Myers v. Beaverton School District 48J

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

JEFFREY MYERS, Case No.: 3:25-cv-00677-AN

Plaintiff,

v.

OPINION AND ORDER

BEAVERTON SCHOOL DISTRICT 48J,

Defendant.

Self-represented plaintiff Jeffrey Myers brings this action against defendant Beaverton

School District 48J ("defendant" or the "District"), alleging that defendant's implementation of a digital hall

pass ("DHP") system violates his substantive liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of his child

and his procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, Oregon Revised Statutes ("ORS")

§336.187, and Article I, sections 9 and 10 of the Oregon Constitution.1 On May 23, 2025, plaintiff filed a

motion for temporary restraining order ("TRO") and preliminary injunction. The Court heard oral argument

from the parties on July 3, 2025. For the reasons stated on the record and discussed below, plaintiff's motion

is DENIED.

LEGAL STANDARD

TROs and preliminary injunctions are governed by the same legal standard. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 65; Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush & Co., Inc., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir.

2001) ("[O]ur analysis is substantially identical for the [preliminary] injunction and the TRO"), overruled

on other grounds by Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008). To obtain a TRO or

1 Plaintiff initially also alleged a claim under ORS § 336.184 in his complaint but has now withdrawn this claim. See

Pl. Resp. Opp'n Def. Mot. to Dismiss ("Pl. Resp."), ECF [26], at 3. Plaintiff also clarifies that he does not assert

independent claims under either the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act ("FERPA") or the Protection of Pupil

Rights Amendment ("PPRA"), and that he cites these statutes only as relevant context for his constitutional and

statutory claims. Id.

preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must show that (1) they are likely to succeed on the merits; (2) they are

likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in the

favor of the plaintiff; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20-22. Under the

Ninth Circuit's sliding-scale approach, if there are "serious questions going to the merits and a hardship

balance that tips sharply toward the plaintiff," as well as a showing that plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm

and the injunction is in the public interest, then a preliminary injunction may still issue. All. for the Wild

Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2011).

BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Defendant is required by Oregon law and school board policy to take attendance of its

students. Decl. Robin Kobrowski Supp. Def. Resp. Opp'n Pl. Mot. for TRO & Prelim. Inj. ("Kobrowski

Decl."), ECF [15], ¶¶ 3-4 & Ex. 1; Decl. Brian Peerenboom Supp. Def. Resp. Opp'n Pl. Mot. for TRO &

Prelim. Inj. ("Peerenboom Decl."), ECF [16], ¶ 5. As part of defendant's attendance procedures, schools

within the District require students to request to leave class for any reason. Kobrowski Decl. ¶ 4. Daily

and class attendance for students is mandatory, and teachers monitor attendance for each class period. Id.

When students request to leave class, teachers monitor "the frequency and length of time that students are

out of class." Id. Secondary schools, such as middle schools, have "campus monitors who sweep hallways"

to maintain safety and direct students back to class. Id. ¶ 5. Defendant monitors students' whereabouts to

provide a safe educational environment, increase educational opportunities, and minimize students'

engagement in inappropriate activities outside of class. Id.

Before the DHP system, schools used either a paper hall pass system or a sign-out sheet,

depending on the teacher's individual process, when a student requested to leave during class time. Id. ¶ 4;

Peerenboom Decl. ¶¶ 5-6. At Mountain View Middle School ("MVMS"), where plaintiff's child is a

student, the paper hall pass system varied amongst teachers; it provided no method for staff to monitor the

frequency that a student requested a hall pass, and teachers were unaware which other students, or how

many other students, were already out of class at a given time. Peerenboom Decl. ¶¶ 5-6. This limited

oversight of the paper hall pass system sometimes meant that multiple students would gather in the hallways

or other communal spaces during class time, which occasionally led to negative interactions between

students and vandalism to school property. Id. ¶ 6. Under the paper hall pass system, teachers sometimes

referred students for additional behavioral or academic support if necessary, particularly if a teacher noticed

that a student frequently left class or stayed away for long periods of time. Id. ¶ 15.

In June 2024, defendant's Executive Administrators met with middle school building

administrators and discussed a pilot program of the DHP system, which was then successfully implemented

through defendant's data management platform Synergy Student Information System ("Synergy SIS") to

replace paper hall pass systems at Whitford Middle School. Kobrowski Decl. ¶ 6; Corrected & Suppl. Decl.

James Newton Supp. Def. Resp. Opp'n Pl. Mot. for TRO & Prelim. Inj. ("Newton Decl."), ECF [35], ¶ 4.

Thereafter, other middle school administrators expressed interest in using the DHP system within their

schools to provide a more efficient and effective process for granting hall passes to students. Kobrowski

Decl. ¶ 6. The DHP system digitized an aspect of an analog system of defendant's attendance procedures

that was already in effect. See Peerenboom Decl. ¶¶ 5, 11.

At MVMS, the primary goal in implementing the DHP system was to increase student

safety on campus by creating a digital system for monitoring students' whereabouts. Id. ¶¶ 6, 13. Before

the DHP system, each teacher implemented slightly different approaches to granting hall passes in their

classroom. Peerenboom Decl. ¶¶ 5-6. Defendant believed that the DHP system would increase efficiency

in approving requests to leave class for both students and teachers and create a streamlined, universal, and

equitable procedure for teachers to grant hall passes. Kobrowski Decl. ¶¶ 6-8; see Peerenboom Decl. ¶ 5.

Furthermore, defendant sought to minimize attention placed on students requesting to leave class; such

attention could be avoided through digital requests, rather than requiring students to verbally ask for

permission to leave class. Peerenboom Decl. ¶ 6.

On December 2, 2024, five eighth-grade teachers at MVMS implemented the DHP system

in their classes. Id. ¶ 8. Before the system's implementation, Advisory teachers developed a PowerPoint

presentation to explain to students how to request a hall pass through the DHP system. Id. On January 17,

2025, some of the eighth-grade teachers presented to other MVMS teachers about the DHP system, and on

January 21, 2025, MVMS teachers presented to the remainder of MVMS students the same PowerPoint

presentation about how to use the DHP system. Id. ¶¶ 9-10.

On January 24, 2025, plaintiff learned from his child that MVMS had implemented the

DHP system. First Am. Compl. ("FAC"), ECF [8], ¶ 11. Plaintiff alleges that when the DHP system was

introduced, it was limited to restroom usage; however, within approximately two months, the DHP system

was expanded to include visits to the health room, student lockers, and technology support. Id. ¶ 14.

The DHP system is accessible to students via StudentVUE. Id. ¶¶ 2, 12. To request a hall

pass, students log in to their StudentVUE account, click "Hall Pass," click "Request a Hall Pass," and select

a destination and duration. Id. ¶ 12 & Ex. B, at 3-5; Newton Decl. Ex. 3. Staff monitor and review real-

time usage and approve hall pass requests. FAC ¶ 12. The DHP system "also includes more advanced

behavioral and logistical features[,] such as limiting the number of students allowed in a given destination

(e.g., a maximum of two students in the health room at one time), controlling when passes can be requested

(e.g., disabling requests during the first and last [ten] minutes of a class), and enforcing individualized

restrictions (e.g., preventing Student A from receiving a pass if Student B currently has one, even if the

students are in different classrooms or grade levels)." Id. ¶ 13E & Ex. M, at 8. From time to time, the

school's Behavioral Health and Wellness Team ("BHWT") reviews this data to identify patterns in student

movement and flag students for "extraordinarily high" usage. Id. ¶¶ 13F, 17A (internal quotation marks

omitted); see Peeremboom Decl. ¶ 15. These data reviews can result in staff-initiated meetings with

students, without prior notice to parents, with the goal of increasing students' educational engagement and

success in school. FAC ¶ 13F; Peeremboom Decl. ¶ 15. The BHWT involves parents when needed, on a

case-by-case basis, to discuss identified issues and support those students. Peeremboom Decl. ¶ 15.

Although parents can view traditional attendance data, such as full-day absences, tardies,

and excused or unexcused absences, through the ParentVUE portal, parents cannot view the data collected

through the DHP system in ParentVUE or on any other parent-facing platform. FAC ¶ 13B. The data

captured by the DHP system—consisting of the student's name, time of request, destination (e.g., restroom,

health center, or locker), selected duration, approving staff member, and total time out—is stored in Synergy

SIS with no published retention limit, purge policy, or expiration schedule. Id. ¶ 15A.

Approximately 150 staff members across the District have access to DHP data for students

at MVMS. Id.; Corrected & Suppl. Decl. Steven Langford Supp. Def. Resp. Opp'n Pl. Mot. for TRO &

Prelim. Inj. ("Langford Decl."), ECF [34], ¶¶ 6-7, 9. The list of authorized users includes MVMS staff,

including the principal, assistant principals, classroom teachers, school counselors, and support staff, as

well as individuals who serve all District students. FAC ¶ 15A & Ex. C; Langford Decl. ¶¶ 6, 8. The access

granted to each staff member is limited in scope based on their job role. Langford Decl. ¶ 6. Those staff

have access to DHP system data so that they can collectively support the effort to monitor students'

whereabouts while at school and perform their job duties. Id. ¶¶ 6, 8.

B. Procedural Background

On March 23, 2025, plaintiff submitted a formal complaint to defendant using its online

complaint portal. FAC ¶ 22 & Ex. F. Due to the form's character limitations, plaintiff submitted a

supplemental document via email containing a detailed explanation of his concerns that the DHP system

violated federal and state law. Id. On April 3, 2025, defendant's Compliance Officer issued an initial

response, stating that the DHP system did not require parental notice or consent, that the tracking of student

movement in school was permissible under the doctrine of in loco parentis, and that defendant would not

suspend use of the DHP system. Id. ¶ 22A & Ex. H, at 5. On April 6, 2025, plaintiff asked for his complaint

to be escalated. Id. at Ex. H, at 4. Defendant's Compliance Officer stated that defendant would provide a

response by May 1, 2025. Id. at Ex. H, at 2.

On April 21, 2025, plaintiff initiated this action in Washington County Circuit Court.

Notice of Removal, ECF [1], ¶ 1. On April 24, 2025, defendant's General Counsel emailed plaintiff, stating

that defendant would be pausing its internal complaint response due to plaintiff's pending lawsuit. FAC

¶ 23B & Ex. J. That same day, defendant removed the action to this Court. See Notice of Removal. On

May 23, 2025, plaintiff filed the FAC. That same day, plaintiff also filed the instant motion for TRO and

preliminary injunction. Pl. Mot. for TRO & Prelim. Inj. ("Pl. Mot."), ECF [9]. Plaintiff seeks to

immediately enjoin defendant's use of the DHP system across all schools in the District where it is deployed.

On June 6, 2025, defendant filed a motion to dismiss, ECF [19], which is now pending before the Court.

DISCUSSION

A. TRO

First, in light of the timing of the parties' own proposed briefing schedule and the end of

the 2024-2025 school year, as well as defendant's representation that the District is not using the DHP

system during the summer, it is apparent that plaintiff's request for a TRO has become moot. Accordingly,

the Court denies plaintiff's request for a TRO.

B. Preliminary Injunction

As for plaintiff's request for preliminary injunction, the Court finds that plaintiff has not

shown a likelihood of success on the merits on any of his claims.

1. Section 1983 Claims

"To prevail under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that he was 'deprived of a right

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed

under color of state law.'" Regino v. Staley, 133 F.4th 951, 959 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting Marsh v. County

of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2012)). Here, plaintiff asserts violations of his Fourteenth

Amendment substantive and procedural due process rights.

a. Substantive Due Process

As for plaintiff's substantive due process claim, plaintiff asserts that defendant's use of the

DHP system violates his liberty interest in directing the care, custody, and upbringing of his child.

It is undisputed that the right "of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and

education of children under their control" is a fundamental right for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (citing

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)). However, this broad parental right is not absolute: it "must bow

to other countervailing interests and rights, such as the basic independent life and liberty rights of the child

and of the State acting as parens patriae[.]" Mueller v. Auker, 700 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2012); see

Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1204 (9th Cir. 2005), op. am. on denial of reh'g on other

grounds, 447 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). "[O]nce parents make the choice as to which school

their children will attend, their fundamental right to control the education of their children is, at the least,

substantially diminished." Fields, 427 F.3d at 1206. Parents

"do not have a fundamental right generally to direct how a public school teaches their child.

Whether it is the school curriculum, the hours of the school day, school discipline, . . .

or . . . a dress code, these issues of public education are generally committed to the control

of state and local authorities."

Id. (citation modified). Therefore, "identifying a general parental right is far different than concluding that

it has been infringed." Hooks v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2000).

The Supreme Court has cautioned courts to be "reluctant to expand the concept of

substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are

scarce and open-ended." Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (citation omitted).

Given this concern, courts must "begin with a careful description of the asserted fundamental liberty

interest" and "then decide whether the asserted interest is objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history

and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist

if [it was] sacrificed." Regino, 133 F.4th at 960 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (alteration

in original).

In his motion, plaintiff loosely invokes general parental rights and emphasizes defendant's

failure to notify or obtain parental consent before launching the DHP system. In his reply, plaintiff focuses

on defendant's use of the DHP system to flag students for meetings with counselors to address possible

behavioral or psychological concerns without parental involvement. Pl. Reply, ECF [20], at 3. In his

complaint, plaintiff likewise suggests that defendant's use of the DHP system to collect behavioral data and

"trigger staff-led evaluations without involving families creates a constitutionally significant intrusion into

parental decision-making." FAC ¶ 36. However, it is ultimately unclear whether plaintiff is asserting a

parental right to decide whether defendant can collect student behavioral data through the DHP system, a

parental right to decide whether defendant can use the data to initiate meetings with students to address

potential behavioral or psychological concerns, or merely a parental right to notice if such activities occur.

Regardless, the Court concludes that none of these asserted rights are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history

and tradition, . . . such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if [they were] sacrificed." Regino, 133

F.4th at 960. Accordingly, plaintiff's asserted liberty interest is not fundamental in nature and therefore not

protected under the substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Because the right to direct how defendant collects or uses student behavioral data is not a

fundamental one, defendant's use of the DHP system need only be "'rationally related to legitimate

government interests.'" Slidewaters LLC v. Wash. State Dep't of Lab. & Indus., 4 F.4th 747, 759 (9th Cir.

2021) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997)). This standard is clearly satisfied

here: defendant's use of the DHP system is rationally related to the legitimate government interests of

monitoring students' attendance, physical location, and class participation to ensure student safety and

general welfare. Accordingly, plaintiff does not allege a deprivation of substantive due process.

b. Procedural Due Process

As for plaintiff's procedural due process claim, plaintiff asserts that defendant violated his

procedural due process rights by failing to notify, obtain consent from, or provide an opt-out opportunity

to plaintiff before collecting data through the DHP system and using those data to initiate student

interventions. Citing 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(1)(i)(A), plaintiff contends that FERPA and the PPRA only

allow defendant to disclose educational records without parental consent if a school official has a

"legitimate educational interest" and that defendant's failure to comply with these statutes violated his right

to procedural due process. FAC ¶¶ 35-36.

Unlike plaintiff's substantive due process claim, his procedural due process claim does not

require allegations of a fundamental right. "Rather, procedural due process 'protects all liberty interests

that are derived from state law or from the Due Process Clause itself.'" Regino, 133 F.4th at 967 (quoting

Mullins v. Oregon, 57 F.3d 789, 795 (9th Cir. 1995)).

As an initial matter, FERPA does not provide an individually enforceable right. Gonzaga

Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 287 (2002). As such, the Court doubts that a violation of FERPA could support

a procedural due process claim. See Schrader v. Emporia State Univ., No. 19-2387-DDC-TJJ, 2021 WL

4284543, at *8 n.6 (D. Kan. Sept. 21, 2021); see also Dixon v. Regents of Univ. of N.M., 242 F.3d 388

(table), 2000 WL 1637557, at *4 n.4 (10th Cir. 2000) (unpublished); McLaughlin v. Fla. Int'l Univ. Bd. of

Trs., 533 F. Supp. 3d 1149, 1171 (S.D. Fla. 2021). Based on the Supreme Court's reasoning in Gonzaga

University, this Court similarly finds it unlikely that the PPRA provides an individually enforceable right

or that a PPRA violation could support a procedural due process claim. See 536 U.S. at 280-89.

However, even assuming that they could, plaintiff does not explain how FERPA or the

PPRA guarantees the liberty interest that he asserts, nor does he show how defendant has violated either

FERPA or the PPRA. FERPA does not require defendant to notify parents when it creates an education

record or to proactively permit access to the DHP system; indeed, plaintiff acknowledges that he could

request his child's DHP data under FERPA. See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1232g. FERPA also permits

disclosure of education records without the written consent of students' parents to "other school officials,

including teachers within the educational institution or local educational agency, who have been determined

by such agency or institution to have legitimate educational interests, including the educational interests of

the child for whom consent would otherwise be required." 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(A); see 34 C.F.R.

§ 99.31(a)(1)(i)(A). Defendant has determined that certain groups of staff members have legitimate

educational interests and explains why these staff have access to data in the DHP system based on their job

responsibilities. Plaintiff asserts that many of these staff have "no educational relationship to the students

being monitored," Pl. Mot. 3, but brings no real argument to the contrary.

The PPRA requires the consent of a student's parent before a student is "required . . . to

submit to a survey, analysis, or evaluation" that reveals certain information, including, in relevant part, the

"mental or psychological problems of the student or the student's family[.]" 20 U.S.C. § 1232h(b)(2).

However, submission of information that is not protected by the PPRA does not violate the PPRA. See,

e.g., Doe No. 1 v. Bethel Loc. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. 3:22-cv-337, 2023 WL 5018511, at *22 (S.D.

Ohio Aug. 7, 2023), appeal docketed, No. 23-3740 (6th Cir. Sept. 8, 2023). Plaintiff's contention that the

DHP system is a survey, analysis, or evaluation that reveals a student's mental or psychological problems

overstates how the DHP system functions. The DHP system requires students to log in to StudentVUE,

click "Hall Pass," click "Request a Hall Pass," and select a destination and duration. This simply does not

constitute a survey under the PPRA. Additionally, the DHP system does not request information that is

protected under the PPRA. The fact that a school's BHWT may later review the data as part of determining

whether students need additional support does not mean that the information itself reveals any "mental or

psychological problems of [a] student." 20 U.S.C. § 1232h(b)(2).

Because plaintiff does not allege a protected interest to which due process protections

attach, he does not allege a deprivation of protected due process. Therefore, plaintiff does not show that he

is likely to succeed on his section 1983 claims.

2. ORS § 336.187 Claim

Plaintiff asserts that defendant's use of the DHP system violates ORS § 336.187. ORS

§ 336.187 requires school districts to disclose students' personally identifiable information ("PII") or other

information allowed to be disclosed under FERPA in two situations, neither of which apply here. However,

the statute does not provide for a private right of action. Furthermore, none of plaintiff's allegations reflect

a failure to disclose PII under the two circumstances described in the statute. Accordingly, plaintiff does

not show that he is likely to succeed on his ORS § 336.187 claims.

3. Oregon Constitutional Claim

Finally, plaintiff asserts that defendant's use of the DHP system constitutes an unreasonable

informational search under Article I, section 9 of the Oregon Constitution.2 Article 1, section 9 "establishes

a right of the people 'to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search,

or seizure.'" State v. Fulmer, 366 Or 224, 229, 460 P.3d 486 (2020) (en banc) (quoting State v.

Rodgers/Kirkeby, 347 Or. 610, 621, 227 P.3d 695 (2010))). "For purposes of Article I, section 9, a search

occurs only if governmental action invades 'a protected privacy interest.'" State v. Newcomb, 359 Or. 756,

764, 375 P.3d 434 (2016) (quoting State v. Wacker, 317 Or 419, 426, 856 P.2d 1029 (1993)). "'[T]he

2 Although plaintiff asserts a claim under Article I, section 10 of the Oregon Constitution in the FAC, he does not

discuss this claim in his briefing. Therefore, the Court declines to address this claim.

privacy protected by Article I, section 9, is not the privacy that one reasonably expects but the privacy to

which one has a right.'" Id. (quoting State v. Campbell, 306 Or 157, 164, 759 P.2d 1040 (1988)) (emphases

in original). To challenge a search as violating Article I, section 9, an individual must assert that their

personal rights were violated, as distinguished from someone else's rights. State v. Johnson, 153 Or. App.

535, 538 n.1, 958 P.2d 887 (1998) (en banc).

Here, plaintiff argues that the DHP system constitutes digital surveillance and "frustrate[s]

[his] ability to oversee or object to data-gathering about his own child." Pl. Reply 4. However, it is clear

from the complaint and briefing that plaintiff bases this claim on the allegations that the DHP system

collects and stores behavioral data of students in the District, including his daughter's. Plaintiff does not

assert a personal privacy right over those data, and thus plaintiff cannot challenge the DHP system under

Article I, section 9.

Even if the Court were to assume that plaintiff has a protected privacy interest in his child's

DHP data, defendant's use of the DHP system does not violate Article I, section 9. Article I, section 9 is

reviewed under the same standards as the Fourth Amendment. State v. Flores, 280 Or 273, 280-81, 570

P.2d 965 (1977) (en banc). Thus, the touchstone for determining the constitutionality of a search is its

reasonableness, which requires "balancing the nature of the intrusion on the individual's privacy against the

promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Bd of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie

Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829 (2002) (citation omitted). As is the case here, "[a] student's privacy

interest is limited in a public school environment where the State is responsible for maintaining discipline,

health, and safety." Id. at 830.

The character of the intrusion into the limited privacy interest is also minimal: in essence,

students are merely informing their teachers where they need to go and for how long. Although the DHP

system stores the data, the data does not "lead to the imposition of discipline or have any academic

consequences[,]" id. at 833; to the contrary, a school's BHWT reviews the data as part of determining

whether it can provide any additional support to certain students. Moreover, defendant has legitimate

government interests in recording class attendance, increasing the amount of time students are spending in

class learning, maintaining a safe educational environment for students and employees, and monitoring

students’ whereabouts on campus in case of an emergency. Defendant has also shown that the DHP system

is a reasonably effective means of achieving these purposes. Since the implementation of the DHP system,

there are fewer students out of class at any given time, which has led to increased classroom attendance and

educational engagement, decreased behavior incidents in non-classroom settings, and a reduction in

incidents of vandalism on campus. The DHP system has also created a streamlined process for requesting

hall passes and increased efficiency in both requesting and reviewing hall passes. In this context,

defendant's use of the DHP system is a reasonable means of furthering its important interests in maintaining

a safe educational environment for its students. Accordingly, plaintiff does not show that he is likely to

succeed on his claim under Article I, section 9.

Because plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits on any of his claims,

the Court finds it unnecessary to address the remaining Winters factors.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and

Preliminary Injunction, ECF [9], is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 18th day of July, 2025.

Adrienne Nelson

United States District Judge

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