Smith v. Chambers-Smith

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

EDWARD SMITH, ) Case No. 1:25-cv-00153

)

Plaintiff, ) Judge J. Philip Calabrese

)

v. ) Magistrate Judge Reuben J. Sheperd

)

ANNETTE CHAMBERS-SMITH, )

et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Edward Smith, an Ohio prisoner incarcerated at the Grafton

Correctional Institution, filed this action without a lawyer against six Defendants,

including prison staff, employees of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and

Correction, and an ophthalmologist from The Ohio State University. He alleges

violations of his federal civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for, among other things,

deliberate indifference, neglect, failure to provide medical care, and dereliction of

duty regarding his cataracts diagnosis and treatment. Plaintiff seeks declaratory,

injunctive, and monetary relief. The five Defendants associated with the Ohio

Department of Rehabilitation and Correction move to dismiss.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the complaint alleges the following facts,

which the Court accepts as true and construes in the light most favorable to Plaintiff

as the non-moving party, as it must in the present procedural posture.

A. Cataracts Diagnosis and Treatment

Currently, Plaintiff Edward Smith is incarcerated at the Grafton Correctional

Institution in Grafton, Ohio. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 4, PageID #2.) In June 2016, Mr. Smith

arrived at Grafton Correctional, where an eye doctor diagnosed him with cataracts.

(Id., ¶ 12, PageID #3.) According to Plaintiff, the eye doctor determined that he did

not meet the criteria for surgery “based on ODRC guidelines.” (Id.) Further, the eye

doctor told Mr. Smith that an eyeglass prescription “would not make a difference”

regarding his vision quality or headaches and informed Mr. Smith that he would

reevaluate the condition in a year. (Id., ¶ 13, PageID #4.)

Some time in 2017 or 2018, a second eye doctor at Grafton Correctional

evaluated Mr. Smith and overruled the opinion of the first eye doctor. (Id., ¶ 14,

PageID #4.) The second eye doctor issued Mr. Smith a prescription to assist with

vision and to alleviate headaches. (Id.) According to Mr. Smith, the prescription cost

$150.00 and “did nothing to improve [his] condition.” (Id., ¶ 15, PageID #4.)

In 2019, a third eye doctor at Grafton Correctional evaluated Mr. Smith and

informed him that he would need cataract surgery in both eyes. (Id., ¶ 16, PageID

#4.) However, Plaintiff alleges that he “did not meet ODRC criteria for surgery at

[that] time,” but he was informed that he would be reevaluated in a year. (Id.)

Further, the third eye doctor told Mr. Smith that glasses would not help his condition.

(Id.)

In January 2021, Defendant Dr. Julianne Matthews, an ophthalmologist at

The Ohio State University, screened Mr. Smith for cataract surgery. (Id., ¶ 17,

PageID #4.) Dr. Matthews informed Mr. Smith that the doctors at Grafton

Correctional provided him with the wrong eyeglass prescription and that “with a

proper prescription his vision was correctable to 20/20.” (Id.) Based on this

information, Mr. Smith purchased a new pair of glasses with the second prescription.

(Id., ¶ 18, PageID #4.) But he alleges that the second prescription was “worse than

the prior GCI prescription” because his vision “when wearing them was completely

blurred, and the headaches persist[ed].” (Id., ¶ 19, PageID #4.) For this reason,

Mr. Smith claims that he “wasted $150.00 on purchasing two useless pairs of glasses

at his own expense.” (Id., ¶ 21, PageID #4.)

Because Dr. Matthews determined that Mr. Smith’s vision was correctable to

20/20, Mr. Smith alleges that “no surgery could be done at that time,” since 20/20

vision is “presumed not to need medical intervention by ODRC medical staff.” (Id.)

Mr. Smith claims that “an ODRC policy [mandated] that he had to wait a full year

before he would be eligible to return to OSU for a second cataract consultation and

surgery.” (Id., ¶ 23, PageID #5.)

B. Cataract Surgery

Mr. Smith alleges that one year after his January 2021 appointment at Ohio

State, Dr. Matthews recommended that he undergo bilateral cataract surgery. (Id.,

¶ 24, PageID #5.) Dr. Matthews told Mr. Smith that ODRC would only perform

surgery on one eye, and that he must “stick to his treatment recommendation until

ODRC provided the required health care in both eyes.” (Id.)

On October 5, 2023, Mr. Smith received successful surgery on his right eye.

(Id., ¶ 25, PageID #5.) However, he experienced a “greater imbalance in vision”

following the surgery, with problems in his left eye and worsened headaches. (Id.)

Dr. Ferguson, an optometrist with the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and

Correction and a Defendant in this case, wrote three additional prescriptions between

Mr. Smith’s surgery and July 2024, with the intention of resolving Mr. Smith’s eye

problems without the need for further surgeries. (Id., ¶ 26, PageID #5.) Mr. Smith

claims that each of these prescriptions cost him $150.00, for a total of $750.00. (Id.,

¶ 27, PageID #5.) Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Ferguson, as well as Dr. Janice Douglas

at Grafton Correctional and Ashley Burger, the healthcare administrator, were

“acting in unison to deny treatment, just as the OSU Optometrist said they would.”

