Merritt v. Knowles

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

ORLANDO DIVISION

TISHAWN MERRITT,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 6:24-cv-1365-JSS-DCI

ZOE KNOWLES, ADVENTIST

HEALTH SYSTEM/SUNBELT, INC.,

PATRICIO G. BRUNO, SOFIA

QADIR, ASPIRE HEALTH

PARTNERS, JORGE DORTA-

DUQUE, and LA AMISTAD

RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT

CENTER, LLC,

Defendants.

___________________________________/

ORDER

All non-defaulting Defendants1 move to dismiss Plaintiff’s pro se complaint

(Dkt. 1). (Dkts. 20, 28, 122, 128, 130.) Plaintiff opposes the motions. (Dkts. 40, 47,

131, 132, 133.) For the reasons outlined below, the court grants the motions.

1 The Clerk has entered default against Deputy Zoe Knowles and Dr. Patricio G. Bruno. (Dkts. 95,

115.) Thus, the court does not discuss these parties further, except to caution Plaintiff that she must

include well-pleaded allegations against them in an amended complaint if she wishes to maintain

claims against them. See Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Hous. Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975)

(“The defendant, by [her or] his default, admits the plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations of

fact . . . . [However, t]he defendant is not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded . . . .”). Because

the complaint is due to be dismissed as a shotgun pleading, the allegations therein are not well-pleaded.

See Alvarez v. Gregory HVAC LLC, No. 8:19-cv-1826-CEH-JSS, 2021 WL 3857560, at *4–5, 2021 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 163505, at *8–12 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2021) (denying a motion for default judgment and

dismissing a complaint as a shotgun pleading). When the court refers to Defendants in this order, it

refers to the non-defaulting Defendants in particular.

BACKGROUND2

Plaintiff alleges that on August 16, 2019, employees with Orange County

emergency services took her to AdventHealth Orlando hospital for elevated blood

pressure and chest pains. (Dkt. 1 at 11.) Plaintiff states that while at AdventHealth,

she was “involuntarily detained” under the Baker Act “for a mental health

examination” related to a domestic violence incident report. (Id.) See Fla. Stat.

§ 394.463; Watkins v. Bigwood, 797 F. App’x 438, 442 (11th Cir. 2019) (“Under

Florida’s Baker Act, a person may be subjected involuntarily to a mental health

examination if there is a substantial likelihood that without care or treatment the

person will cause serious bodily harm to himself or herself or others in the near future.”

(cleaned up)). According to Plaintiff, AdventHealth negligently gave her the anti-

psychotic medicine Haldol, a brand of haloperidol. (Dkt. 1 at 11.) Allegedly, Plaintiff

was detained at AdventHealth from August 16 to 20, 2019, and was then involuntarily

transferred to Central Florida Behavior Center psychiatric hospital. (Id. at 12.) At

Central Florida Behavior Center, Plaintiff states, Dr. Sofia Qadir misdiagnosed

Plaintiff and negligently administered anti-psychotic medication to her as a

requirement for her release. (Id. at 22.) Plaintiff reports that on September 22, 2019,

she was transported to Aspire Health psychiatric hospital. (Id. at 12, 25, 27.) There,

Plaintiff claims, Dr. Jorge Dorta-Duque wrongfully sedated her with haloperidol and

involuntarily restrained her in a room for several hours. (Id. at 27.) Plaintiff further

2 The court derives the facts from the complaint (Dkt. 1). See Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317,

1321–22 (11th Cir. 2012).

states that she was battered at Aspire Health and that consequently, implants in her

body ruptured on September 22, 2019. (Id. at 12, 25.) Plaintiff asserts that in addition

to these ruptured implants, she suffered “declined brain function[ and] visual

impairment” as a result of Defendants’ misconduct. (Id. at 12.)

Plaintiff initiated this case in July 2024 alleging deprivations of her due process

rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as related torts under Florida law. (See Dkt. 1.)

She sues Dr. Qadir, Dr. Dorta-Duque, and the business entities that operate the three

hospitals: Adventist Health System/Sunbelt, Inc. for AdventHealth, La Amistad

Residential Treatment Center, LLC for Central Florida Behavioral Center, and Aspire

Health Partners for Aspire Health. (Id. at 10; see Dkts. 65, 69.) For state tort claims,

Plaintiff alleges “[m]edical negligence, wrongful imprisonment, negligent dispensing

[or administering] of [anti-]psychotic medication[,] and infliction of emotional

distress” against Dr. Qadir, Adventist, and La Amistad, (Dkt. 1 at 13, 17–18, 21; see

Dkts. 65, 69), and “negligent battery, wrongful imprisonment, [and] intentional

infliction of emotional distress” against Dr. Dorta-Duque and Aspire Health Partners,

(Dkt. 1 at 23, 26). Defendants move to dismiss the complaint, raising arguments

related to shotgun pleading and statutes of limitations. (Dkt. 20 at 5–8, 21–24; Dkt.

28 at 3–5, 11–12; Dkt. 122 at 4–6, 9–10; Dkt. 128 at 4–6, 9–10; Dkt. 130 at 5–10, 12–

13, 17–18.)3

3 Defendants further maintain that the complaint fails to state a claim (including by failing to satisfy

elements for section 1983), that Plaintiff’s failure to comply with statutory requirements for her

medical negligence claims necessitates dismissal of the claims, and that Plaintiff cannot pursue joint

APPLICABLE STANDARDS

The court “give[s] liberal construction” to documents filed by pro se plaintiffs,

Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007), but the leniency afforded to

such plaintiffs “does not give [the] court license to serve as de facto counsel for [them]

or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading . . . to sustain an action,” GJR Invs., Inc.

v. County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (emphasis and citations

omitted), overruled on other grounds by Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Further,

pro se plaintiffs are still “required . . . to conform to procedural rules.” Loren v. Sasser,

309 F.3d 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2002); see Cummings v. Dep’t of Corr., 757 F.3d 1228,

1234 n.10 (11th Cir. 2014) (“The right of self-representation does not exempt a party

from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” (quoting Birl

v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. 1981))). The two procedural rules applicable in

the shotgun pleading context are Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and 10(b).

See Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off. 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015).

Rule 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to “contain . . . a short and plain statement of

[a] claim showing that the [plaintiff] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule

10(b) requires plaintiffs to “state [their] claims . . . in numbered paragraphs, each

limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).

To “promote clarity,” Rule 10(b) also requires plaintiffs to state “each claim founded

and several liability on Florida negligence claims. (Dkt. 20 at 9–21; Dkt. 28 at 5–14; Dkt. 122 at 6–9;

Dkt. 128 at 6–9; Dkt. 130 at 7–8, 10–17.) Given the resolution of the issues involving shotgun pleading

and statutes of limitations, the court does not address these other arguments.

on a separate transaction or occurrence . . . in a separate count.” Id. “Complaints that

violate either Rule 8(a)(2) or Rule 10(b), or both, are often disparagingly referred to as

‘shotgun pleadings.’” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1320. Shotgun pleadings “fail . . . to give

the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which

each claim rests.” Id. at 1323. A court may dismiss a complaint as a shotgun pleading

“where ‘it is virtually impossible to know which allegations of fact are intended to

support which claim(s) for relief.’” Id. at 1325 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Anderson

v. Dist. Bd. of Trs. of Cent. Fla. Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th Cir. 1996)).

In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court “accept[s]

the allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] them in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff.” Henley v. Payne, 945 F.3d 1320, 1326 (11th Cir. 2019). To survive a

motion to dismiss, the “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). The

complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544). A claim is facially plausible if a plaintiff pleads facts that

allow a court to draw a reasonable inference that a defendant is liable for the alleged

misconduct. Id. While “detailed factual allegations” are not generally required, “[a]

pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements

of a cause of actions will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Generally,

when analyzing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court only considers

the four corners of the complaint and the exhibits attached to the complaint. See Turner

v. Williams, 65 F.4th 564, 583 n.27 (11th Cir. 2023). “A statute of limitations defense

is an affirmative defense,” Paetz v. United States, 795 F.2d 1533, 1536 (11th Cir. 1986),

but dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is appropriate when “it is apparent from

the face of the complaint that the claim is time-barred,” Karantsalis v. City of Miami

Springs, 17 F.4th 1316, 1319–20 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States ex rel. Hunt v.

Cochise Consultancy, Inc., 887 F.3d 1081, 1085 (11th Cir. 2018)). This court applies

federal procedural law for all claims, federal substantive law for the section 1983

claims, and Florida substantive law for the supplemental state claims. See Palm Beach

Golf Ctr.-Boca, Inc. v. John G. Sarris, D.D.S., P.A., 781 F.3d 1245, 1259 (11th Cir. 2015)

(discussing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).

ANALYSIS

The court first explains why Plaintiff’s complaint constitutes an impermissible

shotgun pleading. The court then addresses Defendants’ arguments that Plaintiff’s

claims against them are time-barred under statutes of limitations.

A. Shotgun Pleading

Plaintiff’s complaint is a shotgun pleading because it does “not separat[e] into

a different count each cause of action or claim for relief.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1322–

23. For example, the sole count against Dr. Qadir alleges “[m]edical negligence,

wrongful imprisonment, negligent administering of [anti-]psychotic medication[,] and

infliction of emotional distress,” (Dkt. 1 at 21), and the sole count against Dr. Dorta-

Duque alleges “negligent battery, wrongful imprisonment, [and] intentional infliction

of emotional distress” (IIED), (id. at 26). Given the pleading deficiency of combining

different claims, such as negligence and false imprisonment,4 within a single count, it

is “virtually impossible [for Defendants] to know [from the complaint] which

allegations of fact are intended to support which claim(s) for relief.” See Weiland, 792

F.3d at 1325 (emphasis omitted); see also Burke v. Custom Marine Grp., 847 F. App’x

578, 581 (11th Cir. 2021) (“The district court correctly identified [the] complaint as

implicating the . . . failure to separate into a different count each cause of action or

claim for relief. In Count V, [the plaintiff] alleged ‘Negligent Manufacturing, Design,

Failure to Warn, Etc.’ . . . . These are distinct theories of liability that involve different

facts and should be asserted independently.” (footnote and quotation omitted));

Trophia v. Camping World, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 3d 1305, 1310 (M.D. Fla. 2022)

(“[B]ecause a claim for loss of consortium is a separate claim, combining that claim

with another claim under the same count raises shotgun[ ]pleading concerns.”).

To correct this deficiency in an amended complaint, Plaintiff must list each of

her claims in a separate count with supporting factual allegations. See Weiland, 792

F.3d at 1322–23. If Plaintiff wishes to bring negligence, false imprisonment, and IIED

4 Though Adventist criticizes Plaintiff’s reference to a tort of “wrongful imprisonment,” (Dkt. 20 at 9

(“Florida law does not recognize a claim for ‘wrongful imprisonment.’”)), the court construes the

“wrongful imprisonment” claims liberally as claims for false imprisonment, see Albra, 490 F.3d at 829.

Florida law requires Plaintiff to establish four elements for false imprisonment: “[(1)] the unlawful

detention and deprivation of liberty of a person [(2)] against that person’s will [(3)] without legal

authority or ‘color of authority’ and [(4)] which is unreasonable and unwarranted under the

circumstances.” City of Boca Raton v. Basso, 242 So. 3d 1141, 1143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting

Montejo v. Martin Mem’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 935 So. 2d 1266, 1268 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)).

claims against a defendant, for example, she must set out one count against the

defendant for negligence, another count against the defendant for false imprisonment,

and another count against the defendant for IIED. Additionally, Plaintiff must include

in each count the elements for that count’s claim and the facts supporting those

elements. Each count must include only the elements and facts applicable to it. See

Ely v. Mobile Cnty. Sch. Bd., No. 15-566-KD-M, 2016 WL 3188926, at *8, 2016 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 73665, at *21 (S.D. Ala. May 11, 2016) (“[The p]laintiff should clearly

state under each count the law under which [s]he is proceeding[,] clearly list what facts

apply to that count[,] clearly explain under each count how the legal right implicated

by that count was violated (including how each element of the cause of action is

alleged)[,] and clearly articulate the relief requested—all with statements of relevant

facts rendering the claims plausible but without excessive tangential or irrelevant

material.”), report and recommendation adopted by 2016 WL 3189244, at *1, 2016 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 73663, at *1 (S.D. Ala. June 7, 2016).

The court notes three additional pleading deficiencies that Plaintiff shall correct

if she amends her complaint. First, it is not clear from the complaint whether Plaintiff

asserts claims of procedural due process, substantive due process, or both under section

1983, nor is it clear which parties are being sued for due process violations. (See Dkt.

1.) To plead a procedural due process claim, Plaintiff must allege “(1) a deprivation

of a constitutionally[ ]protected liberty or property interest[,] (2) state action[,] and (3)

constitutionally[ ]inadequate process.” Arrington v. Helms, 438 F.3d 1336, 1347 (11th

Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). To plead a substantive due process claim, Plaintiff

must allege (1) that she was “depriv[ed] of a constitutionally protected interest[] and

(2) that the deprivation was the result of an abuse of governmental power sufficient to

raise an ordinary tort to the stature of a constitutional violation.” Hoefling v. City of

Miami, 811 F.3d 1271, 1282 (11th Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted). If Plaintiff brings a

due process claim in her amended complaint, she shall specify whether the claim is a

procedural due process or substantive due process claim and shall also identify the

defendant for the claim. The court advises Plaintiff that she cannot proceed under a

theory of respondeat superior with respect to any section 1983 claims, including her

due process claims. See Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1129 (11th Cir. 1992) (“A

defendant cannot be held liable under section 1983 on a respondeat superior or

vicarious liability basis.”). If Plaintiff asserts multiple due process claims, each claim

shall appear in its own count in the amended complaint, and each count shall include

only the elements and facts applicable to the claim therein. Plaintiff shall not include

time-barred counts in her amended complaint.

Second, Plaintiff incorrectly alleges “negligent battery” against some

Defendants. (Dkt. 1 at 23, 26.) See Essex Ins. Co. v. Big Top of Tampa, Inc., 53 So. 3d

1220, 1223 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (“There is no such thing as the negligent

commission of an intentional tort, such as battery.” (cleaned up)). The Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure allow inconsistent claims such as battery and negligence to be

pleaded in the alternative. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2) (“A party may set out two or

more statements of a claim . . . alternatively . . . . If a party makes alternative

statements, the pleading is sufficient if any one of them is sufficient.”). The elements

of a civil battery claim under Florida law are “(1) the intent to cause a harmful or

offensive contact with another person[] and (2) an offensive contact that directly or

indirectly results.” Brown v. J.C. Penney Corp., 521 F. App’x 922, 923 (11th Cir. 2013)

(citing Chorak v. Naughton, 409 So. 2d 35, 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)). To allege

negligence under Florida law, Plaintiff must plead (1) a duty of care owed by defendant

to the plaintiff, (2) the defendant’s breach of that duty, (3) causation, and (4) damages

suffered by the plaintiff. See Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1325 (11th Cir.

2012). If Plaintiff wishes to assert both negligence and battery against a defendant in

her amended complaint, she may do so in the alternative, but Plaintiff shall refrain

from alleging negligent battery in her amended complaint.

Third, although Plaintiff sues Dr. Dorta-Duque and Aspire Health Partners for

IIED specifically, (Dkt. 1 at 23, 26), she sues other Defendants for the infliction of

emotional distress generally without clarifying whether the claims are for IIED,

negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED), or both, (see id. at 13, 17, 21). Florida

law requires Plaintiff to satisfy four elements for an IIED claim:

(1) The wrongdoer’s conduct was intentional or reckless[;] that is, he

intended his behavior when he knew or should have known that

emotional distress would likely result; (2) the conduct was [so]

outrageous . . . as to go beyond all bounds of decency[] and . . . be

regarded as odious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community; (3)

the conduct caused emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress was

severe.

Deauville Hotel Mgmt., LLC v. Ward, 219 So. 3d 949, 954–55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

(quotation omitted). Whether conduct is sufficiently outrageous to support an IIED

claim is an issue of law for the court to decide, not an issue of fact. Id. at 955.

“Although there is no definitive example of what constitutes ‘outrageous conduct’ for

the purposes of maintaining a cause of action for [IIED], Florida case[]law on the

subject has evinced a comparatively high standard.” Golden v. Complete Holdings, Inc.,

818 F. Supp. 1495, 1499 (M.D. Fla. 1993). As for NIED, “[i]n Florida, ‘persons who

suffer a physical injury as a result of emotional distress arising from their witnessing

the death or injury of a loved one’” may assert an NIED claim. Godelia v. Doe, 881

F.3d 1309, 1322 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Zell v. Meek, 665 So. 2d 1048, 1050 (Fla.

1995)). Such a claim also has four elements:

(1) the plaintiff must suffer a discernable physical injury[,] (2) the physical

injury must be caused by the psychological trauma[,] (3) the plaintiff must

be involved in the event causing the negligent injury to another[,] and (4)

the plaintiff must have a close personal relationship to the directly injured

person.

Legrande v. Emmanuel, 889 So. 2d 991, 995 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). If Plaintiff

wishes to assert emotional distress claims in her amended complaint, she shall specify

which type of emotional distress claims she is bringing.

B. Time-Barred Claims

Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s state tort claims against them and section 1983

claims against Dr. Qadir are time-barred.5 (Dkt. 20 at 21–24; Dkt. 28 at 11–12; Dkt.

122 at 4–6; Dkt. 128 at 4–6; Dkt. 130 at 8–10, 12–13, 17–18.) The court agrees.

Florida’s medical negligence statute of limitations provides:

5 The court distinguishes between the state tort claims and due process claims in the complaint because

“[m]ere incidents of [medical] negligence or malpractice do not rise to the level of constitutional

violations.” See Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir. 1991).

An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced

within [two] years from the time the incident giving rise to

the action occurred or within [two] years from the time the

incident is discovered, or should have been discovered with

the exercise of due diligence; however, in no event shall the

action be commenced later than [four] years from the date

of the incident or occurrence out of which the cause of

action accrued, except that this [four]-year period shall not

bar an action brought on behalf of a minor on or before the

child’s eighth birthday. An ‘action for medical malpractice’

is defined as a claim in tort or in contract for damages

because of the death, injury, or monetary loss to any person

arising out of any medical, dental, or surgical diagnosis,

treatment, or care by any provider of health[]care.

Fla. Stat. § 95.11(5)(c); see Silva v. Sw. Fla. Blood Bank, 601 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 1992)

(interpreting “medical diagnosis, treatment, or care” and “provider of health[]care” in

the statute by applying the plain meaning of the words). As Plaintiff has not brought

this case on behalf of a minor, by the statute’s plain language, she had four years

maximum from the complained-of events to assert the state tort claims in her

complaint, and she did not meet this deadline. The complained-of events occurred in

August and September 2019, and Plaintiff did not file the complaint in this case until

July 2024. (See Dkt. 1.) Therefore, Plaintiff’s state tort claims against Defendants are

time-barred under the medical negligence statute of limitations.

La Amistad also contends that Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim against it is

time-barred under Florida’s false imprisonment statute of limitations. (Dkt. 28 at 12.)

The limitations period for false imprisonment is four years in Florida. Fla. Stat.

§ 95.11(3)(n); Garcia v. Psychiatric Institutes of Am., Inc., 638 So. 2d 567, 567 (Fla. Dist.

Ct. App. 1994) (“[T]he tort[] of false imprisonment . . . is subject to the four[-]year

statute of limitations.”). Because Plaintiff filed this complaint in July 2024, more than

four years after her alleged imprisonment, her false imprisonment claim against La

Amistad is time-barred on this basis, as well.

Additionally, Dr. Qadir argues that the due process and emotional distress

claims against her are time-barred under the applicable statutes of limitations for such

claims. (Dkt. 130 at 12–13, 17–18.) Section 1983 claims, such as Plaintiff’s due

process claims, “are governed by the forum state’s residual personal injury statute of

limitations, which in Florida” sets of a limitations period of “four years.” City of

Hialeah v. Rojas, 311 F.3d 1096, 1103 n.2 (11th Cir. 2002); see Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(o).

IIED claims also have a four-year limitations period in Florida. See Fla. Stat.

§ 95.11(3)(n); W.D. v. Archdiocese of Mia., Inc., 197 So. 3d 584, 587 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

2016) (noting the four-year limitations period for IIED claims). As “[a]n action

founded on negligence,” Fla. Stat. § 95.11(5)(a), an NIED claim under Florida law is

subject to a two-year limitations period, id.; see Trocano v. Vivaldi, 720 F. Supp. 3d 1231,

1241 (M.D. Fla. 2024) (observing in the NIED context that “an action founded on

negligence must be filed within two years”). Dr. Qadir’s alleged misconduct occurred

in August 2019. (See Dkt. 1 at 22.) Because Plaintiff filed this complaint in July 2024,

her due process and emotional distress claims against Dr. Qadir are time-barred under

Florida’s statutes of limitations for such claims.

Plaintiff’s arguments on the statute of limitations issues are not persuasive. To

begin with, Plaintiff does not sufficiently develop these arguments with citations to

legal authorities. (See Dkts. 40, 47, 131, 132, 133.) See United States v. Harding, 104

F.4th 1291, 1300 (11th Cir. 2024) (“A party abandons an issue when [it] makes only

passing references to [the issue] or raises it in a perfunctory manner without supporting

arguments and authority.” (quotation omitted)). Nonetheless, the court discusses

Plaintiff’s four main arguments.

First, Plaintiff asserts that as a result of the complained-of events, she was

“physically and mentally unable” to sue La Amistad until June 2023. (Dkt. 47 at 6.)

The court construes this assertion as contending that the statutes of limitations were

tolled because of Plaintiff’s incapacity. Tolling refers to suspending the running of

“the statute of limitations time clock until the identified condition is settled.” Major

League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So. 2d 1071, 1076 (Fla. 2001) (quotation omitted). The

time under the statutes of limitations is tolled by the “adjudicated incapacity, before

the cause of action accrued, of the person entitled to sue.” Fla. Stat. § 95.051(1)(d).

Because the tolling requires Plaintiff to have been deemed legally incompetent before

the complained-of events, not after them, her alleged incapacity fails to toll the statute

of limitations. See Morsani, 790 So. 2d at 1075.

Second, Plaintiff maintains that the continuing violation doctrine applies to her

claims because she received drug treatment in thirty-day increments from August 2019

to December 2022. (Dkt. 132 at 2–3; Dkt. 133 at 3.) “The continuing violation

doctrine permits a plaintiff to sue on an otherwise time-barred claim when additional

violations of the law occur within the statutory period.” Robinson v. United States, 327

F. App’x 816, 818 (11th Cir. 2007). “When the violation alleged involves continuing

injury, the cause of action accrues, and the limitation period begins to run, at the time

the unlawful conduct ceases.” Id. Here, the alleged unlawful conduct ceased in

September 2019 at the latest. (See Dkt. 1.) Consequently, the continuing violation

doctrine does not overcome the statutes of limitations. See Lovett v. Ray, 327 F.3d 1181,

1183 (11th Cir. 2003) (“The critical distinction in the continuing violation analysis is

whether the plaintiff complains of the present consequence of a one[-]time violation,

which does not extend the limitations period, or the continuation of that violation into

the present, which does. Here, the defendants’ act . . . was a one[-]time act with

continued consequences, and the limitations period is not extended.” (alterations

adopted and quotation omitted)).

Third, Plaintiff invokes the relation back doctrine to argue that because she

initially brought her claims against Defendants in August 2023 in a previous lawsuit,

her complaint in this case relates back to her complaint in that lawsuit, which fell

within the four-year limitations period. (Dkt. 131 at 4; Dkt. 133 at 4.) However, the

“relation back doctrine has application only in instances where an original pleading is

amended. . . . The amendment does not . . . relate back to any prior

proceedings . . . not part of the action in question.” Rayo v. New York, 882 F. Supp. 37,

40 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 15); accord Benge v. United States, 17 F.3d

1286, 1288 (10th Cir. 1994) (“[A] separately filed claim, as opposed to an amendment

or a supplementary pleading, does not relate back to a previously filed claim.”).

Therefore, Plaintiff’s current complaint does not relate back to the complaint in her

previous lawsuit.

Fourth, Plaintiff asserts that the Supremacy Clause of the United States

Constitution preempts Florida’s statutes of limitations. (Dkt. 131 at 4; Dkt. 132 at 6;

Dkt. 133 at 5.) The Supremacy Clause preempts “state laws that ‘interfere with, or are

contrary to[,]’ federal law.” Aspen Am. Ins. Co. v. Landstar Ranger, Inc., 65 F.4th 1261,

1266 (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 211 (1824)). Plaintiff does

not identify a federal law for the preemption analysis. (See Dkt. 131 at 4; Dkt. 132 at

6; Dkt. 133 at 5.) However, the court construes her Supremacy Clause argument as

contending that Florida’s statutes of limitations interfere with or are contrary to section

1983 or the federal due process rights Plaintiff seeks to vindicate through that section.

Because the Eleventh Circuit has affirmed when courts have applied Florida’s statutes

of limitations to dismiss state tort claims brought alongside due process claims—and

indeed has affirmed dismissals of due process claims on statute of limitations

grounds—this argument fails. See Hollis v. W. Acad. Charter, Inc., 782 F. App’x 951

(11th Cir. 2019) (affirming the dismissal of a defamation claim as time-barred under

Florida’s statute of limitations for such claims when the pro se plaintiff also brought

due process claims under section 1983); see also McGroarty v. Swearingen, 977 F.3d 1302

(11th Cir. 2020) (affirming the dismissal of substantive due process claims as time-

barred); Black v. Broward Emp’t & Training Admin., 846 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1988)

(affirming the dismissal of procedural due process claims as time-barred); cf. Jones v.

United States, No. 22-13381, 2024 WL 837054, at *5, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 4659, at

*12 (11th Cir. Feb. 28, 2024) (“[T]he Florida statute of repose for medical-malpractice

claims is not preempted by the [Federal Tort Claims Act.]” (citation omitted)).

Plaintiff’s state tort claims against Defendants and section 1983 claims against

Dr. Qadir are thus time-barred.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly:

1. Defendants’ motions (Dkts. 20, 28, 122, 128, 130) are GRANTED.

2. Plaintiff’s state tort claims against Adventist, La Amistad, Dr. Qadir, Aspire

Health Partners, and Dr. Dorta-Duque are DISMISSED with prejudice as

time-barred.

3. Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims against Dr. Qadir are DISMISSED with

prejudice as time-barred.

4. The remainder of Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED without prejudice on

shotgun pleading grounds. If Plaintiff can do so in good faith while fully

complying with this order and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, she may

file an amended complaint. If she does so, she shall comply with all the

directions in this order and shall correct all the pleading deficiencies discussed

herein. Plaintiff shall not include any time-barred claims in her amended

complaint.

5. If Plaintiff wishes to file an amended complaint, she shall do so on or before

August 6, 2025. See Auto. Alignment & Body Serv., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.

Ins. Co., 953 F.3d 707, 720 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[A]n order dismissing a complaint

with leave to amend within a specified time becomes a final judgment if the time

allowed for amendment expires without the plaintiff seeking an extension. And

when the order becomes a final judgment, the district court loses all its

prejudgment powers to grant any more extensions of time to amend the

complaint.” (citation and quotation omitted)). If the amended complaint fails

to comply with any of the directions in this order, the court may dismiss it

without notice to Plaintiff.

ORDERED in Orlando, Florida, on July 16, 2025.

( Yes A _ xheak

JUFIE S. SNEED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies furnished to:

Counsel of Record

Unrepresented Parties

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