ROE v. ODDO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOHN ROE, ) Case No. 3:25-CV-128

)

Petitioner, ) JUDGE STEPHANIE L. HAINES

)

v. )

)

LEONARD ODDO, in his official capacity _)

as Warden of Moshannon Valley Processing _ )

Center, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

OPINION

On April 30, 2025, Petitioner John Roe (“Petitioner”), through counsel, filed a Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “Petition”) (ECF No. 1) and a Motion for a Temporary

Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction (the “PI Motion”) with an accompanying Brief

in Support (ECF Nos. 2, 4). On May 9, 2025, Respondents Leonard Oddo (in his official

capacity as Warden of Moshannon Valley Processing Center), Brian McShane (in his official

capacity as Acting Field Office Director of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”),

- Enforcement and Removal Operations (“ERO”) Philadelphia Field Office), Kristi Noem (in her

official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), and Pam Bondi

(in her official capacity as Attorney General of the United States) (collectively, “Respondents”),

through counsel, filed a Response Brief in Opposition to the PI Motion. (ECF No. 9). On May

14, 2025, Petitioner filed a Reply Brief in Support of the PI Motion. (ECF No. 11). On June 11,

2025, the Court held a hearing on the PI Motion. (See ECF Nos. 17, 21). Following the hearing,

counsel for the parties filed supplemental documents in response to the Court’s inquiries. (ECF

Nos. 19-20). Accordingly, the PI Motion is ripe for disposition. For the following reasons, the

Court DENIES the PI Motion at ECF No. 2.

I, Factual Background

According to the Petition, Petitioner “was abducted from his home somewhere in

Southern Asia, likely in either India or Sri Lanka” and “brought to [California] via ship.” (ECF

No. 1 {ff 19-20). According to the Declaration of Supervisory Detention and Deportation by

Officer Kirby Tejeda (the “Tejeda Declaration”),! on or about May 17, 1994, ICE initiated

proceedings against Petitioner, charging him with removability under § 241(a)(1)(B) of the

Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”)? (ECF No. 9-1 4 3). “Petitioner came to DHS[’s]

attention pursuant to an April 8, 1994 [criminal] conviction for Sodomy: Deviate intercourse

with another person and sexual abuse. Petitioner was sentenced to one to three years[’]

incarceration.” (/d.).

Following his criminal conviction, Petitioner’s deportation proceedings culminated on or

about July 27, 1995, when an immigration judge ordered Petitioner to be removed to India.

(ECF No. 9-2 at 1), Petitioner appealed that order to the Board of Immigration Appeals (the

“BIA”), but the BIA dismissed his appeal on December 4, 1995, making the removability order

final. (/d.).

According to the Tejeda Declaration, in April 1995, ICE detained Petitioner; then, in June

1996, ICE released Petitioner on his own recognizance; and, in October 1997, Petitioner failed to

appear for his hearing regarding removal, which ICE provided notice for via mail in August of

' The Court notes that it largely derives its facts from the Tejeda Declaration because, at the hearing, counsel for

Petitioner stipulated to the factual timeline of the events—but for the factual assertions set forth in Paragraphs 14

and 18.

? Upon the passage of the INA, and for subsequent decades, immigration enforcement and administration were

within the purview of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”). In 2002, however, Congress passed the

Homeland Security Act, which abolished the INS, 6 U.S.C. § 291, and transferred the INS’s responsibilities to the

DHS, including its agency, ICE, id §§ 202, 557. See Louisiana Forestry Ass'n Inc. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 745

F.3d 653, 659 (3d Cir. 2014). Accordingly, any references to the INS in the INA are now considered to refer to

DHS. See 6 U.S.C. § 557; see also Ceesay v. Kurzdorfer, No. 25-CV-267, 2025 WL 1284720, at *16 (W.D.N.Y.

May 2, 2025).

that same year. (ECF No. 9-1 §{§ 5-7). In August 2003, ICE re-detained Petitioner pursuant to

an arrest warrant for felonies (possession of weapon of mass destruction and possession of a

firearm by a felon) (id. J 8), and he pled guilty to the possession-of-a-firearm-by-a-felon charge

(ECF No. 19 at 5). Thereafter, in June 2005, ICE released Petitioner on an Order of Supervision

(“OSUP”). (ECF No. 9-1 49 9, 12). Since his release in 2005, a re-detention in June 2013, and a

subsequent release under an OSUP in June 2013, DHS avers that Petitioner has failed to comply

with ICE ERO processes, such as failing to complete his travel document application. (/d. □□

10-17).

“On or about January 26, 2025, Petitioner was taken into custody relative to a changed

circumstance as it is believed with the new immigration policies there is a [significant likelihood

of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future] for criminal aliens.” (Ud 18).2 Once in

custody, on three separate occasions, ICE provided Petitioner with travel document applications

to complete. (Jd. § 19). On May 1, 2025, Petitioner submitted a travel document application

packet, albeit an incomplete one, to the New York City point of contact to provide to the Indian

Consulate for travel document issuance. (Jd. §§ 20-21). Simultaneously, ICE Removal and

International Operations was requested to assist with the Indian Consulate for the issuance of

travel document. (Jd. § 21). According to the Tejeda Declaration, “i]t is anticipated that the

Indian Consulate will verify [P]etitioner’s citizenship and issue a travel document. Once that

3 The new immigration policy referenced appears to be Section Eight of Executive Order 14165, entitled Securing

Our Borders, signed by President Donald J. Trump on January 20, 2025, 90 Fed. Reg. 8467. (See ECF No. 11 at 7

n.3). Section Eight reads:

Additional International Cooperation. The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Attorney

General and the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall take all appropriate action to facilitate

additional international cooperation and agreements, consistent with the policy of Section 2,

including entering into agreements based upon the provisions of section 208(a)(2)(A) of the INA

(8 U.S.C. 1158(a)(2)(A)) or any other applicable provision of law.

90 Fed. Reg. 8467, at 8468.

occurs it is anticipated that [ICE] ERO will be able to schedule his removal quickly, hopefully

within approximately 30 days of the issuance of a travel document.” (Jd. § 24). In short, “[i]t is

anticipated that [P]etitioner’s removal from the United States is imminent upon the issuance of a

travel document.” (Ud. § 25).

In early May 2025, ICE reviewed Petitioner’s custody status, determining that his

continued detention was warranted because he posed a threat to public safety and had a final

order of removal. (ECF No. 9-4 at 1). At the same time, ICE also sent Petitioner a Notice of

Revocation of Release. (ECF No. 9-2).

In late May 2025, Petitioner’s travel document application was submitted to the Indian

Consulate. (ECF No. 20-1 § 2). On June 6, 2025, Petitioner had an informal interview regarding

his OSUP revocation. (Jd. § 3). His next custody review is scheduled for July 25, 2025, at DHS

Headquarters. Ud. § 4).

On April 30, 2025, Petitioner filed his PI Motion. (ECF No. 2). With his PI Motion,

Petitioner requests this Court to:

(1) Issue an Order requiring Respondents to release Petitioner and enjoining them

from continuing to detain Petitioner during the pendency of this petition, either

pursuant to a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary injunction, or to

this Court’s inherent authority under Lucas v. Hadden; and/or

(2) Order Respondents to stay any transfer or removal of Petitioner during the

pendency of this petition; and/or

(3) Order Respondents to show cause why the Petition for a Writ of Habeas

Corpus should not be expeditiously granted; and/or

(4) Grant Petitioner such other further and additional relief as the Court deems

just and appropriate.

(ECF No. 4 at 27).

On May 2, 2025, the Court denied the PI Motion “insofar that it seeks relief via a

temporary restraining order[]” because Petitioner “failed to show that any injury, loss, or damage

will occur before Respondents can be heard in opposition[.]” (ECF No. 7 at 1). Thereafter, the

parties completed their briefing on the request for a preliminary injunction, and the Court held a

hearing on said request. Now that the Court has heard Respondents’ opposition, it addresses

Petitioner’s preliminary injunction request that the Court order Petitioner’s immediate release

and stay any transfer from Moshannon Valley Processing Center pending the disposition of his

Petition.

Il. Jurisdiction

In opposing this Court’s jurisdiction, Respondents argue that “8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) strips

district courts of jurisdiction over ‘any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from

the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or

execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter.’” (ECF No. 9 at 8). Respondents

also argue that “8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) states that if a claim ‘aris[es] from any action taken or

proceeding brought to remove an alien,” then review of the claim ‘shall be available only in

judicial review of a final order’” in the applicable circuit court. (ECF No. 9 at 9) (quoting Tazu

y. Att’y Gen., 975 F.3d 292, 299 (3d Cir. 2020)). In his Reply Brief, Petitioner argues that

neither 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) nor (b)(9) strips this Court of jurisdiction because Petitioner “is

contesting his detention and is not seeking judicial review of [his] removal order.” (ECF No. 11

at 2). The Court agrees with Petitioner.

Title 28, United States Code, Section 2241 grants federal courts the authority to hear

habeas corpus matters by aliens challenging the lawfulness of their detention by ICE. See

Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 292-96 (2018). Insofar as “(t]he allegations here are

separate and apart from removal proceedings,” this Court has consistently held that it has

jurisdiction over habeas corpus matters by aliens challenging the lawfulness of their detention by

ICE. Doe v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 3:24-CV-259, 2025 WL 360534, at *7 (W.D. Pa.

Jan. 31, 2025); see Bodnari v. Noem, No. 3:24-CV-163, 2025 WL 317985, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Jan.

28, 2025); Akhmadjanov v. Oddo, No. 3:25-CV-35, 2025 WL 660663, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 28,

2025); see also Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 591 U.S. 1, 19

(2020) (“[Title 8 U.S.C.] § 1252(b6)(9) does not present a jurisdictional bar where those bringing

suit are not asking for review of an order of removal, the decision ... to seek removal, or the

process by which ... removability will be determined.” (internal quotations and citations

omitted)); id. (“[Title 8 U.S.C.] § 1252(g) is similarly narrow. That provision limits review of

cases arising from decisions to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal

orders. We have previously rejected as implausible the Government’s suggestion that § 1252(g)

covers all claims arising from deportation proceedings or imposes a general jurisdictional

limitation.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)).

Here, the Court is not reviewing Petitioner’s removal order. Instead, it is examining the

contest of Petitioner’s detention. Thus, the Court has jurisdiction to proceed under said scope of

review.

Ill. Applicable Statutory and Regulatory Framework

Title 8 U.S.C. § 1231 “governs the detention, release, and removal of individuals

‘ordered removed.’” Johnson vy. Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. 573, 578 (2022) (quoting 8 U.S.C.

§ 1231(a)(1)(A)). “After the entry of a final order of removal against a noncitizen, the

Government generally must secure the noncitizen’s removal during a 90-day ‘removal period.’”

Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A)). Detention is mandatory during the 90-day removal

period. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2).

The removal period begins on the latest of the following:

(i) The date the order of removal becomes administratively final.

(ii) If the removal order is judicially reviewed and if a court orders a stay of the

removal of the alien, the date of the court’s final order.

(iii) If the alien is detained or confined (except under an immigration process), the

date the alien is released from detention or confinement.

Id. § 1231(a)(1)(B). “[Section] 1231(a)(6) provides that after the 90-day ‘removal period,’ a

noncitizen ‘may be detained’ or may be released under terms of supervision.” Johnson, 596 US.

at 575 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)).

Regarding continued detention after the 90-day removal period, the Supreme Court, in

Zadvydas v. Davis, recognized a six-month “presumptively reasonable [removal] period of

detention.” 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001). “This 6-month presumption, of course, does not mean

that every alien not removed must be released after six months. To the contrary, an alien may be

held in confinement until it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal

in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Jd. “[O}nce removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable,

continued detention is no longer authorized by statute.” Jd. at 699. “In that case, of course, the

alien’s release may and should be conditioned on any of the various forms of supervised release

that are appropriate in the circumstances, and the alien may no doubt be returned to custody upon

4 violation of those conditions,” id. at 699-700, or for other reasons as prescribed by the Code of

Federal Regulations.

The Code of Federal Regulations sets forth regulations regarding the release and

revocation of release of an alien with a final order of removal. See, e.g, 8 C.F.R. § 241.4

(entitled “Continued detention of inadmissible, criminal and other aliens beyond the removal

period”). With few exceptions, Section 241.4(a) generally grants authority to designated ICE

officials to release or parole aliens, as well as continue an alien’s custody. Jd. § 241.4(a).

Revocation of release is governed by Section 241.4(). Revocation of release can occur

for two reasons: (i) the alien violates the conditions of release,’ or (ii) ICE determines in its

discretion to revoke release.> Id. § 241.4()(1)-(2).

DHS also has promulgated regulations for noncitizens who have “provided good reason

to believe there is no significant likelihood of removal to the country to which he or she was

ordered removed ... in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(a). Section

241.13(i)(2) provides the following:

[DHS] may revoke an alien’s release under this section and return the alien to

custody if, on account of changed circumstances, [DHS] determines that there is a

significant likelihood that the alien may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable

future. Thereafter, if the alien is not released from custody following the informal

interview provided for in paragraph (h)(3) of this section, the provisions of §

241.4 shall govern the alien’s continued detention pending removal.

Id. § 241.13(i)(2). Against this legal backdrop, the Court turns to Petitioner’s request for a

preliminary injunction.

IV. Analysis Regarding the PI Motion

4 If ICE revokes release because the alien violated the conditions of release, then, “[u]pon revocation, the alien will

be notified of the reasons for revocation of his or her release or parole. The alien will be afforded an initial informal

interview promptly after his or her return to [DHS] custody to afford the alien an opportunity to respond to the

reasons for revocation stated in the notification.” 8 C.F.R. § 241. 4()(1).

5 In full, Section 241.4()(2) reads:

Determination by [DHS]. The Executive Associate Commissioner shall have authority, in the

exercise of discretion, to revoke release and return to [DHS] custody an alien previously approved

for release under the procedures in this section. A district director may also revoke release of an

alien when, in the district director’s opinion, revocation is in the public interest and circumstances

do not reasonably permit referral of the case to the Executive Associate Commissioner. Release

may be revoked in the exercise of discretion when, in the opinion of the revoking official:

(i) The purposes of release have been served;

(ii) The alien violates any condition of release;

(iii) It is appropriate to enforce a removal order or to commence removal proceedings

against an alien; or

(iv) The conduct of the alien, or any other circumstance, indicates that release would no

longer be appropriate.

8 CFR. § 241.400).

Preliminary injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy” and “should be granted only in

limited circumstances.” Kos Pharms., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 2004). A

party seeking to obtain such relief must show: “(1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that

it will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that granting preliminary relief will

not result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) that the public interest favors

such relief.” Jd.

Failure to satisfy the first factor of the analysis—a likelihood of success on the merits—

necessitates denial of the injunctive request. Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc.,

882 F.2d 797, 800 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting In re Arthur Treacher’s Franchisee Litig., 689 F.2d

1137, 1143 Gd Cir. 1982)). It follows that district courts need not address the other factors if the

moving party fails to establish the first factor. See Marvin RV. v. T. soukaris, No. 20-CV-5225,

2020 WL 6689760, at *5 n.2 (D.N.J. Nov. 13, 2020) (collecting Third Circuit cases to support

the statement that “[because the pl]etitioner has failed to meet his burden with respect to the

likelihood of success on the merits, the Court need not address the remaining factors’); see also

Peter v. Att'y Gen. of New Jersey, No. 23-CV-3337, 2023 WL 4627866, at *1 (D.N.J. July 19,

2023).

Regarding the likelihood-of-success-on-the-merits factor, Petitioner argues that (i) his

removal is not reasonably foreseeable, and his detention therefore is unlawful (ECF No. 9 at 3—

11), and (ii) ICE’s re-detention and continued detention of Petitioner violates the Administrative

Procedures Act (“APA”), the INA and its attendant regulations, and Petitioner’s Fifth

Amendment right to due process (id. at 11-18). Respondents make arguments in opposition to

each of Petitioner’s arguments. (ECF No. 9 at 10-16). The Court examines Petitioner’s

arguments in order, holding that Petitioner has failed to establish a likelihood of success on the

merits of his claims.

A. Removyability Is Reasonably Foreseeable

Petitioner’s first argument is that his removability is not reasonably foreseeable, and

therefore his detention is unlawful. Petitioner relies on 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), the statute that

Petitioner is detained under, and Zadvydas. (See ECF No. 4 at 3-11). Conversely, Respondents

argue that Petitioner possesses the burden of showing that his detention has become unlawful,

and Petitioner has failed to meet such burden. (ECF No. 9 at 13-16).

In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court decided that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), the post-removal-

period statute, authorizes the Government to detain a removable alien “only for a period

reasonably necessary to secure the alien’s removal,” rather than “indefinitely beyond the

removal period.” 533 U.S. at 682 (emphasis in original). The Zadvydas Court prescribed the

presumptively reasonable time period as six months. Jd, at 701. The presumptively reasonable

time period is only a presumption—not an ironclad timeframe. Jd. (“This 6—month presumption,

of course, does not mean that every alien not removed must be released after six months. To the

contrary, an alien may be held in confinement until it has been determined that there is no

significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.”). The applicable burden

only shifts to the Government if, in addition to showing that the post-removal-order detention

has surpassed six months, the alien also shows that there is no significant likelihood of removal

in the reasonably foreseeable future. Jd. (“After this 6-month period, once the alien provides

good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably

foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that

showing.”).

10

Here, the Court assumes without deciding that Petitioner has shown that the post-

removal-order detention has surpassed six months. Petitioner’s order of removability became

final on December 4, 1995, beginning the 90-day removal period (see ECF No. 9-2), when

Petitioner’s detention was mandatory, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2). Following the 90-day removal

period’s conclusion on March 3, 1996, ICE had the option to continue detention if removal was

reasonably foreseeable in the future or release Petitioner under terms of supervision. Johnson,

596 U.S. at 575 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)). ICE eventually released Petitioner in June 1996

(ECF No. 9-1 §§ 5—6), although the Court is unclear as to the reasoning for his release rather than

removal. Thereafter, on two additional occasions, ICE detained and subsequently released

Petitioner under terms of supervision. (See ECF No. 9-1 §{ 8, 12, 15; ECF No. 9-2 at 1).

According to Petitioner, the Court should aggregate his detention time for purposes of the

Zadvydas analysis, and find that, in total, subsequent to the 90-day removal period of mandatory

detention, ICE has detained Petitioner for approximately two-and-a-half years off and on. (ECF

No. 11 at 1).°

Regardless of whether Petitioner has shown his detention has surpassed six months,

Petitioner has failed to produce evidence demonstrating good cause to believe that there is no

significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Respondents argue, in

short, “this time it is different.” In support of their argument, Respondents invoke the new

Administration’s policy regarding removing criminal aliens. (ECF No. 9-1 § 18). More

importantly, Respondents also point out that, for the first time since Petitioner has been detained,

6 Neither the Supreme Court nor the Third Circuit have ruled on the aggregation of post-removal time when such

detention is interrupted by release pursuant to an OSUP. District courts in this Circuit have voiced skepticism of

such an approach. See, e.g., Nma v. Ridge, 286 F. Supp. 2d 469, 476 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (“It is not clear to the

court, nor does the court necessarily agree, that the length of the petitioner’s detention should be aggregated to

include time he was detained prior to his release on an order of supervision. Each detention had its own particular

set of circumstances.”), This Court is skeptical of such an approach as well. Nevertheless, for the reasons

subsequently discussed the Court need not address this issue.

11

ICE possesses a sufficient travel document application submitted by Petitioner. Ud. {if 24-25).

Respondents aver that “[i]t is anticipated that the Indian Consulate will verify [P]etitioner’s

citizenship and issue a travel document. Once that occurs it is anticipated that [ICE] ERO will

be able to schedule his removal quickly, hopefully within approximately 30 days of the issuance

of a travel document.” (Id § 24). Indeed, in late May 2025, Petitioner’s travel document

application was submitted to the Indian Consulate. (ECF No. 20-1 § 2).

Accordingly, the removal proceeding is underway, and Petitioner has not produced any

evidence to the contrary that supports his assertion that there is no significant likelihood of

removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Petitioner only invokes past instances where ICE

did not remove him. Conversely, Respondents have represented that, due to changes in

circumstances—such as the administrative policy change and the submission of a travel

document application—Petitioner’s removal is likely in the reasonably foreseeable future.

Indeed, the sole purpose of re-detaining Petitioner is to facilitate his removal. Accordingly,

Petitioner has failed to establish the likelihood of success on the merits of his claim. See

Barenboy vy, Att’y Gen., 160 F. App’x 258, 261 n.2 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Once the six-month period

has passed, the burden is on the alien to “provide[] good reason to believe that there is no

significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future...” (quoting Zadvydas, 533

U.S. 678 at 701)); see also Castaneda v. Perry, 95 F.4th 750, 756 (4th Cir. 2024). Therefore, the

Court denies the PI Motion on the grounds that Petitioner’s removal is reasonably foreseeable.

B. ICE’s Re-detention and Continued Detention of Petitioner Does Not Violate the

APA, the INA and Its Regulations, nor Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment Right to

Due Process

Regarding his APA argument, Petitioner offers the following:

Under the [applicable] statutory and regulatory scheme ..., an OSUP may not be

revoked without notice and, at minimum, an informal interview, 8 C.F.R. §

12

241.13(i)(3), and upon specific required findings, including that the individual has

either violated their conditions of release or that they may be removed in the

foreseeable future. None of these procedures were followed in this case and these

failures alone render the revocation of [Petitioner’s] OSUP and the decision to

re[-]detain [Petitioner] arbitrary and capricious.

(ECF No. 4 at 14). Respondents argue that (i) the APA precludes judicial review on this issue

and (ii) even if the Court had jurisdiction on this issue, ICE followed the applicable statutory and

regulatory laws. (ECF No. 9 at 11-13). The Court agrees with Respondents’ second point.’

To explain its conclusion that ICE complied with the applicable laws, the Court first must

articulate what laws are applicable here. After Petitioner’s March 1996 release from ICE

custody, on two additional occasions, ICE has detained and subsequently released Petitioner

under terms of supervision. (See ECF No. 9-1 §§ 8, 12, 15; ECF No. 9-2 at 1). The last

detention and release under terms of supervision occurred in June 2013. (ECF No. 9-2 at 1).

Petitioner alleges that this release was due to the fact there was no significant likelihood of

7 Regarding Respondents’ first point, the Court offers the following. The APA does not apply to “agency action

[that] is committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701 (a)(2). With respect to this exception, the Supreme

Court has stated:

A court could never determine that an agency abused its discretion if all matters committed to

agency discretion were unreviewable. To give effect to [5 U.S.C.] § 706(2)(A)[, which commands

that a court set aside arbitrary and capricious agency action,] and to honor the presumption of

review, we have read the exception in § 701(a)(2) quite narrowly, restricting it to “those rare

circumstances where the relevant statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful

standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.”

Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 586 U.S. 9, 23 (2018) (quoting Lincoln v, Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 191

(1993)). Here, the Court finds that the statutory and regulatory scheme provides a framework giving the Court a

meaningful standard: Either ICE did or did not follow the legal procedures governing the removal process, E.g., 8

C.F.R. § 241.4()(2). The Court offers no opinion regarding ICE’s discretionary decision to re-detain Petitioner.

Further, the APA does not apply to “statutes [that] preclude judicial review.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1). Title 8 U.S.C. §

1252(a)(2)(B) provides that “[nJotwithstanding any other provision of Jaw ... including [S]ection 2241 of Title 28, or

any other habeas corpus provision ... no court shall have jurisdiction to review ... any other decision or action of the

Attorney General or the Secretary of [DHS] the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the

discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of [DHS]....” Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has decided that

Ҥ 1252(a)(2)(B) applies ... only to Attorney General determinations made discretionary by statute, [not] to

determinations declared discretionary by the Attomey General himself through regulation.” Aucana v. Holder, 558

U.S. 233, 237 (2010) (“We hold that the key words “specified under this subchapter” refer to statutory, but not to

regulatory, specifications.”). Here, the Court finds that it has jurisdiction to review ICE’s action taken pursuant to

regulations, rather than statutes.

13

removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. (ECF No. 21 at 53). Respondents allege that ICE

released him due to a leg injury. (Jd. at 44). This distinction is meaningful because it determines

what regulations apply to ICE’s conduct.

At the June 11, 2025, hearing, the Court inquired whether a document existed stating the

precise reason as to Petitioner’s release. Neither party submitted such a document.

Nonetheless, for the reasons discussed at the hearing—namely, the fact that ICE re-

detained and released Petitioner in the same day, which is unlikely enough time to find that his

removal was not reasonably foreseeable—the Court believes that ICE released Petitioner due to

his leg injury. Further, Petitioner has failed to provide any evidence to the contrary. Therefore,

the Court finds that the governing regulation here is 8 C.F.R. § 241.4()(2) because ICE released

Petitioner on supervision due to a medical condition, rather than releasing him due to a lack of a

significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.®

Section 241.1(/)(2) provides that “[rJelease may be revoked in the exercise of discretion

when, in the opinion of the revoking official: ... It is appropriate to enforce a removal order or to

commence removal proceedings against an alien[.]” Jd. § 241.4()(2)(v). Due to administrative

policy changes, ICE believed it was appropriate to enforce Petitioner’s removal order in January

of 2025. The Court will not further scrutinize ICE’s discretionary decision—especially

considering Petitioner has failed to raise evidence demanding further inquiry. Moreover, to the

extent that Section 241.1(/)(2) requires notice of revocation of supervised release and an informal

interview, as 8 C.F.R. § 241.4()(1) and 8 C.F.R. §241.13()(2) do, ICE provided such notice (see

ECF No. 9-2) and informal interview (see ECF No. 20-1 §[ 3). Accordingly, contrary to

Petitioner’s argument, ICE complied with the applicable laws, and thus no APA violation exists.

8 The Notice of Revocation of Release and the Decision to Continue Detention both provide that ICE revoked

Petitioner’s OSUP pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.4. (See ECF No. 9-2).

14

Additionally, for the reasons outlined above, Petitioner’s INA and Fifth Amendment due

process claims also fail. Petitioner has not shown that Respondents have violated 8 U.S.C. §

1231 or 8 C.F.R. § 241.4. Conversely, Respondents have shown that they have complied with

these laws. Accordingly, Petitioner’s INA claim is unsubstantiated. And because compliance

with these laws satisfies the requirements of procedural due process—‘the opportunity to be

heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner[]’”—Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment

claim also is unsubstantiated. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting

Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). Therefore, the Court denies Petitioner’s PI

Motion on the grounds that his detention does not violate the APA, INA, or Fifth Amendment.

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s PI Motion at ECF No. 2. An

appropriate Order follows.

| india Sap’

Stephanie L. Haines

United States District Judge

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