Taylor, Darlene v. Dale's Recycling

FILED

Jul 15, 2025

09:32 AM(CT)

TENNESSEE

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

APPEALS BOARD

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

Darlene Taylor as Surviving Spouse ) Docket No. 2023-07-5405

of Darrell Taylor )

) State File No. 860327-2023

v. )

)

Dale’s Recycling, et al. )

)

)

Appeal from the Court of Workers’ ) Heard June 13, 2025,

Compensation Claims ) in Murfreesboro, TN

Allen Phillips, Judge )

Affirmed and Certified as Final

In this compensation appeal, the employer argues the trial court erred in awarding the

surviving spouse death benefits following the decedent employee’s death. The employee’s

apparent heart attack occurred while he was performing duties associated with his job as a

driver for the employer. His surviving spouse sought workers’ compensation death

benefits, alleging the employee died following a heart attack brought on by physical

exertion and mental stressors while working. The employer denied the claim, asserting the

employee’s heart attack was primarily caused by his pre-existing conditions. In awarding

death benefits, the trial court relied on the expert opinion of a cardiologist retained by the

claimant, and the employer has appealed. Upon careful consideration of the record and the

arguments of counsel, we affirm the trial court’s decision and certify it as final.

Judge Meredith B. Weaver delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in which Presiding

Judge Timothy W. Conner and Judge Pele I. Godkin joined.

Richard R. Clark, Nashville, Tennessee, for the employer-appellant, Dale’s Recycling

Jonathan May, Memphis, Tennessee, for the employee-appellee, Darlene Taylor as

Surviving Spouse of Darrell Taylor

Factual and Procedural Background

Darrell Taylor (“Employee”) worked as a truck driver for Dale’s Recycling

(“Employer”), a company engaged in the purchase and sale of recycled metal products.

Employer dealt in a variety of recycled products, from large metal equipment, such as used

1

HVAC units, to aluminum cans from county recycling centers. The metal was primarily

stored in Milan, Tennessee, and drivers would transport the materials to one of eight

locations for the metals to be processed, sorted, and sold by grades.

On June 22, 2023, Employee was driving a truck containing a large load of scrap

metal to a processing location in LaGrange, Kentucky. While driving behind Employee

through a construction zone on the interstate, a law enforcement officer, Deputy Dennis

Poteet, noticed that some of the scrap metal was falling out of the truck’s trailer, at least

one piece of which had struck another vehicle. Upon clearing the construction zone,

Deputy Poteet turned on his lights and pulled Employee over. Another truck stopped

behind them because debris from Employee’s trailer had struck his vehicle.

After explaining to Employee what he had observed while driving through the

construction zone, Deputy Poteet told Employee to better secure his load. He further

advised Employee he would not issue him a ticket if he rearranged the scrap metal in his

truck to prevent pieces from falling out of the trailer. To complete this task, Employee had

to climb up on the back tire of the trailer and then up metal rungs welded to the side of the

trailer to enter the back.

Meanwhile, the other driver, finding no damage to his own truck, told Deputy Poteet

he was going to leave and did not need a report. Deputy Poteet then reentered his car to

make a phone call because it was too loud on the side of the interstate for him to hear.

While seated in his car, Deputy Poteet initially observed Employee moving about inside

the trailer, but, after approximately ten minutes, he realized he could no longer see

Employee. Upon completion of the call, Deputy Poteet searched around the truck and

inside the cab for Employee. He then climbed the ladder to enter the trailer, at which time

he found Employee lying in the trailer, unmoving, with his eyes open. Deputy Poteet could

not locate a pulse and immediately called emergency medical services, who unfortunately

confirmed Employee had passed away at the scene.

Thereafter, Deputy Poteet had the truck towed, and Employee’s body was taken to

the Grayson County, Kentucky coroner’s office. The coroner did not perform an autopsy

or request one be performed, noting the following in his report:

57 year old found deceased in dump trailer. Deceased was stopped [by

Deputy Poteet] for losing debris . . . . Deceased spoke to [Deputy Poteet] and

did not show signs of distress. Climbed up into trailer to rearrange load.

After 5 to 10 minutes [Deputy Poteet] could not locate deceased and climbed

up into the top of trailer [and] found the deceased. [History] of hypertension.

The coroner’s report listed the cause of death as “cardio respiratory arrest.” Below that, in

a section labeled “Due to or as a Consequence of,” the coroner wrote “chronic

hypertension.” Under another section identified as “Significant Conditions Not Resulting

2

in Underlying Cause,” the coroner wrote “Diabetes.” On the death certificate, completed

July 3, 2023, “cardiorespiratory arrest” due to “chronic hypertension” and “diabetes” was

listed as the cause of death.

Employee’s spouse (“Claimant”) filed a Petition for Benefit Determination (“PBD”)

on August 7, 2023, indicating a First Report of Work Injury had not been filed. In response

to the PBD, Employer denied Employee’s death was primarily caused by work activities

based on the indications of his pre-existing conditions of hypertension and diabetes and the

findings on the coroner’s report. Claimant then retained Dr. Ardindh Kanagasundram, a

cardiologist, who reviewed the case and concluded that the combination of physical

exertion and emotional stress arising from the traffic stop had caused Employee’s “sudden

cardiac death.” Employer retained Dr. Kishore Arcot, also a cardiologist, who conversely

opined Employee’s “fatal heart attack was the result of underlying coronary artery disease

secondary to his risk factors, including hypertension, Type 2 diabetes,

hypercholesterolemia, and non-compliance with his prescribed medicine therapy.” He

further concluded that “the alleged work activities . . . as well as the emotional stress and

anxiety are not the primary cause of this unfortunate outcome.”

Lay Testimony

In preparation for trial, the parties deposed both Deputy Poteet and Bobby Dabbs,

Employer’s Vice President of Operations at the time of Employee’s death. Deputy Poteet

testified that on the date of Employee’s death, he had been dispatched to a construction

zone due to another vehicle hitting some construction barrels. In the course of completing

that call, he was driving behind Employee’s truck for 5 miles and noticed scrap metal

falling out of the trailer, some of which had struck at least one other vehicle. He did not

stop Employee’s vehicle until they had cleared the construction zone, at which time Deputy

Poteet explained why he had pulled Employee over and asked him why he was not using

the cover for his trailer. According to Deputy Poteet, Employee advised him the electronics

for his cover were not working so he was unable to use it. As such, Deputy Poteet told

Employee he would not be writing him a ticket but instructed Employee to secure the

remaining load. Deputy Poteet testified that “[Employee] seemed like he was a little

nervous, because . . . [he] didn’t think [Employee] had a lot of interaction with police.” He

then explained that Employee “was very anxious and nervous initially,” but once Deputy

Poteet explained the reason for the stop, Employee “seemed to calm down.” Deputy Poteet

could not recall the temperature at the time of the stop but did remember that it was a warm

day. Finally, when asked if there was anything abnormal about Employee that Deputy

Poteet noticed during the stop, he testified “I don’t think it was abnormal. I just think he

was nervous being around the police.”

In his deposition, Mr. Dabbs testified that drivers for Employer were not responsible

for manually loading their trailers, but were responsible for making sure the trailers were

loaded correctly. He further testified that he could not tell exactly what type of metal pieces

3

were in Employee’s trailer that day based on pictures, but he knew it was metal identified

as “400 stainless.” He could not estimate the weight of any particular items in the trailer

but stated the weight of 400 stainless in general was “low.” In regard to the cover for the

trailer, Mr. Dabbs testified that if the other electronics for the truck were operational, such

as the light system, then the cover should have been operational as well. Finally, Mr. Dabbs

could not recall any other incidents involving a driver having to secure his load on the side

of the road within the last year.

Expert Medical Testimony

The parties also deposed both cardiologists in preparation for trial. Dr. Arcot

testified he had reviewed Employee’s prior medical records from his primary care

physician, as well the depositions of Deputy Poteet and Mr. Dabbs. It was Dr. Arcot’s

opinion that Employee had several risk factors for cardiovascular disease, including his

age, ethnicity, gender, high blood pressure, Type 2 Diabetes, obesity, and a history of high

cholesterol. He testified that a heart attack was the “presumed cause of death” in the

absence of an autopsy and that Employee had “enough risk factors which created . . . [a]

cholesterol burden in the coronaries, and one of them is going to explode.” He went on to

say, “exertion can exacerbate it, but exertion by itself will not cause a heart attack.” On

cross-examination, Dr. Arcot admitted that, if asked, he would have cleared Employee to

undergo at least certain surgeries from a cardiology standpoint, that Employee’s lipid panel

from December 2022 was “good,” and that, as far as he could tell from the records,

Employee had received no medical treatment for any coronary or cardiac symptoms prior

to his death.

In contrast, Dr. Kanagasundram testified that “[i]n the absence of the emotional and

physical stressors [Employee experienced that day], based on his preexisting risk factors,

[he] would not have expected [Employee] to have a sudden cardiac event that day.” He

explained that Employee had “stable” coronary disease based on the primary care records

indicating that he had no ongoing symptoms. Relying on the lipid panel from December

2022 and Employee’s recent DOT physical, Dr. Kanagasundram testified the diabetes was

well controlled and Employee’s lipid panel had “very favorable numbers.” Dr.

Kanagasundram admitted that “[Employee] could not have plaque rupture by definition

leading to sudden cardiac death” if Employee did not also have coronary artery disease,

although he posited that a person “can still have ventricular arrythmia and certain cardiac

death in the setting of significant emotional and physical stressors” in the absence of

coronary artery disease and a plaque rupture. In assessing the cause of Employee’s death,

he considered the combination of “the fact that he was pulled over by the highway by a

police officer, and then asked to climb into the truck and displace the material[, which was]

a pretty high acute level of exertion probably from what he was used to at baseline.”

However, on cross-examination, Dr. Kanagasundram admitted that he “would need to

know [Employee’s] physical level of activity, his baseline prior to the heart attack to make

that causal connection” and that the only baseline information he had was the primary care

4

records indicating Employee did not have shortness of breath or chest pain with exertion.

He testified he could not assign a specific percentage to the different components causing

the heart attack, which he agreed were the cardiovascular disease, the emotional distress,

and the physical exertion, as well as the heat of the day, although he maintained the primary

cause of the heart attack was the combination of the physical exertion and the mental stress

from the traffic stop. 1

Claimant was the only witness to testify in person at the trial on March 11, 2025.

She testified she saw her husband on the morning of June 22, 2023, before he left for work,

and that she spoke to him two hours later and nothing was out of the ordinary. The coroner

called her the day Employee died, and she related to the coroner her husband’s health

history of high blood pressure and diabetes. She further testified that her husband regularly

filled his prescriptions and took his medications, and none of his medical conditions were

“out of control.” Following the trial, the court issued a compensation order awarding death

benefits to Claimant. The court accepted Dr. Kanagasundram’s opinion regarding

causation over that of Dr. Arcot, determined the traffic stop was a sudden and unusual

stressful event, and concluded the physical exertion required to secure the load, combined

with the mental stressors, primarily caused the heart attack and resulting death. Employer

has appealed.

Standard of Review

The standard we apply in reviewing a trial court’s decision presumes that the court’s

factual findings are correct unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. See

Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(7) (2024). When the trial judge has had the opportunity

to observe a witness’s demeanor and hear in-court testimony, we give considerable

deference to factual findings made by the trial court. Madden v. Holland Grp. of Tenn.,

Inc., 277 S.W.3d 896, 898 (Tenn. 2009). However, “[n]o similar deference need be

afforded the trial court’s findings based upon documentary evidence.” Goodman v.

Schwarz Paper Co., No. W2016-02594-SC-R3-WC, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 8, at *6 (Tenn.

Workers’ Comp. Panel Jan. 18, 2018). Similarly, the interpretation and application of

statutes are questions of law that are reviewed de novo with no presumption of correctness

afforded the trial court’s conclusions. See Mansell v. Bridgestone Firestone N. Am. Tire,

LLC, 417 S.W.3d 393, 399 (Tenn. 2013). We are also mindful of our obligation to construe

1

Both physicians agreed there was no way to know with absolute certainty that Employee had a heart attack

as no autopsy was conducted. Both indicated, however, that it was “most likely” or “probable” that

Employee’s death was caused by was a sudden cardiac event, and there is no proof in the record that weighs

against that probability. “The law does not require absolute certainty on the part of the medical expert and

allows for the existence of some doubt.” Lurz v. International Paper Co., No. 2015-02-0462, 2018 TN

Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 8, at *17-18 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Feb. 14, 2018). Furthermore,

a family can still qualify for benefits due to an employee’s fatal heart attack even if an autopsy is not

conducted. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Shelton Sec. Serv., Inc., 46 S.W.3d 131, 134 (Tenn. 2001). The family

in the instant case chose to have Employee’s body cremated.

5

the workers’ compensation statutes “fairly, impartially, and in accordance with basic

principles of statutory construction” and in a way that does not favor either the employee

or the employer. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-116 (2024).

Analysis

Prior to the passage of the 2013 Workers’ Compensation Reform Act (“Reform

Act”), Tennessee courts generally categorized claims for work-related heart attacks into

two groups: (1) those in which the heart attack is precipitated by physical exertion or strain;

and (2) those in which the heart attack is triggered by mental stress, tension, or some type

of emotional upheaval. Clark v. Nashville Mach. Elevator Co., 129 S.W.3d 42, 47 (Tenn.

2004). Regarding the first category, heart attacks caused by physical exertion or strain at

work, the Tennessee Supreme Court has held that “no extraordinary exertion or unusual

physical strain need be established in order to obtain a recovery.” Bacon v. Sevier Cty.,

808 S.W.2d 46, 50 (Tenn. 1991). In such cases, the employee need only prove the heart

attack was “precipitated by the physical activity or exertion or physical strain of the

employee’s job,” even in cases where the employee suffered from one or more relevant

pre-existing conditions. Id.

Pre-reform case law also established parameters to address a heart attack arising

from mental stress, stating “the heart attack must be immediately precipitated by a specific

acute or sudden stressful event, rather than generalized employment conditions.” Id. at 52.

Although excessive and unexpected stress and worry that can be attributed to the

employment may justify an award of benefits, see Reeser v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 938

S.W.2d 690, 692 (Tenn. 1997), “the ordinary stress of one’s occupation does not because

‘[e]motional stress, to some degree, accompanies the performance of any contract of

employment,’” Cunningham, 46 S.W.3d at 136-37 (quoting Allied Chem. Corp. v. Wells,

578 S.W.2d 369, 373 (Tenn. 1979)). In other words, “[n]ormal ups and downs are part of

any employment relationship and . . . do not justify finding an ‘accidental injury’ for

purposes of worker[s]’ compensation law.” Bacon, 808 S.W.2d at 53. “Accordingly, the

well-settled rule in Tennessee is that physical or mental injuries caused by worry, anxiety,

or emotional stress of a general nature or ordinary stress associated with an employee’s

occupation are not compensable.” Brown v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. E2016-00237-SC-

R3-WC, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 267, at *7 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Apr. 21, 2017).

We previously addressed the impact of the Reform Act on heart attack cases in

Mitchell v. Bunge North America, No. 2016-08-1131, 2019 TN Work. Comp. App. Bd.

LEXIS 15 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Apr. 16, 2019), as follows:

[T]he Reform Act of 2013 changed the definition of a compensable injury

from that applicable when Bacon was decided. As previously noted, under

the Reform Act, an injury must now “arise primarily out of and in the course

and scope of employment.” Thus, while it still makes no difference that the

6

employee, prior to the heart attack, suffered from pre-existing heart disease

or that the heart attack was precipitated by the usual physical strain of the

employee’s job, the proof must now establish the heart attack arose primarily

from the employment considering all causes. The Reform Act is clear that

an injury “shall not include the aggravation of a preexisting disease,

condition or ailment unless it can be shown to a reasonable degree of medical

certainty that the aggravation arose primarily out of and in the course and

scope of employment.”

Id. at *16-17 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).

In addition, we noted that the standards for addressing the impact of mental stressors

in heart attack cases remained the same post-reform, explaining:

[T]he proof must establish that the heart attack resulted from a stressful

incident of abnormal or unusual proportions arising primarily out of the

employment rather than the day-to-day mental stresses and tensions

experienced by an employee as part of his or her job.

As this discussion illustrates, and contrary to Claimant’s position, evidence

of an event precipitating a heart attack is required in both categories of heart

attack claims. The difference lies in the type of event that precipitates the

attack. While heart attacks involving physical stressors require physical

activity or exertion which may be ordinary in nature, heart attacks involving

emotional stressors require abnormal or unusual incidents.

Id. at *18-19 (footnote omitted). 2

In Mitchell, the claimant had offered several different theories addressing the

primary cause of the employee’s fatal heart attack, including physical exertion, mental

stressors, and environmental exposures. Id. at *3. Here, however, Claimant’s expert

testified it was the conglomeration of work-related physical exertion and unusual mental

stressors that primarily caused Employee’s heart attack and death. Thus, the ultimate issue

is whether the preponderance of the evidence supports the trial court’s determination that

Dr. Kanagasundram’s opinion as to the multiple factors supporting his medical causation

opinion offered the more probable explanation.

Employer initially contended in its appeal brief that the trial court should have

accepted the testimony of Dr. Arcot over that of Dr. Kanagasundram. During oral

2

In Mitchell, the claimant relied on pre-reform cases for the proposition that no extraordinary physical

exertion is required to establish medical causation. We agreed that when a heart attack arises primarily

from physical exertion or strain, ordinary physical exertion or strain was sufficient to establish causation.

Mitchell, at *18 n.3.

7

argument, Employer further argued that, regardless of Dr. Arcot’s testimony, the mental

stress of being stopped by a law enforcement officer was not sufficiently unusual or

abnormal in the context of Employee’s work as a professional driver to qualify as a

causative factor under Tennessee law. In other words, Employer submits that, as a truck

driver, Employee should reasonably have expected to encounter law enforcement in the

course and scope of his work and, therefore, that event cannot qualify under Tennessee law

as “unusual” or “abnormal.” Hence, if the mental stress element of the case is nullified

and there is no expert medical opinion indicating that the physical exertion alone was the

primary cause of the heart attack, Claimant’s cause of action must fail.

In support of this argument, Employer points to Reeser v. Yellow Freight Systems,

a pre-reform case in which a truck driver became severely disabled from a stroke he

suffered when he was required to drive in treacherous conditions following an ice storm.

Reeser, 938 S.W.2d at 691. 3 At the trial in Reeser, the employee presented medical proof

that the driving conditions and the stress of driving “could have” caused the stroke, which

was acceptable medical proof at the time to establish medical causation and support an

award of benefits. Id. The employee also presented testimony from several witnesses

regarding the “hazardous,” “horrendous,” and “terrible” driving conditions on the date of

the accident, which they stated were “unusually stressful.” Id. at 692-93. 4 Benefits were

awarded by the trial court, and the Supreme Court concluded there was “ample evidence

in the record to support the trial court’s finding that the employee was performing the

obligations of his employment in an unusual and abnormally stressful set of

circumstances.” Id. at 693.

Here, Employer argues Claimant did not meet her burden of proof as to the mental

stress element because she failed to affirmatively show the traffic stop was abnormal or

unusual for a commercial truck driver. In response, Claimant argued that just because an

event may be foreseeable, that does not mean it cannot also be abnormal or unusual. In

other words, commercial drivers may reasonably expect, at some point in their driving

career, to be stopped by law enforcement. That does not mean, however, that such an event

cannot also cause unusual or abnormal mental stress.

3

Employer filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority following oral arguments, pursuant to Tennessee Rule

of Appellate Procedure 27(d). Claimant filed a Motion to Strike the Notice, properly noting that the

Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure do not apply to the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, but

also contending the relevant rationale discussed in the supplemental case law was not argued at the trial.

We deny Claimant’s Motion to Strike, as all the cases provided by Employer were cited previously in the

Mitchell case, which was discussed extensively by both parties at trial, and we are aware of no authority

supporting the proposition that a litigant waives its right to rely on any particular precedent on appeal unless

it previously cited such cases to the trial court.

4

The employee was left unable to speak by his stroke and was thus unable to testify regarding his

assessment of the driving conditions. Id. at 691.

8

We conclude Employer’s position disregards Deputy Poteet’s direct testimony

concerning Employee’s demeanor during the traffic stop. Unlike in Reeser, where other

employees merely suggested the impact of treacherous driving conditions on an

employee’s mental status, Deputy Poteet offered eyewitness testimony as to Employee’s

nervousness and anxiety at the time of the traffic stop. Moreover, Mr. Dabbs testified

Employee had never been written up and had no indications in his file of poor performance.

Mr. Dabbs also testified that he could think of no other instances of employees being pulled

over to secure their truckload in the recent past, and that it was not a job duty of Employee

to load his truck. Thus, there was no evidence rebutting Deputy Poteet’s assessment of

Employee’s mental status at the time of the stop, and there is unrefuted evidence that the

events preceding Employee’s heart attack were “considerably out of his routine.” See

Myers v. “Classic Express,” No. 03S01-9710-CH-00126, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 582, at *10

(Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Oct. 16, 1998) (awarding death benefits when the employee,

a commercial truck driver, suffered a heart attack the day after having a fuel tank rupture).

Furthermore, Dr. Kanagasundram reviewed the deposition of Deputy Poteet and relied on

it in his determination that the traffic stop would be “quite a stressful event” that

contributed to Employee’s “catastrophic cardiac event” and subsequent death.

In short, the trial court was provided two countervailing expert opinions as to the

primary cause of Employee’s heart attack, and it determined Dr. Kanagasundram’s opinion

offered the more probable explanation. We cannot conclude that finding was in error.

Considering the totality of the circumstances, the proof in the record supports the

trial court’s award of benefits. Determinations by a court as to what constitutes an

abnormal or unusual mental stressor are fact specific. Previously, benefits have been

awarded to a security guard’s estate when a potential shoplifter made threats on his life, as

the court reasoned that, although confrontation with shoplifters was an ordinary stressor

for a security guard, a death threat was not. Cunningham, 46 S.W.3d at 137-38. In another

case, a court awarded a truck driver’s widow benefits when her husband suffered a fatal

heart attack after driving a new route. Russell v. Ryder Integrated Logistics, No. M1998-

00195-WC-R3-CV, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 676, at *6-7 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Dec.

20, 1999). The court determined that the stress of the combination of an unfamiliar route,

mechanical difficulties, heavier traffic, and limited sleep was unusual enough to be

considered the cause of the heart attack. Id. Finally, in another case, the court awarded

benefits when a teacher suffered a heart attack after having to discipline a student several

times, ultimately placing her hand on the student’s shoulder and telling him to “act right.”

Cary v. Local Gov’t Workers’ Comp. Fund, No. W2003-02339-WC-R3-CV, 2004 Tenn.

LEXIS 838, at *10-11 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Sept. 22, 2004.)

Conversely, benefits were denied to a police detective who suffered a heart attack

after spending three days “on call” investigating a rape case, an aggravated assault, and a

report of child abuse, Lane v. City of Cookeville, No. M2006-00871-WC-R3-CV, 2007

Tenn. LEXIS 634, at *3-4 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Aug. 9, 2007); to a salesperson

9

who was told he needed to increase sales, Brown, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 267, at *8; and to a

state employee who suffered a heart attack following a week of preparations for a visit

from the Vice President of the United States, Adams v. State, S/C No. 01-S-01-9101-BC-

00001, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 24, at *8-9 (Tenn. Jan. 6, 1992).

In sum, although it might be foreseeable that a professional truck driver could have

an interaction with law enforcement in the course and scope of his job, nothing in the record

suggests that this particular stop was merely an “ordinary stress” of Employee’s job as a

truck driver. Thus, although reasonable minds may differ as to whether a traffic stop for a

truck driver is abnormal or unusual, we conclude the evidence does not preponderate

against the court’s determination that Employee suffered a fatal heart attack primarily

caused by the emotional stress of the traffic stop combined with the physical exertion

associated with climbing into the trailer to secure the load. 5

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s compensation order and certify

it as final. Costs on appeal are taxed to Employer.

5

Employer filed a Motion for Stay, requesting we postpone our decision in this case until the Supreme

Court renders its opinion in Edwards v. Peoplease, No. 2020-07-0656, 2024 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd.

LEXIS 23 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. July 2, 2024). In Edwards, the Supreme Court has indicated

it will address the appropriate standard of review for expert medical proof presented by deposition, as

opposed to expert proof presented live at trial. However, unlike most other appellate tribunals in this state,

the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board has deadlines for the issuance of its opinions dictated by statute.

See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-217(a) (2024). Thus, we are constrained to issue this opinion by a date certain.

Furthermore, Employer’s primary argument on appeal is based on factual evidence concerning the traffic

stop and not on the proper standard of review for competing expert medical proof. Finally, we conclude

that the result we have reached would be the same irrespective of the appropriate standard of review for

expert medical proof. Therefore, the motion is denied.

10

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

Darlene Taylor as Surviving Spouse ) Docket No. 2023-07-5405

of Darrell Taylor )

) State File No. 860327-2023

v. )

)

Dale’s Recycling, et al. )

)

)

Appeal from the Court of Workers’ ) Heard June 13, 2025,

Compensation Claims ) in Murfreesboro, TN

Allen Phillips, Judge )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Appeals Board’s decision in the referenced case

was sent to the following recipients by the following methods of service on this the 15th day of

July, 2025.

Name Certified First Class Via Via Sent to:

Mail Mail Fax Email

Richard R. Clark, Jr. X rclark@eraclides.com

ewhite@eraclides.com

Jonathan May X jmay@forthepeople.com

jvavak@forthepeople.com

Allen Phillips, Judge X Via Electronic Mail

Kenneth M. Switzer, Chief Judge X Via Electronic Mail

Penny Shrum, Clerk, Court of X penny.patterson-shrum@tn.gov

Workers’ Compensation Claims

Olivia Yearwood

Clerk, Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board

220 French Landing Dr., Ste. 1-B

Nashville, TN 37243

Telephone: 615-253-1606

Electronic Mail: WCAppeals.Clerk@tn.gov