The opinion
In the
Missouri Court of Appeals
Western District
KRYSTAL M. SCROGGS, )
)
Appellant, ) WD84643
)
v. ) OPINION FILED:
) November 1, 2022
STATE OF MISSOURI, )
)
Respondent. )
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Johnson County, Missouri
The Honorable R. Michael Wagner, Judge
Before Division Four: Gary D. Witt, Chief Judge, Presiding, Mark D. Pfeiffer, Judge, and
Louis Angles, Special Judge
Krystal Scroggs ("Scroggs") appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court of Johnson
County ("motion court"), following an evidentiary hearing, denying Scroggs's amended
motion to vacate, set aside, or correct the judgment and sentence, pursuant to Rule 29.15.1
On appeal, Scroggs argues the motion court erred in denying her amended motion because
(1) Scroggs's appellate counsel ("appellate counsel") was ineffective in failing to raise a
sufficiency of the evidence challenge to first-degree child endangerment on direct appeal
1
All rule references are to Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2021), unless otherwise indicated.
because the State failed to produce sufficient evidence that Scroggs "created" a substantial
risk to the health of the baby ("M.J.S.");2 (2) appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to
raise a sufficiency of the evidence challenge to felony murder on direct appeal because the
State failed to produce sufficient evidence to support felony murder predicated on child
endangerment; (3) appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise a sufficiency of the
evidence challenge to abandonment of a corpse because there was insufficient evidence
that Scroggs and her husband, Matthew Scroggs ("Matthew"),3 "disposed" of M.J.S.'s body
because they never relinquished possession of it; and (4) Scroggs's trial counsel ("trial
counsel") was ineffective in failing to object and offer an additional element to the
abandonment of a corpse verdict director because, although the instruction followed MAI-
CR 3d, it was missing an element as established by caselaw. Finding no error, we affirm.
Factual Background
The tragic facts of this case, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, were
recounted by this Court on direct appeal in State v. Scroggs, 521 S.W.3d 649, 651-53 (Mo.
App. W.D. 2017):
In 2013, Scroggs and her husband[, Matthew,] were living in Pleasant
Hill, Missouri with their three children. During the summer, Matthew's
mother, Melinda Brown ("Brown") was caring for the children at her home
a couple hours away from Pleasant Hill. In early June of 2013, Brown took
the three children to visit Pleasant Hill. Brown noticed that Scroggs appeared
to be pregnant. She returned again in July and noticed that Scroggs's breasts
were enlarged, she had gained weight in her stomach, and her nose was red.
This was consistent with how Scroggs looked during her previous
2
We will use these initials for the baby throughout this opinion based on the name M.J.S.'s grandmother
chose for him when law enforcement created a birth certificate and death certificate.
3
Because Krystal and Matthew share the same surname, we will refer to Matthew Scroggs as Matthew. No
familiarity or disrespect is intended.
2
pregnancies. Brown asked Scroggs whether she was pregnant, and Scroggs
angrily denied it multiple times.
Their children were returned by Brown to Scroggs and Matthew in
August. Brown received a call from Matthew on November 4, 2013,
requesting that Brown come to his home. When Brown arrived, Matthew
looked like he had not slept and was exhausted, as if he were "crashing." His
mood vacillated between sadness and anger. The three children were not at
home. Matthew first patted Brown down, as if he were searching for
something, and then forced Brown to hand over her keys and cell phone
because he wanted to tell her something but did not want her to leave.
Matthew informed Brown that Scroggs had delivered a baby [boy] at home
and was in the hospital. Brown asked where [M.J.S.] was, and Matthew
responded, saying, "[a]ll you need to know is that we took care of it."
Matthew also told Brown that there was a stolen car between their garage
and a fence.
Brown spoke with law enforcement and told them a stolen car was
located on the property, which she had seen the day before, and relayed the
information she had received from Matthew about [M.J.S.] She informed
police that she believed Scroggs and Matthew had disposed of [M.J.S.'s]
body and that they both deal in drugs.
When police arrived, Matthew was placed under arrest and gave his
consent for a search of the residence. Police found four glass pipes used for
smoking methamphetamine that had white residue on them. An additional
thirty unused glass pipes were located in the upstairs of the home along with
bags containing marijuana, methamphetamine residue, and additional
marijuana pipes.
Police discovered a blue bucket in the garage filled with what
appeared to be recently poured concrete. Matthew later admitted that
[M.J.S.'s] body was in the bucket and gave permission to police to remove it.
The bucket was taken to the medical examiner, who removed and examined
the contents. [M.J.S.] was located in the concrete inside a cardboard box for
baby wipes and inside a plastic bag that also contained pacifiers, a bottle, a
bib, a baby bottle brush, and formula. An additional plastic bag was also in
the bucket containing the placenta wrapped in a towel. At the bottom of the
bucket was a truck brake rotor.
Scroggs was interviewed twice while in the hospital. She had been
admitted for pneumonia and congestive heart failure. Police asked her if she
was aware she had given birth to a baby boy on October 7. Scroggs hesitated
and stated the birth had taken place a few days after that. Scroggs had learned
that she was pregnant in June but she did not want any more children.
Scroggs did not obtain any prenatal care or seek any medical treatment during
her pregnancy. Although her previous three children had been born in a
hospital, she said that she "wanted to do it like they did back in the day." She
3
did not obtain a midwife to help with the birth, and she and Matthew had not
told anyone about the pregnancy, not even their children. Scroggs admitted
to police that she used methamphetamine and marijuana throughout her
pregnancy. She told a Children's Division investigator that she had only used
methamphetamine prior to the pregnancy but when told that hair follicle tests
would be able to determine whether that was true, she said they would
probably find methamphetamine in her system and that she could not
remember that last time she had used it.
Scroggs claimed [M.J.S.] was born somewhere between five and
seven months into pregnancy and that after he was born [he] looked fine. She
claimed that she called a doctor after the birth, whom she picked out of a
phone book, and the doctor told her that as long as there was not excess
bleeding, everything was okay and there was nothing else she could do.
Scroggs did not remember who this doctor was and could not provide any
information regarding the doctor's identity.
Scroggs stated that after the birth [M.J.S.] would not breast feed or
take a bottle. She told police that she thought he would eventually eat, so
she went to sleep. Scroggs stated that when she woke up, [M.J.S.] was
"gone," as in deceased. She also stated that she had heard him make a
whimpering sound before he died. After she woke up and found [M.J.S.]
dead, she put [him] in a box and gave it to Matthew and told him to "bury it
in the backyard." However, Scroggs also told a detective, after she got out
of the hospital, that she knew [M.J.S.] was in the garage and said she told
Matthew not to bury him yet because she wanted to wait until she was healthy
enough to help bury [M.J.S.]
An autopsy was performed on [M.J.S.] that determined he was born
alive and appeared to be full term. There were no signs of injury or
congenital abnormalities. [M.J.S.] had a methamphetamine level in his
system of 751 ng/mL. Scroggs had to have used methamphetamine a few
days prior to the birth in order for [M.J.S.] to have this level of
methamphetamines in his system at birth. This level of methamphetamine
would have created stress, increased heart rate, and increased blood pressure
in [M.J.S.] This would have created a risk of heart attack, seizure, stroke, or
arrhythmia, which could have caused sudden death. [M.J.S.'s] cause of death
was "methamphetamine intoxication due to maternal methamphetamine
use." Had [M.J.S.] been taken to the hospital, he could have been diagnosed
and treated, as there are interventions that could have increased his likelihood
of survival. A medical expert testified that the failure to seek medical
treatment contributed to [M.J.S.'s] death.
4
Scroggs was convicted of one count of murder in the second degree (Class A
Felony), section 565.021;4 one count of endangering the welfare of a child in the first
degree (Class C Felony), section 568.045; and one count of abandonment of a corpse (Class
D Felony), section 194.425. Scroggs was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment on
count I, a term of seven years' imprisonment on count II, and a term of four years'
imprisonment on count III. The judgment of conviction and sentence were affirmed by
this Court in Scroggs, 521 S.W.3d at 649.
Scroggs filed a timely motion to vacate, set aside, or correct the judgment under
Rule 29.15, and appointed counsel timely filed an amended motion. The motion court held
an evidentiary hearing, and Scroggs, trial counsel, and appellate counsel testified. The
motion court issued findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment denying Scroggs's
amended motion. This timely appeal follows.
Standard of Review
Appellate review of the motion court's judgment under Rule 29.15 is limited to a
determination of whether the findings of fact and conclusions of law are clearly erroneous.
Price v. State, 422 S.W.3d 292, 294 (Mo. banc 2014); Rule 29.15(k). "Findings and
conclusions are clearly erroneous only if a full review of the record definitely and firmly
reveals that a mistake has been made." King v. State, 638 S.W.3d 113, 117 (Mo. App.
W.D. 2022) (quoting Morrow v. State, 21 S.W.3d 819, 822 (Mo. banc 2000)). "It is
incumbent upon the movant in a post-conviction motion to prove his claims for relief by a
4
All statutory references are to Revised Statutes of Missouri (2000), as supplemented through October
2013, unless otherwise indicated.
5
preponderance of the evidence." Dishmon v. State, 248 S.W.3d 656, 660 (Mo. App. S.D.
2008); Rule 29.15(i).
Analysis
"To be entitled to post-conviction relief for ineffective assistance of counsel, the
movant must satisfy the two-pronged Strickland test." Jindra v. State, 580 S.W.3d 635,
641 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). "First, the movant must show counsel failed to perform to the degree
of skill, care, and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would under similar
circumstances." Lindsey v. State, 633 S.W.3d 547, 551 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021). This
requires that the movant show that counsel's representation "fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness." Jindra, 580 S.W.3d at 641; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. The
movant must then show that he was prejudiced by this failure. Jindra, 580 S.W.3d at 641.
"Prejudice occurs when 'there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'" Id. (quoting
Johnson v. State, 406 S.W.3d 892, 899 (Mo. banc 2013)). "A movant must overcome the
strong presumption that counsel's conduct was reasonable and effective." Id. "To
overcome this presumption, a movant must identify specific acts or omissions of counsel
that, in light of all the circumstances, fell outside the wide range of professional competent
assistance." Id. (internal quotations omitted). If a movant fails to satisfy the performance
prong, there is no need to address the prejudice prong. McNeal v. State, 500 S.W.3d 841,
845 (Mo. banc 2016).
6
"To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the
movant must establish that counsel failed to raise a claim of error that was so
obvious that a competent and effective lawyer would have recognized and
asserted it." Anderson v. State, 564 S.W.3d 592, 617 (Mo. banc 2018)
(internal quotation marks omitted). "There is no duty to raise every possible
issue asserted in the motion for new trial on appeal, and no duty to present
non-frivolous issues where appellate counsel strategically decides to winnow
out arguments in favor of other arguments." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). [Scroggs] must overcome the strong presumption that counsel's
conduct was within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d
674 (1984). [Scroggs] must also show that "if counsel had raised the claims,
there is a reasonable probability the outcome of the appeal would have been
different." Anderson, 564 S.W.3d at 617 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Morrison v. State, 619 S.W.3d 605, 609-610 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021).
Points I & II
Scroggs argues, in point I, that the motion court erred in finding appellate counsel
was not ineffective in failing to raise, on direct appeal, a sufficiency of the evidence claim
to Scroggs's conviction of child endangerment in the first degree based on insufficient
evidence that Scroggs's failure to obtain medical care for M.J.S. "created" a substantial risk
to M.J.S.'s life, body, or health. "Where the evidence was sufficient to support the movant's
convictions, appellate counsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing to challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence on direct appeal on those counts." McAllister v. State, 643
S.W.3d 124, 136 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022).
It is of note that appellate counsel on direct appeal did in fact raise two separate
sufficiency of the evidence claims regarding the charge of endangering the welfare of a
child. Scroggs, 521 S.W.3d at 653. In the first point on appeal, appellate counsel
challenged that the evidence at trial failed to establish the element of a "knowing" violation
7
of the statute. Id. In the second point on direct appeal, Scroggs's appellate counsel raised
a claim that the evidence at trial was not sufficient to prove that the failure to seek medical
care for the child "caused" the baby's death. Id. at 655. Now, Scroggs alleges appellate
counsel was ineffective for not raising the additional claim that the evidence at trial was
insufficient to establish that Scroggs's failure to obtain medical care "created" a substantial
risk to the child. At the evidentiary hearing on Scroggs's motion, appellate counsel testified
that he did not raise this claim on direct appeal because the issue had already been finally
decided by the appellate court in State v. Rinehart, 383 S.W.3d 95, 101 (Mo. App. W.D.
2012). Appellate counsel testified that he was particularly aware of the Rinehart case
because he was the appellate counsel in Rinehart and had raised and lost the issue that the
failure to obtain medical care could legally "create" the substantial risk to a child as
required by the statute. The record clearly establishes that appellate counsel recognized
and considered raising this claim on direct appeal but strategically and rationally chose to
raise the claims that were in fact raised because this specific claim had already been
rejected by the appellate court in Rinehart. Scroggs has failed to establish that appellate
counsel was ineffective as, first, appellate counsel did not fail to recognize this claim and
second, appellate counsel properly determined, following Rinehart, there was no
reasonable probability that such a claim would have been successful. Scroggs has failed
to establish that outcome of the appeal would have been different had this claim been
raised.
A person commits the offense of endangering the welfare of a child in the first
degree if she knowingly acts in a manner that "creates a substantial risk to the life, body,
8
or health of a child less than seventeen years of age[.]" Section 568.045. "A parent's failure
to provide or obtain adequate medical care for a child can be the basis for a child
endangerment conviction." State v. Rinehart, 383 S.W.3d 95, 101 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012).
"It is clear that, if a child was in actual need of certain medical treatments and a parent
failed to obtain treatment which was necessary to prevent harm to the life, body or health
of a child, then the parent exposed the child to an actual danger, and thus the parent created
a substantial risk to the life, body, or health of the child." State v. Wilson, 920 S.W.2d 177,
180 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996). In a child endangerment case, the State is "not required to
prove Defendant's actions caused Victim's death." State v. Fowler, 435 S.W.3d 90, 95
(Mo. App. S.D. 2014). Rather, the State is required "to prove risk i.e., the possibility of
loss, injury, or disadvantage." Id. "The fact that the failure to provide medical treatment
creates a risk to the child may be established by expert testimony." Wilson, 920 S.W.2d at
180.
Here, appellate counsel was not ineffective in failing to raise a sufficiency claim on
the charge of child endangerment in the first degree because sufficient evidence supported
Scroggs's conviction, in that Scroggs's failure to obtain medical care for M.J.S. created a
risk to his life. The evidence in the record showed that immediately after M.J.S. was born,
he would not breast feed or take a bottle. Rather than seek medical help, Scroggs went to
sleep. Scroggs knew that she had not sought any prenatal care during her pregnancy and
had used methamphetamine and marijuana during the pregnancy, and M.J.S.'s autopsy
established that Scroggs had used methamphetamine shortly before M.J.S.'s birth. An
expert witness at trial testified that if M.J.S. had received medical attention when his heart
9
rate and blood pressure increased, either at a hospital or in an ambulance, his condition
would have been diagnosed and could have been treated. Medications could have been
given to help lower M.J.S.'s blood pressure. Medical professionals would have also been
able to defibrillate M.J.S. and administer further medications in the event that he suffered
a heart attack, and paramedics called to the home may have been able to intubate M.J.S.
when he failed to maintain oxygen. The expert testified that the failure to seek medical
attention was a contributing factor in M.J.S.'s death.
Scroggs argues there was insufficient evidence that the failure to obtain medical
care created the risk to M.J.S.'s life because the medical expert testified at trial that the
cause of death was maternal methamphetamine use. Therefore, according to Scroggs, the
substantial risk to M.J.S.'s life was actually created before he was born and was a
preexisting condition. However, this argument conflates the multiple risks at issue. It is
clear that Scroggs created a risk to M.J.S.'s health by using illegal substances including
methamphetamine throughout the pregnancy.5 Scroggs's failure to obtain medical care for
M.J.S. after his birth created an additional risk that is subject to criminal liability under
section 568.045. Although maternal methamphetamine use was the cause of death, the
expert witness also testified that Scroggs's failure to seek medical attention for M.J.S. was
a contributing factor in M.J.S.'s death. As we stated in the direct appeal:
The evidence at trial was that Scroggs and Matthew concealed
Scroggs's pregnancy, even lying to Matthew's mother when directly asked if
she was pregnant. They were the only two people who knew about the baby's
existence. As opposed to Scroggs's previous three births in the hospital,
5
Scroggs's methamphetamine use while pregnant was not alleged as a basis for child endangerment in the
charging document, pursuant to State v. Wade, 232 S.W.3d 663, 666 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007). The only basis for
child endangerment in this case as charged is the failure to obtain medical care for M.J.S. after he was born.
10
Scroggs chose to have the child at home without any help from a midwife or
any other person, whether medically trained or not. Scroggs admitted she
used methamphetamine during her pregnancy. The baby's autopsy
established that she had used methamphetamines shortly before the baby's
birth. Scroggs sought no prenatal care or any other medical care during her
pregnancy. After the child was born, Scroggs admitted that the baby would
not eat. Rather than seek medical help, she went to sleep. After the fact, she
created a ludicrous story that she called an unidentified doctor she picked out
of the phonebook after the birth who told her everything was fine without
seeing her or the child. The child died shortly after birth. Rather than contact
the appropriate authorities, Scroggs and Matthew decided to clandestinely
dispose of the child's body. Scroggs's conduct before, during, and after the
pregnancy are all indicative that she knew her methamphetamine use would
harm her child. The jury could infer that Scroggs's failure to obtain medical
care for her child after birth was consistent with her previous conduct; she
knew her drug use would harm her child and she knowingly chose not to seek
medical care for the child to hide her illicit drug use.
Scroggs, 521 S.W.3d at 655.
From this evidence and the medical testimony, a reasonable juror could have
concluded that the failure to obtain medical care for M.J.S. created a substantial risk to his
life, beyond a reasonable doubt. As was thoroughly explained in our prior opinion in
Scroggs, "Death of a newborn infant is the natural and foreseeable consequence of failing
to provide medical care where, as is the case here, the mother knows that she consumed
methamphetamines during pregnancy and immediately before birth." Id. at 656. We
further stated, "In Missouri, it is inconsequential that Scroggs's conduct was not the
immediate cause of death; it is sufficient that the conduct was a contributing cause of
death." Id.
Scroggs argues herein that Rinehart is distinguishable from this case because, in
Rinehart, the son was severely ill for months without receiving medical attention, whereas
11
M.J.S. was only alive for one day. 383 S.W.3d at 98. However, other Missouri cases have
held that waiting even "thirty minutes before calling 911 creates a substantial risk to the
life and health of the child." State v. Johnson, 402 S.W.3d 182, 187 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013).
Regardless, even if Rinehart were marginally distinguishable from this case, appellate
counsel was not ineffective for relying on it in deciding not to raise the additional
sufficiency challenge because Rinehart was clear in its holding that the appellant both
"knowingly" created the substantial risk and "created" the substantial risk to the life of the
baby.
Appellate counsel's reliance on Rinehart in deciding not to raise multiple sufficiency
challenges to the same count did not fall below an objective level of reasonableness. In
addition, Scroggs failed to demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability of a different
outcome, even if appellate counsel had raised the additional sufficiency argument.
Sufficient evidence supported Scroggs's conviction for the felony offense of child
endangerment in the first degree. Scroggs concedes that because her felony murder
conviction was based on the felony of child endangerment in the first degree, if we deny
Point I on appeal then we must also deny Point II on appeal. Accordingly, Points I and II
are denied.
Point III
Scroggs argues the motion court erred when it found appellate counsel was not
ineffective in failing to raise, on direct appeal, a sufficiency of the evidence claim to
Scroggs's conviction of abandonment of a corpse, in that there was insufficient evidence
that Scroggs and Matthew "disposed" of M.J.S.'s body because they never relinquished
12
possession of it. Scroggs fails to even address how this claim was "so obvious that a
competent and effective [appellate] lawyer would have recognized and asserted it."
Anderson v. State, 564 S.W.3d 592, 617 (Mo. banc 2018) (internal quotation marks
omitted). As previously noted, "[w]here the evidence was sufficient to support the
movant's convictions, appellate counsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing to
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on direct appeal on those counts." McAllister,
643 S.W.3d at 136.
"A person commits the crime of abandonment of a corpse if that person abandons,
disposes, deserts or leaves a corpse without properly reporting the location of the body to
the proper law enforcement officials in that county." Section 194.425. "The concept of
'abandonment' in the statute clearly is based upon a person having an interest in, or duty
with respect to, the body." State v. Bratina, 73 S.W.3d 625, 627 (Mo. banc 2002). "To
abandon, the dictionary tells us, is 'to cease to assert or exercise an interest, right or title to
esp. with the intent of never again resuming or reasserting it . . .' or 'to forsake or desert
esp. in spite of an allegiance, duty, or responsibility.'" Id. "The words that the statute uses
to describe the concept of abandonment are 'abandon, disposes, deserts or leaves.' The first
three words contain the concept that the person has a relationship or duty with respect to
the body. To dispose of something implies that one has possession of it." Id.
Here, appellate counsel was not ineffective in failing to raise a sufficiency challenge
because the record supported Scroggs's conviction for abandonment of a corpse. The
evidence presented at trial showed that in early November police discovered a blue bucket
in the garage with what appeared to be recently poured concrete. Matthew later admitted
13
that M.J.S.'s body was in the bucket and gave permission to police to remove it. Scroggs
acknowledged M.J.S. was born in early October. The bucket was taken to the medical
examiner, who removed and examined the contents. M.J.S. was located in the concrete
inside a cardboard box for baby wipes and inside a plastic bag that also contained pacifiers,
a bottle, a bib, a baby bottle brush, and formula. An additional plastic bag was also in the
bucket containing the placenta wrapped in a towel. At the bottom of the bucket was a truck
brake rotor. Scroggs admitted that she placed the body in a box and told Matthew to "bury
it in the backyard." Although the bucket with M.J.S.'s body was found on Scroggs's
property in the garage, the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find that Scroggs had no
intention of recovering the body. It was approximately one month after the child's birth
that its body was found encased in a bucket of concrete that had to be chiseled away in
order for the body to be recovered and autopsied. The body was also found inside an empty
box of baby wipes and alongside baby supplies and a brake rotor, further illustrating
Scroggs's desire to forsake and discard these items. As we stated in Scroggs, "Rather than
contact the appropriate authorities, Scroggs and Matthew decided to clandestinely dispose
of the child's body." 521 S.W.3d at 655.
Scroggs argues that Bratina supports her argument that appellate counsel was
ineffective for not raising a sufficiency challenge regarding the disposal of M.J.S.'s body.
In Bratina, a case in which Bratina left his dead wife's body on the floor of their apartment
for three to four hours before returning, the Supreme Court considered a void for vagueness
challenge to section 194.425 regarding the word "leaves" in the statute. 73 S.W.3d at 627.
The Court applied the maxim of statutory construction, noscitur a sociis, ("it is known from
14
its associates") to interpret "leaves" alongside its textual neighbors, "abandon," "disposes,"
and "deserts." Id. at 627 n.5. In doing so, the Court held that the statute was not vague or
ambiguous because "these terms all have as part of their meaning a relationship or duty
with respect to the dead body." Id. at 627. The Court then remanded the case for trial for
a factual determination regarding whether the defendant had knowingly abandoned his
wife's corpse because "[t]he fact that Bratina returned to the apartment some three to four
hours later may negate the conclusion that he intended to abandon the body of his wife."
Id. at 628. The Court's holding in Bratina does not aid Scroggs. Here, the only issue is
whether Scroggs "disposed" of M.J.S.'s body. The dictionary defines "dispose" as "to get
rid of."6 It is clear from the evidence that Scroggs "got rid of" M.J.S.'s body by placing it
in an empty box of baby wipes, encasing it in a bucket of concrete with other discarded
items, and leaving it in the garage for approximately one month before it was discovered
by police. This case is readily distinguishable from Bratina, based on the extended period
of time between M.J.S.'s body being placed in the bucket of concrete and its discovery,
compared to the brief period of a few hours that Bratina left the house before returning.
The Court in Bratina remanded the case so the jury could evaluate the facts of the case and
the defendant's mental state, but this Court already affirmed Scroggs's "knowing" mental
state on direct appeal in accordance with Bratina's interpretation of section 194.425. See
Scroggs, 521 S.W.3d at 654-55. Therefore, Bratina does not support the notion that
6
Merriam-Webster's Unabridged Dictionary, www.merriam-webster.com (last visited Sept. 29, 2022).
15
appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise a sufficiency challenge to Scroggs's
conviction for abandonment of a corpse.
Point III is denied.
Point IV
Scroggs argues the motion court erred when it found trial counsel was not
ineffective in failing to object to the state's proposed verdict director and in failing to offer
an additional element to the abandonment of a corpse verdict directing instruction. "The
general rule is that instructional errors are not cognizable in a Rule 29.15 proceeding." Hill
v. State, 532 S.W.3d 744, 750 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017). "Not only is instructional error
generally non-cognizable in a post-conviction proceeding, it is even less likely to be
cognizable where, as here, the evidence supporting the movant's conviction was reviewed
on direct appeal and found to be sufficient to sustain the conviction." Id. Regardless, trial
counsel's conduct did not fall below an objective level of reasonableness because the jury
instruction properly stated the applicable law.
The jury received the verdict director based on MAI-CR 3d 332.84 and stated:
A person is responsible for her own conduct and she is also responsible for
the conduct of another person in committing an offense if she acts with the
other person with the common purpose of committing that offense or if, for
the purpose of committing that offense, she aids or encourages the other
person in committing it.
As to Count III, if you find and believe from the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt:
First, that on or between October 1, 2013 and October 31, 2013, in the County
of Cass, State of Missouri, Matthew Scroggs disposed of the corpse of M.J.S.
at 304 Cline Street, Pleasant Hill, and
16
Second, that at the time Matthew Scroggs disposed of the corpse of M.J.S.
he was aware that M.J.S. was dead, and
Third, that at the time Matthew Scroggs disposed of the corpse, the defendant
was the mother of M.J.S., and
Fourth, that at the time Matthew Scroggs disposed of the corpse, Matthew
Scroggs did so without properly reporting the location of the body to the
proper law enforcement officials, and
Fifth, that with respect to the facts and conduct submitted in this instruction,
Matthew Scroggs acted knowingly,
Then you are instructed that the offense of abandonment of a corpse has
occurred, and if you further find and believe from the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt:
Sixth, that with the purpose of promoting or furthering the commission of
that abandonment of a corpse, the defendant aided or encouraged Matthew
Scroggs in committing the offense, then you will find the defendant guilty
under Count III of abandonment of a corpse.
However, unless you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt each and all of these propositions, you must find the defendant not
guilty of that offense.
Scroggs argues trial counsel should have objected to this MAI approved jury
instruction and proposed an additional element to the jury instruction, pursuant to Bratina.
In Bratina, the Court stated, "To dispose of something implies that one has possession of
it." 73 S.W.3d at 627. Therefore, according to Scroggs, the Supreme Court created an
additional element to the abandonment of a corpse statute, and the jury instruction should
have accounted for this additional element by providing another paragraph in the
instruction, such as, "Fourth, that at the time Scroggs disposed of the corpse, defendant had
17
no intention of returning to the corpse or retaining control over the corpse."7 We disagree.
The Supreme Court in Bratina did not create an additional element to section 194.425. As
discussed previously, the Court interpreted the statutory words used to find that a defendant
had abandoned a corpse and held that the word "leaves" is not vague or ambiguous because
it must be read in conjunction with its surrounding words, namely "abandon," "dispose,"
and "deserts." Bratina, 73 S.W.3d at 627. The Court stated that "[t]o dispose of something
implies that one has possession of it" simply to highlight the preceding sentence that "[t]he
first three of these words contain the concept that the person has a relationship or duty with
respect to the body." Id. This relationship or duty requirement is reflected in paragraph
three of the jury instruction. See MAI-CR 3d 332.84, Notes on Use, 2. The jury did not
need to find that Scroggs had possession of M.J.S.'s body because, as the Court noted,
possession is implicit in the notion of disposing. The plain meaning of "dispose," as
previously discussed, was sufficient to instruct the jury on a violation of section 194.425.
And trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to object and offer this additional element
to the verdict director.
Point IV is denied.
7
Scroggs's appellate brief suggests numerous alternative paragraphs that she argues should have been
included in the instructions that she believes would comply with the Court's ruling in Bratina. We included one of
her suggestions to illustrate her argument.
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Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the motion court is affirmed.
__________________________________
Gary D. Witt, Judge
All concur
19