Hamdan v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

LUCIANA HAMDAN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:24-cv-1918-AAS

FRANK BISIGNANO,

Commissioner of the Social

Security Administration,1

Defendant.

__________________________________/

ORDER

Luciana Hamdan requests judicial review of a decision by the

Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner) issuing a partially favorable

decision on her claim for disability insurance benefits (DIB) and supplemental

security income (SSI) under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 405(g).

After reviewing the record, including the transcript of the proceedings before

the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), the administrative record, the pleadings,

and the memoranda the parties submitted, the Commissioner’s decision is

AFFIRMED.

1 Frank Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security on February 16, 2025.

Under Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Mr. Bisignano should be

substituted as the defendant in this suit. No further action needs to be taken to

continue this suit through the last sentence of section 205(g) of the Social Security

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Ms. Hamdan applied for SSI on DIB on March 12, 2021, with an alleged

disability onset date of October 1, 2012. (Tr. 17, 264–78). Disability examiners

denied Ms. Hamdan’s application initially and on reconsideration. (Tr. 141–44,

154–91). Ms. Hamdan requested and received a hearing before an ALJ, which

was held on March 31, 2023. (Tr. 78–98). A supplemental hearing was held on

August 11, 2023. (Tr. 41–78). The ALJ issued a partially favorable decision on

November 27, 2023, finding Ms. Hamdan not disabled before March 12, 2021,

but she became disabled on that date. (Tr. 17–31). Ms. Hamdan requested the

Appeals Council’s review of the ALJ’s partially favorable hearing decision. (Tr.

4, 263). The Appeals Council denied Ms. Hamdan’s request for review on July

18, 2024, making the ALJ’s decision final. (Tr. 1–3). Ms. Hamdan now requests

review of the ALJ’s final decision. (Doc. 1).

II. SUMMARY OF THE ALJ’S DECISION

The ALJ must follow five steps when evaluating a disability claim.2 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). First, if a claimant is engaged in substantial

gainful activity,3 she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b).

2 If the ALJ determines the claimant is disabled at any step of the sequential analysis,

the analysis ends. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).

3 Substantial gainful activity is paid work that requires significant physical or mental

activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1572, 416.972.

Second, if a claimant has no impairment or combination of impairments that

significantly limit her physical or mental ability to perform basic work

activities, she has no severe impairment and is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520(c), 416.920(c); see McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1031 (11th Cir.

1986) (stating that step two acts as a filter and “allows only claims based on

the most trivial impairments to be rejected”). Third, if a claimant’s

impairments fail to meet or equal an impairment in the Listings, she is not

disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). Fourth, if a claimant’s

impairments do not prevent her from doing past relevant work, she is not

disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). At this fourth step, the ALJ

determines the claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC). Id. Fifth, if a

claimant’s impairments (considering her RFC, age, education, and past work)

do not prevent her from performing work that exists in the national economy,

she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g).

The ALJ found Ms. Hamdan had not engaged in substantial gainful

activity since October 1, 2012, the alleged disability onset date. (Tr. 20). Before

March 12, 2021, the date Ms. Hamdan became disabled, she had these

medically determinable impairments: epilepsy, thyroid disorder,

gastroparesis, and depressive disorder. (Id.). However, Ms. Hamdan did not

have an impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limited

(or was expected to significantly limit) her ability to perform basic work-related

activities for 12 consecutive months (Id.). Therefore, the ALJ determined Ms.

Hamdan did not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments

before March 12, 2021. (Id.)

The ALJ determined that beginning on March 12, 2021, Ms. Hamdan

had these severe impairments: epilepsy, Grave’s disease, hypertension,

gastroparesis, vision impairment, obesity, depressive disorder, and anxiety

disorder. (Tr. 24). However, Ms. Hamdan does not have an impairment or

combination of impairments contained in the Listings. (Tr. 25). The ALJ

determined that since March 12, 2021, Ms. Hamdan had the RFC to perform

sedentary work,4 except

[Ms. Hamdan] is able to frequently climb ramps or stairs, stoop,

crouch, and crawl but only occasionally kneel and never climb

ladders, ropes or scaffolds. She must avoid visual tasks requiring

good use of depth perception. She must must avoid exposure to

heat, concentrated wetness, concentrated humidity, concentrated

respiratory irritants and hazards. She is able to understand,

remember and carry out/exercise judgment for simple tasks. She

is able to work in an environment with few day-to-day changes in

terms of work duties, work setting and work processes. She must

avoid interaction with the general public. She must be allowed to

elevate her lower extremities to waist level when seated.

(Tr. 27).

4 “Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally

lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools. Although a

sedentary job is defined as one which involves sitting, a certain amount of walking

and standing is often necessary in carrying out job duties. Jobs are sedentary if

walking and standing are required occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met.”

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a), 416.967(a).

The ALJ considered Ms. Hamdan’s RFC and the testimony of a

vocational expert and concluded that since March 12, 2021, she could not

perform her past relevant work. (Tr. 30). At step five, the ALJ concluded that

since March 12, 2021, no jobs existed in significant numbers in the national

economy that Ms. Hamdan could perform. (Tr. 30–31). Thus, Ms. Hamdan was

not disabled before March 12, 2021, but became disabled on that date and

continued to be disabled through November 27, 2023, the decision date. (Tr.

31).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

Review of the ALJ’s decision is limited to reviewing whether the ALJ

applied correct legal standards and whether substantial evidence supports his

findings. McRoberts v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 1988);

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971). Substantial evidence is more

than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance. Dale v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d

1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). In other words, there must be

sufficient evidence for a reasonable person to accept as enough to support the

conclusion. Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995) (citations

omitted). The Supreme Court explained, “whatever the meaning of

‘substantial’ in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is

not high.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019).

A reviewing court must affirm a decision supported by substantial

evidence “even if the proof preponderates against it.” Phillips v. Barnhart, 357

F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). The court must not

make new factual determinations, reweigh evidence, or substitute its judgment

for the Commissioner’s decision. Id. at 1240 (citation omitted). Instead, the

court must view the whole record, considering evidence favorable and

unfavorable to the Commissioner’s decision. Foote, 67 F.3d at 1560; see also

Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted)

(stating that the reviewing court must scrutinize the entire record to determine

the reasonableness of the Commissioner’s factual determinations).

B. Issues on Appeal

Ms. Hamdan raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether substantial

evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Ms. Hamdan’s depressive disorder

would not significantly limit her ability to work before March 12, 2021; and (2)

whether the ALJ’s findings contain errors of law. (Doc. 15, pp. 3–19).

1. Whether the ALJ erred in finding Ms. Hamdan’s

depressive disorder would not limit her ability to work

before March 12, 2021.

Ms. Hamdan argues the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial

evidence because the ALJ failed to thoroughly consider the medical evidence

regarding her depressive disorder and erred in stating Ms. Hamdan lacked

ongoing treatment during the 12 months before her date last insured. (Doc. 15,

pp. 11–15). In response, the Commissioner argues substantial evidence

supports the ALJ’s finding that Ms. Hamdan did not have a severe impairment

or combination of impairments before March 12, 2021, and the ALJ’s

misstatement regarding Ms. Hamdan’s treatment records did not affect his

analysis of evidence or conclusion. (Doc. 21, pp. 9–15).

At step two of the five-step evaluation process, an ALJ must determine

the severity of any claimed impairment. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c).

A combination of impairments that meets the medical severity requirement

also satisfies this step. Id. Therefore, this step “acts as a filter” to deny claims

without severe impairment. See Risch v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 24-12489,

2025 WL 1386673, at *3 (11th Cir. May 14, 2025) (citing Jamison v. Bowen,

814 F.2d 585, 588 (11th Cir. 1987)).

An impairment that does not “significantly” impact a person’s “physical

or mental ability to complete basic work activities” cannot be labeled severe.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1522(a), 416.922(a). A diagnosis alone cannot be considered

severe without the applicant’s proof that the diagnosed impairment affects a

person’s ability to work. See Wind v. Barnhart, 133 F. App’x 684, 690 (11th Cir.

2005) (citing McCruter v. Bowen, 791 F.2d 1544, 1547) (11th Cir. 1986)).

Therefore, an applicant diagnosed with major depressive disorder and

generalized anxiety disorder is not automatically presumed to have mental

impairments in work environments. See Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 501 F.

App’x 875, 879 (11th Cir. 2012).

Here, the ALJ adequately considered Ms. Hamdan’s non-severe mental

impairments. (Tr. 23–24). For example, the ALJ considered the medical

opinions of state agency doctors, Barry Morris, Ph.D., and Richard Willens,

Psy.D., and found them non-persuasive. (Tr. 23). On initial review, Dr. Morris

found Ms. Hamdan’s depressive related disorders to be non-severe. (Id.).

Although Dr. Morris found Ms. Hamdan’s anxiety-related disorders to be

severe, there was a lack of sufficient evidence to evaluate work-related

limitations. (Id.). Dr. Willens, on reconsideration, affirmed Dr. Morris’

findings. (Id.).

The ALJ properly determined the severity of Ms. Hamdan’s mental

impairments by considering the relevant “paragraph b” four areas of mental

functioning found in section 12.00C of the Listing of Impairments. 20 C.F.R.,

Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 24). These four functioning areas include

(1) understanding, remembering, or applying information; (2) interacting with

others; (3) concentrating, persisting or maintaining pace; and (4) adapting or

managing oneself. (Id.).

The ALJ found Ms. Hamdan had no limitation for the first functioning

area because Ms. Hamdan did not report “any problems with her memory

before her date last insured . . .” (Id.). The ALJ found Ms. Hamdan had a mild

limitation for the second functioning area because of her general appropriate

interactions with her medical providers despite occasions instances of

depression. (Id.). The ALJ found Ms. Hamdan had no limitation for the third

functioning area because evidence and interactions with medical providers

showed an ability to maintain attention over periods. (Id.). Lastly, the ALJ

found Ms. Hamdan had no limitation for the fourth functioning area because

“she presented to examinations with appropriate dress/grooming and . . . there

was no evidence she had problems responding to demands or adapting to

changes.” (Id.).

ALJs must include “some level of clarity” for the basis of their conclusion.

See Winschel v. Comm’r. of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2011). This

clarity includes ALJs explaining the weight given to medical opinions. See

Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731, 735 (11th Cir. 1981). Although clarity is

required, an ALJ is not required to include specificities like “pinpoint

citations.” See Deskins v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:15-cv-283-FtM-CM, 2016

WL 4409340, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 19, 2016). Throughout the ALJ’s opinion,

he consistently cited Exhibits 2F and 5F along with Exhibits 1A and 8A, which

extensively cover Ms. Hamdan’s ongoing medical appointments from 2012

through 2017. (Tr. 23–24). Therefore, the ALJ’s decision offers a sufficient level

of clarity for his disability determination during the relevant period.

The Commissioner concedes the ALJ incorrectly stated Ms. Hamdan had

not received ongoing treatment lasting at least 12 months before her date last

insured. (Tr. 23–24). Indeed, Ms. Hamdan received ongoing psychiatric

treatment every two to three months from a board-certified physician, T.D.

Rao, during the relevant period. (Id.). Factual errors made by ALJs are

considered “harmless” if the error “clear[ly]” did not impact the ALJ’s final

decision. See Jacobus v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 664 F. App’x 774, 776 (11th Cir.

2016) (citing Diorio v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 726, 728 (11th Cir. 1983). The ALJ’s

factual error about Ms. Hamdan’s treatment did not impact the ALJ’s final

decision. Despite stating that no medical treatment occurred during that 12-

month period, the ALJ consistently cited Dr. Rao’s records from the period at

issue in forming his decision that Ms. Hamdan suffered from non-severe

mental impairments. (Tr. 23–24). Therefore, the ALJ’s misstatement clearly

did not impact his final decision.

The ALJ thoroughly considered Ms. Hamdan’s treatment records from

2012 through 2017. In addition, the ALJ’s mistake of fact did not impact his

conclusion. Thus, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision regarding

Ms. Hamdan’s mental impairments

2. Whether the ALJ’s findings contain errors of law.

Ms. Hamdan argues the ALJ’s findings contained errors of law because

the ALJ did not mention Ms. Hamdan’s GAF scores during the relevant time.

(Doc. 15, pp. 16–18). In response, the Commissioner argues the ALJ did not err

by failing to discuss GAF scores because GAF scores are not medical opinions.

(Doc. 21, pp. 15–17).

The Social Security Administration updated its instructions to ALJs for

claims filed after March 27, 2017, to consider GAF scores as “other medical

evidence.” See Coats v. Kijakazi, No. 8:21-cv-01762-AEP, 2023 WL 2706857, at

*12 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2023). ALJs, therefore, do not need to evaluate other

medical evidence to analyze the persuasiveness factors. Id.; see also 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1513(a)(3), 416.913(a)(3). (defining other medical evidence as “evidence

from a medical source that is not objective medical evidence or opinion,

including judgments about the nature and severity of your impairment”).

Ms. Hamdan filed her application for disability benefits after March 27,

2017. (Doc. 21, p. 16). Accordingly, the updated Social Security

Administration’s instructions on GAF scores apply. See Simon v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., 7 F.4th 1094, 1104 n.4 (11th Cir. 2021) (noting that applications filed

after March 27, 2017, should be considered under the new regulations). Thus,

no error of law exists on this issue because the ALJ did not need to evaluate

Ms. Hamdan’s GAF scores due to their status as other medical evidence.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED, and

the Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of the Commissioner and close

the file.

ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on July 11, 2025.

Aranda. Arne hh Sarang_

AMANDA ARNOLD SANSONE

United States Magistrate Judge

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