The opinion
Missouri Court of Appeals
Southern District
In Division
STATE OF MISSOURI, )
)
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
)
v. ) No. SD38373
)
TIMOTHY GREEN, JR., ) Filed: October 29, 2024
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHRISTIAN COUNTY
Honorable Jessica L. Kruse
AFFIRMED
After a jury trial, Timothy Green, Jr. (“Defendant”) was convicted of one count of
second-degree assault and one count of armed criminal action. 1 In two points on appeal,
Defendant claims: (1) the circuit court erred in taxing certain costs against him; and (2)
the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. Finding no
merit in either point, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
Point 1 – Alleging Plain Error in Assessing Court Costs
Defendant’s first point claims:
1
Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory citations are to RSMo 2016, including, as applicable, statutory
changes effective January 1, 2017.
1
The trial court [plainly] erred[ 2] in taxing costs against [Defendant] in the
Judgment, because the Bill of Costs assesses costs against the [S]tate and
certifies [Defendant] as insolvent, in that a trial court may not assess costs
against a defendant who is unable to pay them, and the Bill of Costs
made that certification in accordance with Mo. Rev. Stat. § 550.210.
The circuit court’s judgment (“the judgment”) was executed on a pre-printed form
that contained applicable blank spaces to be filled in and boxes to be checked. One of the
boxes checked was “[c]osts taxed against [Defendant.]” Approximately two months after
the judgment was entered, a Bill of Costs was filed in the case, and it itemized certain
costs charged against the State, including $25,267.02 as the “cost of incarceration[.]”
Defendant argues that the more than $25,000 in costs for his incarceration cannot legally
be assessed against him.
Section 488.010 defines “[c]ourt costs” as “the total of fees, miscellaneous
charges and surcharges . . . imposed in a particular case[.]” Section 488.010(1). A
challenge to the “circuit court’s inter-party allocation of costs” is a proper claim on
appeal because “[t]he allocation decision was part of the final judgment subject to
appeal[.]” State v. Savage, 592 S.W.3d 42, 47 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019).
Defendant admits in his brief that his Rule 29.11 3 after-trial motion did not claim
that the circuit court erred in taxing costs against Defendant, so he requests plain-error
review under Rule 30.20.
Generally, this Court does not review unpreserved claims of error.
State v. Cella, 32 S.W.3d 114, 117 (Mo. banc 2000). Rule 30.20 alters the
general rule by giving appellate courts discretion to review “plain errors
affecting substantial rights may be considered in the discretion of the court
... when the court finds that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has
resulted therefrom.” Rule 30.20. “Plain error review is discretionary, and
this Court will not review a claim for plain error unless the claimed error
2
Defendant and the State both agree that this issue was not preserved for our review and may only be
reviewed for plain error.
3
Unless otherwise indicated, all rule references are to Missouri Court Rules (2024).
2
‘facially establishes substantial grounds for believing that manifest
injustice or miscarriage of justice has resulted.’” State v. Clay, 533
S.W.3d 710, 714 (Mo. banc 2017) (quoting State v. Brown, 902 S.W.2d
278, 284 (Mo. banc 1995), and Rule 30.20). . . . Unless manifest injustice
or a miscarriage of justice is shown, an appellate court should “decline to
review for plain error under Rule 30.20.” [State v. Jones, 191,] 196 [(Mo.
banc 2014)].
State v. Brandolese, 601 S.W.3d 519, 525-26 (Mo. banc 2020).
Defendant does not claim, let alone demonstrate, that he is unable to pay the
mandatory court costs set forth in Chapter 488. Instead, Defendant claims that, as a
matter of law, he cannot be required to pay court costs because a subsequent fee bill sent
to the Missouri Department of Corrections (as required by section 550.190) “was signed
(certified) by both the prosecuting attorney and the judge. And this fee bill states that the
Bill of Costs ‘is properly chargeable against the State of Missouri.’” As the State rightly
points out, Defendant “must present evidence – testimonial, by affidavit, or otherwise –
to establish that [he] is unable to pay the court costs.” State v. Bertrand, 636 S.W.3d
181, 193 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020). Defendant did not do so.
Because no facial manifest injustice appears, we decline to review Point 1 for
plain error.
Point 2 – Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant’s second point claims:
The trial court erred in denying [Defendant]’s motion for judgment of
acquittal after all the evidence, and in entering judgment and sentence,
because the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that [Defendant] had attempted to cause physical injury to [Victim]
by hitting [Victim] with a wood plank, in that the only evidence was that
the two girls were the only ones seen holding the wood plank and
[Defendant] was never seen holding the wood plank or striking [Victim]
with it, and the failure to grant [Defendant]’s motion for judgment of
acquittal violated [Defendant]’s rights[.]
3
We disagree.
Governing Law and Standard of Review
A person commits the offense of assault in the second degree when he attempts to
cause physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous
instrument. Section 565.052.1(2). A person commits armed criminal action when he
“commits any felony . . . by, with, or through the use, assistance, or aid of a dangerous
instrument or deadly weapon[.]” Section 571.015.1.
“We review the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal under
the same standard of review used in reviewing a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury’s guilty verdict.” State v.
Sokolic, 660 S.W.3d 54, 57 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023) (quoting State v.
Bennish, 479 S.W.3d 678, 684-85 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015)). . . . “The
appellate court’s role is limited to a determination of whether the state
presented sufficient evidence from which a trier of fact could have
reasonably found the defendant guilty.” [State v. Niederstadt, 66 S.W.3d
12,] 13-14 [(Mo. banc 2002)]. “The Court examines the evidence and
inferences in the light most favorable to the verdict, ignoring all contrary
evidence and inferences.” Id. at 14.
State v. Shoemaker, 675 S.W.3d 672, 677-78 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023).
The Evidence & Analysis
Victim lived with her two children in a house that she rented from Defendant
(“the home”). In March 2020, Victim’s father (“Father”) had spinal surgery, and when
Father was released from a rehabilitation facility, he came to live with Victim and the
children in the home. Victim had been released from her job during the COVID-19
pandemic, and she soon began having trouble paying her rent. In April 2020, someone
tried to drill the locks out of the home, and Victim’s tires were slashed several times
between April and June, 2020.
4
Defendant and his girlfriend began staying at the home, and in July 2020, Victim
returned from work to find that she had been locked out of the home. The police allowed
Victim into the home, and she and Father began sleeping in one room.
On July 17, 2020, Victim returned to the home and found the door to her bedroom
had been removed, along with the doors to the front and back of the home. The police
returned, and they told Defendant to put the doors back on. They also told Victim to stay
in her room, and they told Defendant and his girlfriend to stay on the other side of the
home.
At some point after Victim went to bed, Defendant came through Victim’s
bedroom window and started punching her in the face. Two women kicked in the
bedroom door, and they started hitting Victim in the face with the handle from a floor
jack. They hit Victim everywhere on her body, and they dragged her off of her bed. The
two women then pulled Victim up and held her by her arms. Victim was then “struck in
the back of [the] head with a wooden object, four-by-four or two-by-four.”
At trial, Victim identified a photograph that depicted the wooden object that hit
her, and she said that it hit her so hard that it broke into two pieces. Victim also testified
that Defendant was the person who hit her from behind with the board.
Defendant claims there was insufficient evidence to convict him of second-degree
assault and armed criminal action because no one actually saw him strike Victim with the
board. The State argues that the evidence adduced at trial supported a reasonable
inference that Defendant struck Victim with the board or, at a minimum, acted in concert
with others who struck Victim with the board. We agree.
5
As earlier noted, Victim testified that Defendant hit her with the board. Even if
Victim did not actually see Defendant hitting her with the board, the only other person in
the room apart from Victim’s attackers was Father. Based upon that fact, and that the two
women were holding Victim, the jury could reasonably infer that Defendant was the
person who wielded the board. “[T]he testimony of only one witness may be sufficient to
sustain a conviction[.]” State v. Peeler, 603 S.W.3d 917, 922 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020)
(quoting State v. Alexander, 505 S.W.3d 384, 395 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016)). Victim’s
testimony was sufficient to allow a reasonable juror to find, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that Defendant caused or attempted to cause serious physical injury to Victim by means
of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument.
Point 2 is denied, and the presumed-correct judgment of the circuit court is
affirmed.
DON E. BURRELL, J. – OPINION AUTHOR
MARY W. SHEFFIELD, J. – CONCURS
MATTHEW P. HAMNER, J. – CONCURS
6