GONZALEZ JIMENEZ

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 129 (BIA 2025) Interim Decision #4108

Matter of Pascacio GONZALEZ JIMENEZ, Respondent

Decided July 9, 2025

U.S. Department of Justice

Executive Office for Immigration Review

Board of Immigration Appeals

(1) Use of false or stolen Social Security numbers and providing false information on tax

returns are negative considerations that weigh against a favorable exercise of discretion.

(2) When a respondent seeks to excuse conduct by claiming to have relied on professional

advice, the respondent should submit evidence of the specific advice given and explain

why it was reasonable to rely on such advice.

FOR THE RESPONDENT: Jill Aleshire, Esquire, Naples, Florida

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Evagelia Solomos, Assistant

Chief Counsel

BEFORE: Board Panel: MALPHRUS, Chief Appellate Immigration Judge; MULLANE

and GOODWIN, Appellate Immigration Judges.

MALPHRUS, Chief Appellate Immigration Judge:

In a decision dated December 19, 2024, the Immigration Judge denied the

respondent’s applications for cancellation of removal and voluntary

departure under sections 240A(b)(1) and 240B(b)(1) of the Immigration and

Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(b)(1), 1229c(b)(1) (2018). The

respondent appeals from the Immigration Judge’s decision. The Department

of Homeland Security (“DHS”) opposes the appeal. Because we conclude

that the respondent does not warrant a favorable exercise of discretion, the

appeal will be dismissed.

The respondent is a native and citizen of Mexico. He conceded, through

counsel, that he is removable as an alien present in the United States who has

not been admitted or paroled. INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (2018). He subsequently filed an application for

cancellation of removal for certain nonpermanent residents and requested

voluntary departure in the alternative.

The Immigration Judge found the respondent ineligible for cancellation

of removal and voluntary departure because he failed to demonstrate good

moral character or that his removal would result in exceptional and extremely

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unusual hardship to his United States citizen children. INA

§§ 240A(b)(1)(B), (D), 240B(b)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(b)(1)(B), (D),

1229c(b)(1)(B). The Immigration Judge also found, in the alternative, that

the respondent did not merit a favorable exercise of discretion.

Cancellation of removal and voluntary departure are both discretionary

forms of relief. See INA §§ 240A(b)(1), 240B(b)(1), 8 U.S.C.

§§ 1229b(b)(1), 1229c(b)(1); Matter of Bain, 29 I&N Dec. 72, 72–73

(BIA 2025) (cancellation of removal); Matter of Pinzon, 26 I&N Dec. 189,

195 (BIA 2013) (voluntary departure). A respondent who applies for such

relief bears the burden of proving that he satisfies all statutory eligibility

requirements and that he merits a favorable exercise of discretion. See

Matter of Bain, 29 I&N Dec. at 72; Matter of Pinzon, 26 I&N Dec. at 195;

see also INA § 240(c)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A) (2018).

In exercising discretion, we “must balance the adverse factors evidencing

the alien’s undesirability as a permanent resident with the social and humane

considerations presented in his (or her) behalf to determine whether the

granting of . . . relief appears in the best interest of this country.” Matter of

C-V-T-, 22 I&N Dec. 7, 11 (BIA 1998) (quoting Matter of Marin, 16 I&N

Dec. 581, 584 (BIA 1978)). Factors relevant to discretion include family ties

within the United States, length of residence in this country, evidence of

hardship to the respondent’s family if deportation occurs, military service,

history of employment, property or business ties, service to the community,

and, where a criminal record exists, proof of rehabilitation. Id. Where

adverse factors are present, the respondent should present offsetting

favorable evidence, which may require unusual or even outstanding equities,

to outweigh the negative factors. Id.; see also Matter of D-A-C-, 27 I&N

Dec. 575, 578 (BIA 2019) (holding in the context of a discretionary grant of

Temporary Protected Status that “any adverse factors, including recent

criminal activity, must be offset by significant additional equities”);

Matter of Arai, 13 I&N Dec. 494, 496 (BIA 1970) (concluding that where

there are adverse factors weighing against the approval of an adjustment of

status application, the applicant may need to offset those factors by showing

“unusual or even outstanding equities”). We review de novo whether the

respondent merits a favorable exercise of discretion. 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) (2025).

We begin by considering the respondent’s equities. The respondent

entered the United States as a teenager, has resided in this country for nearly

20 years, and has significant family ties. He has maintained consistent

gainful employment and has received commendations from his employer and

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neighbors. We recognize that removal to Mexico will result in significant

hardship to the respondent and his family. His four United States citizen

children will either be separated from the respondent or have to relocate with

him to an unfamiliar country with a lower standard of living and fewer

resources than the United States. Three of the children have been diagnosed

with medical conditions and developmental delays for which they previously

received treatment in the United States. However, as the most recent medical

records submitted for the children are dated 2020, and the respondent has not

established that they currently receive or need intensive medical or

educational interventions, their expected hardship is uncertain.

We agree with the Immigration Judge that the foregoing equities are

outweighed by the negative factors in this case. The most significant

negative consideration is the respondent’s 2024 arrest in Florida for drunk

driving with a high blood-alcohol content and with his then 10-year-old son

in the car. See Matter of Thomas, 21 I&N Dec. 20, 23–25 (BIA 1995)

(holding that “criminal conduct which has not culminated in a final

conviction” remains relevant as an adverse discretionary factor when

established by probative evidence). “Drunk driving is an extremely

dangerous crime” that poses a grave danger to the lives and property of

others. Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 141 (2008), abrogated on other

grounds by Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015); see also Matter of

Castillo-Perez, 27 I&N Dec. 664, 669–70 (A.G. 2019) (collecting cases).

Based on the Immigration Judge’s factual findings regarding the

circumstances of the arrest, the respondent created a particularly acute risk

of harm by driving drunk with his young son in the car after having reportedly

consumed about 20 beers. The quantity of alcohol consumed and the

respondent’s actions in endangering a child increase the negative impact of

his DUI arrest. 1

Also weighing against a favorable exercise of discretion is the

respondent’s dishonesty in his dealings with the United States, repeatedly

using false or stolen social security numbers for tax and work-eligibility

purposes. The Immigration Judge did not clearly err in finding that the

respondent utilized two different Social Security numbers, including one

belonging to a deceased United States citizen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i).

The respondent also provided false information on some of his tax returns,

listing his cousins in Mexico as nieces and nephews living with him as

1

The respondent testified that he has not received treatment for alcoholism and does not

consider himself to be an alcoholic.

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household dependents, and claimed income tax credits to which he was not

entitled. 2

Use of false or stolen Social Security numbers and providing false

information on tax returns are negative considerations that weigh against a

favorable exercise of discretion. Presenting a false Social Security number

and false information on tax returns are examples of deceptive conduct that

reflects adversely on an alien’s character. See Cuenca-Arroyo v. Garland,

123 F.4th 781, 785 (5th Cir. 2024) (recognizing that “misrepresentations on

tax filings, such as claiming a dependent nephew residing in Mexico who did

not qualify under U.S. tax law . . . reflect adversely on [an alien’s] credibility

and character, which are relevant factors in the discretionary analysis”);

Marin-Rodriguez v. Holder, 710 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 2013)

(“By knowingly presenting a false Social Security card to an employer to

obtain and maintain unauthorized employment, [the alien] . . . engaged in

deceptive conduct.”). Use of an unauthorized Social Security number

“disrupts the ability of the government to oversee the management of social

security accounts; impacts legitimate tax collection efforts; and imposes a

public cost in efforts to protect personal information.” Munoz-Rivera v.

Wilkinson, 986 F.3d 587, 592 (5th Cir. 2021). Moreover, while not the case

here, conduct of this nature can result in criminal prosecution. See, e.g.,

26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) (criminalizing making a material false statement on a

tax return); 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B) (criminalizing misrepresenting a Social

Security number to be one’s own for any purpose).

The respondent claims that he did not know such conduct was against the

law and that he reasonably relied upon professional advice when filing his

taxes. Specifically, he asserts that all his tax forms were in English, a

language he does not speak or read, and that he was told by his tax

professional that he was allowed to claim his relatives in Mexico as

dependents on his tax return. With respect to the Social Security numbers,

the respondent testified that he only used one Social Security number and

that he thought the Social Security number was his. He further testified that

an attorney provided him with the Social Security number he used and that

he was told it was his. He claims that he was unaware that the number

belonged to another person.

The Immigration Judge did not credit this portion of the respondent’s

testimony and instead found that he testified falsely regarding his use of the

Social Security numbers and his knowledge of the false statements on the tax

2

The respondent does not claim that he financially supported these family members.

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returns. “[L]ack of candor in itself serves as an adverse factor weighing

against a favorable exercise of discretion.” Matter of Burbano, 20 I&N

Dec. 872, 876 (BIA 1994); see also Matter of Gomez-Beltran, 26 I&N

Dec. 765, 768 (BIA 2016) (“Truthful testimony and disclosures are critical

to the effective operation of the immigration court system.”). We discern no

clear error in the Immigration Judge’s factual findings regarding the

respondent’s credibility. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i). The respondent’s

testimony that he only used one Social Security number is contradicted by

the documentary evidence reflecting two Social Security numbers listed on

his tax returns and W-2 forms. Further, the respondent’s testimony that he

obtained a Social Security number about 8 years prior to the 2024 hearing

from an attorney is contradicted by the respondent’s tax returns and

W-2 forms from as early as 2007 reflecting two false Social Security

numbers.

Even apart from the Immigration Judge’s finding that the respondent

provided false testimony, the respondent’s claimed lack of knowledge is not

sufficient to negate the negative considerations in this case. It is well settled

that ignorance of the law is not an excuse or defense against unlawful

conduct. See Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA,

559 U.S. 573, 581 (2010) (“We have long recognized the ‘common maxim,

familiar to all minds, that ignorance of the law will not excuse any person,

either civilly or criminally.’” (citation omitted)); see also Cheek v.

United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991) (noting the “deeply rooted” general

rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse). The respondent has a duty to

ensure the accuracy of any representation he makes to governmental

authorities. See Matter of A.J. Valdez and Z. Valdez, 27 I&N Dec. 496, 500

(BIA 2018) (“[I]t is reasonable to expect that aliens will take steps to

ascertain the accuracy of documents they sign.”). The respondent signed his

tax returns and employment forms under penalty of perjury, and it was

reasonable for the Immigration Judge to infer that he knew and assented to

their contents. See id. at 499–500 (holding that an alien’s signature on an

immigration application establishes a strong presumption that he or she

knows of and has assented to the contents of the application, absent evidence

of fraud or other wrongful acts by another person).

The respondent claims that he relied on the professional advice of his tax

preparer when filing his tax returns and of the attorney who obtained the

Social Security number for him. 3 A claim of reasonable reliance on

professional advice presupposes that such advice was sought in good faith

3

The respondent has not asserted a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

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and that in relying on such advice, one is not willfully ignorant.

See generally Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289, 1301 (11th Cir. 2005)

(recognizing “the general principle that ‘[o]ne who has executed a written

contract and is ignorant of its contents cannot set up that ignorance to avoid

the obligation absent fraud and misrepresentation’” (alteration in original)

(citation omitted)). When a respondent seeks to excuse conduct by claiming

to have relied on professional advice, the respondent should submit evidence

of the specific advice given and explain why it was reasonable to rely on such

advice. Cf. Garland v. Ming Dai, 593 U.S. 357, 371 (2021) (holding that the

agency need not find that credible testimony is persuasive or alone sufficient

to meet the alien’s burden of proof); Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I&N Dec. 516, 519

(BIA 2015) (“[R]egardless of whether an applicant is deemed credible, he

[or she] has the burden to corroborate the material elements of the claim

where the evidence is reasonably obtainable, without advance notice from

the Immigration Judge.”).

Here, the respondent’s vague testimony that he received his

Social Security number 8 years prior to the hearing based on the “10 years”

law from an attorney whose name and information he could not remember is

contradicted by evidence that he used two false Social Security numbers on

prior tax filings. Thus, the evidence is insufficient to support his claim that

he reasonably believed this Social Security number was legitimately

obtained. With respect to the respondent’s false claims regarding his

dependents on his tax filings, he did not present any evidence from his tax

preparer or any other tax professional supporting his claim that he was told

he could claim relatives in Mexico whom he did not support as dependents.

Based on the evidence provided, the respondent has not demonstrated that he

reasonably relied on professional advice when he listed false or stolen Social

Security numbers on his tax forms and employment paperwork and falsely

claimed relatives living abroad as dependents for purposes of a tax credit.

Weighing the respondent’s equities against these negative factors, we

conclude on balance that a favorable exercise of discretion would not be in

the best interests of the United States. See Matter of C-V-T-, 22 I&N Dec.

at 11. Therefore, we will deny his applications for cancellation of removal

and voluntary departure in the exercise of discretion. We need not address

the respondent’s arguments regarding good moral character and hardship.

See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (per curiam) (“As a general

rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the

decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”). The appeal will

be dismissed.

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ORDER: The respondent’s appeal is dismissed.

NOTICE: If a respondent is subject to a final order of removal and

willfully fails or refuses to depart from the United States pursuant to the

order, to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents

necessary to depart the United States, or to present himself or herself at the

time and place required for removal by DHS, or conspires to or takes any

action designed to prevent or hamper the respondent’s departure pursuant to

the order of removal, the respondent shall be subject to a civil monetary

penalty of up to $998 for each day the respondent is in violation. See INA

§ 274D, 8 U.S.C. § 1324d (2018); 8 C.F.R. § 280.53(b)(14) (2025).

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