Giannavola v. Lee, M.D.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ANTHONY GIANNAVOLA,

Plaintiff,

v. 24-CV-6096-MAV

DECISION AND ORDER

LI-WEN GRACE LEE, M.D.,

individually, CARMEN BARBER,

individually, “T.T.,” individually, “C.B.,”

individually, and DOES 1-5,

individually,

Defendants.

INTRODUCTION

On February 9, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 for alleged violations of his Second and Fourteenth Amendment rights. ECF

No. 1. His claims arise from allegations that in April 2020, Plaintiff was prevented

from purchasing a new shotgun because the results of his federal background check

indicated that he had been “committed to a mental institution’—a “disqualifying

event” under federal gun law 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(d)(4) and (g)(4). ECF No. 1 at 4 2-7,

37, 81, 92. He was listed as a “prohibited person” in the National Instant Criminal

Background Check System (“NICS”) based on a report from the New York State Office

of Mental Health (“OMH”) identifying that, in June 2014, Plaintiff had been

“involuntarily committed” to the hospital pursuant to New York Mental Hygiene Law

(“MHL”) § 9.39. Id. at 3, 43-55; see 18 U.S.C. § 922(t); 34 U.S.C. § 40901; MHL §

7.09G)().

In October 2020, Plaintiff applied to receive a Certificate of Relief from

Firearms Disabilities (‘Certificate of Relief’) from the New York Office of NICS

Appeals and SAFE Act! (the “SAFE Act Office”)—a division of OMH. ECF No. 1 at 2—

3. A panel from the SAFE Act Office denied Plaintiffs application for a Certificate of

Rehef in February 2021. Id. at 2. When he challenged this denial through an Article

78 proceeding in state court, the panel’s decision was reversed, and he was issued a

Certificate of Relief (“State Art. 78 Decision”). See id. at 9 114-16.

Plaintiff then brought this federal action against named and unnamed

members of the SAFE Act Office panel that denied his 2020 application for a

Certificate of Relief (collectively, the “Panel Defendants”) and two unnamed

employees of OMH (Doe 4 and Doe 5) who allegedly failed to notify Plaintiff that his

2014 hospitalization had been reported to NICS and failed to “investigat[e]” whether

a report should have been made at all. Jd. at 9 11-24. He brings a 42 U.S.C. § 1983

claim against the Panel Defendants for violating his Second Amendment rights, and

a § 1983 claim against Does 4 and 5 for violating his rights to due process under the

Fourteenth Amendment. Jd. at 19. Plaintiff seeks “compensatory, economic, and

punitive damages, costs, and reasonable statutory attorney's fees.” Jd. at 1, 19.

Before the court is a March 2024 motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Li-Wen

Grace Lee, Defendant Carmen Barber, and Defendant Tony Trahan (captioned “T.T.”)

(collectively, the “MTD Defendants”), each of whom is alleged to be a Panel

Defendant. ECF No. 7; ECF No. 1 at □□ 11-15. Plaintiff filed an objection on April 8,

1 New York’s Secure Ammunition and Firearms Enforcement Act of 2013 (the “SAFE Act”).

2024, ECF No. 10, and the MTD Defendants filed a reply on April 28, 2024, ECF No.

11. This case was transferred to the undersigned on February 11, 2025. ECF No. 12.

For the following reasons, the motion to dismiss is granted. Plaintiffs Second

Amendment claim against the Panel Defendants and his Due Process claim against

Does 4 and 5 are dismissed with prejudice.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from Plaintiffs complaint and the September

2023 decision from the State of New York Supreme Court, Albany County, which the

complaint incorporates by reference. The Court accepts the facts alleged in Plaintiffs

complaint as true for the purpose of resolving the instant motion to dismiss. However,

the legal conclusions or opinions couched as factual allegations in Plaintiffs

complaint do not carry the same presumption of truthfulness. See In re NYSE

Specialists Secs. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 2007).

I. Content Considered

As noted, Plaintiffs complaint incorporates by reference the September 20238

decision from the State of New York Supreme Court, Albany County, which found

that the SAFE Act Office’s decision to deny Plaintiffs 2020 application for a

Certificate of Relief from Firearms Disabilities was arbitrary and capricious. ECF No.

1 at J 114-16; see State Art. 78 Decision at 18. The Court is entitled to consider all

materials incorporated by reference in a plaintiffs complaint to resolve a motion to

dismiss. See Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he

complaint is deemed to include any written instrument attached to it as an exhibit or

any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference.” (quotation omitted));

Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1991) (concluding

that “generally, the harm to the plaintiff when a court considers material extraneous

to a complaint is the lack of notice that the material may be considered,” but “[w]here

plaintiff has actual notice of all the information ... and has relied upon these

documents in framing the complaint the necessity of translating a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion into one under Rule 56 is largely dissipated.”).

The Court would thus be free to consider the full text of the State Art. 78

Decision, which, notably, paints a substantially different picture of Plaintiffs June

2014 hospital admission than the facts Plaintiff himself alleged in his complaint.?

The Court will nevertheless rely on Plaintiffs own factual allegations about his June

2014 hospitalization made within the four corners of the complaint because as will be

discussed, even when doing so, Plaintiffs Second Amendment claim must be

dismissed. The Court includes certain facts from the incorporated State Art. 78

Decision to establish the procedural history of the case and as otherwise necessary to

resolve the instant motion to dismiss.

2 For example: the state court decision states, inter alia, that Plaintiff “was diagnosed with an

adjustment disorder and with an alcohol abuse disorder,” that “he told outpatient treatment providers

that he wanted to hurt the people he used to work for,” that the “treatment providers were concerned

and recommend that [Plaintiff] go to Rochester General Hospital (““RGH”) for more extensive mental

health treatment,” that Plaintiff “drove himself to RGH and agreed to an assessment... [during which

he] admitted that he did not want to live and that he wanted to hurt some of his former employers,”

that although Plaintiff “voiced no suicidal or homicidal plan .. . [i]t was suspected that [he] had an

‘active suicidal ideation’ and a ‘passive homicidal ideation,’ and he was held for further observation,”

and that “[o]n June 6, 2014, a physician at RGH signed an Emergency Admission and directed that

[Plaintiff] be involuntarily committed pursuant to (MHL) § 9.39... not[ing] that [Plaintiff] presented

with significantly increased depression and alcohol use and had suicidal ideation.” State Art. 78

Decision at 2.

II. Substance of Allegations Pleaded

According to the four corners of Plaintiffs complaint, the circumstances of his

2014 hospitalization and subsequent relevant events occurred as follows.

In June 2014, Plaintiff voluntarily drove himself to a hospital because he

wanted to talk to someone about having recently lost his job. ECF No. 1 at 81, 83.

There was no police involvement or allegations of violence or criminal activity. Id. at

{ 82. On June 5, 2014, Plaintiff was evaluated and admitted to the hospital for

“observation.” Id. at §{ 88, 86-87. His intake records reflect that the “Chief

Complaint” was “Psychiatric Evaluation.” Id. at § 84. Plaintiffs psychological

assessment determined that he was not homicidal, that he had “expressed

suicidal/self-harm thoughts—-without intent, that he had ‘passive suicidal ideation,”

and had “made a passive comment about wanting to ‘drive his car into a wall.” Id. at

86-87 (emphasis omitted). His “medical records indicated that he was solely at

the hospital” pursuant to MHL § 9.39, and he did not receive a “Notice of Involuntary

Admission” as required by MHL § 9.27 before admission. Jd. at {J 92, 94.

On June 7, Plaintiff reported: “I do feel depressed but when I say I was going

to drive my car into [a] wall, it’s a figure or speech. I wouldn’t ever do it. I wouldn’t

leave my kids .. . I lost my job back in December, my girl does not work, we have

[two] kids. I just feel down. I’ve never felt this low before, but I do not want to die. Id.

at 89 (punctuation cleaned up). At some point, Plaintiff was assessed again and was

found “negative” for “alcohol/substance use, current overuse,” “threats of suicide/self-

harm,” “intentional self-injury/suicide attempt in past year,” “violent threats towards

others,” “thoughts of harm towards others,” “suicide plan,” “plan to do harm towards

others,” “hopelessness,” “erratic behaviors,” and “other imminent risk factors.” Id. at

{ 90. On June 9, 2014, the hospital discharged Plaintiff “to home.” Jd. at § 91.

As a result of his commitment under MHL 8 9.39, the hospital reported him to

the SAFE Act Office, “which placed his personal identifying information in the NYS

reporting database, and at some point, caused a negative report in NICS.” Id. at

92, 96. Does 4 and 5, who were employed by OMH, knew that Plaintiffs

hospitalization had been reported to NICS but failed to provide Plaintiff with any

notice at that time of such reporting and “failed to conduct any investigation into

whether Plaintiff ha[d] actually been involuntarily committed under MHL [§§] 9.27

or 9.37.” Id. at §§ 18, 97-100.

Plaintiff was unaware that his § 9.39 hospitalization caused a report to NICS,

which impacted his rights to purchase or possess firearms or ammunition, until

approximately six years later when Plaintiff attempted to purchase a new shotgun.

Id. at 3, 100. In April 2020, Plaintiff, an avid hunter and firearm owner for most

of his adult life, submitted to a federal background check through NICS as required

to facilitate his intended purchase. Id. at §{ 3, 75, 76. The transaction was denied

because NICS reflected that he had been “involuntarily committed to a mental

hospital.” Id. at 77.

On October 30, 2020, Plaintiff applied to the SAFE Act Office for a Certificate

of Relief. Id. at { 101. The MTD Defendants, Defendant “C.B.,” and Does 1, 2, and/or

3 (collectively, the Panel Defendants) were on the panel that considered Plaintiff's

application. Jd. at § 106. The Panel Defendants denied Plaintiffs application for a

Certificate of Relief. Id. at { 118. Plaintiff appealed the panel’s decision to the State

of New York Supreme Court, Albany County, pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. Article 78

and MHL § 7.09G)(2). Id. at § 114. In September 2023, the state court held that the

panel’s decision was arbitrary and capricious because Plaintiff “adequately

demonstrated that his ‘record and reputation are such that [he] will not be likely to

act in a manner dangerous to public safety’ and that granting him relief from the

firearms disabilities imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4) and (g)(4) will ‘not be

contrary to public safety.” (the “State Art. 78 Decision”). See td.; State Art. 78

Decision at 13. The state court thus granted his petition and ordered that a Certificate

of Relief be issued and NICS be notified accordingly. ECF No. 1 at { 116; State Art.

78 Decision at 13. This federal lawsuit followed.

LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) when it states

a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). A claim for

relief is plausible when the plaintiff pleads sufficient facts that allow the Court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct.

Id. at 678. In considering the plausibility of a claim, the Court must accept factual

allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Faber

v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2011). At the same time, the Court is

not required to accord “[l]jegal conclusions, deductions, or opinions couched as factual

allegations ... a presumption of truthfulness.” In re NYSE Specialists Secs. Litig.,

503 F.3d at 95.

DISCUSSION

I. Statutory and Regulatory Landscape

Under 18 U.S.C. § 922, certain persons, including those who have been

“adjudicated as a mental defective” or have been “committed to any mental

institution,” are prohibited from shipping, transporting, receiving, or possessing

firearms or ammunition. 18 U.S.C. § 922(¢)(4). Section 922 also makes it unlawful for

any person to “sell or otherwise dispose of any firearm or ammunition” to any person

who has been “adjudicated as a mental defective” or has been “committed to any

mental institution.” Id. § 922(d)(4).

Section 922 does not define “committed to a mental institution” itself, and the

question of whether someone has been so “committed” is one of federal law. See

Escamilla v. United States, 62 F.4th 367, 376 (7th Cir. 2023). Courts look to the state

law that governed a person’s admission and then consider whether the state law is

consistent with federal policy. Id.; see Phelps v. Bosco, 711 F. App’x 63, 64 (2d Cir.

2018); United States v. Waters, 23 F.3d 29, 31 (2d Cir. 1994). Here, regulations of the

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (“ATF”) provide helpful

guidance? as well, defining “committed to a mental institution” as:

A formal commitment of a person to a mental institution by a court,

board, commission, or other lawful authority. The term includes a

commitment to a mental institution involuntarily. The term includes

commitment for mental defectiveness or mental illness. It also includes

commitments for other reasons, such as for drug use. The term does not

3 Because 18 U.S.C. § 922 is a criminal statute, the court is not required to defer to the definition

provided by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives CATF”). See United States v.

Apel, 571 U.S. 359, 369 (2014); Escamilla, 62 F.4th at 376. Both parties reference and rely on this

definition in their motion papers.

include a person in a mental institution for observation or a voluntary

admission to a mental institution.

27 C.F.R. § 478.11.

NICS is a federal database that helps to administer § 922 by allowing firearms

dealers and the authorities to search the backgrounds of prospective firearm

purchasers for disqualifying information. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(t); 34 U.S.C. § 40901;

see also Matter of Colihan v. State of New York, N.Y.S. 3d 359 (2022). State agencies,

such as the OMH in New York, are directed to transmit to NICS the names and

nonclinical identifying information of individuals who have been “committed to a

mental institution.” See e.g., MHL § 7.09G)(1). When a firearms dealer runs a federal

background check on a potential customer, NICS will identify “prohibited persons”

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(d)(4), (g)(4) based on information the database received

from the state agencies. That is what allegedly occurred here when Plaintiff

attempted to purchase a shotgun in April 2020 after his hospitalization in 2014

pursuant to MHL § 9.389.

New York’s MHL § 9.39, entitled “Emergency admissions for immediate

observation, care, and treatment,” provides:

(a) The director of any hospital maintaining adequate staff and facilities

for the observation, examination, care, andtreatment ofpersonsalleged

to be mentally ill and approved by the commissioner to receive and

retain patients pursuant to this section may receive and retain therein

as a patient for a period of fifteen days any person alleged to have a

mental illness for which immediate observation, care, and treatment in

a hospital is appropriate and which is likely to result in serious harm to

himself or others. “Likelihood to result in serious harm” as used in this

article shall mean:

1. substantial risk of physical harm to himself as manifested by

threats of or attempts at suicide or serious bodily harm or other

conduct demonstrating that he is dangerous to himself, or

2. a substantial risk of physical harm to other persons as

manifested by homicidal or other violent behavior by which others

are placed in reasonable fear of serious physical harm.

The director shall cause to be entered upon the hospital records the

name of the person or persons, if any, who have brought such person to

the hospital and the details of the circumstances leading to the

hospitalization of such person.

MHL § 9.39(a). Plaintiffs lawsuit arises from this subsection.

Il. Clarification of Plaintiff's Claims

Neither of Plaintiffs two pleaded claims expressly identifies what conduct

Defendants are alleged to have taken or failed to have taken in violation of his

constitutional rights. See ECF No. 1 at □□□ 119—24 (each count consisting of only two

paragraphs, stating merely that (1) Plaintiff repeats and realleges earlier paragraphs

and (2) “[u]nder the theory that [the Panel Defendants, or Does 4 and 5], are liable to

Plaintiff for violating [his Second or Fourteenth Amendment] rights”). From the

allegations elsewhere in the complaint, the Court understands Plaintiff to be taking

issue with four “events”: (1) that his 2014 hospitalization pursuant to MHL § 9.39

was reported to NICS at all; (2) that Does 4 and 5 did not notify him that a report

was made to NICS or provide him with an opportunity to be heard; (8) that Does 4

and 5 did not conduct their own investigation to confirm whether a report to NICS

should have been made; and (4) that the Panel Defendants denied his 2020

application for a Certificate of Relief.

10

The sole reason pleaded as to why the conduct complained of in events 1, 3,

and 4 was illegal is Plaintiffs position that his 2014 hospitalization pursuant to MHL

§ 9.39 was not an “involuntary commitment.” E.g., id. at 6-17. Plaintiff does not allege

that he should not have been admitted to the hospital under MHL § 9.39 in June 2014

because he did not meet its statutory requirements, nor has he sued any hospital

official or the hospital itself.4 Rather, as mentioned, his complaint acknowledges that

he was admitted under MHL § 9.39, but argues, with legal conclusions couched as

factual allegations, that his admission was not an “involuntary commitment” as

pertinent to the firearm restrictions that stem from such a commitment. E.g., id. at

6, 61-65, 71-72, 78, 92, 110-12.

As the MTD Defendants point out, Plaintiff has not pleaded a discernable facial

or as-applied constitutional challenge to MHL § 9.389, MHL § 7.09G)d), 18 U.S.C.

§§ 922(d)(4) or (g)(4), 27 C.F.R. § 478.11, or to any other federal or state statute or

regulation implicated by his case. See ECF Nos. 1, 7-1 at 11, 10: For example, Plaintiff

does not allege that it is unconstitutional for individuals who have been “involuntarily

committed” to a hospital to be prohibited from purchasing or possessing a firearm or

ammunition. See 18 US.C. 88 922(d)(4), (g)(4); 27 C.F.R. § 478.11. Rather, he alleges

that he was misidentified as a person who was “involuntarily committed.” See Phelps,

711 F. App’x at 64-65 (affirming grant of summary judgment to all defendants on the

grounds that plaintiff was properly denied access to a firearm because he had been

“committed to a mental institution” under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(d)(4), (g)(4) when he was

4 The Court is not commenting on whether such claims would be viable but is merely clarifying

Plaintiffs federal complaint.

11

hospitalized pursuant to MHL § 9.89, and concluding that plaintiffs arguments that

MHL § 9.39 admissions are not “involuntary” were not “constitutional challenge[s]”).

Furthermore, even if he had set forth a clear constitutional challenge,

Plaintiffs lack of compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.1(a) would

preclude the Court’s consideration of it. See, eg., Jones v. U-Haul Co. of

Massachusetts & Ohio Inc., 16 F. Supp. 3d 922, 941 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (even where

plaintiff set forth clear arguments in his filings challenging the constitutionally of the

Federal Arbitration Act, including “that the FAA violates the United States and Ohio

Constitutions because it unlawfully impedes a person’s right to a trial by jury,” the

court declined to consider such arguments because plaintiff had not filed the notice

required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.1(a)); Pierson v. Rogow, No. 15-61812-CIV, 2019 WL

1112298, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 28, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019

WL 2253304 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 25, 2019) (‘There is no indication that Plaintiff has filed

such a notice [under Rule 5.1(a)]. Accordingly, this Court should not consider

Plaintiffs constitutional arguments.”); Carbajal v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. EP-

19-CV-00083-DCG, 2020 WL 134138199, at *9 (W.D. Tex. May 5, 2020) (declining to

consider plaintiffs’ argument that “Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 736 and the

expedited foreclosure procedure violated their due process and equal protection rights

because defendants in these proceedings lack the ability to conduct discovery,

examine witnesses, and appeal the results of these proceedings” because plaintiffs

had not filed the notice required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.1(a)).

12

Rule 5.1(a) sets forth requirements for filings that raise a constitutional

challenge to a statute, stating:

A party that files a pleading, written motion, or other paper drawing

into question the constitutionality of a federal or state statute must

promptly:

(1) file a notice of constitutional question stating the question and

identifying the paper that raises it, if:

(A) a federal statute is questioned and the parties do not include

the United States, one of its agencies, or one of its officers or

employees in an official capacity; or

(B) a state statute is questioned and the parties do not include the

state, one of its agencies, or one of its officers or employees in an

official capacity; and

(2) serve the notice and paper on the Attorney General of the United

States if a federal statute 1s questioned—or on the state attorney general

if a state statute is questioned—ceither by certified or registered mail or

by sending it to an electronic address designated by the attorney general

for this purpose.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.1(a) (emphasis added). Plaintiff is incorrect that this rule does not

apply to his complaint as pleaded or to his papers filed in opposition to the instant

motion. Plaintiff has not sued the United States, one of its agencies, or one of its

officers or employees in an official capacity, therefore, a notice of constitutional

question would have been required to the extent Plaintiff intended to challenge the

constitutionality of a federal statute or regulation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.1(a)(1)(A); ECF

No. 1 at 1. Nor has Plaintiff sued New York State, one of its agencies, or one of its

officers or employees in an official capacity, therefore, a notice of constitutional

question would have been required to the extent Plaintiff intended to challenge the

constitutionality of a New York statute or regulation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.1(a)(1)(B); ECF

13

No. 1 at 1 (all defendants sued by Plaintiff are sued in their individual capacities).

Plaintiff did not file a notice of constitutional question, and by extension, has also

failed to comply with the service requirements of Rule 5.1(a)(2).

Contrary to Plaintiffs position, the fact that the New York State Attorney

General’s Office (““N.Y. A.G.’s Office”) represents the MTD Defendants on Plaintiffs

§ 1983 claim does not relieve Plaintiff of his obligations under Rule 5.1(a). The N.Y.

A.G.’s Office is entitled to service of a notice of constitutional question so that it may

intervene on its own behalf to counter arguments that a particular state statute is

unconstitutional. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.1(a), (c).

Because the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not raised any facial or as-

applied challenges to a federal or state statute, the Court declines to wade into

constitutional questions or into whether Plaintiff could have raised any such

constitutional challenges in his Article 78 proceeding before the state court. See, e.g.,

Phelps, 711 F. App’x at 65 (“Phelps did not raise a constitutional challenge to the

state’s conduct on appeal. Such a challenge would present complex issues, whether

under the Second Amendment or the Due Process Clause.”); Tyler v. Hillsdale County

Sheriff's Department, 837 F.3d 678 (6th Cir. 2016) (an en. banc decision considering

an as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(4) in which eight separate opinions were filed);

Cecos Int'l, Inc. v. Jorling, 895 F.2d 66, 71 (2d Cir. 1990) (concluding that while facial

challenges to the constitutionality of a statute are improper in the Article 78 context,

“the question of whether the statute has been applied in an unconstitutional fashion

may be raised directly in an Article 78 proceeding.”); Corbett v. City of New York, No.

14

18 CIV. 7022 (KPF), 2019 WL 2502056, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2019), aff'd, 816 F.

App’x 551 (2d Cir. 2020) (discussing a “hybrid” Article 78 proceeding, and noting

“constitutional issues can be decided in Article 78 proceedings. In particular, an

Article 78 proceeding is an appropriate forum for determining whether a statute is

unconstitutional as applied to the petitioner.” (quotation omitted)); see also Whitfield

v. City of New York, 96 F.4th 504, 523-29 (2d Cir. 2024) (discussing in detail and

clarifying the standard of assessing res judicata implications of Article 78 proceedings

on a subsequent § 1988 action).

Having clarified the four events that Plaintiff alleges violated his

constitutional rights and that Plaintiff has not raised, let alone properly noticed, any

constitutional challenges to a federal or state statute, the Court next turns to the

central argument underlying most of Plaintiffs alleged grievances.

Ill. MHL § 9.39 as an Involuntary Commitment

Plaintiffs fundamental argument as to why events 1, 3, and 4 are alleged to

have violated his constitutional rights is that his MHL § 9.39 hospitalization in June

2014 was not an “involuntary commitment” and, accordingly, that said

hospitalization did not carry with it any firearms disabilities as contemplated by 18

U.S.C. §§ 922(d)(4) and (g)(4). The MTD Defendants argue that they are entitled to

absolute judicial immunity and qualified immunity, and that Plaintiff is estopped

from arguing he was never involuntarily committed because Plaintiff made the same

argument in his Article 78 proceeding that he was not involuntarily committed, which

the state court rejected. ECF No. 7-1 at 138-21.

15

Because Plaintiffs core argument is incorrect as a matter of law, his claims

based on this faulty legal premise cannot survive a motion to dismiss. Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). Taking the facts alleged by Plaintiff in his complaint as true, he was

admitted to a hospital under MHL 8 9.39, and this commitment was the reason why

he was placed in the NICS database, resulting in his inability to possess or purchase

firearms. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(d)(4), (g)(4).

It is well-established in the Second Circuit and New York state courts that a

hospitalization pursuant to MHL § 9.89 is an “involuntary commitment” by an “other

lawful authority” and, thus, properly triggers the firearms restrictions set forth in 18

U.S.C. §§ 922(d)(4) and (g)(4). See Matter of Colihan, 211 A.D.3d at 1486 (“Courts

have consistently understood [MHL] § 9.89 to be one of the several sections of that

law that authorize involuntary civil commitment.”); Matter of Gardner v. Bassett Med.

Cir., 148 A.D.3d 1331, 13834 (8d Dep’t 2017); Matter of George L., 85 N.Y.2d 295, 305

n.5 (1995); Phelps, 711 F. App’x at 64 (Like Section 9.27, Section 9.39 creates □ □

procedure to admit an individual into a hospital against her will when her mental

illness presents a serious danger to herself or others.”); Oliver v. Robert L. Yeager

Mental Health Ctr., 398 F.3d 183, 188 (2d Cir. 2005); Rodriguez v. City of New York,

72 F.3d 1051, 1061-63 (2d Cir. 1995); Goetz v. Crosson, 967 F.2d 29, 32 (2d Cir. 1992);

Project Release v. Prevost, 722. F.2d 960, 970-71 (2d Cir. 1983); Montgomery v. Cuomo,

291 F. Supp. 3d 308, 311-12 (W.D.N.Y. 2018); see also Escamilla, 62 F.4th at 374

(“The Second Circuit and New York courts have uniformly characterized admission

under § 9.39 as involuntary.”).

16

Plaintiff raised several arguments in response to the instant motion to dismiss

asserting why MHL § 9.39 should not be deemed an “involuntary commitment’—all

of which have been heard and rejected by other courts dealing with similar claims.

Compare, e.g., ECF No. 1 at { 81-91 (describing how Plaintiff “voluntarily drove

himself to the hospital” without police involvement), with Matter of Colihan, 211

A.D.3d at 1437 “Although petitioner may have been cooperative with the admission

process, such cooperation does not render an admission ‘voluntary.”), and Escamilla,

62 F.4th at 374 (rejecting plaintiffs argument that “when a patient willingly receives

care and treatment, an admission under § 9.39 can be considered voluntary in that

particular circumstance,” and “join[ing] the Second Circuit and New York courts in

concluding that commitment under § 9.39 is involuntary regardless of the committed

person’s subjective intent.”).

The reasoning in the plethora of cases on this topic apples to Plaintiff's core

argument here. The New York legislature, through MHL 8 9.39, delegated to hospital

directors the lawful authority to commit patients alleged to have a mental illness who

are likely to cause serious harm to themselves or others on an emergency basis.

Regardless of how an individual arrives at the hospital or his subjective intent, it is

the hospital’s decision whether to commit the person under MHL § 9.39, and if it does

so, the commitment is decidedly involuntary. Plaintiffs emergency commitment

under MHL § 9.39 was “for his own safety because it prevented him from suddenly

changing his mind, walking out, and harming himself or someone else.” Escamilla,

62 F.4th at 374. In contrast, had Plaintiff been admitted under MHL § 9.13, which

17

governs “Voluntary Admissions,” if he had decided to leave the hospital, the hospital

director must have “promptly release[d]” him. MHL 8 9.18(b); see also MHL § 9.138(a)

(unlike § 9.39, voluntary admission only requires an individual to “make [a] written

application”—there is no heightened finding that a physician must make before the

patient is committed to the hospital).

Furthermore, MHL § 9.39 expressly provides for an “emergency” involuntary

commitment for a short period of time—a maximum of 15 days—to address the

“immediate” need for observation, care, and treatment in a hospital of a person

alleged to have a mental illness “which is likely to result in serious harm to himself

or others.” MHL § 9.39(a)-(b). “Within fifteen days of arrival at the hospital, if a

determination is made that the person is not in need of involuntary care and

treatment, he shall be discharged unless he agrees to remain as a voluntary or

informal patient.” MHL § 9.39(b). If after those initial 15 days, a patient is “in need

of involuntary care and treatment and does not agree to remain as a voluntary or

informal patient,” he can be further retained only “by admission to such hospital or

another appropriate hospital pursuant to the provisions governing involuntary

admission on application supported by medical certification and subject to the

provisions for notice, hearing, review, and judicial approval of retention or transfer

and retention governing such admissions.” Id. (emphasis added).

- The provisions of § 9.39 plainly contemplate that a determination of whether

“immediate observation, care, and treatment” is needed is not synonymous with the

patient’s subjective intent or willingness to remain at the hospital. It is also plain

18

that the New York legislature provided patients with additional due process

protections if an involuntary commitment needed to extend beyond 15 days. MHL

§ 9.39(b). That the legislature did so does not mean that the initial “emergency”

admission under MHL § 9.39, applicable for a maximum of 15 days, is not also an

involuntary commitment—to address the immediate need for observation, care, and

treatment in a hospital of a person alleged to have a mental illness which is likely to

result in serious harm to himself or others.

Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against the Panel Defendants for

violating his Second Amendment rights by denying his 2020 application for a

Certificate of Relief on the grounds that he was never involuntarily committed (event

Similarly, a claim that Plaintiffs 2014 hospitalization never should have been

reported to NICS in the first instance (event 1) fails as well. See Phelps, 711 F. App’x

at 64-65 (affirming grant of summary judgment to all defendants on the grounds that

6 The Court notes that even though the state court held that the SAFE Act Office panel erred in

denying Plaintiff relief from firearms disabilities, the deficiencies in the Panel Defendants’ initial

reasoning had nothing to do with Plaintiff being improperly classified as “involuntarily committed”

-and therefore that he should have never had firearms disabilities imposed on him from the outset. See

id. at 9-10. In fact, the state court concluded multiple times that Plaintiffs admission to the hospital

in June 2014 pursuant to MHL § 9.39 was an “involuntary commitment.” Id. at J 4 (Prior to his

involuntary commitment, he had been a lawful owner of firearms for decades.”); 7 (“Commitment

pursuant to [MHL] § 9.39 has been recognized as ‘a formal commitment by other lawful authority’ and

therefore serves as a valid basis for denying an individual the right to possess, receive, or purchase a

firearm.”); 9 (“[I]n June of 2014, a physician and a psychiatrist determined that there was reasonable

cause to believe [Plaintiff] was a danger to himself (though not others) and involuntarily committed

him. Two days later, mental health professionals determined that [Plaintiff] no longer posed such a

risk and released him.”). The state court instead concluded that the evidence before the Panel

Defendants, six years after Plaintiffs admission to the hospital, demonstrated that he would “not be

likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety” and that granting relief from the firearms

disabilities imposed under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(d)(4) and (g)(4) “would not be contrary to public safety.”

Id. at 13; see MHL § 7.09G)(2).

19

plaintiff was properly denied access to a firearm because he had been “committed to

a mental institution” under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(d)(4), (g)(4) when he was hospitalized

pursuant to MHL § 9.39, and concluding that plaintiffs arguments that MHL § 9.39

admissions are not “involuntary” were not “constitutional challenge[s]”). Moreover,

Plaintiff did not allege any facts from which the Court could plausibly infer that any

of the Panel Defendants, or Does 4 and 5, were responsible for the initial OMH report

of Plaintiffs emergency hospitalization to NICS, and, in any case, it is clear from the

face of the complaint that Plaintiffs apparent challenges to event 1 are untimely. See,

e.g., ECF No. 1 at 11, 18, 14, 15(1), 15(2)° (alleging that the Panel Defendants were

Safe Act Office panel members “who considered, and denied, Plaintiff's request to be

removed from the NYS reporting database”), 96 (“The hospital reported Plaintiff to

the SAFE Act Office, which placed his personal identifying information in the NYS

reporting database and, at some point, caused a negative report to NICS.”); 97 (“Doe

Doe 5 learned at or near the time of the event that Plaintiff was reported to the

NYS database.”); see also supra Section IV (discussing the timeliness of Plaintiffs

federal action).

Further, a claim against Does 4 and 5 based on the allegation that they did not

investigate to confirm that Plaintiff had been involuntarily committed (event 3) also

fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. Even assuming Does 4 and 5

had an obligation to “investigat[e],” such an investigation would have confirmed that

6 Plaintiffs complaint contains two paragraphs numbered “15” that contain different factual

allegations.

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Plaintiff had been “involuntarily committed” because he had been committed

pursuant to MHL § 9.39.

