The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MICHAEL ALDRIDGE CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 24-2764
EXXONMOBIL ET AL. SECTION: “J”(1)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are a Motion to Dismiss Third and Ninth Causes of Action
(Rec. Doc. 22), filed by Defendant Glenn Richard, and an opposition filed by Plaintiff
Michael Aldridge (Rec. Doc. 23). Having considered the motions and legal
memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, the Court finds that the motion
should be GRANTED.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This litigation arises out of ExxonMobil’s termination of Plaintiff’s
employment. Although specific details are left unstated in the Complaint, Plaintiff
worked for ExxonMobil, which also employed Defendant Glenn Richard in a
supervisory capacity. (Rec. Doc. 1 at 6 ¶ 17 (“Defendant Glenn Richard was and is an
employee, manager, officer, and/or director of Defendant Exxon Mobil.”)). Plaintiff
alleges he was wrongfully terminated after facing unequal treatment and being
denied promotion by Defendants. Plaintiff, an African American, states his
discriminatory treatment was based on his race. Further, Plaintiff contends, Richard
along with others prevented him from securing subsequent employment in the
chemical industry by “making false private and public accusations that Plaintiff
Aldridge was incompetent, habitually created unsafe work conditions, and was not a
good employee.” Id. at 6 ¶ 19. After obtaining a right-to-sue letter, Plaintiff filed this
action, raising thirteen causes of action.1
Richard now moves for dismissal of two claims against him: Claim 3 breach of
duty of good faith and fair dealing, and Claim 9 civil conspiracy. Plaintiff opposes.
LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead sufficient
facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim
is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts that allow the court to “draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The
factual allegations in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “[D]etailed factual allegations” are
not required, but the pleading must present “more than an unadorned, the-
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The court must
1 Plaintiff mistakenly labels two claims his “Sixth Claim for Relief”, but raises thirteen claims:
(1) Employment discrimination against ExxonMobil,
(2) Breach of contract against ExxonMobil,
(3) Breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing against ExxonMobil and Richard,
(4) Libel and slander against all Defendants,
(5) Inducing breach of contract against Richard and unnamed individuals,
(6) Interference with business relations against all Defendants,
(7) Intentional interference with contract against Richard and unnamed individuals,
(8) Unfair business practices against all Defendants,
(9) Civil conspiracy against all Defendants,
(10) Negligence against all Defendants,
(11) Tortious conduct against all Defendants,
(12) Punitive damages against all Defendants, and
(13) Expenses of litigation and attorneys’ fees against all Defendants.
accept all well-pleaded facts as true and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor
of the plaintiff. Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009).
However, “conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual
conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.” Beavers v. Metro. Life Ins.
Co., 566 F.3d 436, 439 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
Defendant Glenn Richard seeks to dismissal two of the eleven causes of action
made against him in Plaintiff’s thirteen-claim Complaint. Plaintiff’s speculative
opposition provides no ground for either. Both the breach of duty of good faith and
fair dealing and the civil conspiracy claims against Richard must be dismissed.
First, Plaintiff cannot raise a claim of Richard’s breach of duty of good faith
and fair dealing in Plaintiff’s employment contract because Richard’s was not
Plaintiff’s employer. Under Louisiana law, a breach of good faith and fair dealing is
based on an underlying breach of contract. As the Fifth Circuit expressed plainly,
“Breach of contract is a condition precedent to recovery for the breach of the duty of
good faith[.]” Bayle v. Allstate Ins. Co., 615 F.3d 350, 363 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing
Clausen v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland, 660 So. 2d 83, 85–86 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1995)). Plaintiff does not contend that Richard was his employer nor does he raise
an action for breach of contract against Richard. (Rec. Doc. 1 at 12–14 ¶¶ 57–76). “In
the absence of a contractual obligation, the duty of good faith does not exist.” Smith
v. Citadel Ins. Co., 2019-00052 (La. 10/22/19), 285 So. 3d 1062, 1069 (citing La. Civ.
Code arts. 1759, 1983). Plaintiff’s newfound and factually unsupported argument that
Richard acted “ultra vires” to cause a breach of good faith dealing is conclusory and,
more significantly, wholly inapposite. Plaintiff fails to state a claim for the breach of
duty of good faith and fair dealing as to Richard.
Second, and similarly, Plaintiff’s claim of the civil conspiracy against Richard
also fails. Plaintiff admits, as a general rule, an employer cannot conspire with its
employees: “In Louisiana, employees generally cannot conspire with their employers
due to the legal concept of the ‘intracorporate conspiracy doctrine’.” (Rec. Doc. 23 at
4). In his opposition, Plaintiff places his conspiracy claim under the umbrella of 42
U.S.C. § 1981, which prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement
of contracts. An allegation of conspiracy to violate a constitutional right, however,
must be made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985. References to both § 1981 and § 1985,
moreover, are absent in Plaintiff’s Complaint. Instead, Plaintiff alleges in his
pleading a collection of state-law claims that Richard and ExxonMobil conspired to
violate. Whether these claims are brought pursuant to state or federal law is not a
mere academic exercise. See Currier v. Entergy Servs., Inc., No. 11-2208, 2014 WL
4450360, at *3–4 (E.D. La. Sept. 10, 2014) (Feldman, J.) (collecting cases to show the
unsettled state of Louisiana law intracorporate conspiracy doctrine); but see Khoobehi
Props., LLC v. Baronne Dev. No. 2, L.L.C., 16-506 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/29/17), 216 So.
3d 287, 299, writ denied, 2017-0893 (La. 9/29/17), 227 So. 3d 288 (holding that, under
La. Civ. Code art. 2324, a civil conspiracy cannot exist between a business entity and
its employee alone). Nonetheless, the Court accepts Plaintiff’s clarifying concession
that a civil conspiracy between Richard and ExxonMobil cannot exist without an
exception to the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine.
Plaintiff fails to state such an exception. Citing a Fourth Circuit case, Plaintiff
contends Richard’s actions could be construed as performed for his personal gain:
If an employee acts outside the scope of their employment, particularly
if they act for personal gain rather than in furtherance of the company’s
objectives, they might not be protected by this doctrine and could
potentially be found liable for conspiracy with their employer. Plaintiff
posits that Richards [sic] acted ultra vires in part or whole in this matter
by calling him racist names and causing him to be fired.
(Rec. Doc. 23 at 5 (emphasis omitted) (citing Painter’s Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown, 716
F.3d 342 (4th Cir. 2013)). Plaintiff, however, mischaracterizes the holding in this
persuasive authority from the Fourth Circuit. Rather than finding an allegation of
racial animus sufficient for a showing of an employee’s independent and personal
stake in the action, the Painter’s Mill Grille court cautioned against the application.
Such an argument, the court reasoned, “would render the intracorporate conspiracy
doctrine meaningless in the context of § 1985(3) claims because every claim under
that statute depends on a showing that the conspirators shared an invidiously
discriminatory motivation.” Id. at 353 (quotation omitted, cleaned up). Instead, the
court allowed, the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine “probably would not apply
where corporate employees are shown to have been motivated solely by personal bias
because in that case, the interests of the corporation would have played no part in
the employees’ collective action, so the action could not have been taken within the
scope of employment.” Id. (quotation omitted, citation cleaned up, emphasis in
original).
Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations fail to provide any factual support to
Richard’s independently pursuing his own racist ends in the termination of Plaintiffs
employment. At most, Plaintiff states: “It is for his ultra vires acts that Richard is
sued personally.” (Rec. Doc. 23 at 5). Such a conclusory allegation “will not suffice to
prevent a motion to dismiss.” Beavers, 566 F.3d at 439. As the conspiracy claim as to
Richard fails, the conspiracy claim itself must be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Third and
Ninth Causes of Action (Rec. Doc. 22) is GRANTED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 10th day of July, 2025.
ha
CARL J. BA i R Y
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE