Sheward v. Commissioner of Social Security

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

ANGELA R. SHEWARD, CASE NO. 1:24-cv-2240

Plaintiff, DISTRICT JUDGE

DONALD C. NUGENT

vs.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL JAMES E. GRIMES JR.

SECURITY,

Defendant. REPORT &

RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Angela Sheward filed a Complaint against the Commissioner

of Social Security seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision

denying disability insurance benefits, disabled widow’s benefits, and

supplemental security income. This Court has jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. §§

405(g) and 1383(c). The Court referred this matter to a Magistrate Judge under

Local Rule 72.2(b)(1) for the preparation of a Report and Recommendation.

Following review, and for the reasons stated below, I recommend that the

District Court affirm the Commissioner’s decision.

Procedural history

Near the end of 2021, Sheward filed applications for disability insurance

benefits, disabled widow’s benefits, and supplemental security income, alleging

a disability onset date of July 2, 2018.1 Tr. 315–30. In her applications,

Sheward claimed disability due to bipolar disorder, depression, arthritis in her

back, and anxiety. Tr. 376. The Social Security Administration denied

Sheward’s applications and her motions for reconsideration. Tr. 108–10, 141–

43. Sheward then requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge

(ALJ). Tr. 197.

In November 2023, an ALJ held a hearing. Sheward and a vocational

expert testified, Tr. 31–75, and Sheward amended her alleged onset date to

December 21, 2021, Tr. 17, 47. In January 2024, the ALJ issued a written

decision finding that Sheward was not disabled. Tr. 17–33. The ALJ’s decision

became final on November 6, 2024, when the Social Security Appeals Council

declined further review. Tr. 1–3; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.981.

Sheward filed this action on December 26, 2024. Doc. 1. She asserts the

following assignment of error:

Whether the ALJ erred when failing to identify substantial evidence

supporting the residual functional capacity finding and erred in h[er]

evaluation of the medical opinions and prior administrative medical

findings.

Doc. 9, at 1.

1 “Once a finding of disability is made, the [agency] must determine the

onset date of the disability.” McClanahan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 193 F. App’x

422, 425 (6th Cir. 2006).

Evidence

Personal and vocational evidence

Sheward was 50 years old on her amended alleged disability onset date.

Tr. 31. She graduated from high school and used to work in a factory. Tr. 377.

Relevant medical evidence

In October 2018, Sheward went to the emergency room for back pain

that radiated down her right leg. Tr. 472. She said that the night before her

visit, she fell off the fourth rung of a ladder and hit her lower back on a shelf.

Tr. 472. An exam showed that Sheward had mild paraspinal tenderness in her

lumbar areas, normal range of motion, and no edema. Tr. 474. X-rays were

negative for a fracture but “chronic changes were noted.” Tr. 475.

In January 2019, Sheward went to her family medical practice and

reported back pain since her fall in October 2018. Tr. 470. She said that she

hadn’t been to a doctor in a few years. Tr. 470. Sheward’s exam findings showed

pain to palpation of her lower lumbosacral area and with flexion and extension

of her back. Tr. 470. Her joints were “grossly normal.” Tr. 470. Sheward refused

a course of steroids, medication, and physical therapy. Tr. 471. She requested

a referral to a neurologist, which the provider supplied. Tr. 471.

In April 2019, Sheward saw neurologist William Bauer, M.D., for lower

back pain that radiated to her legs. Tr. 501. Sheward reported that her pain

had developed gradually several years before the appointment. Tr. 501. Her

pain was constant and had progressively worsened, and was aggravated by

bending, lifting, and prolonged standing. Tr. 501. Dr. Bauer referenced an

undated lumbar MRI in Sheward’s records that indicated a herniated disc. Tr.

501. On exam, Sheward had tenderness over her lower abdomen and at L5-

S1.2 Tr. 503. She had positive straight leg raise testing, right more than left;

flattening of the lumbosacral spine; paralumbar spasm; and absent ankle

reflexes. Tr. 503–04. Sheward’s gait, station, and cerebellar function were

normal. Tr. 504. She had normal motor strength and sensation. Tr. 504. Dr.

Bauer administered lumbar-area trigger point injections. Tr. 501.

In May and June 2019, Dr. Bauer administered lumbar-area trigger

point injections. Tr. 493, 497.

In August 2019, Sheward followed-up with Dr. Bauer for another round

of trigger point injections. Tr. 489. Sheward reported that the injections

provided more than 50 percent improvement in pain and lasted about a month.

Tr. 489. On exam, she had a normal gait and was able to stand without

difficulty. Tr. 492. Her other relevant findings were the same as her April visit.

Tr. 491–92. Dr. Bauer administered trigger point injections. Tr. 489.

2 Vertebrae in a person’s spine are given letter and number designations

according to their location. The five vertebrae in the lower spine—the lumbar

spine—are L1 through L5, and the five vertebrae at the bottom of the spine—

in the sacrum—are labeled as S1 through S5. See Thomas Scioscia, MD,

Vertebrae in the Vertebral Column, Spine-health Resources,

https://www.spine-health.com/conditions/spine-anatomy/vertebrae-vertebral-

column [https://perma.cc/R9MM-TBZT]; Thomas Scioscia, MD, Sacrum (Sacral

Region), Spine-health Resources, https://www.spine-

health.com/conditions/spine-anatomy/sacrum-sacral-region

[https://perma.cc/S2BR-RBTB].

In October 2019, Sheward followed up with Dr. Bauer’s office and saw a

nurse practitioner. Tr. 485. Sheward reported worsening back pain “with

mowing and walking.” Tr. 485. She was out of her medication. Tr. 485. Her

exam findings were unremarkable. Tr. 487. The provider wrote that Sheward

“needs to start” physical therapy and referred her to psychology for depression.

Tr. 487. The nurse counseled Sheward regarding a positive urine drug screen,

which showed that she was taking medications that were not prescribed, and

adjusted Sheward’s medications. Tr. 487–88.

A week later, Dr. Bauer’s office discharged Sheward as a patient because

she had breached her pain contract and failed a urine drug screen. Tr. 593.

In January 2020, Sheward saw Jatinder Rana, M.D., at the Tiffin

Psychiatry Center for depression, anxiety, mood lability, irritability, and past

memories. Tr. 528–30. Sheward reported that she had been taking the

medication Trileptal for two weeks, but it had not helped. Tr. 528. She said

that she “continued to be fidgety, hyper, moody, [and] irritable.” Tr. 528.

Sheward said that she angered easily and became upset over little things, and

she could not settle or calm down. Tr. 528. She couldn’t fall asleep because her

mind raced. Tr. 528. At times Sheward had panic attacks. Tr. 528. She reported

difficulty focusing and paying attention and described a history of physical and

emotional abuse from a past boyfriend. Tr. 528. Sheward said that she had not

previously had counseling or medication for her mental health symptoms. Tr.

528. Dr. Rana’s exam findings showed that Sheward was oriented and alert,

with a preoccupied demeanor, no attention difficulties, and avoidant eye

contact. Tr. 529. Sheward had agitation and restless psychomotor activity and

rapid and loud speech. Tr. 529. Her mood was dysphoric,3 anxious, irritable,

and depressed, and her affect was full but labile. Tr. 529. Sheward had racing

and guarded thoughts, and she had cooperative, agitated, and withdrawn

behaviors. Tr. 529. She had normal insight, good judgment, intact memory,

and normal cognition. Tr. 529–30. Dr. Rana assessed bipolar II disorder,

chronic post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and anxiety disorder, and

adjusted Sheward’s medication. Tr. 530.

About two years later, in February 2022, Sheward saw Dr. Rana. Tr.

730. At the time of the appointment, Sheward was living with her brother and

a friend and she was not on any medication. Tr. 780. Sheward reported that

she had been feeling awful, angry, depressed, and anxious. Tr. 780. She had

been crying, not doing anything; she had no appetite, and could not sleep. Tr.

780–81. These symptoms had worsened since September 2021, when

Sheward’s husband died in a motorcycle accident. Tr. 781. Sheward also felt

withdrawn, isolated, and guilty. Tr. 781. Dr. Rana assessed adjustment

disorder with depressed mood, prescribed Zoloft and Zyprexa, and

recommended counseling. Tr. 781–82. Two weeks later, Sheward followed up

3 A dysphoric mood is disquiet, restlessness, or malaise. See Dorland’s

Illustrated Medical Dictionary 573 (33rd ed. 2020).

and reported the same symptoms, and Dr. Rana increased her medication. Tr.

779–80.

Sheward returned to Dr. Rana in March 2022. Tr. 778. Sheward

reported that she was sleeping better and her appetite had improved. Tr. 778.

Her crying spells were not as bad. Tr. 778. She described worrying during the

daytime—she was scared and felt like people were out to get her in trouble and

that her husband’s family may take things from her. Tr. 778. Dr. Rana

increased Sheward’s Zyprexa dosage. Tr. 778.

In April 2022, Sheward saw Dr. Rana. Tr. 776. She was crying and said

that she felt overwhelmed. Tr. 776. Sheward felt depressed, could not focus,

and kept thinking about her dad, who passed away a few months before her

husband. Tr. 776. She was anxious and became angry when thinking about

how people stole from her home. Tr. 777. She had difficulty sleeping, her

appetite had decreased, and she did not want to be around anyone. Tr. 777.

Sheward had not started counseling. Tr. 777. Dr. Rana assessed adjustment

disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood, and increased Sheward’s

Zyprexa dosage. Tr. 777.

In June 2022, Sheward told Dr. Rana that she was not tolerating

Zyprexa—she felt too tired and sluggish. Tr. 774. She continued to feel

depressed and did not feel like leaving her house. Tr. 774. She felt like everyone

was watching her, knowing what happened, and she felt guilty and blamed

herself for her husband’s death. Tr. 774. On exam, Sheward was withdrawn,

preoccupied, inattentive, and easily distracted. Tr. 775. She was emotional and

avoidant, anxious and depressed. Tr. 775. Sheward’s affect was constricted and

labile and she had racing thoughts. Tr. 775. Dr. Rana decreased Sheward’s

Zyprexa dosage and increased her Zoloft dosage. Tr. 776.

In December 2022, Sheward saw Semur Rajan, M.D. Tr. 765–66.

Sheward was doing better on medication, although she reported that she was

still crying, isolated, and not trusting anyone. Tr. 765. Dr. Rajan counselled

Sheward on her bipolar disorder and taught her meditation and breathing

exercises. Tr. 765–76.

In July 2023, x-rays of Sheward’s lumbosacral spine showed “[g]rade 1

spondylosis L5 on S1 secondary to bilateral spondylolsysis,” which was similar

to the 2018 imaging, and “[p]rogressive degenerative disc changes at the L5-

S1 level.” Tr. 805–06.

In September 2023, Dr. Rajan wrote that Sheward had “improved quite

considerably” with medication. Tr. 841. She was a little more sociable with

family and counseling had helped. Tr. 843. She still did not have many friends.

Tr. 843. Dr. Rajan wrote that Sheward was unable to work due to her mental

state. Tr. 843. Sheward’s problem list included anxiety, depression, bipolar

disorder, forgetfulness, sleep disorder, nicotine addiction, and lower back pain.

Tr. 841.

Opinion evidence

Treating providers. In May 2023, Dr. Rajan completed a treating source

statement for physical conditions on Sheward’s behalf. Tr. 768–71. Dr. Rajan

indicated that he had treated Sheward since October 2022 for anxiety,

depression, bipolar disorder, sleep disorder, nicotine addiction, and lower back

pain. Tr. 768. He opined that Sheward would be off task more than 25 percent

of a workday and could only maintain attention and concentration for less than

five minutes at a time. Tr. 768. Sheward’s impairments would cause her to

miss four or more days of work per month. Tr. 768. According to Dr. Rajan, due

to all of her impairments, Sheward could rarely (i.e., up to five percent of an

eight-hour workday) lift and carry any weight—from zero to more than 100

pounds. Tr. 769. Due “mostly” to her mental impairments, Sheward could sit,

stand, and walk for less than an hour and required an at-will, sit-stand option.

