The opinion
1
2
3
4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
6
7 MICHAEL CRIBIER, individually and on Case No. 25-cv-02815-WHO
behalf of all others similarly situated,
8 ORDER TRANSFERRING VENUE
Plaintiff,
Re: Dkt. No. 16.
9
v.
10
COMPASS, INC.,
11
Defendant.
12
13 In this nationwide class action, plaintiff Michael Cribier alleges that defendant Compass,
14 Inc. (“Compass”), a national real estate brokerage company, violated the Telephone Consumer
15 Protection Act of 1991 (the “TPCA”) by “cold-calling” potential clients whose numbers were on
16 the National Do Not Call Registry. None of the parties reside in this district and none of the
17 events giving rise to Cribier’s claims occurred here. The Compass agents who “cold-called”
18 Cribier worked for a Compass branch that operates out of San Diego, California, which is within
19 the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. Cribier
20 himself lives in Las Vegas, Nevada, which is also not within this district.
21 Compass moved to dismiss the case for improper venue pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3) and 28
22 U.S.C. § 1406(a), or, in the alternative, to transfer it to the Southern District of California pursuant
23 to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). I will do the latter. Venue is clearly not proper here. Cribier requests that
24 if I transfer the case it should be to the United States District Court for the Southern District of
25 New York (because Compass is headquartered in New York) or to the District of Nevada (where
26 Cribier apparently now resides). Neither alternative venue is superior to the Southern District of
27 California. This matter was suitable for resolution without oral argument and I vacated the
1 giving rise to this litigation occurred in the Southern District of California, where there is local
2 interest in the controversy and easier access to evidence and witnesses, I will exercise my
3 discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) to transfer this case there.
4 BACKGROUND
5 On March 26, 2025, Cribier filed this putative class action alleging that Compass, through
6 its agents, violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. §§ 227, et seq. (the
7 “TCPA”). He claims that Compass and its contracted real estate agents knowingly and negligently
8 engaged in “cold-calling” practices towards potential clients on the National Do Not Call Registry
9 (“NDNCR”) in violation of the TCPA. Complaint (“Compl.”) [Dkt. No. 1] ¶¶ 126-133.
10 The events giving rise to this litigation transpired in San Diego, California. Cribier listed a
11 home that he owned in San Diego on the San Diego Multiple Listing Services, which is affiliated
12 with the National Association of Realtors; that listing is what prompted Compass agents operating
13 out of San Diego to place the at-issue calls. See Declaration of Kathy Mehringer (“Mehringer
14 Decl.”) [Dkt. No. 16-1] ¶ 8, Ex. A. The agents who contacted Cribier had San Diego area codes,
15 see Compl. ¶¶ 78, 83, and apparently operated out of a San Diego branch of a Compass subsidiary,
16 see Motion to Dismiss or Transfer (“Mot.”) [Dkt. No. 16] 8, 15, 20; Mehringer Decl. ¶ 4.
17 Today, Cribier’s residency is unclear. In his complaint, Cribier stated that he was “at all
18 [relevant] times” a “citizen and resident of the State of California.” Compl. ¶ 15. But in his
19 response to Compass’s Motion, Cribier’s counsel Alex Madar says that at the time that the
20 complaint was filed, Cribier’s primary residence was Las Vegas, Nevada.1 See
21 Opposition/Response (“Oppo.”) [Dkt. No. 19]. Madar declares that this information was
22 unavailable to him when he filed the complaint. Declaration of Alex Madar (“Madar Decl.”) [Dkt.
23 No. 19-1] ¶¶ 2-3 (“At the time of filing the Complaint in this matter, I was unaware that Plaintiff’s
24 primary residence was located in Las Vegas, Nevada”).
25 Defendants point out that in a different class action complaint that Cribier filed in the
26
27
1 In a footnote in its Reply, Compass notes that it is unclear whether Cribier has sold his property
1 Southern District of California less than a year before filing this action, Cribier stated he was a
2 citizen and resident of the State of California, County of San Diego. See Michael Cribier et al. v.
3 Carvana LLC, No. 3:24- cv-00094-DMS-JLB (filed Aug. 20, 2024, S.D. Cal.).2 Utility bills
4 attached to the Madar Declaration show that Cribier established his primary residence in Las
5 Vegas as early as October 18, 2024, roughly two months after Cribier filed Cribier v. Carvana, in
6 which he claimed to be a resident of San Diego. Id. ¶ 6 (citing Madar Decl., Ex. 1, which is an
7 energy bill dated October 18, 2024, for his Las Vegas address).3
8 Compass is a national real estate brokerage company formed under the laws of Delaware,
9 with its principal place of business in New York City. Motion to Change Venue (“Mot.”) [Dkt.
10 No. 16] 7. It has approximately 525 offices across the country and has about 33,000 real estate
11 agents working under its brand. Id. The Compass agents who made the at-issue calls to Cribier
12 are contracted with Compass California III, Inc. (“Compass CA”), a Compass entity and
13 subsidiary that operates out of Southern California. Id. 6-7. Compass CA does not operate in
14 Northern California. Mot. 8; Mehringer Decl. ¶ 7.
15 On May 23, 2025, Compass filed a Motion to Change Venue or to Dismiss, arguing that
16 the Northern District of California was the wrong venue for this case and asking that if I do not
17 dismiss the case outright, I transfer the proceedings to the Southern District of California. Cribier
18 opposes dismissal and asks that I transfer this case not to the Southern District of California, but
19 rather to the District of Nevada, where he now resides, or to the Southern District of New York,
20
21
2 The defendants ask that I take judicial notice the complaint in Cribier v. Carvana. Def’s Request
for Judicial Notice (“RJN”) [Dkt. No. 16-2]. As it is a publicly available document the
22
authenticity of which is not in question, I will take judicial notice of it. Cribier v. Carvana is
another putative class action, filed by Cribier in 2024, alleging that Carvana LLC “negligently,
23
knowingly, and/or willfully placed unsolicited text messages to Plaintiff and the putative class on
their respective cellular phone numbers which are registered with the National Do-Not Call
24
Registry and/or were on Defendants’ internal do-not-call records, all in violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227.” It is a very similar lawsuit.
25
3 Defendants accuse Cribier of intentionally obfuscating his address for the purpose of forum
26
shopping. I have no reason to believe that Cribier intentionally concealed his address from his
counsel, or that his counsel knew of Cribier’s changed residency when this complaint was filed;
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Cribier’s counsel has set forth by sworn declaration that Cribier’s change in residence was
1 where Compass is headquartered.
2 LEGAL STANDARD
3 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3), a defendant may move to dismiss a
4 complaint for improper venue. Generally, courts look to the venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391
5 to determine whether venue is proper. The general venue statute provides that a civil action may
6 be brought in:
(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the
7
State in which the district is located;
8 (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the
claim occurred, or a substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action is
9 situated; or
(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this
10 section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal
jurisdiction with respect to such action.
11
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1)–(3).
12
Once the defendant has challenged the propriety of venue in a given court, the plaintiff
13
bears the burden of showing that venue is proper. Piedmont Label Co. v. Sun Garden Packing Co.,
14
598 F.2d 491, 496 (9th Cir. 1979).
15
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), if the court determines that venue is improper, the court
16
must either dismiss the action or, if it is in the interests of justice, transfer the case to a district or
17
division in which it could have been brought. Whether to dismiss for improper venue, or
18
alternatively to transfer venue to a proper court, is a matter within the sound discretion of the
19
district court. See King v. Russell, 963 F.2d 1301, 1304 (9th Cir. 1992).
20
DISCUSSION
21
Cribier filed this action in the Northern District of California, where no parties reside and
22
where none of the events giving rise to litigation occurred. He half-heartedly insists that this
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district is a proper venue for his case because Compass is a national company that operates in
24
California. That is where his argument in favor of this venue starts and ends.
25
With respect to transfer, while Cribier does not oppose transfer generally, he does oppose
26
transfer to the Southern District of California. He concedes that such a transfer would serve the
27
1 trial, see Oppo. 1, but asks that his case be transferred to the Southern District of New York,
2 where Compass is headquartered and where Cribier believes many of its eventually relevant
3 corporate witnesses reside, or else to the District of Nevada, where he now apparently lives and
4 where he now says he lived when he received the at-issue calls. See Oppo. 1. Neither of those
5 options is preferable to the Southern District of California.
