Mark Breiner DDS, LLC v. BTL Industries, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

_______________________________________

)

MARK BREINER DDS, LLC, and )

EMSCULPT OF CT, L.L.C., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

) Civil Action No.

v. ) 24-12413-FDS

)

BTL INDUSTRIES, INC., )

)

Defendant. )

_______________________________________)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

SAYLOR, J.

Plaintiffs Mark Breiner DDS, LLC, and Emsculpt of CT, L.L.C., brought this action

seeking equitable and monetary relief against defendant BTL Industries, Inc. Jurisdiction is

based on federal-question and supplemental jurisdiction.

The amended complaint alleges that defendant engaged in unfair and deceptive business

practices in the sale of certain “body-sculpting” equipment to plaintiffs.1 The complaint also

asserts claims against defendant for breach of contract; breach of the implied covenant of good

faith and fair dealing; violation of state antitrust law; violation of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15

U.S.C. § 13; fraud; and unjust enrichment.

Defendant has moved to dismiss the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 9(b).

For the following reasons, the motion will be granted as to the claim asserted under the

Robinson-Patman Act and otherwise denied without prejudice.

1 For the sake of convenience, the amended complaint will hereinafter be referred to as “the complaint”

unless the context indicates otherwise.

I. Background

Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are set forth as alleged in the complaint.2

A. Parties

Mark Breiner DDS, LLC (“Breiner LLC”) is a limited-liability company registered and

based in Connecticut. (Am. Compl. ¶ 4). The company, which also goes by the name “Breiner

Whole-Body Health Center,” markets itself as a “holistic dental and medical practice.” (Id.).

Emsculpt of CT, L.L.C. (“ECT LLC”) is a limited-liability company that is also registered and

based in Connecticut. (Id. ¶ 5).3

BTL Industries, Inc., is a Massachusetts corporation with a principal place of business in

Marlborough, Massachusetts. (Id. ¶¶ 6-7).4 It develops and manufactures devices designed for

body contouring and skin tightening. (Id. ¶ 7).

B. Factual Background

1. Sales Meeting

BTL sells equipment that purports to use electromagnetic energy and radiofrequency

technology to help users tone their muscles and burn fat. (Id. ¶¶ 8-12). The company’s leading

products include the Emsculpt, Emsculpt Neo, Exilis, Emtone, and Emsella products. (Id. ¶¶ 8-

12). BTL sells its equipment to retailers, who then advertise and sell sessions on the equipment

to individual consumers. (Id. ¶¶ 13-14).

2 On a motion to dismiss, the court may properly consider four types of documents outside the complaint

without converting the motion into one for summary judgment: (1) documents of undisputed authenticity; (2)

documents that are official public records; (3) documents that are central to plaintiff’s claim; and (4) documents that

are sufficiently referred to in the complaint. Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993).

3 The complaint is silent as to the citizenship of plaintiffs’ members, and plaintiffs have not filed affidavits

or exhibits to otherwise establish the identities and citizenship of each of their members. The allegations in the

complaint are therefore insufficient to establish diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

4 The complaint alleges that BTL is incorporated in Massachusetts. (Am. Compl. ¶ 6). However, in its

motion to dismiss, BTL asserts that it is incorporated in Delaware. (Mot. to Dismiss at 2). The parties have not

filed any official records verifying BTL’s place of incorporation. At this stage, the Court proceeds with the facts as

pleaded in the complaint.

On May 5, 2021, Mark Breiner, the principal owner of both Breiner LLC and ECT LLC,

met with BTL representatives at his office in Connecticut. (Id. ¶ 15). At the meeting, BTL

representatives presented a sales pitch about the company’s various devices. (Id.). According to

the complaint, the BTL representatives made several statements about Emsculpt products,

including that Emsculpt “is selling so well and making customers good money”; Emsculpt Neo

“is the holy grail and, like death and taxes, [it] is a certainty in life”; Emsculpt “purchases have

an average payoff of four to five months”; Emsculpt is “the number one requested service in all

of aesthetic and wellness right now”; “[i]t takes about 66 patients to pay [Emsculpt] device[s]

off”; Emsculpt “is the number one device in the industry”; “[t]here is plenty of money to be

made in providing services using BTL’s equipment in the area of Connecticut [that] Breiner

services”; other retail providers “are so successful that they are now also open on Saturdays”;

Emsculpt “brings in 51[ percent] more new patients to [other] practices”; retail partners “could

be missing out on $50,000 to $60,000” by waiting to sell BTL services; “BTL’s equipment

brings in money to providers all year round”; and “[p]roviders servicing customers with BTL

equipment near Breiner are making good money.” (Id.). The BTL representatives also allegedly

told Breiner that one of its non-medical retailers in Connecticut was “making huge money” by

selling Emsculpt Neo services. (Id. ¶ 28). A medical-practice retail partner in Maine was

similarly “making huge money.” (Id.). The complaint alleges that those statements were

misrepresentations intended to induce Breiner to purchase BTL equipment. (Id. ¶ 15).

The complaint further alleges that at the sales meeting, the BTL representatives presented

a spreadsheet projecting the income that Breiner would earn by selling Emsculpt Neo services.

(Id. ¶ 28). According to the complaint, “[BTL] told Breiner that calculating the [minimum price]

of $850 per treatment/session and the number of customers per day is how much money

[plaintiffs] will earn[.]” (Id.). The complaint alleges that “BTL knew that no such market exists

and that virtually none of their retailers were able to sell the services for the [minimum price] of

$850 per session or even $200 per session[.]” (Id. ¶ 29). The projections contained in BTL’s

spreadsheet allegedly significantly influenced Breiner to purchase the equipment. (Id. ¶ 28).

2. Sales Agreements

On May 5, 2021, immediately after the sales pitch, Breiner signed a contract on behalf of

Breiner LLC to purchase two pieces of equipment—the Emsculpt Neo and the Exilis—from

BTL. (Id. ¶ 16). On June 26, 2021, Breiner signed another contract on behalf of Breiner LLC to

purchase the Emsella and Emtone. (Id.). In total, Breiner LLC paid $644,100.55 for the

equipment. (Id.).5 ECT LLC—which was formed two days after the sales meeting on May 7,

2021, and was not a party to the sales agreements—allegedly invested an additional $430,000 in

“staffing, training, marketing, and business development” to operate the BTL equipment. (Id. ¶

18; Mot. to Dismiss Ex. A).6

The Emsculpt Neo sales agreement contained a provision detailing a minimum-

advertised-price (“MAP”) program, according to which Breiner LLC could receive certain

benefits from BTL if it agreed to advertise a consumer retail price of at least $850 per Emsculpt

Neo session. (Am. Compl. ¶ 19; Am. Compl. Ex. A). For example, the contract specified that

BTL would provide two years of free service coverage for the Emsculpt Neo device if Breiner

LLC agreed to comply with the $850 MAP. (Am. Compl. ¶ 20). Compliance with the MAP also

5 The complaint alleges that Breiner LLC financed the equipment purchase with a loan from a finance

company called MMP. (Am. Compl. ¶ 17). The financing agreement allegedly did not disclose the interest rate of

the loan, but allegedly caused the total cost of the purchase to increase to $901,344.62. (Id.).

6 Exhibit A of BTL’s initial memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss is a copy of the official ECT

LLC registration record filed with the State of Connecticut. Because the document is an official public record, the

Court may consider it without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See

Watterson, 987 F.2d at 3.

provided access to BTL’s clinic-referral site, eligibility to purchase future Emsculpt upgrades,

and discounts on the consumable applicators used by the Emsculpt equipment. (Id.). With the

discount, each applicator cost $15,000; without the discount, the applicators cost $30,000. (Id. ¶

23). A decision not to participate in the MAP program or a violation of its terms would

constitute a forfeiture by Breiner LLC of those benefits set forth in the contract. (Id. ¶ 20). A

violation of the MAP-program terms occurred if, among other things, Breiner LLC offered

Emsculpt Neo sessions for less than $850. (Id.).

The Emsculpt Neo sales agreement also contained provisions instituting a re-certification

fee on equipment re-sales, priced at the “then current price list.” (Id. ¶ 24; Am. Compl. Ex. A).

The complaint alleges that the transfer fee amounted, in practice, to $100,000. (Am. Compl. ¶

24). The sales agreement also contained a provision specifying that BTL reserved a security

interest in the products that it sells. (Id. ¶ 25; Am. Compl. Ex. A). It also prohibited the

delegation of duties or assignment of rights by Breiner LLC without BTL’s prior written consent.

(Am. Compl. Ex. A).

Each contract that Breiner signed also contained a choice-of-law provision specifying

that the agreements “shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the

Commonwealth of Massachusetts.” (Id.). The terms of use that Breiner signed in connection

with the Emsculpt Neo purchase further stated that the “agreement and all matters arising

hereunder or in connection herewith shall be governed by, interpreted under, construed[,] and

enforced in accordance with the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, without regard to

the conflicts of law principles thereof.” (Id.). Each contract also included a forum-selection

clause submitting all disputes arising out of the agreements to a court in Boston, Massachusetts.

(Id.).

According to the complaint, BTL’s contracts with other retail partners were substantially

similar to the ones executed by Breiner. (Am. Compl. ¶ 22). However, BTL allegedly did not

routinely enforce certain provisions of its contracts. (Id. ¶¶ 33, 35). For example, BTL allegedly

did not enforce the transfer-fee or the security-interest provisions, resulting in the development

of a secondary market for BTL’s equipment. (Id. ¶¶ 33, 35). According to the complaint, BTL’s

equipment could be purchased for 75 to 90 percent discounts on the secondary market. (Id. ¶

35).

3. Withdrawal from the MAP Program

On May 30, 2023, Breiner sent a letter to BTL stating his intention to voluntarily

withdraw Breiner LLC from the MAP-program portion of the Emsculpt Neo sales agreement.

(Mot. to Dismiss Ex. B).7 The letter further stated that Breiner would begin “offering the sale of

Emsculpt Neo services at prices below the MAP pricing requirements[.]” (Id.). Plaintiffs

allegedly opted out of the MAP program because they were unable to profitably sell the

Emsculpt services at the $850 MAP price. (Am. Compl. ¶ 54).

In response to the notice provided by Breiner, BTL allegedly canceled Breiner LLC’s

discount on the applicator components, causing the unit price to revert to $30,000. (Id. ¶ 55).

BTL also de-listed Breiner LLC from its online provider list and prevented Breiner from

attending a conference of retail-partner owners. (Id.). In addition, BTL allegedly refused to

distribute information about plaintiffs’ assignee, Body Sculpting Discounters, on its websites.

7 Exhibit B of BTL’s initial memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss is a declaration by defense

counsel Samantha Puckett with an attached copy of a letter dated May 30, 2023, and signed by Breiner. (See Mot. to

Dismiss Ex. B). The letter communicates Breiner’s intention to withdraw Breiner LLC from the MAP program.

(Id.). BTL asserts that the complaint incorrectly alleges that Breiner LLC withdrew from the MAP program on

November 30, 2023, as opposed to May 30, 2023. (Am. Compl. ¶ 54). Because (1) plaintiffs do not contest the

veracity of the submitted letter and (2) the document is central to plaintiffs’ asserted claims, the Court may consider

the May 30, 2023 letter without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See

Watterson, 987 F.2d at 3.

(Id. ¶¶ 55-56). The complaint does not set forth any alleged facts explaining the circumstances

of plaintiffs’ assignment of rights to Body Sculpting Discounters.

Finally, in December 2023, BTL allegedly told one of its providers based in Oregon, Dr.

Jill Brown, that plaintiffs were a “scam.” (Id. ¶ 57). Plaintiffs had allegedly arranged for Dr.

Brown to service one of their customers for four Emsculpt Neo sessions; however, Dr. Brown

refused to work with plaintiffs after receiving BTL’s message. (Id.). The prospective customer,

Kelley Allen, also allegedly had been informed by BTL that plaintiffs were a “scam and stole her

money.” (Id.).

C. Procedural Background

Plaintiffs filed suit in this court on September 20, 2024.8 Defendant then filed a motion

to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 9(b). Plaintiffs later filed an amended complaint,

which asserts eight counts against defendant: claims for violation of the Massachusetts Unfair

Trade Practices Statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 11 (Count 1); violation of the Connecticut

Unfair Trade Practices Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110(b) (Count 2); violation of the

Massachusetts Antitrust Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93, § 1-14A, et seq. (Count 3); breach of

contract (Count 4); breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Count 5);

violation of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (Count 6); fraud (Count 7); and unjust

enrichment (Count 8).

In granting the motion to amend, the Court permitted defendant to file supplemental

briefing as to the new pleadings and causes of action set forth in the amended complaint.

8 Plaintiffs initially filed suit in Connecticut state court on May 8, 2024. See Mark Breiner DDS, LLC et al.

v. BTL Indus., Inc., FBT-CV24-6133927-S. Defendant removed the action to federal court on June 7, 2024. See

Mark Breiner DDS, LLC et al. v. BTL Indus., Inc., 24-cv-01002-KAD. The parties entered a stipulation of dismissal

on July 22, 2024, before bringing the suit to this court.

Defendant filed its supplement on May 5, 2025, and plaintiffs filed a response on May 19, 2025.

With leave of court, defendant submitted a final reply brief on June 2, 2025.

II. Standard of Review

To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must state a claim that is plausible on its

face. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In other words, the “[f]actual

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, . . . on the

assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. at 555

(citations omitted). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it

asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). When determining whether a

complaint satisfies that standard, a court must assume the truth of all well-pleaded facts and give

the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences. See Ruiz v. Bally Total Fitness Holding

Corp., 496 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Rogan v. Menino, 175 F.3d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 1999)).

Dismissal is appropriate if the complaint fails to set forth “factual allegations, either direct or

inferential, respecting each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable

legal theory.” Gagliardi v. Sullivan, 513 F.3d 301, 305 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Centro Médico

del Turabo, Inc. v. Feliciano de Melecio, 406 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2005)).

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), the standard for allegations of fraud is higher than the normal

pleading standard. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint alleging fraud must “state with

particularity the circumstances constituting fraud.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).

III. Analysis

A. Federal-Law Claim: Robinson-Patman Act (Count 6)

Count 6 of the complaint asserts a claim under the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13

(“RPA”). It is the only federal-law claim asserted in the complaint. Defendant has moved to

dismiss Count 6 on the ground that the complaint fails to state an RPA claim upon which relief

can be granted.

The RPA prohibits price discrimination “between different purchasers of commodities of

like grade and quality . . . where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen

competition or tend to create a monopoly[.]” Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco

Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 219 (1993) (quoting 15 U.S.C § 13(a)). The statute “proscribes unequal

treatment of different customers in comparable transactions.” FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637,

643 (1966) (emphasis added).

The statute does not “bar a distributor from ever offering lower prices or discounts.”

Smith Wholesale Co. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 477 F.3d 854, 866 (6th Cir. 2007). A seller

may therefore “utilize promotional arrangements and provide financial incentives to favor its

product or even to disfavor competing brands,” thereby rewarding “purchasers who choose to

align their own competitive objectives with those of their supplier.” Id. The key inquiry is

whether those incentives are available to all customers. Indeed, a “plaintiff in a Robinson-

Patman Act suit cannot recover damages for lower prices paid by its competitors to the defendant

if those same prices were available to the plaintiff from a practical standpoint and on equal terms

with its competitors.” Id.

Here, the complaint alleges that defendant engaged in price discrimination by increasing

the costs of the consumable applicators that plaintiffs used for their Emsculpt devices. (Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 93-94). Specifically, in accordance with the terms of the contract, defendant allegedly

doubled the price of the applicator components from $15,000 to $30,000 in response to

plaintiffs’ withdrawal from the MAP program and their subsequent sale of Emsculpt services at

below-MAP prices. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 55, 94; Am. Compl. Ex. A).

The complaint does not allege that plaintiffs were prohibited from accessing the lower-

cost consumable applicators. Indeed, during their enrollment in the MAP program, plaintiffs did

receive the promotional pricing, along with the other benefits listed in the parties’ contract. The

complaint instead suggests that plaintiffs’ withdrawal from the MAP program impermissibly

subjected them to increased applicator costs. However, the arrangement of the MAP program

amounts to nothing more than an incentive program to encourage an “align[ment] [of]

competitive objectives” between defendant and its retail partners. See Smith Wholesale, 477

F.3d at 866. In essence, defendant offered financial incentives to each of its retailers in the form

of discounted consumable Emsculpt components, and in exchange required that the advertised

prices of the Emsculpt sessions remain above a certain threshold. Plaintiffs were not prohibited

from participating in that discount program. The fact that they made a business determination to

withdraw from the program—and therefore forfeit the discounted consumable prices—does not

render defendant’s incentive program an illicit price-discrimination scheme under the RPA.

In opposition, plaintiffs contend that defendant’s failure to enforce certain provisions of

its contracts has also led to the emergence of a secondary market for Emsculpt equipment,

through which other buyers can purchase defendant’s devices at steep discounts. (Pls.’ Opp. at

7). The complaint sets forth allegations that defendant’s failure to enforce the transfer-fee and

perpetual-security-interest provisions of its contracts has allowed for a “secondary equipment

market to emerge.” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 33, 35). As a result, buyers can purchase defendant’s

equipment on the secondary market at a 75 to 90 percent discount compared to the price that

Breiner LLC paid. (Id. ¶ 35). Plaintiffs assert that the price differential between the primary and

secondary markets constitutes price discrimination in violation of the RPA.

However, the complaint fails to allege that any of the secondary-market purchasers are

defendant’s customers. There is no allegation that defendant favored the unidentified secondary-

market purchasers over plaintiffs; indeed, by definition, a secondary-market purchaser is not

interfacing with defendant to acquire Emsculpt equipment. Again, the RPA is designed to

protect “those who compete with a favored [customer.]” Monahan’s Marine, Inc. v. Bos.

Whaler, Inc., 866 F.2d 525, 529 (1st Cir. 1989) (emphasis in original). The alleged secondary-

market purchasers did not compete with plaintiffs for defendant’s favor; they were not even

customers of defendant, let alone favored customers. See Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-

Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164, 177 (2006) (stating that the “hallmark of the requisite

competitive injury [under the RPA] . . . is the diversion of sales or profits from a disfavored

purchaser to a favored purchaser”). Thus, the mere fact that Emsculpt products are available at

discounted prices on a secondary market does not create price-discrimination liability on

defendant’s part under the RPA.

Accordingly, Count 6, the lone federal claim asserted in the complaint, will be dismissed.

B. State-Law Claims

The remaining seven claims asserted in the complaint arise under state law. A federal

court may only consider such claims if it properly exercises supplemental jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1367 or diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

“[I]t is settled law that district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over pendent state[-]law claims when the anchor federal claims for those state[-]law claims are

dismissed.” Borras-Borrero v. Corporacion del Fondo del Seguro del Estado, 958 F.3d 26, 36

(1st Cir. 2020). Indeed, when all federal-law claims are dismissed in the early stages of a

lawsuit, “the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction by dismissing the

[remainder of the] case without prejudice.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted)

(emphasis added); see also United States ex rel. Kelly v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 827 F.3d 5, 15

(1st Cir. 2016) (stating that supplemental state-law claims should also be dismissed when federal

claims are dismissed “at such an early stage”). Thus, because the lone federal-law claim in this

case will be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court declines to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.

As for diversity jurisdiction, it is not apparent whether complete diversity exists here.

See BRT Mgmt. LLC v. Malden Storage LLC, 68 F.4th 691, 695 (1st Cir. 2023) (stating that in

order to exercise diversity jurisdiction, “diversity must be complete; that is, no plaintiff may be a

citizen of the same state as any defendant”). Defendant, which is a corporation, is a citizen of

Massachusetts based on the location of its principal place of business and its alleged place of

incorporation. See id. at 696.9 However, the citizenship of plaintiffs is not clear. Both plaintiffs

are limited-liability companies, which take the citizenship of all of their members. See id. The

parties have submitted records indicating that Mark Breiner is the principal owner and a member

of both LLCs; the records also indicate that he is a citizen of Connecticut. However, that

evidence does not establish whether he is the sole member of each entity, leaving open the

possible existence of non-diverse plaintiff members—that is, citizens of Massachusetts (and,

perhaps, Delaware). Because plaintiffs’ citizenship cannot be ascertained at this stage, the Court

cannot properly exercise diversity jurisdiction over the matter.10

Nonetheless, because there is a reasonable likelihood that the parties are in fact diverse,

plaintiff will be granted an opportunity to show cause that subject-matter jurisdiction exists

under § 1332 and that therefore this court need not dismiss the remaining claims. See Carrozza

9 Defendant may also be a citizen of Delaware based on its assertion—which contradicts the complaint—

that it is incorporated in Delaware, not in Massachusetts. (Mot. to Dismiss at 2).

10 Although defendant has not moved to dismiss the state-law claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), parties cannot confer such jurisdiction on a federal court by “acquiescence[] or

consent.” See BRT, 68 F.4th at 696 (quoting American Fiber & Finishing, Inc. v. Tyco Healthcare Grp., LP, 362

F.3d 136, 139 (1st Cir. 2004)).

v. CVS Pharm., Inc., 992 F.3d 44, 51 (1st Cir. 2021) (“The burden of establishing federal

diversity jurisdiction rests on . . . the party invoking federal jurisdiction.”).11 Plaintiffs shall

make any such filing (including appropriate affidavits and other supporting materials) no later

than 14 days after the date of this memorandum and order (that is, by July 24, 2025).

If plaintiffs are able to satisfy the Court that diversity jurisdiction exists, the Court will

take up defendant’s motion to dismiss as to the remaining counts, without need for further

briefing. If plaintiffs are not able to do so, the Court will decline to exercise subject-matter

jurisdiction as to those counts, and they will be dismissed without prejudice.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to Count 6 and

otherwise DENIED without prejudice. Plaintiff is directed to show cause no later than July 24,

2025, why the remaining counts should not be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject-

matter jurisdiction. Should plaintiff make such showing, the motion to dismiss the state-law

claims will be deemed renewed, without need for further briefing. Otherwise, those claims will

be dismissed without prejudice.

So Ordered.

/s/ F. Dennis Saylor IV

F. Dennis Saylor IV

Dated: July 10, 2025 United States District Judge

11 There is no dispute that the amount in controversy is more than $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.