Tr. 769. Sheward would often need to lie down or recline throughout the day

for hours. Tr. 769. She wouldn’t need a cane, she wouldn’t need to elevate her

legs, and she had no issues using her hands or feet. Tr. 770. As for postural

and environmental limitations, Dr. Rajan opined that these were “N.A.,” or not

applicable, but also that Sheward could “never” perform postural activities or

be exposed to environmental hazards. Tr. 771.

Consultative examiners. In June 2022, Sheward saw consultative

examiner Mark Weaver, M.D., for a physical evaluation. Tr. 734–43. Dr.

Weaver wrote that Sheward “was a somewhat poor medical historian … only

able to give scanty, sparse medical background concerning her present

complaints.” Tr. 734. “From what could be gathered today,” Dr. Weaver wrote,

Sheward complained of lower back problems which had been present for “many

years.” Tr. 734. Sheward said that for this problem she had only had a pain

management consultation, had not tried physical therapy, and was at the time

of her visit receiving no treatment. Tr. 734. She reported frequent back pain

and leg numbness that limited her capacity for sustained sitting, standing,

walking, lifting, and carrying, “although she could not further quantify these

limitations.” Tr. 734. Sheward told Dr. Weaver that she was diagnosed with

PTSD, bipolar disorder, and depression, and that she felt anxious in crowds.

Tr. 734. She said that these issues caused problems “following directions and

travel[ing].” Tr. 735.

Dr. Weaver’s exam findings showed that Sheward retained normal

strength and range of motion in her arms and legs. Tr. 735, 742. She had a

constant, mild, involuntary spasm on inspection and palpation of her lumbar

paravertebral musculature with tenderness to palpation over her lower back

area, left side greater than right. Tr. 735, 742. Her dorsolumbar spine range of

motion was restricted and she complained of pain on extremes of motion. Tr.

737, 739. Sheward’s straight leg raise testing was negative. Tr. 737, 741.

Sheward exhibited a “stiff gait with low back pain.” Tr. 741.

Dr. Weaver also conducted a mental status examination. Tr. 737. He

commented that Sheward demonstrated a somewhat nervous, anxious affect,

and appeared less than completely alert while being oriented. Tr. 737. Sheward

exhibited “flight of thought and difficulty staying on subject,” frequent

difficulty with concentration, and difficulty following directions. Tr. 737–38.

Dr. Weaver opined that “in view of [Sheward’s] low back problems and mental

difficulties, she would probably be limited in the performance of physical

activities involving sustained sitting, standing, walking, lifting, carrying,

following directions, and travel.” Tr. 738. He wrote that Sheward “would

probably be able to perform … handling objects, speaking, and hearing.” Tr.

738.

In October 2022, Sheward saw Sudhir Dubey, PsyD., for a psychological

consultative exam. Tr. 744–49. Sheward reported memory problems for one

year, depression for five years, and concentration issues since childhood. Tr.

744. Her depression had worsened since her husband’s death. Tr. 744. Sheward

described feeling down and depressed and had difficulty sleeping. Tr. 745. She

recalled her medications and said that she found them helpful. Tr. 745.

Sheward indicated that she was able to take care of herself doing basic

activities of daily living, shopping, managing money, taking medications,

maintaining a schedule, driving, and doing paperwork. Tr. 746. Her activities

included reading, writing, and listening to music. Tr. 746. Dr. Dubey remarked

that Sheward’s eye contact was minimal and she “appeared somewhat tense

and anxious.” Tr. 746. Sheward’s speech was unremarkable and her thoughts

were logical. Tr. 247. Sheward was oriented to person, place, time, and

situation; exhibited alert and responsive behavior; and had no attention

problems. Tr. 746. She did not need simple directions or multi-step directions

or questions repeated. Tr. 746. Sheward’s recall of past and recent events was

unremarkable. Tr. 746. Sheward “was able to do six digits forward, zero digits

backward.” Tr. 747. She could recall one of three objects after a five-minute

delay. Tr. 747. Her fund of knowledge was below average and Dr. Dubey

estimated that at that time, Sheward’s cognitive functioning was in the low-

average range. Tr. 747.

Dr. Dubey concluded that Sheward could independently understand,

remember, and carry out simple and multi-step instructions. Tr. 748. She could

independently maintain concentration, attention and pace to remember and

carry out simple tasks. Tr. 749. Sheward would have some difficulty

independently doing so with multi-step tasks, but she could perform these

tasks with supervision. Tr. 749. Dr. Dubey opined that Sheward would have

“some difficulties” dealing with supervision or coworkers and with work

pressure, “which would create some frustration for her, coworkers, and

supervisors.” Tr. 749.

State agency opinions.4 In July 2022, Mehr Siddiqui, M.D., reviewed

Sheward’s record. Tr. 77–79. Regarding Sheward’s physical residual functional

capacity (RFC),5 Dr. Siddiqui opined that Sheward was limited to the light

level of exertion—she could stand, walk, and sit for about six hours in an eight-

hour workday and lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and ten pounds

frequently. Tr. 81. Dr. Siddiqui also assessed postural and environmental

limitations. Tr. 82. In February 2023, Scott Bolz, M.D., agreed with Dr.

Siddiqui’s assessment. Tr. 111–17.

In October 2022, David Dietz, Ph.D., reviewed Sheward’s record. Tr. 77–

79, 81. Regarding Sheward’s mental RFC, Dr. Dietz found that Sheward could

complete tasks that entail simple, concrete, and short instructions. Tr. 83. She

could “complete tasks without a sustained production pace or stringent daily

quota and in a setting where there is some flexibility as to the scheduling of

breaks.” Tr. 83. Dr. Dietz wrote that Sheward “appeared to have the ability to

4 When a claimant applies for disability benefits, the State Agency creates

a record. The record includes the claimant’s medical evidence. A State Agency

disability examiner and a State Agency physician or psychologist review the

claimant’s record and determine whether and to what extent the claimant’s

condition affects his or her ability to work. If the State Agency denies the

claimant’s application, the claimant can ask for reconsideration. On

reconsideration, the State Agency updates the record and a second disability

examiner and doctor review the file and make a new determination. See, e.g.,

20 C.F.R. § 404.1615.

5 An RFC is an “‘assessment of’” a claimant’s ability to work, taking his or

her “limitations … into account.” Howard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 276 F.3d 235,

239 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.945). Essentially, it’s the SSA’s

“description of what the claimant ‘can and cannot do.’” Webb v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 368 F.3d 629, 631 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Howard, 276 F.3d at 239).

maintain social interaction with” others, but “might perform better at a job

requiring limited interactions with people and the public.” Tr. 84. Dr. Dietz

found that Sheward could “adapt and manage herself in a structured and

predictable work setting, where major changes are explained” and “given time

while she adjusts to new expectations.” Tr. 84. In March 2023, Alvin Smith,

Ph.D., reviewed the record and affirmed Dr. Dietz’s assessment. Tr. 111–18.

Hearing testimony

Sheward, who was represented by counsel, testified at the telephonic

administrative hearing held in November 2023. Sheward stated that her lower

back pain affects her ability to twist, push, pull, bend, and lift. Tr. 57. She

listed her treatment as x-rays, injections, and medication. Tr. 57. She tried

physical therapy “a long time ago.” Tr. 58. From a mental standpoint, Sheward

said that she couldn’t work because she could not remember, focus or

concentrate. Tr. 60. She said that she stopped seeing a psychiatrist because

she moved, and her primary-care doctor prescribes her the same medication.

Tr. 61.

The ALJ discussed with the vocational expert Sheward’s past work as a

painter, cleaner, laminator, machine operator, glass inspector, and door

assembler. Tr. 64–65. The ALJ asked the vocational expert to determine

whether a hypothetical individual such as Sheward could perform Sheward’s

past work or any other work if the individual had the limitations assessed in

the ALJ’s RFC determination, described below. Tr. 65–66. The vocational

expert answered that such an individual could not perform Sheward’s past

work, but could perform the following jobs: clothing sorter, inspector, and

electronics worker. Tr. 66.

The ALJ’s Decision

The ALJ made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

1. The claimant meets the insured status

requirements of the Social Security Act through

December 31, 2023.

2. It was previously found that the claimant is the

unmarried widow of the deceased insured worker

and has attained the age of 50. The claimant met the

non-disability requirements for disabled widow’s

benefits set forth in section 202(e) of the Social

Security Act.

3. The prescribed period ends on September 30,

2028.

4. The claimant has not engaged in substantial

gainful activity since December 21, 2021, the

amended alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et

seq., and 416.971 et seq.).

5. The claimant has the following severe

impairments: degenerative disc disease of the

lumbar spine; bipolar II disorder; post-traumatic

stress disorder; major depressive disorder; and

generalized anxiety disorder (20 CFR 404.1520(c)

and 416.920(c)).

6. The claimant does not have an impairment or

combination of impairments that meets or medically

equals the severity of one of the listed impairments

in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR

404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d),

416.925 and 416.926).

7. After careful consideration of the entire record, I

find that the claimant has the residual functional

capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR

404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except: occasionally

climb ramps and stairs; never climb ladders, ropes,

or scaffolds; occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, or

crawl; avoid dangerous work place hazards such as

unprotected heights or dangerous moving

machinery; is able to carry out simple instructions

that do not involve detailed or complex decision

making or judgment; can tolerate occasional

changes in a routine work setting; and can have

occasional interaction with coworkers, supervisors,

and the general public.

8. The claimant is unable to perform any past

relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565 and 416.965).

9. The claimant was … 50 years old, which is defined

as an individual closely approaching advanced age,

on the amended alleged disability onset date (20

CFR 404.1563 and 416.963).

10. The claimant has at least a high school education

(20 CFR 404.1564 and 416.964).

11. Transferability of job skills is not material to the

determination of disability because using the

Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports

a finding that the claimant is “not disabled,”

whether or not the claimant has transferable job

skills (See SSR 82-41 and 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart

P, Appendix 2).

12. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work

experience, and residual functional capacity, there

are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the

national economy that the claimant can perform (20

CFR 404.1569, 404.1569a, 416.969, and 416.969a).

13. The claimant has not been under a disability,

as defined in the Social Security Act, from December

21, 2021, through the date of this decision (20 CFR

404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)).

Tr. 20–32.

Standard for Disability

Eligibility for social security benefit payments depends on the existence

of a disability. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a), 1382(a). “Disability” is defined as the

“inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected

to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous

period of not less than 12 months[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); see also 42 U.S.C.

§ 1382c(a)(3)(A).

An ALJ is required to follow a five-step sequential analysis to make a

disability determination:

1. Is the claimant engaged in substantial gainful

activity? If so, the claimant is not disabled.

2. Does the claimant have a medically

determinable impairment, or a combination of

impairments, that is “severe”? If not, the

claimant is not disabled.

3. Does the claimant’s impairment meet or equal

one of the listed impairments and meet the

duration requirement? If so, the claimant is

disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the next

step.

4. What is the claimant’s residual functional

capacity and can the claimant perform past

relevant work? If so, the claimant is not

disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the next

step.

5. Can the claimant do any other work

considering the claimant’s residual functional

capacity, age, education, and work

experience? If so, the claimant is not disabled.

If not, the claimant is disabled.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. see Jordan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 548 F.3d

417, 422 (6th Cir. 2008). Under this sequential analysis, the claimant has the

burden of proof at steps one through four. Jordan, 548 F.3d at 423. The burden

shifts to the Commissioner at step five “to prove the availability of jobs in the

national economy that the claimant is capable of performing.” Id. “The

claimant, however, retains the burden of proving her lack of residual functional

capacity.” Id. If a claimant satisfies each element of the analysis and meets the

duration requirements, the claimant is determined to be disabled. Walters

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 529 (6th Cir. 1997).

Standard of review

A reviewing court must affirm the Commissioner’s conclusions unless it

determines “that the ALJ has failed to apply the correct legal standards or has

made findings of fact unsupported by substantial evidence in the record.”

Jordan, 548 F.3d at 422. “‘[S]ubstantial evidence’ is a ‘term of art’” under which

“a court … asks whether” the “existing administrative record … contains

‘sufficien[t] evidence’ to support the agency’s factual determinations.” Biestek

v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102 (2019) (citations omitted). The substantial

evidence standard “is not high.” Id. at 103. Substantial evidence “is ‘more than

a mere scintilla’” but it “means only[] ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id. (citations

omitted). The Commissioner’s “findings … as to any fact if supported by

substantial evidence [are] conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek, 587 U.S. at

99.

A court may “not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence, or

decide questions of credibility.” Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir.

2007). Even if substantial evidence or a preponderance of the evidence

supports a claimant’s position, a reviewing court cannot overturn the

Commissioner’s decision “so long as substantial evidence also supports the

conclusion reached by the ALJ.” Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469,

477 (6th Cir. 2003). This is so because there is a “zone of choice within which”

the Commissioner can act, without fear of judicial “interference.” Lindsley v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 560 F.3d 601, 605 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Felisky v.

Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1035 (6th Cir. 1994)).

Discussion

Sheward argues that the ALJ failed to identify substantial evidence to

support the RFC assessment and erred when he evaluated the opinion

evidence. Doc. 9, at 11.

The Commissioner is required to evaluate the persuasiveness of all

medical opinions using the following factors: supportability; consistency;

treatment relationship, including the length, frequency, purpose, and extent;

specialization; and other factors. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920c(a), 416.920c(c)(1)–(5).

Supportability and consistency are the most important factors. 20 C.F.R. §

416.920c(a). Supportability means that “[t]he more relevant the objective

medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical source

are to support his or her medical opinion[] … the more persuasive the medical

opinions … will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(1). Consistency means “[t]he more

consistent a medical opinion[] … is with the evidence from other medical

sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical

opinion[] … will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(2). The Commissioner must

explain the supportability and consistency factors when discussing a medical

opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2). “[A]n ALJ need not,” however, “specifically

use the terms ‘supportability’ or ‘consistency’ in his analysis.” Cormany v.

Kijakazi, No. 5:21-cv-933, 2022 WL 4115232, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 9, 2022)

(citing cases). The Commissioner is not required to discuss the remaining

factors. Id. (citing § 404.1520c(b)(2)).

As an initial matter, Sheward’s brief is long on generalizations and short

on specifics. To the extent that Sheward describes with specificity what errors

she believes the ALJ made, I consider them below.

A. Mental impairments

Sheward complains that the ALJ compared the opinions of the state

agency reviewers, Drs. Dietz and Smith, “primarily to the examination

findings of consultative examiner Dr. Dubey, but the ALJ did not acknowledge

the greater limitations and abnormal examination findings found by Dr.

Dubey.” Doc. 9, at 14 (citing Tr. 29); see also Doc. 9, at 18. The ALJ discussed

the mental-impairment opinions by Drs. Dietz and Smith and explained:

These opinions are partially persuasive. They are

consistent with one another. There is evidence to

support moderate concentration and interaction

limitations. The claimant has difficulty being social

and leaving her home. However, she is able to

interact appropriately with providers, get along with

her brother, she reported having friends at times but

that she generally stayed home and help to herself.

There were some instances of limited eye contact,

but she generally exhibited normal behavior.

Similarly, she was mainly able to participate, follow

directions, and manage her own medical treatment.

There was one note of low intelligence, but the

claimant largely exhibited normal memory and the

ability to participate and follow instructions by

providers. She indicated she could manage her only

daily activities. Dr. Dubey noted the claimant was

oriented, exhibited alert and responsive behavior,

had no attention problems, did not need simple

directions or questions repeated, did not need multi-

step directions or questions repeated, and was able

to recall past and present events. Therefore, only

mild limitation in adaptation and understanding,

remembering, and applying information is

supported. These are partly persuasive.

Tr. 29. Elsewhere in her decision,6 the ALJ acknowledged some of the

abnormal findings that Dr. Dubey observed. Tr. 27 (the ALJ commenting that

Dr. Dubey wrote that Sheward had “minimal” eye contact, “appeared

6 The ALJ’s decision must be read as a whole, see Hill v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 560 F. App’x 547, 551 (6th Cir. 2014), and the ALJ is not required to

repeat factual findings made elsewhere in the decision, see Forrest v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., 591 F. App’x 359, 366 (6th Cir. 2014).

somewhat tense and anxious,” and that “Sheward’s cognitive functioning at

that time appeared to be in the low average range.”); Tr. 746–47. And the ALJ

referenced these findings in the passage above. So the ALJ “acknowledge[d]

the greater limitations and abnormal examination findings found by Dr.

Dubey,” see Doc. 9, at 14, 18; Tr. 27, 29.

Sheward argues that “[w]hen evaluating Dr. Dubey’s opinion, … the

ALJ mischaracterized the record as showing ‘mostly normal mental status

findings, the claimant’s ability to independently carry out her daily activities,

and her improvement with conservative treatment.’” Doc. 9, at 14 (citing Tr.

29, 744–50), Doc. 9, at 19. But Dr. Dubey wrote that Sheward reported taking

medication and that it was helpful, and that Sheward could care for herself

independently by performing activities of daily living such as shopping,

managing money, taking medications, maintaining a schedule, driving a car,

doing paperwork, reading, and writing, Tr. 746–48, as the ALJ noted, Tr. 28,

29. So the ALJ’s reference to Sheward’s activities and improvement with

conservative treatment was accurate. Indeed, elsewhere in the decision, the

ALJ explained that medication and counseling had helped Sheward’s

symptoms, Tr. 27, 28, a finding that Sheward does not challenge.7 See also

7 In her reply brief, Doc. 14, at 2, Sheward dissociates herself from the

statement she made in her opening brief that “the ALJ mischaracterized the

record as showing … the claimant’s ability to independently carry out her daily

activities,” Doc. 9, at 14. She then launches a new argument attacking the

relevance on the RFC of her ability to perform certain activities. Doc. 14, at 2–

3. This argument is forfeited because Sheward raised it for the first time in her

reply brief. See Island Creek Coal Co. v. Wilkerson, 910 F.3d 254, 256 (6th Cir.

Burley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 4:23-cv-218, 2023 WL 9604195, at *16 (N.D.

Ohio Dec. 20, 2023) (the ALJ’s characterization of the claimant’s treatment as

conservative was accurate since it “required no associated emergent, inpatient,

or day program treatment related to her mental health”), report and

recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 1297554 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 27, 2024). The

ALJ also commented that Sheward stopped seeing a psychiatrist and

thereafter obtained her medication from her primary care doctor. Tr. 27; see

also Blacha v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 927 F.2d 228, 231 (6th Cir. 1990)

(claimant’s failure to seek treatment undercut complaints of disabling

symptoms).

And Dr. Dubey’s exam findings could be characterized as “mostly

normal”—at least it is not a mischaracterization to say so. See Tr. 746 (Dr.

Dubey’s “normal” exam findings showing unremarkable hygiene, appropriate

dress, no unusual motor activity, coherent and normal speech, logical thoughts,

intact orientation, alert and responsive behavior, no attention problems,

unremarkable recall of past and recent events, no need for repeated questions

or directions, appropriate performance on serial sevens, ability to “do six digits

forward,” average math ability, and appropriate abstraction ability, versus

“abnormal” findings of minimal eye contact, somewhat tense and anxious

appearance, inability to perform “digits backward,” below-average general

2018) (“Time, time, and time again, we have reminded litigants that we will

treat an ‘argument’ as ‘forfeited when it was not raised in the opening brief.’”)

(citation omitted)).

fund of knowledge, delayed recall of one-out-of-three items, and low-average

cognitive functioning “at this time.”).

To the extent that the ALJ referenced “mostly normal exam findings”

throughout the record when evaluating Dr. Dubey’s opinion, Tr. 29, the ALJ

elsewhere in her decision detailed evidence showing that Sheward had some

abnormal findings throughout the record, Tr. 26–27, but that her exam

findings improved with treatment and medication, Tr. 26, 27 (the ALJ

observing that “[r]ecords from Semur Rajan, M.D., in September 2023 noted

the claimant had improved quite considerably.”). Tr. 28. The ALJ observed that

Sheward’s greater abnormal exam findings occurred at a time in 2020 when

she had not had counseling or medication and was just starting treatment, and,

in 2022,8 contemporaneous with the then-recent deaths of her husband and

father. Tr. 26; see also 28 (the ALJ commenting that “[t]he majority of

[Sheward’s] reported symptoms understandably stemmed from the deaths of

her husband and father, which were in close proximity [to each other].”). The

ALJ remarked that Dr. Dubey concluded that Sheward’s symptoms “were

likely to improve as her situational stressors stabilized, and she went through

the appropriate grieving process.” Tr. 27. Finally, the ALJ noted that “other

medical records typically noted normal mental status findings including

normal alertness, orientation, mood, recent and remote memory, affect,

8 The record shows a two-year gap in treatment from January 2020 to

February 2022. See, e.g., Doc. 9, at 20 (Sheward’s brief).

knowledge, attention, insight, and judgment,” Tr. 27 (citing “Ex. 1F; 2F,” i.e.,

Tr. 470, 474, 486, 491, 495, 499, 504), and that Sheward “had generally normal

behavior with both familiar and unfamiliar medical providers,” Tr. 28.

Next, Sheward complains that the ALJ “did not incorporate the

limitations of Drs. Dietz, Smith, and Dubey into the RFC finding.” Doc. 9, at

14. But she doesn’t identify what limitations these doctors assessed that she

believes the ALJ did not, but should have, incorporated. Sheward has therefore

forfeited this argument.9 See McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995–96 (6th

Cir. 1997) (“[I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by

some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed [forfeit]ed. It is not

sufficient for a party to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way,

leaving the court to . . . put flesh on its bones.”) (internal citations omitted).

Later in her brief,10 Sheward notes that Dr. Dubey found that Sheward’s

“attention, memory and mood issue . . . would create some frustration for her,

coworkers and supervisors.” Doc. 9, at 22 (citing Tr. 749). Sheward posits that

“[t]his limitation goes beyond the frequency of interaction but indicates that

9 Defendant, in his brief, asserted that the ALJ’s RFC “was mostly

consistent with the state agency reviewers’ opinions”; detailed the reasons

why; and asserted that any potential error as to a “pace” restriction would be

harmless. Doc. 11, at 14 n.10; see also Tr. 65–66 (vocational expert testimony).

In her reply brief, Sheward did not address this argument. So even if Sheward

hadn’t forfeited this state-agency-reviewer argument, any such error would be

harmless for the reason Defendant states and which Sheward has not disputed.

10 Rather than presenting argument about the ALJ’s evaluation of each

doctor’s opinion in defined passages, Sheward weaves all of her arguments

about all of the doctor’s opinions together throughout her brief.

[Sheward] would have difficulties with the actual interaction with others.” Doc.

9, at 22. It’s not clear what Sheward means by “actual” interaction with others

or how this would be inconsistent with the ALJ’s RFC finding limiting Sheward

to occasional interaction with coworkers, supervisors, and the general public,

Tr. 24. In any event, the ALJ accurately described Dr. Dubey’s opinion as “a

bit vague as to what is meant by ‘some difficulties.’” Tr. 29. This is an

acceptable reason to discount an opinion. See Woodard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

Admin., No. 5:22-cv-1728, 2023 WL 6005004, at *10 (N.D. Ohio July 27, 2023)

(“Opinions that express functional limitations in vague terms can be

discounted as not describing any functional limitations at all.”) (citing

Quisenberry v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 757 F. App’x 422, 431 (6th Cir. 2018)),

report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 5842016 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 11,

2023); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1) (defining a claimant’s RFC as “the

most you can still do despite your limitations.”).

Sheward writes, “[t]he ALJ also found consultative physical examiner

Dr. Weaver’s ‘commentary on the claimant’s mental health, which was outside

the scope of his examination with the claimant’, to be less persuasive, but Dr.

Weaver assessed multiple abnormal findings on examination.” Doc. 10, at 14,

17 (citing Tr. 30, 734–43). Sheward does not dispute that Dr. Weaver was

tasked with conducting a physical consultation exam. See Tr. 30, 738. This was

therefore an appropriate topic for the ALJ to consider. See 20 C.F.R. §

416.920c(c)(4) (ALJ considers the specialization of the source; “a specialist may

be more persuasive about medical issues related to his or her area of specialty

than the medical opinion … of a medical source who is not a specialist in the

relevant area of specialty.”); Adams v. Massanari, 55 F. App’x 279, 284 (6th

Cir. 2003) (“the ALJ may discredit the opinion of a physician that is outside

her area of expertise”) (citing Turley v. Sullivan, 939 F.2d 524, 527 (8th Cir.

1991)); Behnke v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:10-cv-2105, 2011 WL 5519856, at

*2 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 10, 2011) (finding that the ALJ appropriately discounted a

medical opinion in part because the doctor was “was outside her area of

expertise when it came to mental assessment”).

Moreover, the ALJ explained why he discounted Dr. Weaver’s opinion

that Sheward would “probably be limited” while performing certain activities

due to physical and mental reasons—it was “vague and undefined and d[id]

not state to what degree or how she would be limited in functional terms.” Tr.

30, 738; see, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1) (defining a claimant’s RFC as “the

most you can still do despite your limitations.”); Woodard, 2023 WL 6005004,

at *10. Finally, the ALJ acknowledged Dr. Weaver’s observations about

Sheward’s mental health, Tr. 27, 30, so Sheward’s assertion that the ALJ “did

not consider the support provided by Dr. Weaver,” Doc. 9, at 17, is belied by

the decision, which shows otherwise.

Sheward points out that the ALJ found treating source Dr. Rajan’s

opinion “not persuasive for many reasons” and accuses the ALJ of

mischaracterizing the record. Doc. 9, at 15 (citing Tr. 30). The ALJ discussed

Dr. Rajan’s opinion and explained:

This opinion is not persuasive for many reasons. The

findings are not supported by the very conservative

treatment and objective findings overall. Dr. Rajan

indicated he had only seen the claimant a few times

for medication management. Overall, the record

shows conservative treatment. The claimant

responds overall well to medication. There is little

psychiatric therapy or counseling, and no inpatient

or emergent treatment. Mental status examinations

with her medical providers are generally

unremarkable. There is no evidence to support the

extreme off task or absences. Also, the sit, stand,

walk, and other physical limitations are not what

Dr. Rajan typically treats the claimant for and is

beyond his specialty. He indicated the claimant

could lift and carry more than 100lbs., which is

clearly inconsistent with her lumbar impairment.

He indicated the claimant could concentrate for less

than five minutes. However, that is inconsistent

with her reports of being able to carry out her own

daily activities including shopping, managing

money, taking medications, maintaining a schedule,

driving, and doing paperwork. His own brief

examinations do not support such severe

limitations. His opinion is also internally

inconsistent. For example, he cited “mostly mental”

findings to support sitting, standing, and walking

limitations. Similarly, Dr. Rajan indicated the

claimant had no postural or environmental

limitations but also marked the boxes labeled

“never” for each activity. This adds a level of

uncertainty to his opinion. Therefore, I do not find it

persuasive.

Tr. 30.

Sheward asserts that the ALJ’s comment that “[m]ental status

examinations with her medical providers are generally unremarkable” is a

mischaracterization. Doc. 9, at 15. Even if this could be said to be a

mischaracterization, which Sheward has not shown for the reasons explained

above, the ALJ cited eleven other reasons why she discounted Dr. Rajan’s

opinion, and these reasons support the ALJ’s explanation. Tr. 30. Sheward

contends that the ALJ “also erred when failing to cite to any contradicting

evidence when finding, ‘[t]here is no evidence to support the extreme off task

or absences.’” Doc. 9, at 15. But the ALJ cannot cite evidence that does not

exist. Moreover, the ALJ cited Sheward’s ability to perform certain tasks as

inconsistent with an inability to maintain attention and concentration for more

than five minutes, Tr. 30, which goes to off-task behavior.

Sheward’s additional arguments fare no better. Sheward argues that the

ALJ’s evaluations of the opinions of Dr. Deitz, Dr. Smith, Dr. Dubey, and Dr.

Weaver were all “inaccurate and internally inconsistent” because these

doctors’ opinions “all contained limitations more significant than included in

the RFC finding.” Doc. 9, at 18, 22. But Sheward concedes that “an ALJ is not

required to rely upon a medical opinion and is not required to adopt a medical

opinion verbatim.” Doc. 14, at 1; see, e.g., Tucker v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 775 F.

App’x 220, 226 (6th Cir. 2019) (“No bright-line rule exists in our circuit

directing that medical opinions must be the building blocks of the residual

functional capacity finding”). Sheward’s references to an ALJ’s duty “to build

an accurate and logical bridge,” Doc. 9, at 10, 11, 12, 15, and the ALJ’s duty to

“explain how the record supports the RFC finding,” Doc. 9, at 21, do not show

that the ALJ erred—for the reasons explained above, the ALJ’s decision as a

whole provided sufficient articulation for the Court to review.

Finally, Sheward recites evidence and provides analysis of why she

believes that all of the doctors’ opinions were more persuasive than the ALJ

found them, see, e.g., Doc. 9, at 20, 23, but citing evidence and disagreeing with

the ALJ’s conclusion does not show that the ALJ’s decision lacks substantial

evidence, see, e.g., Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997) (“The

decision of an ALJ is not subject to reversal, even if there is substantial

evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion, so

long as substantial evidence supports the conclusion reached by the ALJ.”).

B. Physical impairments

Sheward argues that the ALJ erred when she evaluated the opinions of

the state agency reviewers, Drs. Siddiqui and Bolz. Doc. 9, at 23. She contends

that the ALJ “did not discuss the evidence reviewed” by the doctors and that

the ALJ “made no findings under the supportability factor.” Id. at 23–24.

But the ALJ did both of these things. Elsewhere in her decision, the ALJ

discussed the same evidence that the doctors reviewed. See, e.g., Tr. 25 (ALJ

discussing Sheward’s: 2018 emergency room visit and lumber x-ray; January

2019 visit for back pain, including Sheward’s refusal of steroid treatment,

muscle relaxant, and physical therapy and her request to see a neurologist;

2019 visits with Dr. Bauer, including Sheward’s normal gait, “mild to benign

exam[] findings,” and trigger point injections, which were helpful; and June

2022 consultative exam with Dr. Weaver); Tr. 77–79 (state agency record

showing the evidence Drs. Siddiqui considered, including Sheward’s 2018

lumbar x-ray, refusal of steroid, muscle relaxant, and physical therapy; exams

showing full strength and a normal gait; lack of assistive device; and Dr.

Weaver’s exam). And when she evaluated Drs. Siddiqui’s and Bolz’s opinions,

the ALJ explained that Sheward’s ability to perform light work, as found by

the doctors, was “supported by the lack of significant objective findings,

improvement with conservative treatment, normal gait, [and] no assistive

device.” Tr. 28; see also Tr. 82 (Dr. Siddiqui indicating that Sheward could

perform light work and citing in support Sheward’s full strength and lack of

assistive device).

Sheward also challenges the ALJ’s evaluation of Dr. Weaver’s opinion.

Doc. 9, at 24. The ALJ discussed Dr. Weaver’s opinion as follows:

Following the physical consultative examination,

Dr. Weaver concluded the claimant’s ability to do

physical activities included the following: in view of

her low back problems and mental difficulties, she

would probably be limited in the performance of

physical activities involving sustained sitting,

standing, walking, lifting, carrying, following

directions, and travel; and would probably be able to

perform physical activities involving handling

objects, speaking, and hearing (Ex. 7F). This is less

persuasive. Stating the claimant probably would be

limited in performance of physical activities is vague

and undefined and does not state to what degree or

how she would be limited in functional terms.

Tr. 30. Sheward complains that “the ALJ did not identify an inconsistency with

the opinion or otherwise explain how the opinion was unsupported.” Doc. 9, at

24. But Dr. Weaver’s opinion gave the ALJ little to evaluate, as the ALJ

explained. This goes to the supportability factor. See, e.g., Maldonado v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:24-cv-415, 2025 WL 1104886, at *22 (N.D. Ohio Apr.

14, 2025) (a doctor’s “vague” opinion goes to the supportability factor). Indeed,

it is questionable whether Dr. Weaver’s opinion could be considered a medical

opinion at all. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a)(2) (defining a “medical opinion” as

“a statement from a medical source about what [claimants] can still do despite

[their] impairment(s) and whether [they] have one or more impairment-related

limitations or restrictions” in their ability to perform the physical, mental, or

other demands or work).

In any event, given the fact that the ALJ’s RFC limited Sheward to

performing light work, which could be said to be consistent with Dr. Weaver’s

opinion—Sheward has not persuasively argued otherwise11—any purported

error would be harmless. See Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 547

(6th Cir. 2004) (an ALJ’s error evaluating opinion evidence is harmless when

the ALJ’s RFC is consistent with the opinion).

11 Sheward asserts that Dr. Weaver “assess[ed] limitations sitting,

standing, walking, lifting, and carrying that were not included in the RFC

finding and incompatible with the amount of standing, walking, lifting, and

carrying required for light work.” Doc. 9, at 24 (citing Tr. 738). But “[s]aying it

does not make it so.” GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 205 F.3d 416, 426 (D.C. Cir.

2000). Sheward hasn’t explained why Dr. Weaver’s opinion that Sheward

“would probably be limited in the performance of physical activities involving

sustained sitting, standing, walking, lifting, [and] carrying” is incompatible

with light work. Moreover, the vocational expert at the hearing testified that

if an individual with Sheward’s RFC was instead limited to four, rather than

six, hours of standing and walking, and even if the limitation amounted to a

sit-stand option, there were still jobs that such an individual could perform.

Tr. 70–71.

Finally, Sheward challenges the ALJ’s comment, when evaluating Dr.

Rajan’s opinion, that the “the sit, stand, walk, and other physical limitations

are not what Dr. Rajan typically treats the claimant for and is beyond his

specialty.” Tr. 30. Sheward asserts that Dr. Rajan is a board-certified surgeon

and current primary care physician. Doc. 9, at 24 (citing Tr. 768). But she has

not shown that the ALJ’s statement that Dr. Rajan typically treated Sheward’s

mental, rather than physical, problems is inaccurate, and the record supports

the ALJ’s statement. See Tr. 765–66, 841–43. Sheward also hasn’t shown that

Dr. Rajan is an orthopedic surgeon, rather than a general surgeon, so she has

not shown that the ALJ’s specialty comment regarding Dr. Rajan’s assessment

of Sheward’s lumbar spine-related limitations was inaccurate.

All told, Sheward has not shown that the ALJ erred when evaluating

the medical opinion evidence.

Conclusion

For the reasons explained above, I recommend that the Court affirm the

Commissioner’s decision.

Dated: July 15, 2025

/s/ James E. Grimes Jr.

James E. Grimes Jr.

U.S. Magistrate Judge

OBJECTIONS

Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with

the Clerk of Court within 14 days after the party objecting has been served

with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Failure

to file objections within the specified time may forfeit the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. See Berkshire v. Beauvais, 928 F.3d 520, 530–31 (6th

Cir. 2019).