6 I. VENUE IS NOT PROPER IN THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
7 Under Fed. R. Civ. Rule 12(b)(3), when a defendant moves to dismiss for improper venue,
8 as Compass has here, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the venue is proper. Piedmont Label Co.,
9 598 F.2d at 496; Trujillo v. Intermex Prods. USA, Ltd, No. 1:18-CV-1476 AWI BAM, 2018 WL
10 6528428, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2018). Cribier has not met that burden. The Northern District
11 of California is the wrong place for this case to proceed.
12 A. Section 1391(b)(1)
13 With respect to § 1391(b)(1), Compass does not reside in this district. A corporation
14 defendant resides in “any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal
15 jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2).
16 In a state with several districts, like California, a corporation is under the jurisdiction of the
17 districts where it has personal jurisdiction as if “that district [was] a separate State.” 28 U.S.C. §
18 1391(d); see Ambriz v. Coca Cola Company, No. 13-cv-03539-JST, 2014 WL 296159, at *3 n.2
19 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2014); Johnson v. Law, 19 F. Supp. 3d 1004, 1008 (S.D. Cal. 2014). A court
20 cannot assert jurisdiction over a defendant lacking minimum contacts without violating Fourteenth
21 Amendment due process requirements and “traditional notions of fair play and justice.” Int’l Shoe
22 Co. v. State of Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Minimum contacts with the forum state are
23 established by examining the defendant’s “general or all-purpose” and “specific or case-linked”
24 relationships with the forum state. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S.
25 915, 919 (2011).
26 This court does not have general jurisdiction over this matter. General jurisdiction exists
27 “only where a defendant’s contacts with the forum are so ‘constant and pervasive’ as to render it
1 2025 WL 1370488, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2025) (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S.
2 117, 122 (2014)). Contrary to Cribier’s argument otherwise, see Oppo. 1, general jurisdiction
3 does not arise simply because a corporation does regular business in the forum state. See Daimler,
4 571 U.S. at 139. To be “essentially at home” in a jurisdiction the defendant corporation must (a)
5 be incorporated in the state, or (b) principally conduct business there. See id. at 137; see also
6 Ranza v. Nike, Inc., 793 F.3d 1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Daimler, and explaining that
7 “[t]he paradigmatic locations where general jurisdiction is appropriate over a corporation are its
8 place of incorporation and its principal place of business [internal citations omitted] [and] [o]nly in
9 an ‘exceptional case’ will general jurisdiction be available anywhere else.”) (internal citations
10 omitted). As the United States Supreme Court observed in Daimler, although a corporation may
11 have a nationwide presence, a “corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at
12 home in all of them.” Daimler, at 139 n. 20; see also Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062,
13 1069-71 (9th Cir. 2014); Mehr v. Federation Internationale De Football Association, 115 F. Supp.
14 3d 1035, 1048 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
15 Compass conducts business in the San Francisco Bay Area, but its corporate offices are
16 headquartered in New York, New York. Mot. 8; Declaration of Katie Mehringer [Dkt. No. 16-1]
17 ¶¶ 3-4. The only subsidiary that is alleged to have participated in the events giving rise to this
18 litigation is Compass CA. Mot. 7-8. The named agents in Cribier’s complaint are licensed to
19 operate under Compass CA, and Compass CA “has no presence or operations of any kind in
20 Northern California.” Mot. 9; Mehringer Decl. ¶¶ 1,7. This court does not have general
21 jurisdiction over Cribier’s claims.
22 It also lacks specific jurisdiction. In the Ninth Circuit, specific jurisdiction over an out-of-
23 state defendant exists if (1) it has ‘purposefully’ directed its activities towards the forum state; (2)
24 the claim is born as a result of its activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable or
25 “comport[s] with fair play and substantial justice.” Williams v. Yamaha Motor Co., 851 F.3d
26 1015, 1023 (9th Cir. 2017); see also Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797,
27 801 (9th Cir. 2004). In evaluating the requisite minimum contacts, a defendant has with the state,
1 v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 283-84 (2014); Axiom Foods, Inc. v. Acerchem Int’l, Inc., 874 F.3d 1064,
2 1068 (9th Cir. 2017).
3 Cribier argues that Compass is subject to this court’s specific jurisdiction because while
4 the facts giving rise to his injury occurred in San Diego, “the facts giving rise to the class’[s]
5 alleged injuries in this case took place in almost every district in the country.” Oppo. 1 (emphasis
6 added). That is not sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction in this court. In the context of
7 evaluating jurisdiction for a proposed class action, courts have consistently held that the named
8 plaintiff’s claim “must arise out of or result from the defendant’s forum-related activities,” rather
9 than the claims of the “unnamed members of the proposed class, who are not party to the litigation
10 absent class certification.” See Mot. 14, n.6 (string citing Ambriz v. Coca Cola Company, No. 13–
11 cv–03539–JST, 2014 WL 296159, *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2014), Levine v. Entrust Group, 2012
12 WL 6087399, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2012), and Johnson v. Law, 19 F. Supp. 3d 1004, 1010
13 (S.D. Cal. 2014)).
14 B. Section 1391(b)(2)
15 With respect to § 1391(b)(2), the actions of which Cribier complains do not enjoy a
16 “substantial” nexus with this district. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). Courts in this circuit have held in
17 TCPA actions that where the allegedly improper calls were not made from or received in the
18 district where the action was filed, venue was not proper in that district. See Johnson, 19 F. Supp.
19 3d at 1010.
20 Here, the named agents, who were working for a Compass office in San Diego, allegedly
21 made calls to Cribier to inquire about a home in San Diego that he had listed for sale in January of
22 2025. Mot. 8-10; Mehringer Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. A at pp. 4-5; Reply 7. Cribier openly admits that his
23 alleged injuries did not arise in the Northern District and agrees that the interest of judicial
24 efficiency is served by transferring this case to the Southern District of California. Oppo. 1
25 (“Transfer to the Southern District of California would also be in the interest of justice to ensure
26 that the most relevant witnesses are available to appear at trial.”). Because the events and/or
27 omissions giving rise to Cribier’s claim do not enjoy a “substantial” nexus with the Northern
C. Section 1391(b)(3)
1
Venue under § 1391(b)(3) is appropriate only when venue is not appropriate under §§
2
1391(b)(1) or 1391(b)(2) in any forum. See Trujillo, 2018 WL 6528428, at *4; 28 U.S.C. §
3
1391(b)(3). Compass argues that § 1391(b)(3) cannot be used to establish venue in the Northern
4
District because venue is proper in the Southern District of California. Cribier does not address §
5
1391(b)(3) in his response to the defendant’s Motion. The complaint and Compass’s uncontested
6
representations suggest that venue in the Southern District of California would be proper. There is
7
no basis to apply § 1391(b)(3) here.
8
II. TRANSFERRING VENUE UNDER SECTION 1406
9
Where an action has been commenced in an improper venue, a court shall dismiss the
10
action or, if deemed to be in the interest of justice, transfer it to different venue where the case
11
could have been properly brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a); Russo v. Omadi Inc., No. 24-CV-02194-
12
HSG, 2024 WL 4607709, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2024). Venue is proper where (1) “any
13
defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located”; (2) “a
14
substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred”; or (3) where there is
15
“no district in which an action may otherwise be brought, any judicial district in which any
16
defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.” 28 U.S.C. §
17
1391(b).
18
“Section 1404(a) generally applies when the transferor court is a proper venue for the
19
action, while § 1406(a) is relied on when venue is not proper in the forum where a plaintiff
20
originally filed suit.” Nelson-Devlin v. Eli Lilly & Co., Nos. 2:14-cv-02811-KJM-EFB, 2:14-cv-
21
02914-KJM-EFB, 2:14-cv-03004-KJM-EFB, 2015 WL 5436700, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2015).
22
“Unlike 1404(a) transfers, no particular factors guide the decision ordering transfer under § 1406.”
23
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). However, courts in this circuit have observed that when
24
deciding whether transfer would be in the interests of justice, the relevant factors “are the same as
25
those applicable to Section 1404(a).” 4 Billing v. CSA-Credit Sols. of Am., Inc., No. 10-cv-0108
26
27
4 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), “a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
1 BEN (NLS), 2010 WL 2542275, at *5 (S.D. Cal. June 22, 2010). And again, “[i]t is only proper
2 to transfer venue to a court where the case ‘could have been brought’ (i.e., the ‘transferee court’
3 must have proper subject matter jurisdiction, proper venue, and be able to exercise personal
4 jurisdiction[.])” Abrams Shell v. Shell Oil Co., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1103 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
5 As discussed, this action might have been properly brought in the Southern District of
6 California, where the named Compass contractors that made the allegedly unlawful calls operate
7 and where Cribier owned (or owns, see supra, n.1) property. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2); see also
8 Abrams Shell, 165 F. Supp. at 1103. Cribier argues that this matter might have been brought in
9 New York City because that is where Compass is headquartered; perhaps, but as explained above,
10 the alleged acts that gave rise to this action occurred in the Southern District of California and
11 related to property Cribier owned (or owns) in San Diego. The same logic applies to disfavor
12 transferring venue to the District of Nevada.
13 The factors that courts may consider when evaluating motions to transfer under 28 U.S.C.
14 § 1404(a), which some courts have applied to evaluate whether to transfer venue under § 1406(a),
15 see Billings, 2010 WL 2542275, at *5, support transferring this action to the Southern District of
16 California. Because the named Compass agents supposedly responsible for placing the at-issue
17 phone calls operate out of San Diego, transferring this case to the Southern District of California
18 will ultimately improve access to key witnesses and allow the parties to more efficiently gather
19 evidence from them.
20 The Southern District of California also has a comparatively greater local interest in this
21
the convenience of parties and witnesses, and the interests of justice.” Pfeiffer v. Himax Techs.,
22
Inc., 530 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1123 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)). In analyzing the
“interests of justice” involved, a number of factors are relevant, including the following: (1) the
23
location where the relevant agreements were negotiated and executed; (2) the state that is most
familiar with the governing law; (3) the plaintiff’s choice of forum; (4) the respective parties’
24
contacts with the forum; (5) the contacts relating to the plaintiff’s cause of action in the chosen
forum; (6) the differences in the costs of litigation in the two forums; (7) the availability of the
25
compulsory process to compel attendance of unwilling non-party witnesses; and, (8) the ease of
access to sources of proof. Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 498–99 (9th Cir. 2000).
26
“No single factor is dispositive, and a district court has broad discretion to adjudicate motions for
transfer on a case-by-case basis.” Sharma v. Globalfoundries U.S., Inc., No. 5:15-CV-03631-EJD,
27
2016 WL 2742399, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2016) (citation omitted).
1 controversy compared to this court or either of the other courts that Cribier proposes. The alleged
2 || violations of the TCPA were performed by a real estate company, Compass CA, that operates in
3 its district.> See Gilmore-Webster v. Bayou City Homebuyers Inc., No. 18-CV-05702-JSC, 2019
4 }} WL 1100492, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2019) (“Texas has a greater local interest because the
5 lion’s share of the events occurred in Texas.”); PlayUp, Inc. v. Mintas, No.
6 |} 221CV02129GMNNIK, 2023 WL 2020791, at *7 (D. Nev. Feb. 13, 2023) (“Nevada has an
7 interest in adjudicating disputes over conduct that allegedly occurred within its borders... .”).
8 Finally, I give Cribier’s own choice of forum little weight in these circumstances, where
9 this district is not a proper venue and where Cribier has also filed a case in the Southern District of
10 || California within the last year, suggesting he is not unfamiliar with or prejudiced by litigating in
11 that venue. See discussion supra, “Background” (discussing Cribier’s other TPCA class action,
a 12 filed in August 2024, in the Southern District of California). The convenience of the parties and
13 witnesses, access to evidence, and local interest in the controversy all favor transfer of this matter
14 || to the Southern District of California.
CONCLUSION
a 16 For the foregoing reasons, this action shall be transferred to the United States District
= 17 Court for the Southern District of California for all further proceedings. All future hearings in this
18 action are vacated.
19 IT IS SO ORDERED.
20 || Dated: July 14, 2025
21 .
22
73 Wiliam H. Orrick
United States District Judge
24
25
> Compass also points out that litigation in the Southern District of California proceeds more
26 : wi □□
quickly than litigation in the Southern District of New York, meaning that transferring this case to
07 Southern District of California would likely result in a quicker resolution of the action. Mot. 21;
Request for Judicial Notice [Dkt. No. 16-2] Ex. B, ECF pgs. 29-40. The difference in litigation
pace between the two districts is negligible, so this factor does not drive my conclusion one wa
28 or the other