WILSON v. CAMDEN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

KYDERE WILSON,

Plaintiff, Civ. Action No. 25-2656 (JXN) (SDA)

Vv.

OPINION

CAMDEN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS,

Defendant.

NEALS, District Judge

Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Kydere Wilson’s (“Plaintiff’) civil rights Amended

Complaint (“Amended Complaint”)', filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 2), and an

_ application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2-1). The Court grants Plaintiff leave to

proceed in forma pauperis and orders the Clerk of the Court to file the Amended Complaint.

The Court must now review the Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§

1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious,

for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiffs Eighth

Amendment sexual assault claim against Defendant Lindsey may proceed and the remainder of

! Plaintiff filed an initial Complaint in this matter. (ECF No. 1.) Before the Court had the opportunity to screen the

initial Complaint, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 2.) An amended complaint generally supersedes

and replaces an original complaint. However, considering Plaintiff's pro se status, the Court will consider the facts

alleged in the imitial Complaint as incorporated in the Amended Complaint.

the claims are dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted.

L BACKGROUND?

Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee confined in Camden County Correctional Facility @CCCF”),

in Camden, New Jersey, filed an initial Complaint in this matter. (ECF No. 1.) Prior to the Court’s

screening of the Complaint, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 2.) While the

Amended Complaint names only Camden County Department of Corrections? in the caption, the

Court construes the Amended Complaint as seeking to raise claims against (1) Camden County;

(2) Officer Lindsey (“Lindsey”); (3) Sergeant Rojas (“Rojas”); (4) Internal Affairs Investigator

Tyler Fermandes (“Fermandes”); and (5) CCCF medical staff. (See generally ECF Nos. | and 2.)

The Amended Complaint raises the following claims: (1) § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment sexual

assault claim against Defendant Lindsey; (2) § 1983 Afonei/* claim against Defendant Camden

County; (3) § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment failure to protect claim against Defendants Rojas and

Fermandes; and (4) § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against CCCF

medical staff. (See id.)

According to the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff has been “raped on many occasions due to

[| being transgender.” (ECF No. | at 5.) Plaintiff claims that the most recent assault was by Officer

Lindsey and Plaintiff “gave his semen to Internal Affairs.” Ud; ECF No. 2 at 3.) Plaintiff submits

that they informed prison staff that they cannot be alone because Plaintiff is mentally unstable due

* The Court construes the factual allegations of the Complaint as true for the purposes of this screening only.

3 Plaintiff names Camden County Department of Corrections. It is unclear if Plaintiff wishes to raise a claim against

Camden County or CCCI, The Court construes the Amended Complaint as raising a claim against Camden County.

However, any potential claim against CCCF would be dismissed with prejudice, as a county jail is not a “person”

amenable to suit under § 1983. See, 2g, Coleman v. Corizon Med., No. 18-4611, 2019 WL 5704591, at *3 (DNL.

Nov. 5, 2019); Walker v. Cty, of Gloucester, No. 13-7073, 2018 WL 1064210, at *3 (D.NJ. Feb. 27, 2018} (collecting

cases); see also Boomer v. Lewis, 541 F. App'x 186, 192 (3d Cir. 2013).

4 Monell vy. Department of Social Services, 436 US, 658 (1978).

to the rape, and Sergeant Rojas placed Plaintiff in a single cell. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) Plaintiff also

claims that “medical started giving [Plaintiff] [five] medications that [Plaintiff] was allergic to and

it hurt [Plaintiff's] body but they refused to call for help.” (d.) In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff

submits that Internal Affairs Investigator Tyler Fermandes was informed of the rape and allowed

Officer Lindsey to stay around Plaintiff. (ECF No. 2 at 5.) Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Camden

County Department of Corrections “violated [Plaintiffs] rights because they allowed this Officer

Lindsey to come back around [Plaintiff].” Ud.) Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. (/d.)

IL. STANDARD OF REVIEW

District courts must review complaints in civil actions in which a plaintiff is proceeding in

forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), or seeks redress against a governmental employee

or entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). District courts may sua sponte dismiss any claim that is

frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which the court may grant relief or secks

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See §§ 1915(e)(2)(B),

1915A(b),

The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to

Sections 1915(e)(2)(B) or 1915A is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012);

Courteau v. United States, 287 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008). A court properly grants a motion

to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if, “accepting all well pleaded allegations in the complaint as

true, and viewing them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, plaintiff is not entitled to relief.” □□

re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1420 Gd Cir. 1997) (quotations and

citations omitted).

To survive sud sponte screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint must aliege

“sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible. Pow/er v. UPMS Shadyside,

578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Belmont vy. MB Inv. Partners, Inc., 708 F.3d 470,

483 n.17 Gd Cir. 2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), Moreover, while pro

se pleadings are liberally construed, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their

complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (d Cir. 2013)

(citation omitted),

I. DISCUSSION

In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendants are liable to him under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

(See generally ECF Nos. | and 2.) A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C, § 1983

for violations of his constitutional rights, which provides in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or

usage, of any State or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen

of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall

be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress.

Thus, to obtain relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish: (1) that one of his rights secured by

the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated; and (2) that this violation was caused

or committed by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S, 42, 48

(1988); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989); Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 806 (3d

Cir. 2000). In a § 1983 action, the personal involvement of each defendant in the alleged

constitutional violation is a required element, and, therefore, a plaintiff must allege how each

defendant was involved in the events and occurrences giving rise to the claims. See Rode v.

Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 Gd Cir, 1998).

Here, the Court construes Plaintiff's Amended Complaint to allege claims for relief against

Defendants Lindsey, Camden County, Rojas, Fermandes, and CCCF medical staff.

A. Failure to State a Claim

1, Fourteenth Amendment Sexual Assault—Defendant Lindsey

The Court construes the Amended Compiaint as bringing a Fourteenth Amendment claim

against Defendant Lindsey for sexual assault. (ECF No. 2 at 5.)

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects pretrial detainees. Jacobs

v. Cumberland Ciy., 8 F.4th 187, 193-94 Gd Cir. 2021) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535

(1979)), A sexual assault claim is analyzed in the same manner as an excessive force claim, See

Rieks v. Shover, 891 F.3d 468, 473-74 (3d Cir. 2018) (stating that although the Supreme Court has

not addressed sexual abuse of inmates by prison officials, courts have held that the framework for

excessive force claims “has evolved to encompass claims for sexual abuse and harassment by

prison officials as well”). In Graham v. Connor, the Supreme Court explained that it was “clear”

that the Fourteenth Amendment protects pretrial detainees from “the use of excessive force that

amounts to punishment.” 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989).

Claims for sexual abuse and harassment are evaluated similarly to excessive force claims

in that the prisoner must allege facts plausibly establishing both objective and subjective

components. Ricks, 891 F.3d at 475 (stating that the misconduct “must be objectively, sufficiently

intolerable and cruel, capable of causing harm, and the official must have a culpable state of

mind”). Regarding the subjective component, the Court “consider{s] whether the official had a

legitimate penological purpose or if he or she acted ‘maliciously and sadistically for the very

purpose of causing harm.’” /d. (quoting Whitley y. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986)).

Regarding the objective prong, the Court considers whether the action is “repugnant to the

conscience of mankind” or whether it is “sufficiently serious or severe.” Jd. at 475-76 (citations

omitted),

Plausible allegations of sexual assault meet the standard of impermissible punishment

because sexual assault cannot and does not serve a legitimate governmental objective. In #.D. □

Sharkey, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit concluded that an immigration

detainee, who is entitled to the same due process protections as pretrial detainees, had a clearly

established right “not to be sexually assaulted by a state employee while in confinement,” and the

detainee’s sexual assault allegations against the employee “set forth a plausible violation of her

right to personal bodily integrity protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment.” 928 F.3d 299, 307 (3d Cir. 2019) (stating that the alleged sexual assault “could not

have served a legitimate governmental objective and thereby constituted impermissible

punishment.”),

Here, Plaintiffalleges a plausible claim under the Fourteenth Amendment for sexual assault

against Defendant Lindsey. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Lindsey “raped” Plaintiff. (ECF No. 2

at 5.) This allegation plausibly states both the objective and subjective components of a sexual

assault claim. Therefore, the Court will permit Plaintiff to proceed on the Fourteenth Amendment

sexual assault claim against Defendant Lindsey.

2. Monell Claim—Camden County

Plaintiff names Camden County in the Amended Complaint and alleges that Plaintiff has

been sexually assaulted and their “rights are constantly neglected.” (ECF No, 2 at 3.) The Court

constiues the Amended Complaint as asserting a Mone// claim against Defendant Camden County.

“A defendant in a civil rights aclion must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs;

liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.” Rode y,

Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 Gd Cir. 1987), The liability of a municipality, like Camden

County, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is governed by Monell. Camden County may not be found liable

simply because it employs wrongdoers, See id. at 691-92; Natale v. Camden County Correctional

Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 583 (3d Cir. 2003). Instead, Plaintiff must assert facts showing that the

County had a relevant policy or custom, and that the policy or custom caused a violation of

Plaintiff's constitutional rights, See Nefale, 318 F.3d at 583-84; accord Jiminez v. All American

Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F. 3d 247, 249 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that a plaintiff must show a “direct

causal link between a... policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.”) (quoting

City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989)).

Here, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts regarding a Camden County policy that caused a

violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, Rather, Plaintiff makes a conclusory allegation that

their rights were violated. The Amended Complaint is devoid of any facts regarding a “custom,

practice, procedure, or policy.” As such, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief against

Camden County and the Amended Complaint is dismissed without prejudice against Camden

County.

3. Fourteenth Amendment, Failure to Protect—Defendants Rojas and

Fermandes

The Court construes the Amended Complaint as raising Fourteenth Amendment failure to

protect claims against Defendants Rojas and Fermandes, Plaintiff alleges that they told “them that

[Plaintiff] was mentally unstable” and Defendant Rojas still placed Plaintiff back in the single cell

where the sexual assault occurred. (ECF No. | at 5.) Plaintiff submits that Internal Affairs

Investigator Tyler Fermandes was informed of the rape and allowed Officer Lindsey to stay around

Plaintiff. (ECF No. 2 at 5.)

The Eighth Amendment of the Constitution imposes a duty on prison officials to “take

reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

832-33 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)), “A prisoner has a valid

failure-to-protect claim if the prison official shows ‘deliberate indifference’ to a substantial risk of

serious harm to an inmate.’” Thomas v. Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 223 n.4 (3d Cir. 2014)

(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S, at 828). To be deliberately indifferent, a prison official must both

“knowl ] of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.’” Carter v. Lawler, 446 F,

App’x 420, 423 (3d Cir, 2011) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). The Third Circuit, in

nonprecedential opinions, applies the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard to

failure to protect claims brought by pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment. Adi/fon v.

Clinton Cnty. Corr. Facility, No. 21-cv-01479, 2022 WL 2823562, at *3 (M.D, Pa. July 19, 2022)

(collecting cases).

Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief against Defendant Rojas. Plaintiff alieges only that

Plaintiff told “them” that Plaintiff was mentaliy unstable, Piaintiff does not allege facts to show

whom they informed regarding their mental instability. The Amended Complaint lacks facts that

show Defendant Rojas was informed of Plaintiffs mental state. Plaintiff fails to plead facts that

Defendant Rojas knew of an excessive risk to Plaintiff and was deliberately indifferent to that risk.

Hamilton vy. Leavy, 117 ¥.3d 742, 746 Gd Cir, 1997) (explain that plaintiff must show defendant’s

deliberate indifference to the risk). As such, any claim against Defendant Rojas is dismissed

without prejudice for failure to state a claim under § 1915A(b)(1).

Regarding Defendant Fermandes, Plaintiff alleges only that Defendant Fermandes was

informed of the rape after it had occurred and makes a conclusory allegation that Fermandes allows

Defendant Lindsey to be around Plaintiff. The Amended Complaint lacks facts that show in what

capacity Defendant Lindsey works around Plaintiff or how he is a current risk to Plaintiff. Parkel/

Markell, 622 F. App’x. 136, 139 (3d Cir. 2015); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (unadorned

conclusions or bald assertions insufficient to state a claim for relief). Plaintiff does not plead facts

to show that Defendant Fermandes was aware of a current excessive risk of harm to Plaintiff and

disregarded said risk. Thus, Plaintiff fails to provide anything but conclusory allegations as to

Defendant Fermandes’ deliberate indifference and said claim must be dismissed without prejudice

for failure to state a claim. Parkell, 622 F. App’x. at 139; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

4, Fourteenth Amendment, Deliberate Indifference—Defendant CCCF Medical

Staff

The Court construes the Amended Complaint as raising a claim for Fourteenth Amendment

deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's medical needs against CCCF medical staff. (ECF No. 1 at 5.)

Plaintiff alleges that “medical started giving [Plaintiff] [five] medications that [Plaintiff] was

allergic to and it hurt [Plaintiff’s] body but they refused to call for help.” Ud.)

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to pretrial detainees’ claims

of inadequate medical care. Bocchino v. City of Atlantic City, 179 F. Supp. 3d 387, 403 (D.N.J.

2016). To state such a claim, a pretrial detainee must allege: (1) a serious medical need; and (2)

behavior on the part of prison officials that constitutes deliberate indifference to that need. Estelle

v. Gamble, 429 US. 97, 106 (1976); Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 Gd

Cir, 2003).

Here, Plaintiff fails to allege facts against any particular member of the medical staff.

Rather, Plaintiff makes a vague allegation that Plaintiff was given medication they were allergic

to. Plaintiff fails to submit facts regarding what medical treatment had been provided to Plaintiff

and if the medical staff were informed of any allergic reaction. As such, any Fourteenth

Amendment deliberate indifference claim is dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim

for relief under § 1915A(b)(1).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment sexual assault claim

against Defendant Lindsey may proceed. The remainder of the Amended Complaint is

DISMISSED without prejudice. An appropriate Order follows.

DATED: July 14, 2025 YEIDN XAVIER NEALS

fics) tates p istrict Judge

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