“In determining the appropriate choice of law, this Court applies Pennsylvania's choice-of-law rules. Under Pennsylvania law, ‘courts generally honor the intent of the contracting parties and enforce choice of law provisions in contracts executed by them.’”
How later courts described this case
- “In determining the appropriate choice of law, this Court applies Pennsylvania's choice-of-law rules. Under Pennsylvania law, ‘courts generally honor the intent of the contracting parties and enforce choice of law provisions in contracts executed by them.’”
- Court does not take facts related to damages as true for purposes of default judgment
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
SIGNATURE ENERGY LLC, )
SIGNATURE ENERGY CARD SERVICES )
LLC, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 25-540
) Judge Nora Barry Fischer
CORPORATE AIR LLC, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION
In this case, Plaintiffs Signature Energy LLC (“Signature”) and Signature Energy Card
Services LLC (“SECS”) bring alternative claims of breach of contract and unjust
enrichment/promissory estoppel against Defendant Corporate Air LLC based on its nonpayment
of invoices for aviation fuel and default on its credit accounts held with Plaintiffs. (Docket No.
1). Presently before the Court is a Motion for Default Judgment, a declaration from counsel, and
brief in support filed by Plaintiffs seeking a default in the amounts of unpaid invoices, contractual
interest/late fees and attorney’s fees and costs. (Docket Nos. 11; 12). After careful consideration
and for the following reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion [12] will be granted, in part, and denied, in part.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Allegations
Based on the uncontested allegations in Plaintiffs’ Complaint, the Court finds the
following. Plaintiff Signature is a successor entity to EPIC Aviation, LLC and is in the business
of selling aviation fuel to customers. (Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 1, 9, 12). Plaintiff SECS is a successor
entity to EPIC Card Services, LLC and provides credit to certain aviation fuel customers enabling
them to use charge cards for fuel purchases. (Id. at ¶¶ 2, 10, 17). Defendant operates a customer
cargo airline transportation business out of Allegheny County Airport in West Mifflin. (Id. at ¶¶
5, 11).
For diversity purposes, both Plaintiffs trace their citizenship to the same ultimate parent
company, Signature Aviation US holdings, Inc., which is a Delaware Corporation with its principal
place of business in Florida. (Id. at ¶¶ 1-4). The sole member of Defendant is an individual, Mark
Schreiner, who is a resident of Pennsylvania. (Id. at ¶ 5). As the Plaintiffs are citizens of Delaware
and Florida and Defendant is a citizen of Pennsylvania, the parties are completely diverse. See 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a).
Plaintiffs and Defendant are parties to three separate agreements pursuant to which
Defendant was able to purchase aviation fuel from Plaintiffs on credit and/or using the credit cards:
1) a Fuel Purchase Agreement entered into by Defendant and EPIC
Aviation, LLC (now Plaintiff Signature) on April 1, 2010 and
amended on October 1, 2013, Pl. Exs. 1, 2;
2) an EPIC Card account originally formed on April 2, 2010
between Defendant and EPIC Aviation, LLC (now Plaintiff
Signature), Pl. Ex. 3; and,
3) a Signature Card account, originally formed on April 25, 2018
between Defendant and Epic Card Services, LLC (now Plaintiff
SECS), Pl. Ex. 4.
(See Pl. Exs 1-6). All three agreements are: governed by Oregon law; require Defendant to timely
pay costs incurred for aviation fuel purchases; authorize Plaintiffs to recover attorneys’ fees and
costs for enforcement actions; and, permit Plaintiffs to charge interest on late payments, including
eighteen percent (18%) per year on the entire unpaid balance under the Fuel Purchase Agreement
and twelve percent (12%) per year on delinquent credit accounts for the EPIC Card and Signature
Card. (Id.). Each of the agreements also permitted the initial entities to assign them to the
successor entities which are Plaintiffs in this action. (/d.). The credit card agreements further
enable the issuers to demand full and immediate payment of all outstanding amounts upon a default
by the borrower. (Pl. Exs. 5, 6).
In Count I, Signature alleges that it has adhered to all of its obligations under the Fuel
Purchase Agreement, as amended, but that Corporate Air LLC breached same by failing to pay
funds owed for fuel purchased under the agreement. (Docket No. 1 at □ 26-32). Signature
maintains that Corporate Air LLC was advised of the breach on January 31, 2025 and that it owes
Signature $522,182.10 in principal and $46,601.87 in interest on this account as of the date of
filing, April 22, 2025. (Ud. at J§ 28-29). Signature has attached a series of invoices to the
Complaint seeking the same amount of principal and after computing the interest at 18% annually
for each invoice, the Court has compiled the following chart:
‘OUTSTANDING FUEL PURCHASE AGREEMENT INVOICES - COURT |
INVOICE DATE DATE CUSTOMER POs INVOICE LOAD NUMBER AMOUNT ECF Rate Days ingerest
S/a20a4 aa7/2004 573209 7eg0281 S22711 $26,210.19 1-2AT2 O.L8 4/22/2005 206 52,662.67
e/19/2004 10/3/2004 ETHAN 7eaoen4 S22075 $26,196.91 1-2AT3 4/22/2005 200 52,593.71
e/1s/20a4 10/3/2004 373230 Fea3S55 S29357 $25,697.92 1-3.AT4 0.18 4/22/2025 200 $2,594.53
e/m/2a4 10/4/2004 373231 Fe40310 S29896 $25,605.29 1-2.ATS 0.18 4/22/2025 199 §2,519.01
Simms loya/a0aa 373231 Fe40311 S29855 $25,655.04 LATS 0.18 4/22/2025 199 52,517.74
S/2e/2004 12/2004 373233 Feq22e5 SMEG2 $25,909.01 LSAT? 0.18 4/22/2025 191 52,446.07
S/2a/2004 10/12/2004 373233 Feaz2e7 SMG62 $25,939.28 12ATS O.18 4/22/2005 191 52,445.15
S/2a/20a4 10/12/2004 S7a234 Teas S982 $25,991.55 1-3A4T9 0.18 4/22/2005 191 52,448.22
Halas 10/13/ ma Saas TEI M985 $97,460.09 1-54T 10 0.18 4/22/2005 190 $3,510.32
SV3/2004 10/20/2004 Sais faa B666 $25,005.50 1-84T 11 0.18 4/22/2005 183 2287.71
iG ad 16/5 Sarat tau Bes §25.6ib 1-5AT 12 O18 4fz2/aoas 178 S2a692
Nila 16h vie TM6siS 26781 $25,406.87 1-207 1 O18 afsa/ a5 50,092.65
Hiv 10/B/ Sih THAG?11 EYMLE $24, 01042 1-2aT O18 af2/ 175 $2,008.71
Wav Lisa S7a242 TRSGDS EMTS $25,802.29 1-287 15 O18 4/72/05 168 51,972.00
Sinalmes Liao S7HU1 Tea) S27RS6 S24, E0146 1-3.AT 16 O18 4/22/25 168 52,015.02
S{35/2004 11/9/2004 ETHAN TRH9652 S2GR02 $25, 731-90 LEAT IT O.L8 4/22/2005 463 $1,907.61
Sizs/z0aa 1i/s/2004 573343 Tea9653 SIRSTE $23,049.05 1-3.AT 18 4/22/2025 463° $1,927.07
S/2a/20a4 11/14/2004 373245 Tes0S02 S29260 S24 057.85 1-3.AT 19 O.18 4/22/2025 058 $1,874.53
Saad 1l4/2004 373240 Tas0o7? S27660 $33,100.14 1-2.AT 20 4/22/2025 058 $2,579.25
LOY 1/2004 11/15/2004 s73246 Fasl392 S4S4 924/009.93 1-2. II O.18 4/22/2005 157 $1,363.61
‘OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS S522, 18210
inkerest bs SOLA
TOTAL $565,751.97
(See Pl. Ex. 7). Beyond the principal and interest set forth above, Plaintiff also seeks post-
judgment interest at the judgment rate, and an award of attorney fees and costs. (Docket No. 1 at
6). Signature seeks the same relief against Defendant under the alternative theories of unjust
enrichment/promissory estoppel at Count III. (Docket No. 1 at 40-44).
In Count II, Plaintiff SECS alleges that it complied with all conditions of the credit card
agreements for the Signature Card and Epic Card accounts and that Defendant defaulted on both
by failing to pay balances owed to it, i.e., $230,872.39 on the EPIC Card, including finance
charges, late fees and interest; and $64,838.11 on the Signature Card, including finance charges,
late fees and interest. (Docket No. 1 at J§ 33-39). Once again, SECS seeks the same relief in Count
IV, asserting alternative theories of unjust enrichment/promissory estoppel. (Ud. at 45-49).
SECS has attached a series of invoices to the Complaint for unpaid charges made on the
two accounts and finance charges which were assessed during the relevant period. (PI. Exs. 8; 9).
As to the Signature Account, the Court has compiled the following chart from the attached
invoices:
OUTSTANDING SIGNATURE CARD COUNT It
PURCHASE Da TE STATEMENT DATE GAURD O. INWOICE & AMOUNT ECF
aad 16/204 "0016 575319-1540724 §.2.M 1-10
a/li/2004 WING "O06 BELLS SL676.00 1-L0AT3
a/laimaa 9/16/2024 “0131 S500 1S: 15410001 $160.23 1-L0AT4
af23/2004 24/2024 “0016 414398143871 SLI7600 1-10 ATS
a/23/ 24 S/24/2006 “0131 14521-11452 S2.40017 1-10
eto "0016 ATs SLSLAT2 1-10
os S44 "OLE 4153-1518 SLH2.00 1-LOATE
‘o/23/ 04 9/24/2004 "0124 A16194- 15431461 $190.17 1-L0ATS
‘3/26/2004 S/27/2004 “0124 S42590-1497215 $3,532.17 1-L0 AT 10
‘3/26/2004 S/27/2004 "0018 42499-1757 $2,164.16 1-L0 ATO
of 23/2024 S/320/2004 "0131 a20682- 17258 S6.097.76 1-10 AT 12
o/2as 2 S20e4 "01M ARMS $1615.09 1-10 47 13
Oy Lia 10/2/2004 “0131 aeago-15ee7Se4 $1,954.73 1-L0.AT 14
120 10/2/2004 “0131 9 Aa 708015807463 $2403.17 1-10.47 15
o/a 2008 1O/7/2004 “D016 = BSED ISSA $843.80 120 AT 16
10/s/ 2008 1OfT/20G8 *D01S = aSG61 1S $2,633.09 1-00 47 17
LOS) aoe. ahee “0006 597-1 $1515.72 1-20.47 18
Lae IM "0015 | ASRS 5h.7O0.08 1-10 47 29
Lo Lay a □□□ 20e8 "OLdd 474431-154 76058 $4,149.71 1-L0AT20
LO L620 WyIT2084 “0134 $81336-1M 79197 S3.119.17 1-L0AT
7/24. 10/12/2024 "0016 SE5105- 1481553 92,197.55 1-D0.AT 22
TOTAL Gutstanding S046 78
□□ 24 FINANCE CHARGE RH/ae PCHAGOOOOOt TA S153 1-14T 2
SEPT 24 FINAMOE CHARGE 9/20/2004 PCHAGORIOOO SSTL.a7 1-L0ATI4
(CCT 24 FINANCE CHARGE Loy 21/2004 PCHAGODIOOON Teas $778.58 1-L0ATIS
MOV 24 FINANCE CHARGE 11/20/2004 PCHRGODOOOO0I 7921 5765.10 1-10. AT 26
DEC 24 FINALE Laa/20e4 PCHAGOOOOO0] Tai $6041 1-10.47 27
JAN 2S PAPO OMLGEeE L/SL/2025 PCH DOOOD00 101 1 6041 1-10 47 28
Tosal Finance Charges 53.596.90
TOTAL S34 042.68
With respect to the EPIC Card, the Court has compiled the following chart from the
attached invoices:
rtanone ene J
288} ei es
[___s/atane| ___syS/2oaa|-onre _[asaTi7-isiaanie | _s8i7780|0-9aT 14 |
| avnavzozs] avueyzomel*ors lanancoasennees | $54.48 [1-9.aT 30 |
= eae
eee aed
PO
Jag Finance charge | S/2H/2028| PREHRGOGMOOITEST | 587A □□ /LS.AT 4S |
ponmwonsmanctoanes TTP peal
po
(Pl. Ex. 9). Plaintiffs’ Complaint does not include invoices for finance charges assessed in
February, March or April, 2025. (See Docket No. 1).
B. Procedural History
Plaintiffs initiated this action by filing their Complaint against Defendant on April 22,
2025. (Docket No. 1). They then paid $100 to have Allegheny County Deputy Sheriff Calvin
Cygrymus serve the Complaint and Summons on Corporate Air LLC and service was effectuated
on April 28, 2025 by providing it to the person in charge of the business at 15 Allegheny County
Airport in West Mifflin, PA, ie., flight attendant Susan Pernice. (Docket Nos. 4, 5). Proof of
service was filed on CM/ECF on April 29 and May 5, 2025. (Docket Nos. 4, 5). Defendant did
not timely answer the Complaint within 21 days or by May 19, 2025, as required by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and as is expressly stated on the Summons form. (Id.).
On May 20, 2025, Plaintiffs requested that the Clerk of Court enter default against
Defendant after it failed to plead or otherwise respond to the Complaint. (Docket No. 6). Later that
same day, the Clerk issued an entry of default. (Docket No. 7). On May 22, 2025, Plaintiffs filed
a motion for default judgment, including an award of attorneys’ fees and costs as part of default
judgment, a declaration by lead counsel Joseph F. Butcher, Esq., a proposed Order, and a brief in
support. (Docket Nos. 11; 12). The Court ordered the Plaintiffs to serve Defendant with the
Court’s Order and directed Defendants to file a response by June 6, 2025. (Docket No. 13).
Thereafter, Plaintiffs submitted a Notice and Proof of Service of May 30, 2025 Order of Court,
indicating that the Order was served on Defendant via U.S. Mail, First Class postage prepaid at its
address of record. (Docket No. 14). Defendant has not filed a response as of the date of this
Memorandum Opinion and Order.
C. Attorney’s Fees and Costs and Additional Interest
In Plaintiffs’ accompanying fee petition, Attorney Butcher declares that Plaintiffs have
been represented by three attorneys from Zimmer Kunz PLLC, including him, shareholder Ryan
Zeli, Esq. and associate Kyzen Smith, Esq. (Docket No. 11-1). Attorney Butcher states that the
hourly rates of $300 claimed for the shareholder fees and $225 for the associate fees are
“customary billing rates for these attorneys,” “commensurate with [their] respective levels of
experience and credentials at the time the services were performed,” and that the hourly rates are
“fair and reasonable” when compared to hourly rates charged by “other attorneys of similar
practice areas and tenure” in this area. (Docket No. 11-1 at ¶¶ 4-6).
The fee petition includes timesheets detailing the services performed by each attorney and
the costs incurred by the firm during the representation from March 26, 2025 and the filing of the
motion for default judgment on May 22, 2025. (Docket No. 11-1 at 4-12). Specifically, Plaintiffs
seek the following:
Attorney. Hours Rate Amaound
JFE Butcher, Joseph F 4.70 S200,.00 $10,760.00
ms ESSSs oy ee
EXPENSE SUMMARY
Cade Description Amount
a3 COURIER SERVICE 100M)
Total Fees & Disbursements $20,207.50
Balance due upon receipt $20,507.50
(Docket No. 11-1 at 12).
As to additional interest on the outstanding invoices, Attorney Butcher declares that the
interest due on the three accounts for the 31-day period from the date the Complaint was filed
April 22, 2025 through the date of the motion, May 22, 2025, includes the following:
1. $7,982.95 in interest (at 18%) on the outstanding balances for
the Fuel Purchase Agreement;
2. $2,157.13 in interest (at 12%) on the outstanding balance for the
EPIC Card Account; and,
3. $600.41 in interest (at 12%) on the outstanding balance for the
Signature Account.
(Docket No. 11-1 at §§ 7-12). Plaintiffs assert that they will provide updated information
concerning attorney’s fees and costs in a supplemental motion, if a hearing is deemed necessary
in this matter and/or additional fees and costs are incurred. (Docket No. 12).
III.LEGAL STANDARDS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a) provides, “When a party against whom a judgment
for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by
affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party's default.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). If a plaintiff
seeks relief other than a “sum certain” in damages, the plaintiff “must apply to the court for a
default judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). That is what has occurred here, as Plaintiffs have filed a
motion seeking a default judgment including the sums certain set forth in the Complaint as well as
additional interest, attorneys’ fees and costs.
“[T]he entry of a default judgment is left primarily to the discretion of the district
court.” Hritz v. Woma Corp., 732 F.2d 1178, 1180 (3d Cir. 1984); see also Thornton v. West, 529
F. App’x 107, 110 (3d Cir. June 17, 2013). Upon the Clerk’s entry of default, “the factual
allegations of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as
true.” Comdyne I, Inc. v. Corbin, 908 F.2d 1142, 1149 (3d Cir. 1990); Murphy v. Ability Recovery
Servs., LLC, 2019 WL 7708592, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 2019). That said, “the Court need not
accept the moving party's legal conclusions[.]” Bower v. NRA Grp., LLC, 2019 WL 3306515, at
*2 (W.D. Pa. July 22, 2019) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, “the Court
must decide whether the unchallenged facts constitute a legitimate cause of action,” before
entering a default judgment against the defendant. Murphy, 2019 WL 7708592, at *1 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Once the Court determines that the plaintiff has plausibly
alleged a valid cause of action, the Court must consider three factors when deciding whether to
grant default judgment: “(1) prejudice to the plaintiff if default is denied, (2) whether the defendant
appears to have a litigable defense, and (3) whether defendant’s delay is due to culpable
conduct.” Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2000).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55, the Court “may conduct hearings” when it
needs to “determine the amount of damages” to enter or effectuate a default judgment. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 55(b)(2)(B). “Rule 55(b)(2)’s language regarding hearings is permissive.” Joe Hand
Promotions, Inc. v. Yakubets, 3 F. Supp. 3d 261, 271 (E.D. Pa. 2014). As numerous courts have
held, if the Court can determine the amount of damages to be awarded based on affidavits or other
evidentiary materials, “[t]he Court is under no requirement to conduct an evidentiary hearing with
testimony.” E. Elec. Corp. of N.J. v. Shoemaker Constr. Co., 657 F. Supp. 2d 545, 552 (E.D. Pa.
2009); see Rainey v. Diamond State Port Corp., 354 Fed. App’x. 722, 724 (3d Cir. 2009) (“If it is
necessary to determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment by
evidence, the court may conduct a hearing.”) (emphasis added and internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). The Court, in its discretion, does not believe that a hearing is warranted to resolve
this matter.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Liability
The Court initially turns to the first step in the default judgment analysis, i.e., whether “the
unchallenged facts” put forward by the Plaintiffs “constitute a legitimate cause of action.” Murphy,
2019 WL 7708592, at *1 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, the unchallenged
facts certainly put forth legitimate causes of action at Counts I and II for breach of contract against
Defendant arising from its breach of the Fuel Purchase Agreement and the terms of the agreements
for the EPIC Card and Signature Card accounts.1 (See Docket No. 1).
1 As Plaintiffs have conceded that no further relief is sought for their alternative theories of unjust
enrichment/promissory estoppel at Counts III and IV, such claims will be dismissed, without prejudice and no further
discussion of such claims is necessary. (See Docket No. 11 at ¶ 23).
The parties agreed that Oregon law governs their contractual relationships and Oregon law
will be applied to analyze the agreements. See Kruzits v. Okuma Mach. Tool, 40 F.3d 52, 55 (3d
Cir. 1994) (“In determining the appropriate choice of law, this Court applies Pennsylvania's
choice-of-law rules. Under Pennsylvania law, ‘courts generally honor the intent of the contracting
parties and enforce choice of law provisions in contracts executed by them.’”). It is well
established that “[t]o maintain a claim for breach of contract under Oregon law, a party must
‘allege the existence of a contract, its relevant terms, plaintiff's full performance and lack [of]
breach, and defendant’s breach resulting in damage to plaintiff.’” Farmer v. Thar Process, Inc.,
705 F. Supp. 3d 1218, 1226 (D. Or. 2023) (quoting Slover v. Oregon Bd. of Clinical Social
Workers, 144 Or. App. 565, 570, 927 P.2d 1098 (1996)) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). Oregon law also permits the recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs in proceedings to
enforce a contract where such relief is specified in the contract. See Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 20.096(1)
(“(1) In any action or suit in which a claim is made based on a contract that specifically provides
that attorney fees and costs incurred to enforce the provisions of the contract shall be awarded to
one of the parties, the party that prevails on the claim shall be entitled to reasonable attorney fees
in addition to costs and disbursements, without regard to whether the prevailing party is the party
specified in the contract and without regard to whether the prevailing party is a party to the
contract.”).
With respect to Count I, Signature has sufficiently alleged that it met all of its obligations
under the Fuel Purchase Agreement, as amended, that Defendant breached the agreement by failing
to pay the outstanding invoices for aviation fuel purchases attached to the Complaint, and that it
has been damaged by the Defendant’s ongoing failure to pay the invoices. (See Docket No. 1 at
¶¶ 26-32). This agreement also authorized the assignment to Signature and expressly permitted it
to charge interest and seek attorneys’ fees and costs upon a default. (See Pl. Exs. 1; 2). Given
same, Signature has plainly set forth a valid breach of contract claim at Count I. See Farmer, 705
F.Supp. 3d at 1226.
Similarly, as to Count II, SECS has averred that it met all of its obligations under the
agreements for the EPIC Card and Signature Card, that Defendant breached those agreements by
defaulting on the accounts, and that SECS has been damaged by its ongoing failure to pay the
outstanding balances. (Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 33-39). The assignment to SECS is expressly permitted
under the agreements as are the recovery of attorney’s fees and finance charges, including late fees
and interest. (See Pl. Exs. 3-6).
Having determined that Plaintiffs have stated claims upon which relief can be granted for
breach of these agreements, the Court next considers whether Defendant has any “litigable
defenses,” that would prevent entry of a default judgment against it. Chamberlain v. Giampapa,
210 F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2000).
In this Court’s estimation, it appears that there are no valid bases for Defendant to challenge
jurisdiction or venue in this matter. To that end, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this
dispute based on diversity of citizenship because Plaintiffs are citizens of Florida and Delaware
while Defendant is a citizen of Pennsylvania such that the parties are completely diverse and the
amount in controversy exceeds the statutory threshold of $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).
The Court also has personal jurisdiction over Defendant because it was properly served with the
Summons and Complaint by having a Deputy Sheriff provide same to the person in charge of
Defendant’s business operating at 15 Allegheny Airport, West Mifflin, PA on April 19, 2025, as
is authorized under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and applicable Pennsylvania law. See
e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(A) (permitting service upon a corporation or other entity within a
judicial district in the manner prescribed in 4(e)(1)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1) (permitting service
upon by “following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts of general
jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or where service is made”); Pa. R. Civ.
P. 424(2) (“Service of original process upon a corporation or similar entity shall be made by
handing a copy to any of the following persons provided the person served is not a plaintiff in the
action […] (2) the manager, clerk or other person for the time being in charge of any regular place
of business or activity of the corporation or similar entity.”). Venue is also proper in this Court as
the breach of the agreements occurred within the Western District of Pennsylvania. 28 U.S.C.
§1391(b)(2).
All told, and after careful consideration, it does not appear that Defendant has any litigable
defenses that would prevent the entry of default judgment against it. See e.g., Murphy, 2019
WL7708592, at *3 (declaring that the defendant “appears to have been properly served, subject
matter jurisdiction is present, and venue is appropriate” and concluding that no litigable defenses
exist).
The Court next considers whether Plaintiffs would suffer prejudice if the Court did not
enter a default judgment against Defendant. Chamberlain, 210 F.3d at 164. “A plaintiff will be
prejudiced absent a default judgment where, due to the defendant’s continued failure to respond to
plaintiff’s claims, the plaintiff is left with no other recourse.” Cyprus Mines Corp. v. M & R Indus.,
Inc., 2015 WL 1469529, *8 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2015). Before the initiation of the instant action,
Defendant was provided with the invoices for the outstanding charges on the accounts, Plaintiffs
notified Defendant of the default on January 31, 2025, and Defendant has failed to pay its
obligations, amounting to several hundred thousand dollars due and owing. (Docket No. 1 at ¶¶
13-25). Moreover, despite being served, Defendant has refused to answer the Plaintiffs’ Complaint
or otherwise participate in this action. (See Docket Report Civ. A. No. 25-540). Accordingly, the
Court finds that Plaintiffs would suffer prejudice if the Court did not enter default judgment against
Defendant. See, e.g., Murphy, 2019 WL7708592, at *3, at *3.
At the next step in the default judgment analysis, the Court must consider whether
Defendant’s “delay is due to culpable conduct.” Chamberlain, 210 F.3d at 164. Again, this is an
action to collect on debts which have been outstanding for several months prior to Plaintiffs
alerting Defendant of the default on January 31, 2025, and the debts remain outstanding despite
Plaintiffs instituting this lawsuit on April 22, 2025, and later moving for a default judgment. (See
Docket No. 1). Plaintiffs were forced to engage counsel in an ongoing effort to collect these debts
while Defendant has effectively ignored its financial obligations, demonstrating its culpable
conduct. See Hritz v. Woma Corp., 732 F.2d 1178, 1183 (3d Cir. 1984). As such, the Court finds
that Plaintiffs have sufficiently established that they are entitled to a default judgment as to Counts
I and II.
B. Damages
The Court continues with its evaluation of the Plaintiffs’ request for damages as part of the
default judgment including breach of contract damages and interest/fees set forth in the Complaint
as well as additional interest since the filing of the Complaint and attorney’s fees and costs for
bringing and prosecuting this action to date. (See Docket Nos. 11; 12). Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(c) provides that “[a] default judgment must not differ in kind from, or exceed in
amount, what is demanded in the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c). Thus, the Court must examine
the damages requested in the motion for default judgment with respect to each Count to ensure
that it does not exceed that requested in the Complaint.
1. Count I
As to Defendant’s breach of the Fuel Purchase Agreement at Count I, Signature demanded
$522,182.10 in principal and $46,601.87 in interest through the date of the filing of the Complaint,
April 22, 2025, ongoing contractual interest, post-judgment interest and attorney’s fees. (Docket
No. 1 at ¶¶ 28-29). Counsel avers that the amount of interest accruing at 18% annually, from the
filing of the Complaint on April 22, 2025 and the next 31 days through the date of its Motion, May
22, 2025, included an additional $7,982.95 in interest. (Docket No. 11-1 at ¶ 8).
The Court has determined that the principal amount set forth in the Complaint is the same
amount as the outstanding balances on the submitted invoices (as is noted in the above chart) and
that the interest was properly computed in both the Complaint and the declaration of counsel. (See
e.g., Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 28-29; Pl. Ex. 7; p.3, supra). As those amounts are sufficiently supported
by invoices and straightforward computations of interest, the Court will include them in the default
judgment. For reasons explained below, the Court will also grant Signature’s request that half of
the attorneys’ fees and costs claimed be awarded to it in an amount of $10,151.25. See § V.B.3,
infra. In sum, the Court will award Signature damages of $587,170.67 at Count I, delineated as
follows:
COUNT I
Principal $522,182.10
Interest $54,584.82
1/2 Attorney Fees $10,151.25
1/2 Costs $252.50
TOTAL $587,170.67
2. Count 2
Moving on, as to Defendant’s breach of the agreements for the EPIC Card and Signature
Card accounts at Count II, the amounts that SECS demanded in its Complaint for outstanding
balances and finance charges on both accounts consist of single figures that are not broken down
between outstanding balances/finance charges and exceed the amounts which the Court has
computed from the invoices attached to the Complaint, as is noted below:
COUNT II ‐ EPIC COUNT II ‐ SIGNATURE
Complaint 230,872.39 Complaint $64,838.11
Invoices ‐ Outstanding Balance 214,877.19 Invoices ‐ Outstanding Balance $50,446.78
Invoices ‐ Finance Charges 10,844.90 Invoices ‐ Finance Charges $3,595.90
Invoices ‐ Total 225,722.09 Invoices ‐ Total $54,042.68
(See Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 37-39; Pl. Exs. 8, 9; p. 4-5, supra). The Court will include the amounts
supported by the invoices attached to the Complaint in the default judgment. See Comdyne I, Inc.,
908 F.2d at 1149 (Court does not take facts related to damages as true for purposes of default
judgment). In his declaration, Attorney Butcher avers that the finance charge (interest accruing at
12% annually), for the 31 days from the filing of the Complaint on April 22, 2025 through the date
of Plaintiffs’ Motion, May 22, 2025, included an additional $600.41 on the Signature Card and
$2,175.90 on the Epic Card. (Docket No. 11-1 at ¶¶ 9-12). While SECS did not include invoices
for the finance charges assessed in February, March, April, and May of 2025, the Court can
compute the daily rate for each account and determines that the total finance charges for the 111-
day period from February 1, 2025 through May 22, 2025 are $2,149.86 for the Signature Card and
$7,791.126 for the EPIC Card. Hence, the amounts in the following chart will be included in the
default judgment:
COUNT II ‐ EPIC COUNT II ‐ SIGNATURE
Invoices ‐ Outstanding Balance 214,877.19 Invoices ‐ Outstanding Balance $50,446.78
Invoices ‐ Finance Charges 10,844.90 Invoices ‐ Finance Charges $3,595.90
Additional Finance Charges 7,791.13 Additional Finance Charges $2,149.86
Invoices ‐ Total 233,513.22 Invoices ‐ Total $56,192.54
Grand Total Count II $289,705.76
For reasons explained in the next section of this Memorandum Opinion, the Court will also grant
SECS’ request that half of the attorneys’ fees and costs claimed be awarded to it in an amount of
$10,151.25. See § V.B.3, infra. Altogether, the Court will award SECS damages at Count II of
$300,109.51, as follows:
COUNT II ‐ TOTAL
EPIC $233,513.22
SIGNATURE $56,192.54
1/2 Attorney Fees $10,151.25
1/2 Costs $252.50
Total $300,109.51
3. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
Plaintiffs seek a total of $20,870.50 in attorney’s fees and $505 in costs and ask that the
fees and costs be equally apportioned between the default judgments for Signature and SECS.
(Docket Nos. 11; 12). The Court finds that the costs are appropriately claimed and will likewise
grant the request to apportion the award between the Plaintiffs. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1)
(“Unless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs--other than
attorney's fees--should be allowed to the prevailing party.”). With respect to their request for
attorneys’ fees, as noted above, all three agreements authorize Plaintiffs to recover attorneys’ fees
in this type of enforcement action and the same is consistent with Oregon law. (Pl. Ex. 1 at 7; Pl.
Ex. 4 at 2; Pl. Ex. 6 at 3). However, some additional analysis is required as the Court is tasked
with evaluating the reasonableness of the attorneys’ fees claimed.
Courts in the Third Circuit assess requests for attorneys’ fees using the lodestar method. In
re: S.S. Body Armor I., Inc. v. Carter Ledyard & Milburn LLP, 927 F.3d 763, 773 (3d Cir. 2019).
Under the lodestar method, a court determines the reasonable fee “by multiplying the number of
hours . . . reasonably worked on a client's case by a reasonable hourly billing rate for such services
given the geographical area, the nature of the services provided, and the experience of the
lawyer.” Id. An attorney’s reasonable hourly rate is “the prevailing rate[] in the community for
similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Clemens
v. New York Cen. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 903 F.3d 396, 402 (3d Cir. 2018). An attorney’s hourly rate
“is normally addressed by submitting affidavits of other attorneys in the relevant legal community
attesting to the range of prevailing rates charged by attorneys with similar skill and
experience.” See, e.g., Bd. of Tr. of Greater Pa. Carpenter’s Med. Plan v. Schwartzmiller, 2021
WL 679988, at *15 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 2021) (Fischer, J.). That said, courts have relied on other
probative evidence of an attorney’s hourly rate aside from affidavits. See Napold v. Parvatishver,
LLC, 2018 WL 1089680, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2018) (Fischer, J.) (finding that an hourly rate
was reasonable by examining the attorney-fee awards in other cases in the Western District of
Pennsylvania).
In the fee petition, Plaintiffs seek a total of $20,870.50 in attorney’s fees for the 78.4 hours
of work performed by Zimmer Kunz PLLC, and request hourly rates of $300 for shareholders
Butcher and Zeli and $225 for associate Smith. (Docket Nos. 11; 11-1; 12). Attorney Butcher
avers that the hourly rates are those customarily charged by these attorneys for services rendered
to their clients. (Docket No. 11-1 at ¶ 4). The Court also agrees with Attorney Butcher’s opinion
that the hourly rates are reasonable and consistent with the fees charged by other attorneys with
similar levels of experience in the Pittsburgh legal market. (Docket No. 11-1 at ¶ 6). To that end,
both shareholders involved in this action have significant experience as Butcher was admitted to
the Pennsylvania Bar in 2000 and has 24 years of experience while Zeli was admitted in 2006 and
has 18 years of experience. Associate attorney Smith was admitted in 2000 and has five years of
experience. This Court has approved similar hourly rates for lawyers with equivalent experience
levels. See e.g., Pletcher et al. v. Giant Eagle, et al., Civ. A. No. 20-754, Docket Nos. 112, 114
(W.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2021) (adopting Report and Recommendation of Special Master finding that
hourly rate of $350 for attorney with 15 years of experience was reasonable for defending ADA
case); Board of Trustees of OPCMIA Local 526 Combined Funds, Inc. v. Spartan Construction
Services, Inc. et al., Civ. A. No. 24-1406, Docket No. 22 (W.D. Pa. May 29, 2025) (approving fee
petition for ERISA default judgment action and approving hourly rate of $250 for attorney with 5
years of experience). Thus, the Court holds that the instant hourly rates are reasonable.
When it comes to examining whether the number of hours expended by an attorney is
reasonable, a “court may not reduce an award sua sponte; rather, it can only do so in response to
specific objections made by the opposing party.” Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc.,
426 F.3d 694, 711 (3d Cir. 2005). In the default judgment context, courts have held that the lack
of objection by a party means that the court cannot reduce the number of hours expended as
unreasonable. See, e.g., Arku-Nyadia v. Legal Sea Foods, LLC, 2022 WL 958465, at *8 (D.N.J.
Mar. 29, 2022) (“The Court is mindful in determining the reasonableness of the time spent by
counsel that the defaulted defendant did not oppose this motion and that the Court thus may not
‘reduce counsel fees sua sponte as excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary in the absence
of a sufficiently specific objection.’”) (citation omitted). Having carefully considered the detailed
time sheets submitted by Plaintiffs’ counsel, it is the Court’s view that they demonstrate that the
hours expended by the attorneys from Zimmer Kunz were reasonably undertaken in pursuing this
matter from the initial investigation through the motion for default judgment and that the services
rendered were appropriately assigned based on the individual attorneys’ relative levels of
experience. (Docket No. 11-1 at 4-12). In sum, the Court finds that, under the lodestar method,
the rates and hours claimed for this case are reasonable, and the Court will award the requested
$20,870.50 in attorney’s fees. See S.S. Body Armor, 927 F. 3d at 773.
V. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment [11] is granted, in part
and denied, in part. An appropriate Order follows.
s/Nora Barry Fischer
Nora Barry Fischer
Senior U.S. District Judge
Date: July 10, 2025
cc/ecf: All counsel of record.