Groves v. Harris

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

JERMIE L. GROVES,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action 1:25-cv-479

Judge Jeffery P. Hopkins

Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura

CHAE HARRIS,

Warden, Warren Correctional Institution,

et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Jermie L. Groves, an Ohio inmate who is proceeding without the assistance of

counsel, sues Chae Harris, the Warden of Warren Correctional Institution (“WCI”), WCI’s

Medical and Mental Health Departments, and the U.S. Government under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

alleging that Defendants have been deliberately indifferent to her serious medical needs in

violation of the Eighth Amendment by denying her gender affirming surgery and hormone

therapy. This matter is before the Court for the initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint under 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A to identify cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal of

Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune

from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b)(1)–(2); see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth,

114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997). Having performed the initial screen, Plaintiff MAY

PROCEED on her claims for injunctive relief against Warden Harris in his official capacity, but

it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s remaining claims be dismissed for failure to state a

claim on which relief can be granted.

This matter is also before the Court for consideration of Plaintiff’s motion for leave to

proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2), which is GRANTED. (ECF

No. 1.) Plaintiff must pay the full amount of the Court’s $350 filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

Plaintiff’s certified trust fund statement reveals that she has $4.47 in her prison account, which is

insufficient to pay the filing fee.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), the custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust accounts

(Inmate ID Number A768606) at the Warren Correctional Institution is DIRECTED to submit

to the Clerk of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio as an initial

partial payment, 20% of the greater of either the average monthly deposits to the inmate trust

account or the average monthly balance in the inmate trust account, for the six months

immediately preceding the filing of the Complaint.

After full payment of the initial, partial filing fee, the custodian shall submit 20% of the

inmate’s preceding monthly income credited to the account, but only when the amount in the

account exceeds $10.00, until the full fee of $350.00 has been paid to the Clerk of this Court. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997).

Checks should be made payable to: Clerk, United States District Court. The checks

should be sent to:

Prisoner Accounts Receivable

260 U.S. Courthouse

85 Marconi Boulevard

Columbus, Ohio 43215

The prisoner’s name and this case number must be included on each check.

It is ORDERED that Plaintiff be allowed to prosecute her action without prepayment of

fees or costs and that judicial officers who render services in this action shall do so as if the costs

had been prepaid. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff and

the prison cashier’s office.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to

“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In

doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are

assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from

filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e):

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid,

the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—

* * *

(B) the action or appeal—

(i) is frivolous or malicious; [or]

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. . . .

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte

dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or

upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See

also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (requiring a court to conduct a screening of “a complaint in a civil action

in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a

governmental entity . . . [to] identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion

of the complaint [that is] frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted”).

Further, to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the

basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also

Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule

8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual

demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B.,

727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).

Although this pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations, a pleading

that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”

is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). A complaint will not

“suffice if it tenders naked assertion devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (cleaned up).

Instead, to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (cleaned up). Facial

plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The

plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the

strength of competing explanations for the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504

(citations omitted). Further, the Court holds pro se complaints “to less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Garrett v. Belmont Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 374 F. App’x 612,

614 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient

treatment, however, has limits; “courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim

asserted.” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v.

Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)).

II. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff alleges that, although she was assigned the gender of male at birth, she suffers

from gender dysphoria and is a transgender woman. Plaintiff has requested both hormone

therapy and gender affirming surgery from Warren Correctional Institution (“WCI”) as treatment

for her gender dysphoria. Plaintiff was told that “they are looking into the hormones” but that

“they don’t do sex changes in prison.” (Compl., ECF No. 1-1, PAGEID #11, 15.) Plaintiff feels

“that the state is refusing this treatment because every time I ask about it they give me a diffrent

[sic] exuse [sic].” (Id. at PAGEID #14.) Plaintiff names as Defendants Chae Harris, Warden of

WCI, WCI’s Medical and Mental Health Departments, and the U.S. Government. As relief,

Plaintiff seeks an order requiring the prison to provide her with hormone therapy and gender

affirming surgery. (Id. at PAGEID #9, 13.) The undersigned construes Plaintiff’s Complaint to

advance claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical

needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

The undersigned first considers the appropriate Defendants for Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff

does not specify whether she sues Warden Harris in his individual or official capacity. To the

extent that Warden Harris is sued in his individual capacity, those claims must be dismissed

because Plaintiff fails to allege the necessary personal involvement by Warden Harris in the

decision to deny Plaintiff gender affirming care. To prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must

plead two elements: “(1) deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

States (2) caused by a person acting under color of state law.” Hunt v. Sycamore Cmty. Sch. Dist.

Bd. of Educ., 542 F.3d 529, 534 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing McQueen v. Beecher Cmty. Sch., 433

F.3d 460, 463 (6th Cir. 2006)). To establish the second element, a plaintiff must show “personal

involvement” by the defendant. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation

omitted). This is because Ҥ 1983 liability cannot be imposed under a theory of respondeat

superior.” Id. (citation omitted). Thus, to hold a supervisor liable under § 1983, a plaintiff “must

show that the official at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the

unconstitutional conduct.” Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up).

Plaintiff’s allegations do not mention Warden Harris and therefore she has not plausibly alleged

that Warden Harris was personally involved in the decision to deny her gender affirming care.

Plaintiff therefore cannot succeed on an individual-capacity claim against Warden Harris.

On the other hand, to the extent that Plaintiff sues Warden Harris in his official capacity,

that claim is essentially one against the State of Ohio. A suit against a state official in his or her

official capacity is “not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office,”

and is therefore “no different from a suit against the State itself.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State

Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). And although sovereign immunity generally precludes federal-

court jurisdiction when a private citizen sues a state or its instrumentalities, an exception exists

when the doctrine set forth in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), applies. See Boler v. Earley,

865 F.3d 391, 410 (6th Cir. 2017). The Ex Parte Young doctrine applies when a plaintiff brings

“claims for prospective relief against state officials sued in their official capacity to prevent

future federal constitutional or statutory violations.” Id. at 412. Here, because Plaintiff seeks

prospective, injunctive relief in the form of an order requiring WCI to provide her with hormone

therapy and gender affirming surgery to avoid further violation of her Eighth Amendment rights,

her official-capacity claims against Warden Harris are not barred by sovereign immunity.

Next, Defendants WCI Medical and Mental Health Departments are instrumentalities of

the State of Ohio, and therefore Plaintiff’s claims against these departments are redundant with

Plaintiff’s official-capacity claim against Warden Harris. The undersigned therefore recommends

dismissal of WCI’s Medical and Mental Health Departments.

Finally, as to the U.S. Government, Plaintiff’s allegations make no reference to the

federal government. Plaintiff was convicted by a state court of a state crime, and it is a state

correctional facility that is alleged to have denied her gender affirming care. There is simply no

connection between Plaintiff’s allegations and the U.S. Government. Plaintiff’s Complaint

therefore tenders only “naked assertion devoid of further factual enhancement,” which does not

suffice to state a claim under Iqbal. See 556 U.S. at 678.

Thus, the only appropriate Defendant for Plaintiff’s claims is Warden Harris in his

official capacity. Turning to the merits of Plaintiff’s claims, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff

may proceed on her official-capacity claim against Warden Harris for injunctive relief in the

form of an order requiring WCI to provide Plaintiff with hormone therapy and gender affirming

surgery. See Fisher v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 484 F. Supp. 3d 521, 543 (N.D. Ohio 2020)

(prisoner stated Eighth Amendment claim for denial of gender affirming surgery when prisoner

plausibly alleged that the prison had a blanket ban on such surgery without determining whether

surgery was appropriate or necessary on a case-by-case basis).

III. DISPOSITION

For these reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No.

1) is GRANTED. Plaintiff MAY PROCEED on her official-capacity claim against Warden

Harris for injunctive relief, but it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s remaining claims be

DISMISSED under §§ 1915A(b) and 1915(e) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be

granted.

Plaintiff has submitted a summons form (Form AO-440) (ECF No. 1-3) and a service of

process by U.S. Marshal form (Form USM-285) (ECF No. 1-4). However, the summons form is

deficient because Plaintiff neglected to include her name and address in the appropriate section.

Moreover, Plaintiff has not submitted a service copy of the Complaint. If Plaintiff wishes to have

the United States Marshal effect service of the summons and Complaint on Defendant Harris,

Plaintiff is DIRECTED to file a completed summons form and a service copy of the Complaint

to the Clerk of Court. If Plaintiff does so, the Clerk is DIRECTED to issue the summons and the

United States Marshal is DIRECTED to serve by certified mail upon Defendant Harris the

issued summons, a copy of the Complaint, and a copy of this Order and Report and

Recommendation.

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those

specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with

supporting authority for the objection(s). A District Judge of this Court shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations

to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a District Judge of this Court may accept,

reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive

further evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report

and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of

the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Chelsey M. Vascura

CHELSEY M. VASCURA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE