The opinion
In the
Missouri Court of Appeals
Western District
STATE OF MISSOURI ex rel. )
MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF )
CORRECTIONS, )
)
Relator, ) WD87421
)
V. ) OPINION FILED:
) SEPTEMBER 24, 2024
THE HONORABLE )
DANIEL R. GREEN, )
CIRCUIT JUDGE, )
)
Respondent. )
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN PROHIBITION
Before Writ Division: Cynthia L. Martin, Presiding Judge, Lisa White Hardwick, Judge
and Gary D. Witt, Judge
On August 12, 2024, B.Z. initiated a contempt proceeding against the Missouri
Department of Corrections ("Department of Corrections"), seeking to enforce a 2017
Permanent Injunction entered in Case No. 17AC-CC00213, an action brought by D.G.
against the Department of Corrections, in the Circuit Court of Cole County, Missouri.
The Permanent Injunction addressed which version of sections 217.735.1 and 559.106.1
the Department of Corrections could enforce to require an offender to submit to lifetime
supervision, including electronic GPS monitoring, for specified sexual offenses. On the
same day the contempt proceeding was filed, the Honorable Daniel R. Green
("Respondent") entered an order ("Order") that directed the Department of Corrections to
appear on October 1, 2024, to show cause why it should not be held in contempt, and that
ordered the Department of Corrections to release B.Z. from lifetime supervision,
including electronic GPS monitoring, no later than forty-eight hours after the Order's
entry.
The Department of Corrections filed a petition for writ of prohibition or, in the
alternative, mandamus ("Writ Petition") seeking to prohibit Respondent from taking any
further action other than vacating his Order and seeking an emergency stay order. Just
prior to the 48-hour deadline imposed by the Order, we issued a stay prohibiting any
further action from being taken in Case No. 17AC-CC00213. After considering
suggestions in opposition to the Writ Petition, we issued a preliminary writ of prohibition
prohibiting Respondent or anyone else from taking any action to enforce the Order.
Because B.Z. cannot establish that the Department of Corrections violated the
Preliminary Injunction by requiring B.Z. to submit to lifetime supervision, including
electronic GPS monitoring, our preliminary writ of prohibition is made absolute.
Factual and Procedural Background
The History of Section 217.735 and Section 559.106
In 2005, the General Assembly enacted section 217.735 and section 559.106 to
address lifetime supervision for certain sexual offenses. Section 217.735 applies when an
offender is found guilty of and is incarcerated for a designated offense, and section
559.106 applies when an offender is found guilty of and placed on probation for a
designated offense. As enacted in 2005, section 217.735.1 and section 559.106.1 listed a
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series of sexual offense statutes, and provided that lifetime supervision, including
electronic GPS monitoring, would be required for each of the offenses if based on an act
committed on or after August 28, 2005, against a victim who was less than fourteen years
old, by an offender who is a prior sex offender as defined by subsection .2 of sections
217.735 and 559.106.
The General Assembly amended both statutes in its 2006 session, with the
amendments taking effect on June 5, 2006 (the "2006 amendments"). The 2006
amendments to section 217.735.1 and section 559.106.1 listed the same sexual offense
statutes as were set forth in the 2005 version of the statutes, but appeared to create two
categories of offenses, so that some of the offenses would require lifetime supervision
regardless the victim's age and the offender's prior sex offender status, while others
would require lifetime supervision only if the victim was less than fourteen years old and
the offender was a prior sex offender. After the 2006 amendments, section 217.735.1
provided:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, the [probation
and parole] board shall supervise an offender for the duration of his or her
natural life when the offender has pleaded guilty to or been found guilty of
an offense under section 566.030, 566.032, 566.060, or 566.062 based on
an act committed on or after August 28, 2006, or the offender has pleaded
guilty to or has been found guilty of an offense under section 566.067,
566.083, 566.100, 566.151, 566.212, 566.213, 568.020, 568.080, or
568.090 based on an act committed on or after August 28, 2006, against a
victim who was less than fourteen years old and the offender is a prior sex
offender as defined in subsection 2 of this section.
After the 2006 amendments, section 559.106.1 similarly provided:
Notwithstanding any statutory provision to the contrary, when a court
grants probation to an offender who has pleaded guilty to or has been found
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guilty of an offense in section 566.030, 566.032, 566.060, or 566.062,
based on an act committed on or after August 28, 2006, or the offender has
pleaded guilty to or has been found guilty of an offense under section
566.067, 566.083, 566.100, 566.151, 566.212, 566.213, 568.020, 568.080,
or 568.090, based on an act committed on or after August 28, 2006, against
a victim who was less than fourteen years old and the offender is a prior sex
offender as defined in subsection 2 of this section, the court shall order that
the offender be supervised by the board of probation and parole for the
duration of his or her natural life.
For ease of reference, we refer in this opinion to sections 566.030, 566.032, 566.060, and
566.062 as "Category One offenses," and to sections 566.067, 566.083, 566.100,
566.151, 566.212, 566.213, 568.020, 568.080, and 568.090 as "Category Two offenses."
In conjunction with revisions to the criminal code in 2014 which became effective
on January 1, 2017, the General Assembly again amended sections 217.735 and 559.106
(the "2017 amendments"). Following the 2017 amendments, section 217.735.1 provided:
1. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, the
[probation and parole] board shall supervise an offender for the duration of
his or her natural life when the offender has been found guilty of an offense
under:
(1) Section 566.030, 566.032, 566.060, 566.062, 566.067, 566.083,
566.100, 566.151, 566.212, 566.213, 568.020, 568.080, or 568.090 based
on an act committed on or after August 28, 2006; or
(2) Section 566.068, 566.069, 566.210, 566.211, 573.200, or 573.205 based
on an act committed on or after January 1, 2017, against a victim who was
less than fourteen years old and the offender is a prior sex offender as
defined in subsection 2 of this section.
Following the 2017 amendments, section 559.106.1 similarly provided:
Notwithstanding any statutory provision to the contrary, when a court
grants probation to an offender who has been found guilty of an offense in:
(1) Section 566.030, 566.032, 566.060, 566.062, 566.067, 566.083,
566.100, 566.151, 566.212, 566.213, 568.020, 568.080, or 568.090, based
on an act committed on or after August 28, 2006; or
4
(2) Section 566.068, 566.069, 566.210, 566.211, 573.200, or 573.205 based
on an act committed on or after January 1, 2017, against a victim who was
less than fourteen years of age and the offender is a prior sex offender as
defined in subsection 2 of this section;
the court shall order that the offender be supervised by the board of
probation and parole for the duration of his or her natural life.
The 2017 amendments added additional structure to sections 217.735.1 and 559.106.1
with subsections (1) and (2). Section 217.735.1(1) and section 559.106.1(1) subjected all
Category One and Category Two offenses to lifetime supervision for acts committed on
or after August 28, 2006, without regard to the age of the victim, and without the
requirement that the offender be a prior sex offender. Section 217.735.1(2) and section
559.106.1(2) identified additional criminal offenses not previously referenced in either
statute that would require an offender to be subject to lifetime supervision for acts
committed on or after January 1, 2017, but only where the victim was less than fourteen
years old and the offender is a prior sex offender.
The 2017 Permanent Injunction
In April 2017, D.G.1 filed a petition seeking preliminary and permanent
injunctions and seeking a declaratory judgment ("Petition") against the Department of
Corrections in the Circuit Court of Cole County in Case No. 17AC-CC00213. D.G. had
been convicted of a violation of section 566.083, RSMo 2000 & Supp. 2009, for acts
committed in December 2009. Section 566.083 is a Category Two offense. The versions
of section 217.735.1 and 559.106.1 in effect as of December 2009 required a person
1
D.G. is not a party to the proceedings giving rise to the Writ Petition.
5
convicted of a Category Two offense to have victimized a person less than fourteen years
old and to be a prior sex offender before lifetime supervision could be imposed. The
2017 amendments to sections 217.735.1 and 559.106.1 subjected Category Two
offenders to lifetime supervision for any act committed on or after August 28, 2006,
without first finding that an offender is a prior sex offender whose victim was less than
fourteen years old. The Petition challenged the constitutionality of the 2017 amendments
to sections 217.735 and 559.106 as violative of the prohibition against ex post facto and
retrospective laws.2
D.G. and the Department of Corrections agreed to the terms of a consent
preliminary injunction ("Consent Preliminary Injunction"), and filed the Consent
Preliminary Injunction on May 22, 2017.3 Relevant to this case, the Consent Preliminary
Injunction reflected the parties' agreement that: (1) for those offenders who have been
found guilty of a Category Two offense (that is, an offense under section 566.067,
566.083, 566.100, 566.151, 566.212, 566.213, 568.020, 568.080, or 568.090) based on
acts committed on or after August 28, 2006, but before January 1, 2017, the Department
of Corrections would be enjoined from enforcing section 217.735.1(1) and section
559.106.1(1) as amended in 2017, and would instead be required to apply section
217.735.1 and section 559.106.1, as amended in 2006; (2) for those offenders who have
2
See MO. CONST. art. I, section 13.
3
The Consent Preliminary Injunction erroneously recites that the 2006
amendments to sections 217.735 and 559.106 took effect on August 28, 2006. Though
the 2006 amendments to sections 217.735 and 559.106 apply to acts committed on or
after August 28, 2006, they took effect on June 6, 2006.
6
been found guilty of a Category Two offense (that is, an offense under section 566.067,
566.083, 566.100, 566.151, 566.212, 566.2113, 568.020, 568.080, or 568.090) based on
acts committed on or after January 1, 2017, the Department of Corrections would not be
enjoined from enforcing sections 217.735.1 and 559.106.1, as amended in 2017; and (3)
for those offenders who have been found guilty of a Category One offense (that is, an
offense under section 566.030, 566.032, 566.060, 566.062, 566.068, 566.069, 566.210,
566.211, 573.200, or 573.205), the Department of Corrections would not be enjoined
from enforcing sections 217.735.1 and 559.106.1, as amended in 2017, which meant the
2017 amendments could be enforced for Category One offenses based on acts committed
on or after August 28, 2006.
The practical effect of the Consent Preliminary Injunction was to subject Category
One offenses based on acts committed on or after August 28, 2006, to lifetime
supervision without the need to find both that a victim was less than fourteen years old
and that the offender was a prior sex offender. The practical effect of the Consent
Preliminary Injunction was to subject Category Two offenses to lifetime supervision
without condition if based on acts committed on or after January 1, 2017, but subject to
the conditions that the victim was less than fourteen years old and the offender was a
prior sex offender if based on acts committed on or after August 28, 2006 and before
January 1, 2017.
On September 18, 2017, the Consent Preliminary Injunction was converted by
agreement into a permanent injunction ("Permanent Injunction") by the trial court in Case
No. 17AC-CC00213. According to the terms of the Consent Preliminary Injunction, the
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Permanent Injunction will remain in force and effect until termination by agreement of
the parties, by order of the court, or by any change in the law the renders the injunction
no longer effective or appropriate.
B.Z.'s Effort to Enforce the Permanent Injunction
In 2016, B.Z. pleaded guilty4 to two counts of first-degree child molestation in
violation of section 566.067 (a Category Two offense), and four counts of first-degree
statutory sodomy in violation of section 566.062 (a Category One offense). All six
crimes were perpetrated against a victim who was less than fourteen years old. The
crimes were charged and convicted based on acts committed between August 28, 2006,
and January 1, 2017. It does not appear from the record that B.Z. was a prior sex
offender at the time of his crimes or convictions. B.Z. was sentenced to five years'
incarceration for each of the six counts, with the sentences ordered to run concurrently.
On December 1, 2021, ahead of his anticipated December 6, 2021 release from the
Department of Corrections, B.Z. was required to sign an order of lifetime supervision
form, a global positioning agreement - discharged lifetime supervision form, and a
lifetime supervision determination and requirements form. The preprinted portions of the
order of lifetime supervision form, and the lifetime supervision determination and
requirements form, collectively provide that "pursuant to section 217.735 and 559.106,"
the offender has pled guilty or been found guilty of an offense requiring lifetime
4
The phrase "found guilty" as appears in the revisions to the criminal code enacted
in 2014, and effective as of January 1, 2017, encompasses guilty pleas. Wagner v.
Bowyer, 559 S.W.3d 26, 30-31 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018).
8
supervision, including electronic GPS monitoring.5 In the field on the order for lifetime
supervision form where the "offense" is required to be identified, B.Z.'s form was
completed to state "statutory sodomy 1st Degree (4 counts)," referring to his convictions
for violating section 566.062, a Category One offense.
On August 12, 2024, B.Z. filed a verified motion for show cause order and other
relief ("Motion for Show Cause Order") in the Circuit Court of Cole County under the
same case number the Permanent Injunction was entered in 2017. B.Z. sought an order
requiring the Department of Corrections to show cause why it should not be held in
contempt for violating the Permanent Injunction. B.Z. claimed that he was not a prior sex
offender, and that the Department of Corrections' application of the 2017 amendments of
section 217.735.1 and section 559.106.1 to him constitute the ex post facto and
retrospective application of laws in violation of the Permanent Injunction. On the same
day that B.Z. filed the Motion for Show Cause Order, the Respondent entered the Order
directing the Department of Corrections to appear on October 1, 2024, to show cause why
it should not be adjudged and held in contempt of court for its refusal to comply with the
Permanent Injunction, and directing the Department of Corrections to release B.Z. from
lifetime supervision, including electronic GPS monitoring, no later than forty-eight hours
after the Order's entry.
5
Because B.Z. was sentenced to five years' incarceration for each of his
convictions, and was not placed on probation, the preprinted forms' references to section
559.106 are not relevant to his case and can be disregarded.
9
The Department of Corrections filed the Writ Petition and asserted that the
Respondent exceeded his authority in entering the Order because the Department of
Corrections was not enjoined by the Permanent Injunction from enforcing the 2017
amendments to section 217.735.1 and section 559.106.1 for violations of section 566.062
(a Category One offense). We stayed all further proceedings in Case No. 17AC-
CC00213 just moments before the expiration of the deadline to release B.Z. from lifetime
supervision imposed by the Order. We also ordered Respondent to file suggestions in
opposition to the Writ Petition.
On August 22, 2024, after considering the Writ Petition, the suggestions in
opposition to the Writ Petition, and the exhibits filed by the parties, we issued a
preliminary writ of prohibition that prohibited the Respondent or any other party from
taking any action to enforce the Order. We dispensed with further briefing and oral
argument as permitted by Rule 84.24.6
Standard Applicable to Writs of Prohibition
"Prohibition is a powerful writ, divesting the body against whom it is directed to
cease further activities." Doe v. Frisz, 643 S.W.3d 358, 364 (Mo. banc 2022) (quoting
State ex rel. Riverside Joint Venture v. Mo. Gaming Comm'n, 969 S.W.2d 218, 221 (Mo.
banc 1998)). There are three scenarios in which a writ of prohibition is appropriate:
(1) to prevent the usurpation of judicial power when a lower court lacks
authority or jurisdiction; (2) to remedy an excess of authority, jurisdiction
or abuse of discretion where the lower court lacks the power to act as
6
All Rule references are to Missouri Court Rules, Volume I -- State, 2024, unless
otherwise noted.
10
intended; or (3) where a party may suffer irreparable harm if relief is not
granted.
State ex rel. Morales v. Alessi, 679 S.W.3d 467, 471 (Mo. banc 2023) (quoting State ex
rel. Barron v. Beger, 655 S.W.3d 356, 359-60 (Mo. banc 2022)). "The essential function
of prohibition is to correct or prevent inferior courts . . . from acting without or in excess
of their jurisdiction." State ex rel. Adams v. Crane, 652 S.W.3d 402, 405 (Mo. App.
W.D. 2022) (quoting State ex rel. Zahnd v. Van Amburg, 533 S.W.3d 227, 229-30 (Mo.
banc 2017)). While we typically do not issue a writ of prohibition to correct interlocutory
error, "'[i]f a party cannot state facts sufficient to justify court action or relief, it is
fundamentally unjust to force another to suffer the considerable expense and
inconvenience of litigation'" and "'is . . . a waste of judicial resources and taxpayer
money.'" State ex rel. City of Lee's Summit v. Garrett, 568 S.W.3d 515, 519 (Mo. App.
W.D. 2019) (quoting State ex rel. Henley v. Bickel, 285 S.W.3d 327, 330 (Mo. banc
2009)).
Analysis
B.Z.'s Motion for Show Cause Order sought a finding that the Department of
Corrections had "willfully, contumaciously, [and] intentionally disregarded" the terms of
the Permanent Injunction, and requested that the Department of Corrections be found in
civil contempt for failing to obey the Permanent Injunction. The Respondent issued his
August 12, 2024 Order, and effectively found the Department of Corrections to have
violated the Permanent Injunction, as the Order directed the near immediate release of
B.Z. from lifetime supervision. If the Permanent Injunction permitted the Department of
11
Corrections to require B.Z. to submit to lifetime supervision, the Respondent exceeded
his authority in entering the Order.
"The judicial power granted to the courts by the constitution is the power to
perform what is generally recognized as the judicial function--the trying and
determining of cases in controversy." State ex rel. Grooms v. Privette, 667 S.W.3d 92,
95 (Mo. banc 2023) (quotation omitted). The power to perform the judicial function
includes "those incidental powers which are necessary and proper to the performance of
that function." Id. (quotation omitted). Those incidental powers include the court's
"inherent power to punish contemptuous acts and to preserve and vindicate the law's
power and dignity." Estate of Johnson v. Kranitz, 168 S.W.3d 84, 92 (Mo. App. W.D.
2005) (emphasis omitted). "Disobedience of a valid judgment or order, which the court
has jurisdiction to enter, interferes with the administration of justice and constitutes
contempt." Id.
Civil contempt is a remedial action that is used to "compel compliance with the
relief granted in an order, judgment, or decree." Taormina v. Taormina, 639 S.W.3d 482,
493 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) (quoting Jones v. Jones, 296 S.W.3d 526, 528 (Mo. App.
W.D. 2009)). Civil contempt is appropriate if the record shows both that the "individual
had an obligation to perform or refrain from some action under a court order, and . . . the
individual failed to meet that obligation." Chemline Inc. v. Mauzy, 618 S.W.3d 701, 706
(Mo. App. E.D. 2021).
The Permanent Injunction includes three clear and unambiguous orders relating to
the Department of Corrections' ability to enforce section 217.735.1 by requiring an
12
offender to submit to lifetime supervision, including electronic GPS monitoring. First, if
an offender has been found guilty of a Category Two offense based on acts committed on
or after August 28, 2006, but before January 1, 2017, the Department of Corrections shall
apply the 2006 amendments to section 217.735.1, so that the offender is only subject to
lifetime supervision if he is a prior sex offender and the victim was less than fourteen
years old. Second, if an offender has been found guilty of a Category Two offense based
on acts committed on or after January 1, 2017, the Department of Corrections shall apply
the 2017 amendments to section 217.735.1, so that the offender is subject to lifetime
supervision regardless the age of the victim or the offender's status as a prior sex
offender. Third, if an offender has been found guilty of a Category One offense, the
Department of Corrections is not enjoined from enforcing the 2017 amendments to
section 217.735.1, so that the offender is subject to lifetime supervision for offenses
based on acts committed on or after August 28, 2006, regardless the age of the victim or
the offender's status as a prior sex offender.
In 2016, B.Z. pleaded guilty to two counts of first-degree child molestation in
violation of section 566.067, a Category Two Offense. He also pleaded guilty to four
counts of first-degree statutory sodomy in violation of section 566.062, a Category One
offense. B.Z.'s offenses were based on acts committed on or between August 1, 2012,
and April 27, 2013. B.Z. concedes his victim or victims were less than fourteen years
old. However, no one contends that B.Z. was a prior sex offender at the time of his
offenses or convictions. When B.Z. completed his term of incarceration, the Department
13
of Corrections required him to submit to lifetime supervision, but only with respect to his
four convictions for violating section 566.062, a Category One offense.
Under the plain terms of the Permanent Injunction, the Department of Corrections
was required to apply the 2006 amendments to section 217.735.1 to B.Z.'s convictions for
violating section 566.067, a Category Two offense, based on acts committed between
August 28, 2006 and January 1, 2017. The Department of Corrections abided by the
terms of the Permanent Injunction for these convictions, as it did not require B.Z. to
submit to lifetime supervision for his section 566.067 offenses.
Under the plain terms of the Permanent Injunction, the Department of Corrections
was not enjoined from applying the 2017 amendments to section 217.735.1 to B.Z.'s
convictions for violating section 566.062, a Category One offense, even though said
offenses were based on acts committed prior to January 1, 2017. When the Department
of Corrections required B.Z. to submit to lifetime supervision, including electronic GPS
monitoring, in connection with his Category One offenses, it was acting as authorized by
the Permanent Injunction.
Respondent nonetheless argues that permitting the Department of Corrections to
require B.Z. to submit to lifetime supervision for a Category One offense based on acts
committed prior to January 1, 2017, constitutes ex post facto and retrospective application
of laws in violation of the Missouri Constitution. The argument is based on a
construction of the 2006 amendments to section 217.735.1 and 559.106.1 that would read
the phrase "against a victim who was less than fourteen years old and the offender is a
prior sex offender" as applicable to both Category One and Category Two offenses,
14
instead of only to Category Two offenses. Respondent's suggestions in opposition to the
Writ Petition argued that this construction of the 2006 amendments was required because
the 2017 amendments to sections 217.735.1 and 559.106.1 changed the law with respect
to Category One offenses, demonstrated by "the inclusion in the [2017] amendment[s] of
a semi-colon . . . with the disjunctive 'or' and the separate subsection numbering '(2)' with
the conjunctive clause of 'and the offender is prior offender.'"
No decisional law has interpreted the 2006 amendments to section 217.735.1 and
section 559.106.1 to conclude that the phrase "against a victim who was less than
fourteen years old and the offender is a prior sex offender" applies to both Category One
and Category Two offenses, instead of only to Category Two offenses. We do not need
to resolve that question here.7 For purposes of B.Z.'s contempt proceedings, all that is
relevant is that D.G. and the Department of Corrections agreed that the phrase "against a
victim who was less than fourteen years old and the offender is a prior sex offender" in
the 2006 amendments to sections 217.735.1 and 559.106.1 applied only to Category Two
offenses. When D.G. and the Department of Corrections consented that the 2017
7
As we note, supra, B.Z.'s argued construction of the 2006 amendments to sections
217.735.1 and 559.106.1 is hard to reconcile with the fact that those amendments
materially varied from the 2005 versions of both statutes because the specified sexual
offense statutes were separated, and were no longer listed together as collectively subject
to the conditions of the victim's age and the offender's status as a prior sex offender.
"[L]egislatures are not presumed to have intended a useless act." Kilbane v. Dir. of Dep't
of Revenue, 544 S.W.2d 9, 11 (Mo. banc1976) (holding that the interpretation of an
amended statute proposed by the appellant "would mean that the . . . amendment made no
change in the law[] because the items listed by appellant as taxable under the amended
law were taxable before the amendment," so that the amendment would have
accomplished nothing and been a useless act).
15
amendments to sections 217.735.1 and 559.106.1 could be enforced for all Category One
offenses, including those based on acts committed after August 28, 2006, they were not
consenting to the ex post facto or retrospective application of a law. Instead D.G. and the
Department of Corrections were simply reflecting their agreement that the 2017
amendments to sections 217.735.1 and 559.106.1 did not change the law with respect to
Category One offenses because the 2006 amendments to sections 217.735.1 and
559.106.1 already required lifetime supervision for Category One offenses without
condition.
We recognize that B.Z. does not agree with this construction of the 2006
amendments to section 217.735.1 and section 559.106.1. However, B.Z.'s disagreement
reflects a challenge to the "validity" of the Permanent Injunction, but not a challenge to
whether the Department of Corrections complied with the plain terms of the Permanent
Injunction. Nothing prohibits B.Z. from bringing an independent declaratory judgment
action to ask a court to determine whether application of the 2017 amendments to section
217.735.1 to his convictions for violating section 566.062, a Category One offense,
constitutes the ex post facto and retrospective application of a law. But, B.Z. is not
entitled to circumvent that essential step by claiming that the Department of Corrections
is in contempt because it complied with a provision of the Permanent Injunction with
which B.Z. does not agree. The purpose of civil contempt is to compel compliance with a
previous order, judgment, or decree. Taormina, 639 S.W.3d at 493. The use of civil
contempt to challenge the validity, and thus seek annulment, of an underlying order,
16
judgment, or decree is inappropriate. Brown v. Brown, 680 S.W.3d 507, 521 (Mo. App.
W.D. 2023).
Because the Department of Corrections complied with the plain terms of the
Permanent Injunction when it required B.Z. to submit to lifetime supervision for his four
convictions under section 566.062, the Respondent acted in excess of its authority in
entering the Order directing the Department of Corrections to appear to show cause why
it should not be held in contempt, and directing the Department of Corrections to release
B.Z. from lifetime supervision.
Conclusion
Our preliminary writ of prohibition is made absolute. Respondent and all others
are prohibited from taking any action to enforce the August 12, 2024 Order issued in
Case No. 17AC-CC00213 in response to B.Z.'s August 12, 2024 Motion to Show Cause
Order. Respondent is further prohibited from taking any other action in response to
B.Z.'s August 12, 2024 Motion to Show Cause Order other than to vacate the
Respondent's August 12, 2024 Order, and to enter an order dismissing the Motion to
Show Cause Order.
__________________________________
Cynthia L. Martin, Presiding Judge
All concur
17