided proof that files containing the comments and representative sample were successfully

uploaded to that system, and requested consideration of the submitted items that the AG

had overlooked:

On March 5, 2019, our office received your letter indicating that you had not

received written comments stating the reasons why claimed exceptions apply or a

copy or representative sample of the information pertaining to OR2018-11726.

Attached are copies of the confirmation email and webpage evidencing that our

office submitted the letter via the Official Texas Attorney General Public

Information Act Electronic Filing System. (see Exhibit B).

We respectfully request your consideration of the attached materials:

By electronic submission received by the city of Dallas (“[C]ity”) on February 26,

2018, Ruth Torres submitted a request for information pertaining to

specified records.

The information requested by Ruth Torres has been previously sent to your office

for an open records decision on March 13, 2018 (see Exhibit C). The City

expanded on that request in a subsequent letter on March 16, 2018 (see

Exhibit C).

In a June 6, 2019 reply, the assistant AG in the Open Records Division who

issued the AG’s May 17, 2018 letter informed the City that a new identification number was

assigned to the City’s April 1 letter, indicated that the City’s letter was deemed a prohibited

“reconsideration” request, and advised the City of the option to file a challenge in district court:

You ask this office to reconsider Open Records Letter No. 2018-11726 (2018).

Your request was assigned ID# 768956.

Section 552.301(f) of the Government Code provides that a governmental body is

prohibited from asking for a reconsideration of the attorney general’s decision.[1]

[Citation omitted.] Therefore, unless you file a timely challenge in district court,

you must comply with Open Records Letter No. 2018-11726.[2]

Subsection 552.301(f) requires a determination from the AG concerning the precise

information at issue before a governmental body must release the requested information:

A governmental body must release the requested information and is prohibited

from asking for a decision from the attorney general about whether information

requested under this chapter is within an exception under Subchapter C if:

(1) the governmental body has previously requested and received a

determination from the attorney general concerning the precise

information at issue in a pending request; and

(2) the attorney general or a court determined that the information is

public information under this chapter that is not excepted by

Subchapter C.

Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.301(f) (emphasis added).

The AG now says that by the time it issued its June 6, 2019 letter, the City could not

possibly have filed a timely challenge in district court.

This letter did not address the City’s submission of its written comments and representative

sample through the AG’s PIA electronic-filing system. 3

City sues and AG files plea to jurisdiction

Less than 30 days later, on June 21, 2019, the City sued the AG challenging the

May 17, 2018 letter ordering disclosure and the June 6, 2019 letter declining the alleged request

for reconsideration. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.324(b) (stating that governmental body seeking

declaratory relief from compliance with AG’s decision must bring suit under PIA against AG

within 30 calendar days after date governmental body receives AG’s decision). The City sought

a judgment declaring that the information at issue is excepted from public disclosure under the

PIA as privileged attorney-client communication.

The AG filed a plea to the jurisdiction contending that the City “received a

decision about the information at issue” and that the City’s suit was untimely under the PIA

because it was not filed within 30 days of when the City received the AG’s decision. See id. In

support of the plea, the AG attached evidence of the May 17, 2018 letter and the June 6, 2019

letter declining the alleged request for reconsideration. Relying on paragraph 6 of the City’s

original petition, the plea also argued that the City received a copy of the AG’s May 17, 2018

letter on March 5, 2019. Torres moved to intervene in the suit, see id. § 552.325, and to join the

AG’s plea. She disputed the City’s assertion of attorney-client privilege and argued that she was

the City’s “actual client.”

The City filed an amended petition, which was its live pleading at the hearing. In

its amended petition, the City alleged that it did not receive the May 17, 2018 letter from the AG:

This letter from the AG is unclear about whether the City’s submitted documents were

returned and enclosed: “Enc: Submitted documents [delete if no docs].”

After diligent search, Plaintiff has been unable to locate any record of having

received Open Records Letter No. OR2018–11726 from Defendant. Instead,

Plaintiff did not become aware that a decision relating to the March 13 and March

16 requests for an attorney general ruling had been issued until March 5, 2019.

That was the day when an employee of Plaintiff received from Defendant’s Open

Records Division a list of rulings, including Open Records Letter No. OR2018–

11726, and then accessed and downloaded the decision from Defendant’s website.

The AG did not amend his plea, which continued to rely on paragraph 6 of a superseded petition.

The City’s response to the plea to the jurisdiction included evidence of its letters

to the AG, including the March 16 letter that timely submitted the City’s written comments and a

representative sample identifying the attorney-client privileged communications—between an

attorney in the City Attorney’s Office and its client, a City department—within the PIA request.

The City argued that these letters disproved the AG’s allegation about the City’s alleged

noncompliance with the PIA and that the AG mischaracterized the City’s attempt to clarify the

status of its request for decision as a request for “reconsideration” of a decision on the comments

and representative sample that the AG said was not provided and thus, evaded review despite

their timely submission. Among other arguments, the City contended that (1) there was no proof

that the AG sent a decision to the City; (2) the City never received its requested decision from

the AG as to the timely submitted comments and representative sample at issue; and (3) the City

timely filed suit on June 26, 2019, within thirty days of the AG’s June 6, 2019 letter stating that

the City made a prohibited request for reconsideration. Cf. id. § 552.301(f); cf. also San Jacinto

River Auth. v. Paxton, No. 03-19-00547-CV, 2019 WL 3952829, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin

Aug. 22, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that party could not seek reconsideration of

whether requested information fell within exception to public disclosure when party’s request for

AG decision was submitted untimely).

The district court convened a hearing on the plea to the jurisdiction and

considered the parties’ submitted evidence. During the hearing, the district court asked the

assistant AG to “share with the Court how the Attorney General sends these letters” because “no

one is telling me what happened to this correspondence.” Rather than responding about how a

decision on the claimed exception from disclosure was sent to the City, the assistant AG

addressed how copies of PIA rulings are sent to a requestor 4:

The Public Information Act imposes a deadline on the Attorney General to reach

a decision. . . . And then it just requires that we send a copy to the request[o]r, but

it doesn’t prescribe any particular method. We just send it regular mail, Your

Honor, and frankly, we do tens of thousands of these a year. So, some of that,

candidly, is just budgetary. Right? I mean, it would be a tremendous expense and

undertaking if we were obtaining return receipt on the thousands and thousands of

tens of thousands of PIA rulings that we send out.

The assistant AG argued that the AG’s May 17, 2018 letter “was served up” to the City because

“[t]hey received it from our [w]ebsite. So, even if they didn’t get it in the mail, there’s no—like

we said, there’s no requirement of that.”

Torres told the district court that she never “got any notices.” The City similarly

denied that the AG had sent the May 17, 2018 letter by “regular mail” or any other method.

Rather, the City “reached out to the Attorney General to request status on several outstanding

cases, and in response to that email the Attorney General sent the City a list of well over 150

outstanding decisions.” The City went to the AG’s website and “fish[ed] through” those 150

decisions before locating the AG’s May 17, 2018 letter. But the City was uncertain that the letter

“Requestor” is defined in the PIA as “a person who submits a request to a governmental

body for inspection or copies of public information.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.003(6); see id.

§ 552.306 (requiring AG to render decision determining whether requested information is within

exception to disclosure and distinguishing between “governmental body” and “requestor”).

retrieved was intended for this case because of the letter’s factual inaccuracies about what the

City had allegedly omitted from its request to the AG. The City told the district court that Torres

has no right or entitlement to privileged attorney-client documents and communications, which

the City has an ethical duty to protect.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court granted the plea. The City filed

a motion for new trial that the district court heard and denied. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Standard of review

The City contends that the district court erred in granting the AG’s plea to the

jurisdiction. Statutory prerequisites to suit are jurisdictional requirements for claims against

governmental entities, and a governmental entity may challenge a plaintiff’s noncompliance with

a statutory prerequisite in a plea to the jurisdiction. City of Madisonville v. Sims, 620 S.W.3d

375, 377 (Tex. 2020). We review a trial court’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction de novo.

Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex. 2004); County of

Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002). A plea to the jurisdiction may challenge

the facts pleaded and, relevant here, the existence of jurisdictional facts by attaching evidence to

the plea. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226-27. 5 “[T]he statutory prerequisite in PIA section 552.324

that a governmental body file suit seeking declaratory relief from an Attorney General decision

Although the AG’s plea to the jurisdiction included a challenge to the City’s

pleadings—contending in substance that the City had pleaded itself out of court by alleging facts

in paragraph 6 that affirmatively negated the timely filing of its cause of action against the AG—

the City’s original petition was superseded by an amended petition that did not contain similar

allegations, and the AG did not amend his plea. Cf. Texas Dep’t of Corr. v. Herring, 513 S.W.2d

6, 9 (Tex. 1974) (recognizing that party may plead itself out of court by pleading facts that

affirmatively negate its cause of action). Thus, we consider the remaining challenge to the

existence of jurisdictional facts raised in the AG’s plea to the jurisdiction.

on a PIA request within thirty days of receipt of that decision is jurisdictional.” San Jacinto

River Auth., 2019 WL 3952829, at *3; see City of Jacksboro v. Two Bush Cmty. Action Grp.,

No. 03-10-00860-CV, 2012 WL 2509804, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin June 28, 2012, pet. denied)

(mem. op.) (noting that “[j]urisdictional facts are facts that relate to whether jurisdiction exists”).

A plea to the jurisdiction that challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts

requires consideration of the relevant evidence submitted by the parties and necessary to

resolving the jurisdictional issues raised. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227. When, as here, a

challenge to the existence of jurisdictional facts does not implicate the merits of the case and the

facts are disputed, the trial court must make fact findings necessary to resolve the jurisdictional

issue. See id. at 226. When the trial court does not issue findings of fact, which was not done

here, we presume that the trial court resolved all factual disputes in favor of its determination.

See American Type Culture Collection, Inc. v. Coleman, 83 S.W.3d 801, 806 (Tex. 2002). We

then determine whether the trial court’s implied findings are supported by legally sufficient

evidence. BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002). We review

the entire record to determine if any evidence supports jurisdiction. Texas Ass’n of Bus. v. Texas

Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993).

The jurisdictional evidence here involves the timeliness of the City’s suit, rather

than its merits, which involve the claim of attorney-client privilege as to information Torres

requested under the PIA. The jurisdictional issue is whether the City presented any evidence that

it filed suit against the AG within 30 days of the City’s receipt of the AG’s decision concerning

the required disclosure of the precise information at issue under the PIA. See Tex. Gov’t Code

§§ 552.301(f), .324(b). The crux of the disagreement is when the City received a decision from

the AG about whether the City’s timely submitted comments and representative sample showed

that the information requested from the City included privileged attorney-client communications

excepted from public disclosure. See id. § 552.107.

By granting the plea to the jurisdiction on the record presented at the hearing, the

district court impliedly found that, after the AG issued a decision to the City concerning the

required disclosure of the precise information at issue, the City received that decision but did not

file suit against the AG within 30 days of its receipt. To prevail, the City must establish that

there is no evidence supporting the district court’s implied finding that the City’s suit was filed

untimely. See Graham Cent. Station, Inc. v. Peña, 442 S.W.3d 261, 263 (Tex. 2014) (noting that

party who challenges legal sufficiency of adverse finding on issue on which it did not have

burden of proof must demonstrate on appeal that no evidence supports that adverse finding).

We sustain a legal-sufficiency or no-evidence challenge if the record shows:

(1) the complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; (2) that the court is barred by the rules of

law or evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (3) that the

evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a scintilla; or (4) that the evidence

establishes conclusively the opposite of a vital fact. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802,

810 (Tex. 2005). In reviewing a no-evidence challenge, we view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the finding, crediting favorable evidence if a reasonable fact finder could and

disregarding contrary evidence unless a reasonable fact finder could not. Id. at 827. The

ultimate test for legal sufficiency is whether the evidence would enable reasonable and

fair-minded people to make the finding under review. Id.

Legal sufficiency of implied finding of untimeliness

The Attorney General’s plea to the jurisdiction contended that the PIA’s 30-day

deadline to file suit is jurisdictional and that the City must release all Torres’s requested

information—regardless of whether it includes any attorney-client-privileged communications

excepted from disclosure—because the City missed that deadline. As evidence in support of the

plea, the AG attached (1) the letter issued May 17, 2018, faulting the City for failing to submit

written comments and a representative sample in support of its claimed exceptions to disclosure

and (2) the subsequent letter issued June 6, 2019, addressing what the AG characterized as the

City’s request for “reconsideration of the attorney general’s decision.”

Once the AG has determined that the public information must be disclosed, a

governmental body’s only way to avoid disclosing that information is a suit against the AG

seeking relief from compliance with his decision. Paxton v. City of Dallas, 509 S.W.3d 247, 266

(Tex. 2017); see Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.324. Section 552.324 of the PIA provides

(a) The only suit a governmental body may file seeking to withhold information

from a requestor is a suit that:

(1) is filed in a Travis County district court against the attorney general in

accordance with Section 552.325; and

(2) seeks declaratory relief from compliance with a decision by the

attorney general issued under Subchapter G.

(b) The governmental body must bring the suit not later than the 30th calendar

day after the date the governmental body receives the decision of the attorney

general determining that the requested information must be disclosed to the

requestor. If the governmental body does not bring suit within that period, the

governmental body shall comply with the decision of the attorney general. If a

governmental body wishes to preserve an affirmative defense for its officer for

public information as provided in Section 552.353(b)(3), suit must be filed within

the deadline provided in Section 552.353(b)(3).

Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.324. Here, the AG’s plea to the jurisdiction recites as a “fact[]” that the

City received the AG’s May 17, 2018 letter on March 5, 2019, citing paragraph 6 of the City’s

original petition. As we have noted, this pleading was superseded by the City’s amended

petition, the live pleading when the district court heard the AG’s plea, and the AG did not amend

his plea. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 65 (stating that when pleading is substituted for earlier instrument,

earlier one is no longer regarded part of pleading in record); Sumner v. Board of Adjustments,

No. 01-14-00888-CV, 2015 WL 6163066, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 20, 2015,

pet. denied) (mem. op.) (noting that earlier-filed petition, superseded by amended one, provided

no basis for trial court’s ruling on plea to jurisdiction). Allegations in a superseded pleading are

no support for the district court’s ruling on the plea or its finding on this disputed

jurisdictional fact.

Alternatively, the AG argued at the plea hearing, as he does on appeal, that the

City received the AG’s May 17, 2018 letter that the AG “issued” to the City on March 5, 2019,

when the City downloaded it from the AG’s website. Because the download date is more than

30 days before the City filed its June 21, 2019 suit, the AG argued that the City’s suit was

untimely. The AG’s plea expressly acknowledged that the City’s suit “was brought within 30

days of the Attorney General’s June 6, 2019 letter.” But in the AG’s view, the City had already

“received a decision about the information at issue” by that time, and under this Court’s

precedent in San Jacinto River Authority, the 30-day period for filing suit could not begin with

“a reconsideration prohibition letter.” Cf. 2019 WL 3952829, at *3.

The City’s response to the plea included affidavits and its correspondence with

the AG showing that the City did not receive a determination from the AG concerning the

required disclosure of the precise information at issue. Cf. Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.301(f). The

affidavit from a paralegal with the City Attorney’s Office stated that the City was unable to

locate any record of receiving the AG’s May 17, 2018 letter. The affidavit also explained that

after a city employee received “a list of rulings” from the AG’s Open Records Division on

March 5, 2019, the AG’s website was accessed, and the May 17, 2018 letter was downloaded.

As noted, the City was uncertain that the letter retrieved was intended for this case because of the

letter’s factual inaccuracies about what the City had allegedly omitted from its request to the AG.

In its April 1, 2019 letter to the AG, the City pointed out that the City had timely

submitted its written comments and representative sample through the AG’s PIA

electronic-filing system, provided proof that files containing the comments and representative

sample were successfully uploaded to that system, and requested consideration of the submitted

items that the AG had overlooked. Rather than addressing the City’s timely submission of its

written comments and representative sample through the AG’s PIA electronic-filing system, the

AG decided on June 6, 2019, that the City had made a prohibited request for “reconsideration”

under subsection 552.301(f) of the Government Code. The AG then advised the City that it

would have to comply with the AG’s May 17, 2018 letter “unless you file a timely challenge in

district court,” although the AG now contends that filing a challenge on June 6, 2019, would

have been untimely. In sum, the City contends that it never received a decision from the AG

about whether the City’s timely submitted comments and representative sample showed that

Torres’s PIA request encompassed attorney-client privileged communications within the section

552.107 exception to public disclosure. We agree.

No evidence supports the district court’s implied finding that the City received a

decision from the AG concerning the required disclosure of the precise information at issue. The

AG did not state how the May 17, 2018 letter was sent to the City, only how copies of PIA

rulings are typically sent to requestors. An affidavit from the city’s paralegal denied any record

of receiving that letter from the AG. The AG asserted that even if he had not mailed that letter, it

“was served up” to the City because “[t]hey received it from our [w]ebsite.” That assertion

conflicts with the provisions of subsection 552.308(a), which address acceptable methods for

delivering any PIA notice, decision, or other document from the AG to required recipients.

Subsection 552.308(a) states in relevant part that when a request, notice, or other

document must be given to a person within a specified period, the requirement is timely met if

the document is “sent” to the person by first class United States mail or common or contract

carrier, properly addressed, with postage or handling charges prepaid and: (1) it bears a

post-office cancellation mark or a receipt mark of a common or contract carrier indicating a time

within the required period; or (2) the person required to give the document furnishes satisfactory

proof that it was deposited in the mail or with a common or contract carrier within the required

period. Id. §§ 552.308(a), .309 (allowing any notice, decision, or other document that Attorney

General must “deliver” within specified period to be sent electronically). Nothing in the record

shows that any of these delivery methods were used to send the Attorney General’s May 17,

2018 letter to the City (or to Torres). No PIA statute authorizes or addresses delivery only by

publication or website posting, as the AG suggested to the district court. Thus, there was no

evidence to support an implied finding that the City received an AG decision determining that

the precise information at issue must be disclosed more than 30 days before the City filed this

lawsuit. See id. § 552.324(b).

Further, the AG’s own evidence at the hearing showed that his May 17, 2018

letter relied on the false premise that the City’s request for a ruling on the applicability of the

attorney-client privilege was incomplete. Undisputed evidence before the district court at the

hearing showed that the City had timely submitted its comments and a representative sample

supporting its claimed exception for attorney-client privileged communications. The attorney

general had a duty under the PIA to review what the City had timely submitted in support of the

exception in section 552.107. See id. § 552.306(a) (requiring AG to promptly render requested

decision “determining whether requested information is within one of the exceptions of

Subchapter C”).

Then the AG relied on an omitted-information presumption to order the City’s

disclosure of the precise information at issue: