Washington v. Red Roof

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

ROOSEVELT WASHINGTON,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action 2:25-cv-707

Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.

Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura

RED ROOF,

Defendant.

ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Roosevelt Washington, an Ohio resident proceeding without the assistance of

counsel, has submitted a request to file a civil action in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 1.) The Court

GRANTS Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis. All judicial officers who render

services in this action shall do so as if the costs had been prepaid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

This matter is also before the Court for the initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF

No. 1-1) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to identify cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal

of Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune

from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Having performed the initial screen, for the reasons

below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS this action under

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to

“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In

doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are

assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from

filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e):

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid,

the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—

* * *

(B) the action or appeal—

(i) is frivolous or malicious; [or]

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted . . . .

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte

dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or

upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the basic

federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also Hill v.

Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule

8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual

demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B.,

727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).

Although this pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations, a pleading

that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”

is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). A complaint will not

“suffice if it tenders naked assertion devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (cleaned up).

Instead, to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (cleaned up). Facial

plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The

plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the

strength of competing explanations for the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504

(citations omitted). Further, the Court holds pro se complaints “to less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Garrett v. Belmont Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 374 F. App’x 612,

614 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient

treatment, however, has limits; “courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim

asserted.” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v.

Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)).

II. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff alleges that he has information about financial crimes that he has shared with

out-of-state FBI representatives. Perhaps in retaliation for sharing this information, unspecified

“people, group[s], or organization[s]” have bought several homes that Plaintiff has rented for the

purpose of evicting him. These unspecified individuals or entities have also bribed the owners of

hotels (in which Plaintiff has stayed since his rental homes were sold) to kick Plaintiff out.

Plaintiff further alleges that “they are bringing the homeless into Columbus, Ohio by Greyhound

under cover of darkness from other states.” In his prayer for relief, Plaintiff asks for assistance

“with the agency violating my civil rights.” (Compl., ECF No. 1-1.) Although the Complaint

caption names “Red Roof” as the sole Defendant (presumably referring to Red Roof Inn, the

business located at the address Plaintiff lists for Defendant) the Complaint contains no

allegations pertaining to Red Roof Inn.

Plaintiff’s allegations are threadbare and do not give rise to any cognizable cause of

action. Even if the Court construed the Complaint to allege that Defendant Red Roof Inn

accepted bribes for the purpose of evicting Plaintiff in retaliation for his FBI informant activities,

the Complaint identifies no state or federal authority creating a cause of action for this conduct.1

Nor is any readily apparent to the Court. Although providing information to the FBI may be

protected by the First Amendment, claims for First Amendment retaliation may be brought only

against state actors. See, e.g., Reguli v. Russ, 109 F.4th 874, 880 (6th Cir. 2024). Because Red

Roof Inn is a private business, and not a representative or agent of the State of Ohio, no First

Amendment retaliation claim may be maintained against it. And because the Court cannot

discern a basis for any other cognizable cause of action, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a

claim on which relief can be granted and Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed.

III. DISPOSITION

For these reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 1)

is GRANTED. The undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Complaint be DISMISSED

under § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.

1 Although Plaintiff references 18 U.S.C. § 241, this criminal statute does not create a private

right of action. See Booth v. Henson, 290 F. App’x 919, 920–21 (6th Cir. 2008) (no private right

of action under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 or 242).

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those

specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with

supporting authority for the objection(s). A District Judge of this Court shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations

to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a District Judge of this Court may accept,

reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive

further evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report

and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of

the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Chelsey M. Vascura

CHELSEY M. VASCURA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE