Reeves v. Bondi

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

MICHAEL REEVES,

Plaintiff,

- against - MEMORANDUM & ORDER

25-cv-2857 (NRM) (MMH)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE;

THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND

SECURITY; NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY;

U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS

ENFORCEMENT,

Defendants.

MICHAEL REEVES,

Plaintiff,

- against - 25-cv-3021 (NRM) (MMH)

PAM BONDDL in her official capacity as the U.S.

Attorney and head of the United States

Department of Justice (DOJ); KASH PATEL, in

his official capacity as the Director the FBI; TULSI

GABBARD, in her official capacity as the Director

of National Intelligence,

Defendants.

NINA R. MORRISON, United States District Judge:

Pro se plaintiff Michael Reeves filed the above-captioned actions, Reeves v.

United States Department of Justice, 25-CV-2857 (NCM)(MMB) (“Reeves I’) and

Reeves v. Bondi, 25-CV-3021 (NRM) (MMH) (“Reeves IT’) in the United States

District Court for the Southern District of New York. On May 22, 2025, Reeves I

was transferred to this Court. On May 30, 2025, Reeves II was transferred to this

Court. The actions are consolidated solely for the purpose of this Order. Plaintiff’s

requests to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 are granted

solely for the purpose of this Order.1 For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s

actions are DISMISSED, and Plaintiff is warned against future frivolous in forma

pauperis complaints.

BACKGROUND

Both actions concern what Plaintiff alleges has been longstanding, constant

surveillance by the United States government. He states that the unrelenting

surveillance, allegedly imposed pursuant to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act

(“FISA”) Section 702, has affected every aspect of his life.

In Reeves I, the complaint naming the United States Department of Justice

as the defendant, Plaintiff alleges that “he was maliciously added to the terrorist

watch list” and “is continuously followed, harassed and tortured by organized

groups using intelligence from illegal data” that is “gather[ed] from his personal

devices” and via drones and helicopters. ECF No 1 at 2. The amended complaint,

which adds the Department of Homeland Security, the National Security Agency

and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement as defendants, outlines a series

of incidents over the past approximately two years in which he has been allegedly

surveilled and harassed. ECF No. 9. He alleges that he was first added to the

1 The Court notes that Reeves’s applications, which are identical except for

their captions, contain inconsistent information about his employment status and

income and inadequate information about his financial obligations.

“terrorist watch list” in February 2021 and since that date has been continuously

harassed by “organized teams of agents and drones overhead” ECF No. 9 at 5.2

The amended complaint outlines incidents between June 4, 2023 and May 2025 in

New York and North Carolina in which, inter alia, defendants “chased down

interstate 95 south, and shot him with low frequency sounds, injuring his eyes

and ears,” “persistently ambushed [him] by a drone that flew exceedingly low

overhead following him from Walgreens, to a restaurant, the laundromat,

mechanic shop, corner store and finally back home.” Id. at 1, 5. He seeks damages

of twenty million dollars. Id. at 22.

Plaintiff brings Reeves II as a “petition for a writ of habeas corpus.” He does

not allege that he is physically in defendants’ custody, but argues that the “extreme

surveillance” he is under has resulted in a form of “unusual detention” from which he

seeks release. ECF No. 1 at 1–6. He names as respondents, Pam Bondi, the United

States Attorney General, Kash Patel, the Director of the FBI, and Tulsi Gabbard, the

Director of National Intelligence. The allegations in Reeves II are consistent with

Reeves I, that is, he alleges that “every move, every word, every keystroke are

monitored, recorded and exploited under FISA Section 702,” and the “torment” and

“constant threat of loud drones hovering overhead” makes it “impossible for him to

leave his home.” Id. at 2.

2 The Court quotes all of Plaintiff's submissions verbatim. All spelling,

grammar, and punctuation are as in the original unless otherwise indicated.

LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim is plausible

‘when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Matson v. Bd. of

Educ., 631 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009)). Although all allegations contained in a complaint are assumed to be true,

this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pro se

complaint “must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429

U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). The Court’s obligation “to construe a pro se complaint liberally”

continues to apply “[e]ven after Twombly” established the plausibility standard for

assessing pleadings. Newsome v. Bogan, 795 F. App’x 72, 72 (2d Cir. 2020) (summary

order) (quoting Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009)).

A district court shall review an in forma pauperis action and dismiss it where

it finds the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief

may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune

from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

DISCUSSION

A court may dismiss a claim as “factually frivolous” if the sufficiently well-

pleaded facts are “clearly baseless”—that is, if they are “fanciful,” “fantastic,” or

“delusional.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32–33 (1992) (quoting Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 327, 328 (1989)). The Court finds that Reeves’s

allegations meet that standard, and therefore dismisses these actions as frivolous.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(2)(B)(i); Denton, 504 U.S. at 33 (“[A] finding of factual frivolousness

is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly

incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict

them.”).

Moreover, the Court notes that Plaintiff is a prolific filer of pro se complaints.

The Court now issues another warning to Plaintiff against future frivolous filings.

The Court takes judicial notice of the May 7, 2025 Order of the United States District

Court for the Middle District of North Carolina in Reeves v. United States of America,

No. 24-CV-1108 (CCE)(JLW), ECF No. 17 at 11–13, in which that Court dismisses

Plaintiff’s claims that the “United States is using directed energy weapons, ‘voice-to-

skull technology,’ drones and aircraft, “artificial sun and moon,’ radiation,

‘sonic/microwave weapons,’ and other ‘devices’ to torment, assail, torture, surveil, and

otherwise harm him” and details plaintiff’s extensive filings in that court and his

litigation history in the federal courts. Plaintiff has filed “forty lawsuits in no fewer

than nine jurisdictions” including the Second, Third, Fourth, and the District of

Columbia Courts of Appeals, and the District of New Jersey, the District of the

District of Columbia, the Middle District of North Carolina, the Eastern District of

New York,3 and the Southern District of New York. Id. at 1–11 (describing each

3 Plaintiff has filed seven prior actions in this Court. In addition to the four

cases listed by the District of North Carolina: Reeves v. Metropolitan Detention

Center of Brooklyn et al., 15-CV-3262; Reeves v. Holder et al., 15-CV-1145; Reeves v.

City of New York et al., 24-CV-2408; and Reeves v. Immigration and Naturalization

filing), 11–13 (listing each case by jurisdiction).

Like the Middle District of North Carolina, Id. at 15–17; ECF No. 19 (Order

and Judgment), this Court warns plaintiff against future frivolous filings. The ability

to litigate in forma pauperis is regarded as a privilege and may be denied if abused.

In re Anderson, 511 U.S. 364, 366 (1994); In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 179–180 (1991)

(“In order to prevent frivolous petitions for extraordinary relief from unsettling the

fair administration of justice, the Court has a duty to deny in forma pauperis status

to those individuals who have abused the system.”); Polanco v. Hopkins, 510 F.3d 152,

156 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that the ability to proceed in forma pauperis “’is not a

constitutional right,’ but rather ‘a congressionally created benefit’” (quoting

Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 1999)). The Second Circuit has held

that a district court not only has the authority, but also an obligation, to deny this

benefit to a litigant who has demonstrated a history of filing frivolous and vexatious

claims. See In re Martin–Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1261 (2d Cir. 1984) (“Federal courts

have both the inherent power and the constitutional obligation to protect their

jurisdiction from conduct which impairs their ability to carry out Article III

functions.”). The Second Circuit has upheld the district court’s authority to issue a

filing injunction “when a plaintiff abuses the process of the Courts to harass and

annoy others with meritless, frivolous, vexatious or repetitive proceedings.” Lau v.

Meddaugh, 229 F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks

Service et al., 14-CV-4709, Plaintiff has filed three other cases: Reeves v.

Immigration and Naturalization Services, et al., 14-CV-4709; Reeves v. Excelsior

College, 15-CV-152; and Reeves v. New York City Housing Authority et al.,

23-CV-3646.

omitted and alterations adopted). However, it is the “the unequivocal rule in this

Circuit that the district court may not impose a filing injunction on a litigant sua

sponte without providing the litigant with notice and an opportunity to be heard.”

Iwachiw v. New York State Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 396 F.3d 525, 529 (2d Cir. 2005)

(alterations adopted) (quoting Moates v. Barkley, 147 F.3d 207, 208 (2d Cir. 1998)).

The Court has considered Plaintiff’s litigation history and his persistence in

filing frivolous actions containing incredible and at times incomprehensible

allegations. Plaintiff has taxed the resources of the federal courts as “[e]very paper

[he has] filed with the Clerk of this Court, no matter how repetitious or frivolous,

require[d] some portion of the institution’s limited resources.” In re McDonald, 489

U.S. 180, 184 (1989). Plaintiff has clearly exceeded the reasonable access to the

courts afforded to him by the in forma pauperis statute and “abuse[d] the process of

the Courts to harass and annoy others with meritless, frivolous, vexatious or

repetitive proceedings.” Lau, 229 F.3d at 123 (internal quotation marks omitted and

alterations adopted).

This Order shall serve as a warning that the Court hopes will deter Reeves

from further frivolous filings. Should he persist in filing frivolous actions in this

Court, the Court may direct Reeves to show cause why an Order barring the

acceptance of any future in forma pauperis complaints for filing in this Court without

first obtaining leave of the Court should not be entered. 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, these actions are dismissed as frivolous. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915 (e)(2)(B)(i). Furthermore, the Court notifies Reeves that if he files any further

frivolous in forma pauperis actions, the Court may direct him to show cause why an

order should not be entered barring the filing of future in forma pauperis complaints

without leave of the Court.

The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal would

not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the

purpose of any appeal. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962).

The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgments, close these

cases, mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff and to note the mailing on the docket.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ NRM

NINA R. MORRISON

United States District Judge

Dated: July 16, 2025

Brooklyn,

New York