The opinion
In the Missourt Court of Appeals
Castern District
DIVISION TWO
SWEETGUM PROPERTIES, LLC, ) No. ED112750
)
Appellant, J Appeal from the Circuit Court of
) St, Louis County
)
)
)
)
vs. 23SL-CC04959
ST. LOUIS COUNTY BOARD OF
EQUALIZATION, CHERYL A. KUNZLER
JAMES F. HORNE, AND ROBERTS. __)
KOCH, )
)
)
Honorable Brian H. May
Respondents. Filed: November 26, 2024
Before Lisa P. Page, P.J., Rebeca Navarro-McKelvey, J., and Patricia Breckenridge, Sp. J.
OPINION
Sweetgum Properties, LLC (Sweetgum) appeals from the trial court’s judgment quashing
the writ of certiorari issued in the case and dismissing Sweetgum’s writ petition. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Sweetgum is the owner of property located in St. Louis County (Property). The St. Louis
County Assessor (Assessor) increased the appraised and assessed value of the Property in 2023,
and Sweetgum filed an appeal with the St. Louis County Board of Equalization (BOE). After a
hearing, the BOE upheld the Assessor’s valuation of the Property. Sweetgum subsequently filed
a petition for a writ of certiorari against the BOE and its members in the St. Louis County circuit
court directing the BOE to file its record of the hearing with the court, to review the BOE’s
decision in light of the record, and to reverse the BOE’s decision with instructions for the BOE
1o adopt Sweetgum’s proposed fair market value. The trial court initially issued a preliminary
writ of certiorari. In response, the BOE filed a motion to quash the writ and dismiss the petition,
which the trial court granted. This appeal follows.'
DISCUSSION
In its sole point on appeal, Sweetgum argues the trial court erred in quashing the writ of
certiorari and dismissing its petition because the court erroneously declared and applied the law.”
According to Sweetgum, the plain language of Section 138.430 RSMo (Cum. Supp. 2021) does
not apply to the procedural claims it asserts are at issue in this matter because the statute only
requires appeal to the Missouri State Tax Commission (STC) of issues related to assessment,
valuation, methodology, and discrimination. We disagree.
Standard of Review
In its brief Sweetgum states the appropriate standard of review is of the trial court’s grant
of a motion to dismiss, which is de novo, citing Lynch v. Lynch, 260 S.W.3d 834, 836 (Mo. banc
2008). The BOE accepts Sweetgum’s statement of the standard of review and “further includes”
the standard of review for quashed writs of certiorari. Neither party sets forth the correct
standard of review.
While the denial of a writ application is not generally appealable, where the trial court
has issued a preliminary writ which is then quashed, the order quashing the writ is an appealable
final judgment. State ex rel. Rosenberg v. Jarrett, 233 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007)
(internal citation omitted). In Professional Fire Fighters of Eastern Missouri v. City of
| Sweetgum initially filed its appeal in the Missouri Supreme Court, arguing it had exclusive jurisdiction over the
construction of revenue laws of the state. The Supreme Court ordered the cause transferred to our court “where
jurisdiction is vested.”
2 In addition to its point on appeal, Sweetgum argues in the jurisdictional statement that we may determine the
matter should be transferred to the Supreme Court, even in light of its decision that jurisdiction is vested in our
court, We decline to transfer the case.
3 All further statutory references are to RSMo (Cum. Supp. 2021), unless otherwise indicated.
2
University City, 457 S.W.3d 23, 27-28 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014), this court found it is the manner in
which the trial court disposes of the writ petition that determines the proper standard of review,
just as if the case was brought as original litigation. In that case, the key question was whether
the trial court resolved the underlying controversy on its merits. Jd. Where the trial court
considers and rules on the merits of the controversy, we will affirm the denial of a writ unless it
is not supported by substantial evidence, it is against the weight of the evidence, or the court
erroneously declares or applies the law. Jd.
However, if the trial court has issued a preliminary order and subsequently quashes the
writ, effectively denying a permanent writ, our review is for abuse of discretion. U.S. Dept. of
Veterans Affairs v. Boresi, 396 S.W.3d 356, 359 (Mo. bane 2013). Thus, because we are
reviewing the trial court’s disposition of Sweetgum’s underlying writ petition by quashing the
preliminary writ without considering the merits of the underlying controversy, our review is only
whether the trial court abused its discretion in quashing the preliminary writ. State ex rel.
Rosenberg, 233 S.W.3d at 761. We presume the ruling of the trial court is correct, and we will
find an abuse of discretion only where the decision is clearly against the logic of the
circumstances and arbitrary and unreasonable. Jd. “An abuse of discretion in denying a writ
occurs when the circuit court misapplies the applicable statutes.” Boresi, 396 S.W.3d at 359.
Analysis
The central question in this case is whether Sweetgum’s claim must be appealed to the
STC under Section 138.430. Sweetgum contends it is merely challenging the BOE’s failure to
comply with the statutes requiring it to follow a certain procedure in evaluating the assessment,
rather than raising any substantive issue regarding the BOE’s decision, and therefore, its petition
for writ of certiorari was appropriate. Specifically, Sweetgum claims the assessed valuation of
the Property increased more than fifteen percent from the previous assessment, which required
the Assessor to prove a physical inspection was performed pursuant to Section 137.115. Section
138.060.1. Accordingly, Sweetgum asserts Section 138.060.1 required the BOE to rule in
Sweetgum’s favor on its appeal of the assessment as a matter of law because the Assessor failed.
to present sufficient evidence to establish the physical inspection was performed.
However, the administrative process set forth in chapters 137 and 138 is not “merely a
procedural checklist to judicial review.” Bravo vy, Jackson Co. Bd. of Equalization, 638 S.W.3d
913, 921 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021). It is part of a “complex scheme of property taxation,” general
supervision of which is vested in the STC. Bartlett y. Ross, 891 S.W.2d 114, 116 (Mo. banc
1995): Section 138.410, This scheme initially requires a complaint about the property
assessment be brought before a county board of equalization, which shall determine “all appeals
from the valuation of property made by the assessor... .” Section 138.060.1. Pursuant to
Section 138.430.1, property owners then have the right to appeal “all questions and disputes
involving the assessment against such property. . .” determined by the local board of equalization
to the STC. The STC then investigates the appeal and “shall correct any assessment or valuation
which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary or capricious.” Section 138.430.1. In
light of the STC’s particular expertise to enforce the laws relating to property taxation, the
legislature set forth these parameters for a taxpayer’s challenge to an assessment. Bravo, 638
S.W.3d at 921. In doing so, the legislature expressly limited direct appeal of local board of
equalization decisions to only those “involving the exclusion or exemption of such property from
assessment or from the tax rolls,” or “the taxable situs of such property.” Section 138.430.3.4
* Sweetgum does not argue either of these exceptions as the basis of its appeal of the BOE decision.
4
In its order quashing the preliminary writ of certiorari and dismissing Sweetgum’s
petition, the trial court found that the issue of whether the Assessor properly demonstrated the
performance of an “appropriate physical property inspection” concerned a “question and dispute
involving” the assessment of Sweetgum’s property. As a result, the court concluded Sweetgum
was required to exhaust the administrative remedy provided to it in Section 138.430.1. We
agree.
The well-established doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires an
aggrieved party to seek available remedies before the court can intervene. State ex rel. Jackson
Co. v. Chamberlain, 679 S.W.3d 463, 465 (Mo. banc 2023). This doctrine must be of primary
consideration when construing a statute providing for review of administrative action. /d.
(internal quotation omitted). As discussed above, the legislature has expressly set forth the
procedure to appeal an assessment. Only after exhausting the administrative remedies may a
taxpayer then seek judicial review in the circuit court. Section 138.430; Section 536.100; see
also State ex rel. Jackson Co., 679 S.W.3d at 465.
Sweetgum claims its petition for writ of certiorari was proper pursuant to Section
536.150.1 because the statute states, in relevant part, that when an administrative officer or body
has rendered a decision “which is not subject to administrative review, determining the legal
rights, duties or privileges of any person . . . and there is no other provision for judicial inquiry
into or review of such decision,” it may be reviewed by suit for certiorari. (emphasis added).
Sweetgum argues its challenge to the Assessor’s failure to provide sufficient evidence of a
physical inspection pursuant to Section 137.115 is such a claim because it is procedural in
nature. Thus, it was not raising any issue subject to administrative review under Section
138.430.1.
Sweetgum relies on State ex rel. Wilson Chevrolet, Inc. v. Wilson, 332 S.W.2d 867 (Mo.
1960), to support its argument that taxpayers can bring a petition for writ of certiorari under
Section 536.150 to review procedural issues. The Wilson Court held the trial court erred in
quashing its preliminary writ of certiorari because the writ was appropriate to review the records
of the local board of equalization to determine whether the board had given proper notice to the
taxpayer as a jurisdictional prerequisite to its decision. /d. at 873. Upon the record before it, the
Court was able to discern there was no proof of personal notice to the taxpayers as required by
statute. Jd. at 871-72. The Court noted this simple, jurisdictional fact must be affirmatively
shown by the agency’s record and because notice was not shown in the record, the Court
declared the proceedings increasing the tax valuation were void. /d. at 872-73. But the
Supreme Court plainly stated, “[i]t seems clear that Section 536.105° was not intended to be
applicable in providing a review (by stated statutory actions, including certiorari) of a decision of
a local board of equalization.” Jd. at 872.
It is undisputed Sweetgum had the right to appeal the issue of a Section 137.115 physical
inspection to the STC as one of “all questions and disputes involving the assessment” against its
Property. Section 138.430.1 (emphasis added). The STC is vested with the authority to
investigate and correct any assessment that is “shown to be unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary
or capricious.” Jd. Unlike the jurisdictional issue considered in Wilson, Sweetgum is arguing a
contested factual issue regarding the sufficiency of proof of the physical inspection best left to
the expertise of the STC. This is not such a jurisdictional issue.
Section 138.430.1 clearly encompasses Sweetgum’s allegation that there was insufficient
evidence of a physical inspection of the property to support the assessment. As a result, the
5 At the time the case was decided the relevant language contained in Section 536.150 was then in Section 536.105.
6
BOE’s decision was subject to administrative review, and Section 536.150 does not apply. As
previously discussed, Sweetgum must exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking judicial
review of the assessment, which required Sweetgum to appeal the BOE’s decision to the STC.
See State ex rel. Jackson Co., 679 S.W.3d at 465. Thus, the trial court did not err in quashing the
writ of certiorari and dismissing Sweetgum’s petition. Point one is denied.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
IN
CUAL
~ Lisa P. Pag, Presiding Judge
Rebeca Navarro-McKelvey, J., and
Patricia Breckenridge, Sp. J., concur.