The opinion
Case: 24-50152 Document: 76-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/15/2025
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
July 15, 2025
No. 24-50152
____________ Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Mathias Ometu,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
City of San Antonio; Devin Day, Officer, Badge # 0490;
Richard Serna, Officer, Badge # 1466,
Defendants—Appellees.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 5:21-CV-925
______________________________
Before Elrod, Chief Judge, and Higginbotham and Southwick,
Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
Police officers stopped Plaintiff because they believed he matched the
description of someone accused of domestic violence. He declined to provide
his name or any identifying information. He was detained, ultimately
arrested, but later found not to be the described person. He brought Section
1983 claims against the officers and the municipality that employed them.
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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The district court granted summary judgment to the Defendants. We
AFFIRM.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The events at issue in this appeal were captured by body-worn
cameras, dashboard cameras, and a backseat camera. In August 2020, San
Antonio Police Officer Richard Serna responded to a domestic violence call
at an apartment complex. As Serna approached, he saw the Plaintiff, Mathias
Ometu, leaving that complex on foot. Ometu is a heavily-bearded black man,
and he was wearing a green t-shirt, a hat, and a white pair of basketball shorts
with a black stripe down each side. Serna did not stop Ometu at the time.
Instead, he went to the apartment to speak with the domestic violence victim,
Kiara Davenport. Davenport described her assailant as a black male who
“kind of” had a beard and was wearing green. Davenport also told Serna that
her attacker had gone around the back of the apartment complex. Serna
called for assistance and gave a description of the suspect as a “black male,
probably about six foot, like a neon green t-shirt, full, black beard.” Serna
stated that he passed the suspect as he was entering the complex, but did not
know what he looked like at that time.
Officer Devin Day responded and saw Ometu jogging in the area. Day
informed Serna of Ometu’s location, and both officers approached him.
Serna arrived first and asked for Ometu’s name, explaining that Ometu
resembled the suspect he was looking for. Ometu refused to provide that
information. After several attempts to obtain his name, Ometu was
handcuffed. Serna then called Davenport to obtain additional information
about her attacker. She gave Serna the name and date of birth of her attacker,
Darren Smith, and Serna pulled up a mugshot from 2017. Davenport also
told Serna that her attacker was not wearing a hat. While Serna was speaking
with Davenport, Day told Ometu: “Listen, man, the only reason we’re
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stopping you is because you match the description of the guy she said
assaulted her.” Ometu responded: “Yeah, black. Yeah, great job.” Day
insisted to Ometu that he stopped him because of his clothing description,
not his race.
Serna asked for identification and grabbed Ometu’s shorts pocket.
Ometu told Serna to stop touching him and said, “I don’t consent to a
search.” Serna explained to Ometu that he was responding to a domestic
violence call and that Ometu seemed to fit the victim’s description of the
perpetrator. The officers attempted to arrange for Davenport to come to
them and tell them if Ometu was her attacker, but she could not leave her
small children alone. Davenport described her attacker to a third officer as
5’10, black, medium build, with short hair and “just a little bit of scruff on his
chin,” and wearing a green shirt with black basketball shorts. Serna informed
the third officer that Ometu matched most of the description, except his
basketball shorts, which were white with a black stripe, and the size of his
beard. Officer Serna decided he would transport Ometu to Davenport for
identification.
Ometu refused to enter the police vehicle on his own. The officers
forced him into the vehicle by pushing and pulling him. Ometu yelled that
the officers were choking him, and the officers denied they were doing so.
Immediately after the struggle, Day can be heard telling the other officers that
he was “kicked in the face” and “right in [his] eye.” Day later told officers
Ometu also kicked him in the leg. Day and Serna explained that Day had
grabbed Ometu under his chin when he pulled him into the car. After Ometu
was in the vehicle, Davenport arrived and told officers that Ometu was not
her attacker. An hour after he was moved into the police vehicle, Ometu was
informed he would be arrested for “failure to ID” and “assault on a PO.”
Those charges were brought, but it is not clear what happened to them.
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Before Ometu was identified, Serna explained to other officers that he
believed Ometu refused to identify himself because he was the attacker and
had an outstanding robbery warrant. Serna told the other officers the
description “pretty much matches, except for the beard.” Another officer
viewed the attacker’s out-of-date mugshot and said “that looks a lot like him
kind of . . . it looks a lot like him. You just throw some facial hair on there,
add a few years.”
Ometu filed suit against the City of San Antonio and the police officers
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. He asserted claims against the City for failure to train,
supervise, or discipline its police officers. He asserted claims against the
officers for excessive force, substantive due process violations, unlawful
detention, false imprisonment, negligence, and assault and battery. The City
and Ometu filed cross-motions for summary judgment on Ometu’s claim
against the City. The police officers and Ometu filed cross-motions for
summary judgment on Ometu’s claims against them. The officers asserted a
defense of qualified immunity.
The magistrate judge recommended granting the City of San Antonio
summary judgment on Ometu’s claims against it. The magistrate judge also
recommended granting summary judgment to the officers based on qualified
immunity. Ometu filed objections to the Report and Recommendations. The
district court adopted the Report and Recommendations, finding it
“abundantly clear from the video evidence, which the Magistrate Judge
accurately relied on . . . that the reason Ometu was stopped is because he
appeared to match the description of a domestic violence perpetrator.”
Further, the district court stated, “[i]n all other respects, Ometu’s
arguments are conclusory and give the Court no pause in adopting the
Magistrate Judge’s recommendation.” Ometu timely appealed.
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DISCUSSION
On appeal, our review of a grant of summary judgment is de novo,
meaning we consider the evidence and law as a district court would. Perry v.
Mendoza, 83 F.4th 313, 316 (5th Cir. 2023). Summary judgment is
appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Evidence and inferences are typically viewed “in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” McGlothin v. State Farm
Mut. Ins. Co., 925 F.3d 741, 745 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Cooley v. Hous. Auth.
of Slidell, 747 F.3d 295, 298 (5th Cir. 2014)). When, as here, there is video
and audio of the incident in question, courts “should ‘view[] the facts in the
light depicted by the videotape.’” 1 Garcia v. Orta, 47 F.4th 343, 350 (5th Cir.
2022) (alteration in original) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–81
(2007)).
As a threshold matter, Ometu argues the district court denied him due
process by granting summary judgment although he “was ready, willing and
able to commence [trial] on 4/8/2024 9:30AM prior to the entry of summary
judgment.” Ometu cites no authority to support his claim that he was denied
due process, and he was not.
_____________________
1
Ometu asserts throughout his briefing that the district court mistakenly relied on
fabricated evidence and “Appellees’ false narratives and alternative facts.” His conclusory
attacks on the validity of the evidence do not rely on evidence in the record to support his
claims. In his reply, he refers to “false, uncorroborated, and doctored video feeds,” and
devotes an entire section to a claim that the “video and audio recordings are not
authenticated.” Ometu did not raise a challenge to the authenticity of the video footage in
his initial brief, and it does not appear that he ever raised it before the district court. Thus,
we will not consider that argument. Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 397 (5th Cir.
2021).
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We turn now to Ometu’s other arguments. 2
I. The City of San Antonio
As to the City, Ometu’s complaint alleged a failure to train, supervise,
and discipline. On appeal, he also alleges a policy of racial profiling. Ometu
forfeited his racial-profiling claim by failing to raise it in district court. See
Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2021). We next
consider Ometu’s failure-to-train claim. In his briefing, Ometu concedes that
Officer Day and Officer Serna received training and education on “many
occasions.” Specifically, he concedes the officers “were educated and
trained and were aware of the United States Supreme Court’s decision and
rationale in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 2 (1968)[,] concerning reasonable
suspicion and detention and the Supreme [C]ourt decision in Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)[,] concerning the use of excessive force.” With
the failure-to-train and policy of racial-profiling claims thus disposed, we turn
to Ometu’s two remaining claims: failure to supervise and failure to
discipline.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
“unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Section
1983 permits an individual to sue a person acting under color of law for “the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under Section 1983, plaintiffs
may bring these claims against municipalities if the deprivation was
“pursuant to [an] official municipal policy.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
_____________________
2
Ometu’s Conclusion and Prayer contains requests that the district court’s order
dismissing his claims against the Chief of Police and his claims under the Texas Tort Claim
Act be reversed. The rest of his briefing is devoid of any argument on either claim, save
one line in his reply brief. Therefore, he has failed to brief the argument in adequate
fashion, and we do not consider it. Rollins, 8 F.4th at 397.
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436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Under Monell, “a plaintiff must show that an
official policy promulgated by a municipal policymaker was the moving force
behind the violation of a constitutional right.” Henderson v. Harris County,
51 F.4th 125, 130 (5th Cir. 2022).
To succeed on a failure-to-supervise or failure-to-discipline claim
under Monell, Ometu must show: (1) the City failed to supervise or discipline
the officers involved; (2) a causal connection between that failure and the
alleged violations of his rights; and (3) the failure constituted deliberate
indifference to Ometu’s rights. See Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 277
(5th Cir. 2023) (failure to train); Verastique v. City of Dallas, 106 F.4th 427,
432 (5th Cir. 2024) (failure to discipline). Deliberate indifference can be
shown by establishing the City “had notice of a pattern of similar violations”
or “the constitutional violation was the highly predictable consequence of a
particular failure to train.” Davidson v. City of Stafford, 848 F.3d 384, 397
(5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Kitchen v. Dallas County, 759 F.3d 468, 484 (5th Cir.
2014), abrogated in part by Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015)).
The only evidence Ometu cites to support his claims are interrogatory
responses from Officers Serna and Day asserting they are “not aware of any”
records showing they had been disciplined for the use of excessive force or a
false arrest. In contrast, the City cites its many policies and procedures
mandating standards for disciplining, supervising, and training officers.
Aside from citing three somewhat ambiguous interrogatory questions
and responses, Ometu has directed this court to no evidence of a failure to
supervise or a failure to discipline. He has provided no evidence of a causal
connection between any alleged failure and the alleged violations of his rights,
and he has failed to show anything amounting to deliberate indifference of his
rights. We conclude that Ometu’s failure-to-supervise and failure-to-
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discipline claims cannot succeed, and the district court properly granted
summary judgment in the City’s favor. 3
II. Officers Day and Serna
Next, we consider the claims against Officers Day and Serna. On
appeal, Ometu asserts the officers stopped him without reasonable suspicion,
arrested him without probable cause, and used excessive force against him.
The officers argue they did not commit any constitutional violations
and are protected by qualified immunity. “Once an officer ‘raises the
defense of qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing the
defense does not apply.’” Perry, 83 F.4th at 317 (quoting Bryant v. Gillem,
965 F.3d 387, 391 (5th Cir. 2020)). “To overcome qualified immunity, the
plaintiff must show that the officer (1) violated a constitutional right that was
(2) clearly established at the time.” Id. A court may evaluate those factors
in either order or even consider only one and conclude it is not satisfied.
Garcia v. Blevins, 957 F.3d 596, 600 (5th Cir. 2020). “[A] right is ‘clearly
established’ only if it ‘is sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would
have understood that what he is doing violates that right.’” Betts v. Brennan,
22 F.4th 577, 584 (5th Cir. 2022) (alteration in original) (quoting
Cunningham v. Castloo, 983 F.3d 185, 191 (5th Cir. 2020)).
_____________________
3
Ometu makes a few passing references to the doctrine of ratification. The
doctrine of ratification, which applies only in “extreme factual situations,” allows for the
establishment of a municipal liability based on post-conduct ratification by a policymaker.
Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 848 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Snyder v.
Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 1998)). Ometu neglects to explain how his case falls
within the bounds of “extreme factual situations,” and he seems to cite the doctrine mostly
in support of his racial-profiling claim. Ometu’s brief is inadequate on this issue, and we
reject the argument. See Rollins, 8 F.4th at 397.
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A. Reasonable Suspicion
We first consider whether the officers had reasonable suspicion to
stop and detain Ometu. A police officer “can stop and briefly detain a person
for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported
by articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot.’” Turner v.
Lieutenant Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 690 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). “[A] law enforcement officer acts with
reasonable suspicion if, based on the totality of the circumstances, he has ‘a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person
stopped of criminal activity.’” United States v. Rose, 48 F.4th 297, 302 (5th
Cir. 2022) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,
417–18 (1981)). “Reasonable suspicion must exist before the initiation of an
investigatory detention.” United States v. McKinney, 980 F.3d 485, 490 (5th
Cir. 2020). A stop must be “justified at its inception” and the officer’s
actions should be “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that
justified the stop.” United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 506 (5th Cir.
2004) (en banc). That means the duration of an investigatory stop “must be
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of
the stop.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion).
In assessing whether a detention is too long in duration
to be justified as an investigative stop, we consider it
appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a
means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their
suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to
detain the defendant.
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985). Our duty is not to “parse[]
the situation in hindsight,” but to “examin[e] it through the totality of [the
officer’s] experience in the moment.” See United States v. Martinez, 102
F.4th 677, 685 (5th Cir. 2024).
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Ometu argues there was no objective basis for believing he had
committed a crime, and he was stopped simply because of the racism of the
officers. The video tells a different story. Davenport gave Officer Serna a
brief description of her attacker as a black man wearing green and with at least
some semblance of a beard. Ometu is a black man with a beard who was
wearing a bright green shirt, and he was leaving Davenport’s apartment
complex in the direction she indicated her attacker went. Those are clear,
articulable facts that support reasonable suspicion for the purpose of a valid
stop. The fact that Ometu had a large beard was not clearly contradictory to
Davenport’s description at the time Ometu was stopped. 4 We conclude the
officers had reasonable suspicion to justify the stop at its inception.
We must now consider “whether the officer’s subsequent actions
were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop.”
Brigham, 382 F.3d at 506. Recall, the officers were required to “diligently
pursue[] a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their
suspicions quickly.” Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686. As the detention continued,
Officer Serna obtained additional information from Davenport and accessed
a three-year-old mugshot of the attacker. He also received a more detailed
description of Davenport’s attacker from another officer. As Officer Serna
acknowledged, the color of Ometu’s shorts and his substantial beard did not
_____________________
4
Throughout his briefing, Ometu asserts no reasonable person could believe
Ometu and Smith were the same person. To support his assertion, he provides a side-by-
side comparison of Ometu and Smith. He argues “there is not a scintilla of evidence to
demonstrate that Ms. Davenport gave Officer [Serna] a description of anyone that is: fully
‘bearded black man dressed in a lime green t-shirt, a hat, and long shorts with a wide black
stripe down the side of each leg . . . and a bald headed black man.’” Ometu misunderstands
the standard for reasonable suspicion. It was not necessary that Ometu be the person
Davenport described; it was only necessary that the officers were reasonable in their
suspicion. See Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60–61 (2014). The officers had no
current, side-by-side comparison photos at the time Ometu was stopped.
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fit with Davenport’s more detailed description. Ometu’s hat also did not fit
the description. Perhaps this new information was sufficient to dispel the
officers’ suspicion, such that the officers should have concluded the stop.
Further, the officers may have “acted unreasonably in failing to recognize or
to pursue” the alternative option of sending Davenport a photo of Ometu for
identification to quickly dispel their suspicions. See id. at 687.
Even if the officers violated Ometu’s constitutional rights, that would
be sufficient to satisfy only one element of the analysis of qualified immunity.
We would still be required to evaluate “whether the allegedly violated
constitutional rights were clearly established at the time of the incident; and, if
so, whether the conduct of the defendants was objectively unreasonable in
the light of that then clearly established law.” Hare v. City of Corinth, 135
F.3d 320, 326 (5th Cir. 1998). We must use our “full knowledge of [our] own
[and other relevant] precedents,” to determine if the right was clearly
established at the time of the incident. Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516
(1994) (second alteration in original) (quoting Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183,
192 n.9 (1984)). “If officers of reasonable competence could disagree as to
whether the plaintiff’s rights were violated, the officer’s qualified immunity
remains intact.” Tarver v. City of Edna, 410 F.3d 745, 750 (5th Cir. 2005).
Therefore, the officers will be entitled to qualified immunity even if they were
mistaken when they believed they had the requisite reasonable suspicion to
continue the detention, so long as that belief was reasonable. See id.; see also
Rucker v. Marshall, 119 F.4th 395, 400 (5th Cir. 2024).
Though the beard and color of Ometu’s shorts did not match
Davenport’s later description, other facts weighed in favor of continued
reasonable suspicion that Ometu could be Davenport’s attacker. Based on
these other facts, including the green shirt, Ometu leaving the apartment
complex as Officer Serna entered to respond to Davenport’s call, and
Ometu’s unwillingness to provide his name, the officers could have
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reasonably, even if mistakenly, believed they still had the requisite reasonable
suspicion to continue the detention. See Rucker, 119 F.4th at 400.
Throughout his detention, the officers took investigatory steps to
identify Ometu, including the attempt to transport him to Davenport for
identification. Though an alternative means of identification was available,
the officers could have reasonably believed the detention was not too long
because they continued to pursue investigatory steps. See Sharpe, 470 U.S.
at 687–88. Moreover, the officers could have reasonably believed that
transporting Ometu for identification was a reasonable investigatory step
because it was unclear whether placing Ometu in the police car and
transporting him back to the apartment complex would render the detention
an arrest. We have held that, under appropriate circumstances, it can be
“‘reasonable to detain a suspect at gunpoint, handcuff [him], and place [him]
in a police car’ during an investigatory stop.” Smith v. Heap, 31 F.4th 905,
911 (5th Cir. 2022) (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Thomas,
997 F.3d. 603, 615 (5th Cir. 2021)). In addition, because “police may require
a person temporarily detained under Terry to move to another place, the
question is whether [the particular] transportation was reasonable.” United
States v. McCargo, 464 F.3d 192, 198 (2d Cir. 2006). We find that “officers
of reasonable competence could disagree as to whether” the detention
violated Ometu’s constitutional rights. See Tarver, 410 F.3d at 750.
Ultimately, “we find no precedent that clearly establishes ‘the
violative nature of’” the officers’ particular actions, and Ometu has not cited
any. Santander v. Salazar, 133 F.4th 471, 482 (5th Cir. 2025) (quoting
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011)). The officers are therefore
entitled to qualified immunity for their stop of Ometu.
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B. Probable Cause
We next consider Ometu’s claim that he was arrested without
probable cause. “An arrest is unlawful unless it is supported by probable
cause.” Flores v. City of Palacios, 381 F.3d 391, 402 (5th Cir. 2004). “Probable
cause exists when the totality of facts and circumstances within a police
officer’s knowledge at the moment of arrest are sufficient for a reasonable
person to conclude that the suspect had committed or was committing an
offense.” United States v. Levine, 80 F.3d 129, 132 (5th Cir. 1996) (emphasis
added).
Ometu argues the officers continued to detain and arrest him without
probable cause after Davenport told them he was not her attacker. According
to Ometu, “[i]t is undisputed that Plaintiff-Appellant was [u]nlawfully
[a]rrested in [v]iolation of [the] Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment[s],” and
he is thus entitled to summary judgment. The officers argue “the
uncontested video, still photos, and affidavit evidence show beyond doubt
that Ometu used force to prevent or obstruct Day and Serna from effecting
his transport,” in violation of Texas Penal Code § 38.03, and “intentionally
caus[ed] bodily injury to Day and Serna by kicking them,” in violation of
Texas Penal Code § 22.01. That evidence “established not only probable
cause to believe that Ometu committed the offenses of assault and resisting
transport but uncontroverted proof that he did in fact commit those
offenses.”
Under Texas law, it is an assault to “intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly cause[] bodily injury to another.” Tex. Penal Code
§ 22.01(a)(1). It is a felony to assault a police officer “lawfully discharging
an official duty.” § 22.01(b)(1). The video footage shows Ometu kicking
Day as he resists being placed in the vehicle for transport. The video footage
supports a reasonable officer’s conclusion that Ometu committed an offense
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when he kicked the officers. Thus, the officers had probable cause to arrest
Ometu for assaulting the officers because they had just witnessed it.
No constitutional violation occurred, because the officers had
probable cause to make the arrest. The officers are entitled to qualified
immunity on Ometu’s unlawful-arrest claim.
C. Excessive Force
Finally, we consider Ometu’s claim that the officers used excessive
force against him in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. “The
‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20
vision of hindsight.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
Reasonableness in this context is an objective standard. Id. at 397. “We have
repeatedly held that ‘noncompliance or continued physical resistance’
justifies the use of force.” Rucker, 119 F.4th at 403 (collecting cases).
“Excessive force claims are necessarily fact-intensive; whether the force
used is ‘excessive’ or ‘unreasonable’ depends on ‘the facts and
circumstances of each particular case.’” Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156,
167 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). Among the factors
we consider are “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses
an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is
actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham, 490
U.S. at 396. To prevail on his excessive force claim, Ometu “must show
‘(1) injury, (2) which resulted directly and only from a use of force that was
clearly excessive, and (3) the excessiveness of which was clearly
unreasonable.’” Darden v. City of Fort Worth, 880 F.3d 722, 727 (5th Cir.
2018) (quoting Cooper v. Brown, 844 F.3d 517, 522 (5th Cir. 2016)).
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The use of force is captured, in its entirety, on the video footage with
various angles. 5 Ometu repeatedly refused to identify himself despite the
officers’ numerous requests and their explanation that they were looking for
a domestic violence suspect, so the officers decided to transport Ometu to
Davenport for identification. At the time, the officers believed Ometu was
likely Davenport’s attacker, who she claimed choked her. The officers
attempted to force Ometu into the car for approximately 2.5 minutes. At
times, one officer pushed him while the other pulled him. At no point during
the altercation did the officers kick, punch, or use a weapon against Ometu.
When additional officers arrived, they ceased pushing him into the car and
several officers spoke with Ometu while he sat in the car.
Considering the severity of the crime the officers believed Ometu
committed and his active physical resistance, the officers did not use
excessive force and are entitled to qualified immunity on that claim.
AFFIRMED.
_____________________
5
Although the officers’ body-worn cameras fell off during the struggle, Serna’s
backseat camera and Day’s dashboard camera continued to capture the incident.
15