The Court now turns to Plaintiffs last remaining pleaded grievance.

IV. Due Process

Plaintiff lastly seeks to hold Does 4 and 5, both employees of OMH, liable under

§ 1983 for their alleged failures to notify Plaintiff that he had been reported to NICS

(event 2), thus depriving Plaintiff of his rights to due process. ECF No. 1 at {4 98,

100, 121—22. This claim fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

Plaintiffs opposition to the instant motion to dismiss does not address the

viability of his due process claim. See ECF No. 10. The MTD Defendants argued that

this claim against the unnamed OMH employees is untimely. See Fleischman. v.

Wyoming Cnty., No. 1:21-CV-00318, 2021 WL 5916009, at *1 (W.D.N-Y. Dec. 15, 2021)

(addressing defendant's standing to move to dismiss claims against unnamed

defendants); Ruiz-Rivera v. United States, 212 F. Supp. 3d 298, 295 (D.P.R. 2015)

(same); Seagroves v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 2012 WL 2573468, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. July 8,

2012) (same). The Court agrees.

“A statute of limitations affirmative defense normally cannot be decided on a

motion to dismiss.” Markel Am. Ins. Co. v. Mr. Demolition, Inc., T17 F. Supp. 3d 238,

244 (E.D.NLY. 2024) (quotation omitted). “However, ‘[w]here the dates in a complaint

show that an action is barred by a statute of limitations, a defendant may raise the

affirmative defense in a pre-answer motion to dismiss.” Jd. (alteration in original)

(quoting Ghartey v. St. John’s Queens Hosp., 869 F.2d 160, 162 (2d Cir. 1989)); see

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also McKenna v. Wright, 386 F.3d 432, 436 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[a]n affirmative defense

may be raised by a pre-answer motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), without resort

to summary judgment procedure, if the defense appears on the face of the

complaint.”). “Such a motion is properly treated as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted... .” Ghartey, 869 F.2d

at 162; accord Ruane v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 923 F. Supp. 2d 454, 458 (H.D.N-Y. 2013).

Because there is no federal statute of limitations governing actions brought

pursuant to § 1983, courts apply the forum state’s general personal injury statute of

limitations. Lounsbury v. Jeffries, 25 F.3d 1381, 183 (2d Cir. 1994). “In an action

arising in New York pursuant to Section 1983, the applicable statute of limitations is

‘borrowed from New York’s general statute of limitations for personal injury actions,’

which is three years.” Ruane, 923 F. Supp. 2d at 458; see Ormiston v. Nelson, 117 F.3d

69, 71 (2d Cir. 1997) (“New York’s three-year statute of limitations for unspecified

personal injury actions, New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 214(5), governs

section 1983 actions in New York.”). “The three-year limitations period applies

regardless of whether Plaintiff seeks legal, equitable, or declaratory relief.” Levine v.

McCabe, 357 F. Supp. 2d 608, 614 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). As for accrual, “[flederal law

determines when a section 1983 cause of action accrues.” Pearl v. City of Long Beach,

296 F.3d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 2002). The Second Circuit has ruled that accrual occurs “when

the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.”

Singleton v. City of N.Y., 682 F.2d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 1980).

22

Here, Plaintiffs complaint alleges that he was unaware that his June 2014

hospitalization had caused firearms disabilities until a federal background check

prevented him from purchasing a new shotgun in April 2020. ECF No. 1 at {{ 8, 100.

Accepting those allegations as true, Plaintiff knew or had reason to know, no later

than April 2020, that he did not have prior notice or an opportunity to be heard

regarding his inclusion in the NICS database. Plaintiffs federal action was filed on

February 9, 2024, almost four years later. Id. at 20. Accordingly, because the statute

of limitations has expired, Plaintiffs due process claim must be dismissed with

prejudice. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed, Plaintiffs Second and Fourteenth Amendment

claims cannot survive the instant motion to dismiss. His due process claim is

untimely as apparent from the face of his complaint, and his remaining grievances

are based on the faulty legal premise that his hospitalization pursuant to MHL § 9.39

was not an “involuntary commitment.” Moreover, Plaintiffs federal action does not

raise any discernable facial or as-applied constitutional challenges to federal or state

law and, even if it did, Plaintiff did not comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

5.1(a). Plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed in its entirety and with prejudice.

ORDER

For the foregoing reasons,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to dismiss, ECF No. 7, is

GRANTED; and it is further

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ORDERED that Plaintiffs Second and Fourteenth Amendment claims are

DISMISSED with prejudice; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall close this case.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: July_.“_, 2025 □□□

Rochester, New York fo A if A eae feet ny Pes

HON. MEREDITH A. VACCA

United States District Judge

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