(Id., ¶ 29, PageID #5.)

C. Denial of Second Surgery

On August 28, 2024, Dr. Ferguson evaluated Mr. Smith and told him that he

required eye surgery in his left eye because his cataracts were causing a loss of vision

and severe headaches. (Id., ¶ 30, PageID #5.) He told Mr. Smith that glasses would

not help his vision and that Mr. Smith should consult Dr. Douglas regarding his

headaches. (Id.)

Dr. Douglas held a follow-up appointment and passed Mr. Smith’s information

on to Ms. Burger. (Id., ¶ 31, PageID #5–6.) Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Burger was

informed of Dr. Ferguson’s surgery recommendation, but notified Mr. Smith that “he

would not receive the medically necessary surgery but would instead receive further

monitoring.” (Id.)

On September 25, 2025, Dr. Ferguson told Mr. Smith that “the State decided

not to authorize cataract surgery for the left eye,” and that he would issue a

prescription instead, despite earlier informing Mr. Smith that glasses would not help

his vision. (Id., ¶ 32, PageID #6.) The same day, Ms. Burger took Mr. Smith’s

prescription and told him that she would follow up with him the next day about “why

new useless prescriptions [were] being filled.” (Id., ¶ 33, PageID #6.) According to

Plaintiff, as of October 11, 2024, Ms. Burger has not responded to this inquiry. (Id.)

Mr. Smith claims that the delay and denial of service has “caused substantial

pain and suffering, worsened [his] vision, [and] exacerbated his eye health to a degree

that surgery will be more complicated and less likely to restor[e] full or normal

vision.” (Id., ¶ 34, PageID #6.) He alleges that “Defendants denying [his] cataract

surgery in the left eye . . . is a retaliatory act for complaints related to their medical

neglect, and not because of any alleged hidden and/or undocumented one eye cataract

surgery policy.” (Id., ¶ 38, PageID #6.) Further, Mr. Smith claims that this denial

was part of a “pattern of retaliatory conduct by the Defendants against multiple

inmates that goes back years” to “put cost savings over the health” of Mr. Smith. (Id.,

¶ 39, PageID #6.)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Based on these events, Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint, asserting claims

against each Defendant in both their individual and official capacities under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. (Id., ¶¶ 5–10, PageID #2–3.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that

Annette Chambers-Smith, Director of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and

Correction, Warden Jerry Spatny, assistant healthcare administrator Ashley Burger,

Dr. Douglas, the physician administration at the Department, Dr. Ferguson, and

Dr. Matthews each acted with negligence and deliberate indifference regarding either

the policies or medical treatment regarding his eye care. (Id., PageID #7.) The five

Defendants affiliated with the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction

move to dismiss. (ECF No. 14.) Although Plaintiff filed suit on January 29, 2025, he

has yet to perfect service on Dr. Julianne Matthews. (ECF No. 7; ECF No. 8.)

ANALYSIS

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim

on which a court may grant relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion under Rule

12(b)(6) tests “the plaintiff’s cause of action as stated in the complaint,” and is “not a

challenge to the plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Golden v. City of Columbus, 404 F.3d

950, 958–59 (6th Cir. 2005). A complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007)). A claim is plausible where “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To survive a motion to

dismiss, a complaint must “raise a right to relief above the speculative level” into the

“realm of plausible liability.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557 n.5.

On a motion to dismiss, the Court construes factual allegations in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff, accepts them as true, and draws all reasonable

inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Wilburn v. United States, 616 F. App’x 848, 852

(6th Cir. 2015) (citing Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007)). But

a pleading must offer more than mere “labels and conclusions,” and “a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Nor is a court required to accept “[c]onclusory

allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual allegations.” Eidson v.

Tennessee Dep’t of Child.’s Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 634 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Twombly,

550 U.S. at 544).

Therefore, the Court must distinguish between “well-pled factual allegations,”

which must be treated as true, and “naked assertions,” which need not be. Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678 (cleaned up); see also, e.g., Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v.

Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 375 (6th Cir. 2011) (determining that because some of the

plaintiff’s factual allegations were not well-pled, their conclusory nature disentitled

them to the presumption of truth). A plaintiff need not include detailed factual

allegations, but must provide more than “an unadorned, the-Defendant-unlawfully-

harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Rule 8 “does not unlock the doors of

discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Id. at 678–79.

Although the pleadings and documents pro se litigants file are liberally

construed and held to less stringent standards than the formal pleadings of lawyers,

Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004), litigants who do not have a

lawyer are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). Even a pro se complaint must

“contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face’” to avoid dismissal. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570).

I. Statute of Limitations

Courts may grant motions to dismiss based on an applicable statute of

limitations only if “the allegations in the complaint affirmatively show that the claim

is time-barred.” Snyder-Hill v. Ohio State Univ., 48 F.4th 686, 698 (6th Cir. 2022)

(quoting Lutz v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 717 F.3d 459, 464 (6th Cir. 2013)).

Section 1983 itself does not provide a statute of limitations. In such circumstances,

federal courts borrow the applicable limitations period from the most analogous one

available under State law. See Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249–50 (1989). Here,

the most closely analogous limitations period under Ohio law is the general two-year

limitations period for bringing a tort action. See Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.10; see

Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989, 992 (6th Cir. 1989) (en banc).

When a cause of action under Section 1983 accrues presents “a question of

federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S.

384, 388 (2007). In Wallace, the Supreme Court recognized “the standard rule that

accrual occurs when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action . . . that

is, when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.” Id. (quoting Bay Area Laundry

& Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., Inc., 522 U.S. 192, 201

(1997)) (cleaned up).

The “continuing violation” doctrine permits courts to “consider as timely all

relevant violations ‘including those that would otherwise be time-barred.’” National

Parks Conservation Ass’n, Inc. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 480 F.3d 410, 416 (6th Cir.

2007) (quoting Sharpe v. Cureton, 319 F.3d 259, 267 (6th Cir. 2003)). “[D]iscrete

discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are related to

acts alleged in timely filed charges.” National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536

U.S. 101, 113 (2002). The Sixth Circuit has extended this reasoning to Section 1983

claims. Sharpe, 319 F.3d at 267 (determining that there was “no principled basis

upon which to restrict Morgan to Title VII claims,” and concluding that “the Supreme

Court’s reasoning must be applied to . . . § 1983 claims”).

In Bruce v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc., 389 F. App’x 462, 466 (6th Cir.

2010), the defendant denied the plaintiff surgery for his hip and knee on multiple

occasions from 2003 to 2007 while the plaintiff was incarcerated. However, the Sixth

Circuit determined that the “[a]ctual actions by [the defendant] of refusing medical

care represent discrete unlawful acts (beyond passive inaction) that trigger the

statute of limitations,” notwithstanding the continuing violation doctrine. Bruce, 389

F. App’x at 466–67. So too here. According to his allegations, Mr. Smith was found

ineligible for surgery on multiple occasions, starting in June 2016. (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 12,

16, 21, PageID #3–4.) Because Plaintiff filed this action on January 29, 2025, any of

the previous discrete acts denying medical care that accrued before January 29, 2023

are time-barred.

Defendants move to dismiss, arguing that the statute of limitations bars any

of Plaintiff’s claims which accrued before January 29, 2023. (ECF No. 14, PageID

#87–88.) Plaintiff argues that his earlier claims are not time-barred because “[t]he

sole purpose of [Defendants] prescribing multiple eyeglasses was to attempt to

pretend that some form of ‘treatment’ was offered, when, in fact, none was.” (ECF

No. 15, PageID #96.) Still, each previous denial of medical care constitutes a discrete

act as a matter of law for purposes of the statute of limitations. Bruce, 389 F. App’x

at 466–67.

Plaintiff cites Kovacevich v. Kent State University, 224 F.3d 806, 829 (6th Cir.

2000), to argue that all allegedly unconstitutional acts may be challenged if one falls

within the limitations period. (ECF No. 15, PageID #96.) But Kovacevich dealt with

employment discrimination claims and predated Sharpe, which determined that

“[p]revious ‘continuing violation’ law must be reexamined in light of the Supreme

Court’s recently imposed limits on the viability of the doctrine.” Sharpe, 319 F.3d at

267. In other words, Kovacevich was decided before Sharpe extended to Section 1983

claims the determination in Morgan that “discrete discriminatory acts are not

actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed

charges.” 536 U.S. at 113. Plaintiff also relies on Weigel v. Baptist Hospital of East

Tennessee, 302 F.3d 367, 376–77 (6th Cir. 2002), which suffers from the same defect.

Therefore, the relevant statute of limitations bars any claims in the first twenty-four

paragraphs of Plaintiff’s complaint, which all accrued before January 29, 2023.

II. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Claims

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants are liable in their official and individual

capacities under Section 1983 for alleged violations of his First, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendment rights. (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 1–3 & 35–39, PageID #2 & #6–7.)

Although Plaintiff alleges several of these constitutional violations generally without

providing much of a connection between his treatment at Grafton Correctional and

the violations of his rights, the Court construes Plaintiff’s pro se complaint liberally.

See Martin, 391 F.3d at 712.

To state a claim under Section 1983, Plaintiff must allege: (1) “a right secured

by the United States Constitution;” and (2) “the deprivation of that right;” (3) “by a

person acting under color of state law.” Troutman v. Louisville Metro Dep’t of Corr.,

979 F.3d 472, 482 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Watkins v. City of Battle Creek, 273 F.3d

682, 685 (6th Cir. 2001) (abrogated on other grounds)). Defendants argue that

Plaintiff fails to state a claim on which the Court may grant relief on all claims

against them. (ECF No. 14, PageID #86–92.)

II.A. Supervisory Liability

To state a claim against a governmental official in his individual-capacity, “a

complaint must allege that the defendants were personally involved in the alleged

deprivation of federal rights.” Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir.

2002). “[A] supervisor cannot be held liable simply because he or she was charged

with overseeing a subordinate who violated the constitutional rights of another.”

Peatross v. City of Memphis, 818 F.3d 233, 241 (6th Cir. 2016). In other words, a

supervisor or other governmental official is not vicariously liable for the violations of

a person’s civil rights that another commits. To state a claim under Section 1983 for

the violation of a civil right, “a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official

defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the

Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Liability must be based on each defendant’s

own “active unconstitutional behavior.” Bass v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041, 1048 (6th

Cir. 1999). The plaintiff must allege facts suggesting that each defendant “did more

than play a passive role in the alleged violation or showed mere tacit approval of the

[challenged action].” Id.

At the very least, the individual defendant must have “implicitly authorized,

approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending

officers.” Essex v. County of Livingston, 518 F. App’x 351, 355 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting

Phillips v. Roane Cnty., 534 F.3d 531, 543 (6th Cir. 2008)). A defendant must have

“encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly

participated in it.” Id. at 355 (quoting Phillips, 534 F.3d at 543). To prevail on an

individual supervisory liability claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show that

“the supervisor encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way

directly participated in it.” Taylor v. Michigan Dep’t of Corr., 69 F.3d 76, 81 (6th Cir.

1995) (quoting Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984)). “[A]

supervisor’s failure to act, without more, is insufficient to establish supervisory

liability.” Hollis v. Erdos, 480 F. Supp. 3d 823, 833 (S.D. Ohio 2020) (citing Peatross,

818 F.3d at 241). Mere failure to act cannot establish individual liability. Essex, 518

F. App’x at 355 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 751

(6th Cir. 2006)).

Several of Plaintiff’s claims fail to establish whether various Defendants who

are officers or employees of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction

played any personal role in the alleged violations of Mr. Smith’s civil rights. Plaintiff

alleges that Ms. Chambers-Smith, the Department’s Director, and Mr. Spatny, the

warden of Grafton Correctional, “acted with neglect and deliberate indifference in

failing to make or enforce policies consistent with [Plaintiff’s] medically necessary eye

care recommended by multiple optometrists.” (ECF No. 1, PageID #7.)

Defendants cannot be held liable “solely in their supervisory capacity with

overall responsibility for enforcing policies at the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation

and Corrections.” Roundtree v. Dunlap, No. 3:18-cv-1198, 2019 WL 3252912, at *3

(N.D. Ohio July 19, 2019). Further, allegations that these Defendants were aware of

any alleged incidents or misconduct fail, as a matter of law, to give rise to supervisory

liability. Hollis, 480 F. Supp. 3d at 833 (citing Peatross, 818 F.3d at 241). In Hollis,

the court determined that the warden in that case was not liable under Section 1983

in part because the plaintiffs had merely alleged that the warden had failed to act,

which was “not enough.” Id. at 834. Specifically, the court determined that the mere

allegation that “the Warden generally knew of a potential risk that could potentially

result in harm of some kind at some point in time, and should have done more to

prevent that possible harm,” was “not enough for personal liability.” Id. at 835–36.

Further, “[t]he ‘denial of administrative grievances or the [mere] failure to act’ by

prison officials does not subject supervisors to liability under § 1983.” Grinter v.

Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 576 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300

(6th Cir. 1999)). Plaintiff has not pled that any of these Defendants “at least

implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional

conduct.” Hollis, 480 F. Supp. 3d at 835 (quoting Phillips, 534 F.3d at 543).

In his opposition, Plaintiff attempts to clarify that Ms. Chambers-Smith and

Mr. Spatny “are named as defendants for the sole purpose of being responsible for

carrying out the injunctive relief sought herein, once granted by this Court” and that

“none of these defendants are being named solely in their non-acting supervisory

roles.” (ECF No. 15, PageID #97.) That statement concedes that Ms. Chambers-

Smith and Mr. Spatny have no personal involvement in the alleged deprivation of

Mr. Smith’s constitutional rights. Frazier, 41 F. App’x at 764. Without any allegation

of personal involvement, such individual-capacity claims under Section 1983 cannot

survive. Id. To the extent that Plaintiff brings a claim for supervisory liability

against Ms. Burger, such a claim fails regarding the allegation that she “fail[ed] to

ensure medical care consistent with [Plaintiff’s] medically necessary eye care.” (ECF

No. 1, PageID #7.) Such an alleged failure to act cannot survive for supervisory

liability purposes. Grinter, 532 F.3d at 576 (citing Shehee, 199 F.3d at 300).

Taking the allegations of the complaint as true, the Court concludes, as a

matter of law, that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for supervisory liability against

Ms. Chambers-Smith, Mr. Spatny, or Ms. Burger. As a result, Plaintiff fails to state

any personal capacity claim against Ms. Chambers-Smith or Mr. Spatny.

II.B. Deliberate Indifference

The Eighth Amendment “forbids prison officials from ‘unnecessarily and

wantonly inflicting pain’ on an inmate by acting with ‘deliberate indifference toward

[his] serious medical needs.” Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 895 (6th

Cir. 2004) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). “The Eighth

Amendment embodies ‘broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards,

humanity, and decency’ against which courts must evaluate penal measures.” Reilly

v. Vadlamudi, 680 F.3d 617, 623 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102).

To succeed on such a claim, Plaintiff must meet an objective as well as

subjective test. Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 895 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

834 (1994)). The objective test requires Plaintiff to “plead facts which, if true,

establish the existence of a ‘sufficiently serious’ medical need.” Reilly, 680 F.3d at

623 (quoting Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 895). Defendants do not contend that Plaintiff’s

complaint fails to satisfy the objective test that his cataracts constitute a “serious

medical need.” Id. In any event, the Sixth Circuit has determined that cataracts

requiring surgery constitute a “serious medical need.” Cobbs v. Pramstaller, 475 F.

App’x 575, 580 (6th Cir. 2012).

For the subjective test, Plaintiff “must demonstrate Defendants acted with ‘a

sufficiently culpable state of mind in denying medical care.’” Reilly, 680 F.3d at 623

(quoting Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 895). A defendant has a sufficiently culpable state

of mind if he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. “Deliberate indifference is characterized by obduracy or

wantonness—it cannot be predicated on negligence, inadvertence, or good faith

error.” Id. (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)). Further, “[m]ore than

ordinary negligence or medical malpractice is needed” to state a claim for deliberate

indifference. Vartinelli v. Aramark Corr. Servs., LLC, 796 F. App’x 867, 870 (6th Cir.

2019) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835). Plaintiff “‘must allege acts or omissions

sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’” Id.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s complaint does not satisfy the subjective test

because it fails to establish “an act by a Defendant that indicates, even inferentially,

that they intended to punish the Plaintiff.” (ECF No. 14, PageID #89–91.) The Court

applies this subjective test to the actions of each individual Defendant based on the

allegations in the complaint.

II.B.1. Health Care Administrator Burger

Defendants contend that “Plaintiff alleges no action by Berger [sic] that can be

considered deliberate indifference.” (ECF No. 14, PageID #89.) Plaintiff alleges that

Ms. Burger’s attempt “to give him glasses instead of the medically necessary surgery

was motivated by deliberate indifference,” and that Ms. Burger, “after being informed

of the recommendation that Plaintiff needed surgery in his left eye, “notified Plaintiff

that he would not receive the medically necessary surgery but would instead receive

further monitoring.” (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 28 & 31, PageID #5–6.) Further, Plaintiff claims

that Ms. Burger told him that “she would get back to him the next day as to why new

useless prescriptions are being filled when it is clear they will not resolve the

problem.” (Id., ¶ 33, PageID #6.) According to Plaintiff, however, she never did.

Plaintiff’s claim that Ms. Burger was motivated by negligence or deliberate

indifference in these instances is conclusory, and a legal conclusion in any event. At

this stage of the proceedings, the Court takes as true the allegations that Ms. Burger

knew of the recommendation for surgery in Mr. Smith’s left eye, told Mr. Smith that

he would instead receive further monitoring, and did not answer Mr. Smith’s question

about the alleged futility of his prescriptions. Eidson, 510 F.3d at 634 (6th Cir. 2007)

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544).

None of these allegations of personal conduct on behalf of Ms. Burger amounts

to “acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs.” Reilly, 680 F.3d at 624. “[A] complaint that a physician has been

negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of

medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. “In

evaluating a deliberate indifference claim, ‘[w]e distinguish between cases where the

complaint alleges a complete denial of medical care and those cases where the claim

is that a prisoner received inadequate medical treatment.’” Alspaugh v. McConnell,

643 F.3d 162, 169 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n. 5

(6th Cir. 1976)). Further, “[w]here a prisoner alleges only that medical care he

received was inadequate, ‘federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess

medical judgments.’” Id.

In Cobbs, 475 F. App’x at 582, the Sixth Circuit determined that even though

the defendants denied surgery for the plaintiff after they were warned by a doctor

that the plaintiff needed cataract surgery, the plaintiff “fail[ed] to show that this

denial was anything other than the product of considered medical judgment.” In its

reasoning, the Sixth Circuit determined that “[d]uring the relevant time period, [the

plaintiff] regularly met with ophthalmologists and optometrists,” and that the

defendants eventually ordered that “doctors monitor the condition.” Id. So too here.

Plaintiff met with multiple optometrists and doctors regarding his cataracts and had

surgery on his right eye. (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 12, 14, 16–17, 24–26, 30–33, PageID #3–6.)

Instead of an outright denial of treatment, Ms. Burger told Plaintiff that he “would

instead receive further monitoring.” (Id., ¶ 31, PageID #5–6.) Indeed, following this

interaction, Plaintiff had an appointment with Dr. Ferguson, the same doctor who

recommended eye surgery, who provided him with a prescription. (Id., ¶ 32, PageID

#6.) In treating cataracts, a prescription for “an alternate course of treatment, i.e.,

eye glasses” is evidence that “the defendants have not been deliberately indifferent

to plaintiff’s medical needs.” Phillips v. Lindamood, No. 3:09-1187, 2009 WL

5205379, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 23, 2009).

Plaintiff might dispute the adequacy of this treatment (ECF No. 15, PageID

#97–99), but it is not the role of the Court to weigh medical considerations in the place

of experienced medical professionals. Alspaugh, 643 F.3d at 169; see also Westlake,

537 F.2d at 860 n.5. The question of what type of treatment to apply “is a classic

example of a matter for medical judgment.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107. “A medical

decision not to order . . . [certain] measures, does not represent cruel and unusual

punishment,” and “[a]t most it is medical malpractice.” Id.

Plaintiff relies on Alford v. Terrell, No. 1:20-cv-4333, 2020 WL 3969340, at *3

(S.D. Ohio July 14, 2020), for the proposition that “treatment must be so ‘woefully

inadequate as to amount to no treatment at all’ to give rise to a cause of action under

§ 1983.” There, the court determined that the plaintiff’s complaint failed to allege

deliberate indifference regarding surgeries for his eyes, in part because he “received

some medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment.” Id.

(citing Westlake, 537 F.2d at 860 n.5). Such is the case here as well, where Mr. Smith

received some medical attention for his cataracts and eye problems. His complaint is

with the adequacy of the treatment he received.

For these reasons, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Ms. Burger.

II.B.2. Dr. Douglas

Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Douglas’s attempt “to give him glasses instead of the

medically necessary surgery was motivated by deliberate indifference” and that

Dr. Douglas “acted with neglect and deliberate indifference in failing to address

Plaintiff’s headaches, but rather continued to send him back to the optometrist.”

(ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 28 & 30–31, PageID #5–7.)

Again, Plaintiff’s claim that Dr. Douglas was motivated by negligence or

deliberate indifference in these instances is conclusory, and a legal conclusion in any

event. Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true at this stage, there are no allegations of

personal conduct on behalf of Dr. Douglas that amount to “acts or omissions

sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.”

Reilly, 680 F.3d at 624. At best, Dr. Douglas’s alleged failure to address Plaintiff’s

headaches constitutes negligence. But the Eighth Amendment does not

constitutionalize a claim for medical malpractice, if there was any here. See Reilly,

680 F.3d at 627 (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105–06). In Reilly, the pro se plaintiff

alleged that his doctor in prison failed to “provide timely . . . medical care” and ensure

the plaintiff was “evaluated by a physician.” Id. at 625. The Sixth Circuit determined

that “[t]hese allegations may support a claim for professional negligence, but under

established law, deliberate indifference ‘entails something more than mere

negligence.’” Id. (quoting Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 895). So too here. Because Plaintiff

does not allege any facts that support the subjective test that Dr. Douglas disregarded

“an excessive risk to inmate health or safety,” Plaintiff fails to state a claim against

Dr. Douglas. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

II.B.3. Dr. Ferguson

Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Ferguson wrote prescriptions for Plaintiff that did not

help his eyesight or alleviate his headaches. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 26, PageID #5.) Further,

Plaintiff claims that Dr. Ferguson’s attempt “to give him glasses instead of the

medically necessary surgery was motivated by deliberate indifference” and that

Dr. Ferguson “acted with neglect and deliberate indifference in failing to insure

medical treatment consistent with [Plaintiff’s] medically necessary eye care as

recommended by multiple other optometrists.” (Id., ¶ 28, PageID #5 & #7.) Also,

Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Ferguson told him that his left eye required surgery and

that glasses would not improve Plaintiff’s vision, but later issued Plaintiff

prescription glasses despite his earlier statement. (Id., ¶¶ 30 & 33, PageID #5–6.)

As previously stated, Plaintiff’s claim that Dr. Ferguson was motivated by

negligence or deliberate indifference in these instances is conclusory, and a legal

conclusion in any event. Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true at this stage, there are

no allegations of personal conduct on behalf of Dr. Ferguson that amount to “acts or

omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical

needs.” Reilly, 680 F.3d at 624. Similar to Ms. Burger and Dr. Douglas,

Dr. Ferguson’s alleged actions provided Mr. Smith with medical treatment that he

deems inadequate. As previously discussed, this does not rise to the level of

deliberate indifference to violate the Eighth Amendment. Alspaugh, 643 F.3d at 169

(quoting Westlake, 537 F.2d at 860 n. 5). These claims might amount to negligence

or medical malpractice. See Reilly, 680 F.3d at 627 (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at

105–06). But courts are “generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments.”

Alspaugh, 643 F.3d at 169. Because Plaintiff does not allege any facts that support

the subjective test that Dr. Ferguson disregarded “an excessive risk to inmate health

or safety,” Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Dr. Ferguson. Farmer, 511 U.S. at

837.

II.C. Retaliation

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants denied him “cataract surgery in the left eye

. . . [a]s a retaliatory act for complaints related to their medical neglect, and not

because of any alleged hidden and/or undocumented one eye cataract surgery policy.”

(ECF No. 1, ¶ 38, PageID #6.) Plaintiff claims that these acts violated his First

Amendment rights. (Id.) Further, he cites Brito v. Houghlen, No. 1:16-cv-02322 (N.D.

Ohio), to allege a “pattern of retaliatory conduct by the Defendants against multiple

inmates that goes back years” in order to “put cost savings over the health of

Plaintiff.” (Id., ¶ 39, PageID #6.)

To state a claim for First Amendment retaliation, Plaintiff must plead that

(1) he engaged in a constitutionally protected activity; (2) Defendants’ adverse action

caused him to suffer an injury that would likely chill a person of ordinary firmness

from continuing to engage in that activity; and (3) the adverse action was motivated,

at least in part, as a response to the exercise of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Leary

v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 737 (6th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).

II.C.1. Constitutionally Protected Activity

“It is well established that prisoners have a constitutional right to file

grievances against correctional employees.” Pasley v. Conerly, 345 F. App’x 981, 984

(6th Cir. 2009) (citing Herron v. Harrison, 203 F.3d 410, 415 (6th Cir. 2000)); see also

Violett v. Reynolds, 76 F. App’x 24, 27 (6th Cir. 2003) (determining that filing a

grievance is protected conduct). But a prisoner’s First Amendment right to file

institutional grievances without being subject to retaliation “only extends to the filing

of non-frivolous grievances.” Walker v. Michigan Dep’t of Corr., 128 F. App’x 441,

445–46 (6th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).

It is unclear what “complaints for medical neglect” Plaintiff refers to in his

complaint. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 38, PageID #6.) In one instance, Plaintiff alleges that he

was seen by Dr. Ferguson “[a]s a result of Plaintiff’s continued complaints.” (Id., ¶ 32,

PageID #6.) It is not clear whether such complaints in this context were filed

grievances or generalized expressions of frustration with prison staff regarding his

medical treatment. Later in his complaint, Plaintiff references two complaints that

were “never received by the court” on October 9, 2024 and November 13, 2024. (Id.,

PageID #7–9.) These might be legal complaints that Plaintiff attempted to file with

the Court. Liberally construing the allegations to refer to filing grievances (or

complaints in court), Martin, 391 F.3d at 712, such complaints constitute

constitutionally protected conduct, Pasley, 345 F. App’x at 984 (citing Herron, 203

F.3d at 415).

II.C.2. Adverse Action

“[T]his Circuit has held that any action that would deter a person of ordinary

firmness from exercising protected conduct will suffice” as an adverse action, and

“[t]he analysis of this factor must be tailored to the circumstances such that prisoners

might have to endure more than public employees.” Fritz v. Charter Twp. of

Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 724 (6th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Plaintiff does not

allege that any retaliatory conduct deterred him from filing a grievance or continuing

to seek treatment. Indeed, the complaint itself demonstrates that Plaintiff continued

to make complaints regarding his medical treatment after the denial of his second

surgery, which led to at least one additional appointment with Dr. Ferguson in which

he received prescription glasses. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 32, PageID #6.) The Court sees

nothing in the complaint that the medical judgment of Defendants deterred

Mr. Smith or a person of ordinary firmness from raising complaints or seeking

treatment. Fritz, 592 F.3d at 724. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for

retaliation.

II.D. Fourteenth Amendment

Plaintiff generally alleges violations of his Fourteenth Amendment rights in

his complaint, stating that the “denial of services violates the United States

Constitutional provisions of the fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection and due

process under the fourteenth Amendment.” (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 1–3 & 37, PageID #2 &

#6.) Further, he claims that “Defendants Spanty [sic], Dr. Douglas, S. Ferguson,

[and] A. Berger . . . acted in violation of Plaintiff’s Constitutional Rights under the

. . . Fourteenth Amendment.” (Id., PageID #7.)

“Without question, prisoners are not considered a suspect class for purposes of

equal protection litigation.” Jackson v. Jamrog, 411 F.3d 615, 619 (6th Cir. 2005)

(citing Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 604 (6th Cir. 1998)). Further, “[t]he ‘Due

Process Clause does not protect every change in the conditions of confinement having

a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner.’” Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 430 F.3d 795,

804 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 478 (6th Cir. 2005)).

“Both pretrial detainees . . . and convicted prisoners have a constitutional right to be

free from deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs. For a pretrial

detainee, the right arises under the Fourteenth Amendment, while a prisoner’s right

comes from the Eighth Amendment.” Howell v. NaphCare, Inc., 67 F.4th 302, 310–11

(6th Cir. 2023) (citing Richmond v. Huq, 885 F.3d 928, 937 (6th Cir. 2018)).

Plaintiff contends that, in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), “the

Supreme Court held that a prisoner retains due process rights to medical care.” (ECF

No. 15, PageID #99.) But the Supreme Court in Farmer acknowledged that “the

treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined

are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832

(quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993)). Therefore, because Plaintiff is

a prisoner, he fails to state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.

II.E. Policy Violations

Plaintiff makes multiple allegations of “negligent care . . . due to an ODRC

policy that he had to wait a full year before he would be eligible to return to OSU for

a second cataract consultation and surgery” and a “hidden and/or undocumented one

eye cataract surgery policy.” (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 23 & 38, PageID #5–6.) Plaintiff claims

that “Defendant’s Policy of only allowing one cataract surgery per incarcerated adult

when two are medically necessary is deliberate indifference to inmate health.” (Id.,

PageID #7.) In his opposition, Plaintiff argues that “the defendant has attempted to

initiate an unwritten ‘one eye’ policy (called by some staff members: ‘one eye jack’),

which, although they admitted to this on paper in the Brito case, they actively lied to

Judge Solomon Oliver during oral proceedings, stating that there is no ‘one eye

policy.’” (ECF No. 15, PageID #94–95.)

To the extent Plaintiff alleges violations of Department policy, “alleged

violations of ODRC policy do not state a claim under § 1983” because “Section 1983

does not provide a remedy for violations of state laws or regulations.” Tolliver v. Ohio

Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., No. 2:22-cv-4567, 2023 WL 2990186, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Apr.

18, 2023) (citations omitted); see also Brown v. Mahlman, No. 1:233-cv-239, 2022 WL

17817615, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 19, 2022) (dismissing alleged violations of

Department policy because they “fall outside the scope of § 1983”). A defendant’s

“alleged failure to comply with [a State] administrative rule or policy does not itself

rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” Tolliver, 2023 WL 2990186, at *8

(citations omitted). Therefore, none of these alleged violations state a claim under

Section 1983.

II.F. Official-Capacity Claims

Plaintiff’s suit against Defendants in their official capacities is a suit against

the State. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985); see also Hollis, 480 F.

Supp. 3d at 836 (S.D. Ohio 2020) (determining that the warden was a State

employee). The Supreme Court has held that “neither a State nor its officials acting

in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State

Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Suing officials in their official capacities for “acts

performed within the scope of [their] authority is equivalent to suing the

governmental entity itself.” Graham, 473 U.S. at 166 (1985).

“For the State of Ohio and ODRC, the Eleventh Amendment provides

immunity from suits brought in federal court.” Kirkland v. ODRC, No. 4:23-cv-00305,

2023 WL 8807240, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 19, 2023) (citing Welch v. Texas Dep’t of

Highways & Publ. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987)). While States may waive their

Eleventh Amendment immunity, “Ohio has not done so for cases brought under

Section 1983.” Id. (citing Wolfel v. Morris, 972 F.2d 712, 718 (6th Cir. 1992)).

Eleventh Amendment immunity “extends to State agents and instrumentalities, like

ODRC.” Id. (citing Beil v. Lake Erie Corr. Records Dep’t, 282 F. App’x 363, 366 (6th

Cir. 2008)).

Plaintiff argues that the Eleventh Amendment does not protect Defendants

because they “do not enjoy immunity for acts committed under color of state law

which are committed with deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of a

prisoner.” (ECF No. 15, PageID #95.) But Plaintiff appears to confuse claims against

a person in his official capacity with claims against that person in his individual

capacity. Graham, 473 U.S. at 165 (distinguishing official capacity and personal

capacity and acknowledging that “[p]ersonal-capacity suits seek to impose personal

liability upon a government official for actions he takes under color of state law”).

Further, the cases on which Plaintiff relies do not support his argument. (ECF

No. 15, PageID #95.) In Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106, the Supreme Court discussed how a

plaintiff must allege deliberate indifference to serious medical needs to demonstrate

a violation of the Eighth Amendment. But this discussion came in the context of

individual capacity claims. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 98–101. In Papasan v. Allain, 478

U.S. 265, 277 (1986), the Supreme Court observed that State officials can be sued in

their official capacities “only where the underlying authorization upon which the

named official acts is asserted to be illegal.” Plaintiff alleges no such authorization

here. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against these Defendants in their

official capacities fail.

III. Failure to Serve Dr. Matthews

The record reflects that Plaintiff did not serve Dr. Julianne Matthews. (See

ECF No. 7; ECF No. 8.) “If a defendant is not served within 90 days after the

complaint is filed, the court—on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—

must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that

service be made within a specified time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); Abel v. Harp, 122 F.

App’x 248, 250 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Byrd v. Stone, 94 F.3d 217, 219 (6th Cir.

1996)).

Plaintiff filed his complaint on January 29, 2025. (ECF No. 1.) More than 90

days have passed since then but Plaintiff has not served Dr. Matthews. Although the

Court would typically provide Plaintiff with time to obtain service, in this case doing

so would be futile. Like Plaintiff’s allegations against Ms. Burger, Dr. Douglas, and

Dr. Ferguson, none of Plaintiff’s allegations of personal conduct on behalf of

Dr. Matthews amount to “acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Reilly, 680 F.3d at 624. The

complaint alleges only that Dr. Matthews screened Mr. Smith for cataract surgery,

informed him that he had been given the wrong prescription for eyeglasses,

recommended bilateral cataract surgery, and told him to stick to his treatment

recommendation. (ECF No. 1, 94 17 & 24, PageID #4-5.)

At most, construed in Plaintiff's favor, these claims amount to nothing more

than negligence or medical malpractice. They do not rise to the level of deliberate

indifference under the Eighth Amendment. Reilly, 680 F.3d at 627 (quoting

Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 895). Because Plaintiff makes no allegation that

Dr. Matthews subjectively disregarded “an excessive risk to inmate health or safety,”

Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Dr. Matthews. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. For

these reasons, continuing the case against her is futile, and the Court DISMISSES

this action against Defendant Dr. Julianne Matthews.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss of the

five Defendants associated with the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and

Correction. (ECF No. 14.) Further, the Court DISMISSES Defendant Dr. Julianne

Matthews pursuant to Rule 4(m).

SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 18, 2025

J.PhilipCalabrese

United States District Judge

Northern District of Ohio

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