State of Florida v. Reddick

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D2023-2175

_____________________________

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellant,

v.

QUINTON M. REDDICK,

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.

Joshua M. Hawkes, Judge.

July 9, 2025

KELSEY, J.

This appeal raises a Fourth-Amendment issue in a child

pornography case. Before this case arose, Appellee was on

probation as a registered sex offender for traveling to meet a minor

to commit an unlawful sexual act. This case involves multiple new

child-pornography charges. Appellee moved to suppress evidence

of child pornography found on his electronic devices. The trial court

found one argument valid among the many that Appellee raised,

and granted the motion to suppress, rejecting the State’s argument

that the independent source doctrine saved the evidence from

suppression. We reverse.

Facts

The Tallahassee Police Department (TPD) received a tip from

the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC),

linking child pornography to Appellee. NCMEC provided TPD a

picture featuring a very young male child, which NCMEC, TPD,

and ultimately the trial judge found to constitute child

pornography. NCMEC gave TPD information identifying the

Snapchat account to which the picture had been uploaded, as well

as the user’s phone number, date of birth, e-mail address, and user

name. These matched the information Appellee had provided on

his Florida sex offender registration form. TPD, therefore, knew

that information in advance, and thus also knew that Appellee had

a cell phone, an e-mail address, and internet access. The internet

protocol (IP) address was traced to a virtual private network (VPN)

provider, a service that can be used to disguise the actual physical

location of online activity.

The TPD officer assigned to the case wanted to make sure it

was Appellee’s account. In mid-afternoon, two TPD officers went

to Appellee’s registered address. One officer’s body-worn camera

(BWC) recorded the encounter. There was no immediate response

to the officer’s first knock. Appellee answered the officer’s second

knock almost a full minute after the first knock, appearing sleepy

or as if the light hurt his eyes. The door opened directly onto a

staircase. Leaving the entrance door open, Appellee stepped

outside. The officer explained the purpose of the visit as verifying

Appellee’s information on his sex-offender registration, and asked

if Appellee minded if the officers entered the apartment. Appellee

first said they could come in, and started upstairs, then turned

around and said he did mind—but again left the door open. The

officer asked for Appellee’s ID, and Appellee said he needed to go

upstairs and get his keys because the ID was in his car. As he

turned toward the stairs, his smart watch rang. He looked at it for

a couple of seconds, pushed a button on it, then started up the

stairs, before the officer called him back for more questioning.

Appellee stepped fully outside and closed the door behind him.

Appellee answered questions confirming his identity, date of

birth, phone number, e-mail address, internet provider, and status

as a sex-offender probationer. He appeared dubious about why

2

TPD was conducting this check rather than the Sheriff’s Office,

and said he had already updated his information as required for

his change of address. He confirmed his telephone number and e-

mail address—both of which were connected to the Snapchat

account on which the pornographic image was flagged—and

confirmed his social media identification and his internet provider.

He said no one lived with him, and he was working two jobs: at

Best Buy and a communications company. The officer then

instructed Appellee to turn around to be handcuffed, and—

importantly for resolving the issue on appeal—explained that he

was going to detain Appellee and secure the apartment in

anticipation of obtaining a search warrant.

Footage from the officer’s BWC showed him going up the

stairs, announcing his presence, and asking if anyone was inside.

He opened a utility closet at the top of the stairs, shone a flashlight

into the bathroom through its open door, opened the door to a

clothes closet adjoining the bathroom, opened a closet containing a

stacked washer and dryer, and looked around at the main living

area. The apartment was a small one-room studio in which two

electronic-device screens or monitors were in plain view. The

larger one was positioned on a stand against the wall at the foot of

the bed, and appeared to be a TV. The other was smaller, on a desk

beside the bed. Both screens were black and blank as if powered

off. The officer did not open any cabinets, drawers, or anything else

that could function as a container. He did not scrutinize or touch

anything connected to the two screens, nor any other objects in the

apartment. He turned to look all around the room, then returned

to the head of the stairs and called for his partner to bring Appellee

up.

The first officer seated Appellee at the card table, explaining

again that they were going to get a search warrant. He advised

Appellee of his Miranda rights and asked if he still wanted to talk

or not. Post-Miranda, Appellee asked what was going on. The

officer explained that they had some information about online

activity, specifically images on Snapchat, more specifically child

pornography, tied to Appellee on an account other than the

“MarcusQ” one. The officer was the first to mention “MarcusQ.”

Appellee said “never happened—no.” The officer asked how it was

that Appellee’s account was tied to child pornography, and

3

Appellee said he would wait for a lawyer before talking further.

The officer again said he was about to apply for a search warrant

and advised Appellee he was probably going to be charged for

transmitting child pornography. Appellee said someone was

setting him up. The officer went downstairs to get his computer

out of his car, and turned off his BWC. It is undisputed that both

officers sat in the apartment with Appellee while writing a

warrant application and waiting for the warrant, which together

took about an hour and twenty minutes.

Significantly, the requesting officer disclosed in the warrant

application that he had performed a protective sweep: “I secured

the residence to ensure no one else was present in the home in

anticipation of applying for a search warrant.” The application also

noted that Appellee had first confirmed his phone number and e-

mail address, both of which were connected to the suspect

Snapchat account, before the officer entered the apartment. The

officer did not disclose in the warrant application anything that he

saw inside the apartment. Nothing that Appellee said after being

detained was disclosed in the search warrant.

The officer testified at the suppression hearing that based on

the information already available to him, he assumed in advance

that there would be computers and other electronics in the

apartment. He said it is standard practice to include in a warrant

application all devices that could contain electronic images,

because many different devices can store media and images. He

considered the sweep necessary “to ensure that no one else was

inside the residence who could destroy evidence of this

investigation such as computers, laptops, tablets, phones, USBs,

anything we might be–would be searching for . . . .” He repeated

multiple times that he entered and swept the apartment out of

concern that anyone inside who realized why law enforcement was

investigating Appellee could start destroying evidence.

There is neither evidence nor argument that either officer

conducted any further search or accessed any of Appellee’s

property while waiting for the warrant. The detective affirmatively

denied under oath that any such additional search was conducted

or that he used anything he saw in the apartment to inform the

warrant application. He stayed in the apartment because it was

4

more comfortable than having everyone sitting in one of the police

cars while awaiting the warrant.

The warrant application itself explained why it was necessary

to search for a variety of items:

The above [extensive list of] items are being sought

as Snapchat can be accessed via a mobile device, or a

desktop device. Based on my training and professional

experience, it is common for individuals to obtain child

sexual abuse material through different means, such as

direct downloads, peer-to-peer file sharing and trading

with others. This rarely happens on one platform;

therefore, each of the above items will be sought to

determine how the child sexual image was obtained, if it

has been shared with others, and if Reddick possesses

additional child sexual abuse material, or has committed

other offenses related to the possession and/or

transmission of child sexual abuse material.

In addition to disclosing the protective sweep, the warrant

application explained the evidence tying Appellee to child

pornography:

The suspect user name in this investigation was

identified as having elements of Reddick’s name and the

associated email address was shown as

qreddick@hotmail.com. Reddick has been investigated for

inappropriate contact with juvenile males by TPD in 2014

and LCSO [Leon County Sheriff’s Office] in 2020. Reddick

had an injunction issued against him in May of 2020 for

contact with a juvenile male. Reddick is a sexual offender

due to a conviction for Traveling to Meet a Minor to

Commit Unlawful Sexual Act in Gainesville in 2018. I

confirmed the male Reddick was traveling to meet was

portrayed as a male child. Reddick’s last address provided

during his sex offender registration (10/19/2020) was

within the city limits of Tallahassee, FL at 4286 Avon

Park Cir, which is the residence to be searched.

5

The description of the property to be seized in the warrant

application appears to consist predominantly of broad boilerplate

language involving numerous synonyms, seeking all manner of

computer and cellular hardware, software, storage devices and

media, input/output devices, and all data contained therein. Other

items covered in the application included operations manuals,

sources of passwords and usernames, correspondence and

documents pertaining to images or interest in sexual exploitation

of children, bills and other documents showing ownership of

hardware and Internet accounts that could be used to access child

pornography, items showing dominion and control of the property

searched, all data on all devices that could relate to possession or

distribution of child pornography, cell phones and other mobile

devices capable of storing images or videos or sending or receiving

electronic mail, and all potentially relevant content on such

devices.

The warrant application also explained the justification for

broad access to devices and materials, again in what appears to be

standardized, boilerplate language. The application detailed that

obtaining information from electronic devices requires processing

by qualified computer experts because of the large volume of

evidence that can be stored on such devices; the highly technical

experience and skills required to conduct meaningful data

searches; and the necessity of providing experts access to all

available pertinent hardware, software, and peripherals to

exhaust available data.

A judge issued the warrant as requested. The resulting search

ultimately produced evidence generating new charges: one count

of transmission of child pornography, seven counts of possession of

child pornography, and one count of possession with intent to

promote child pornography (based on Appellee’s transmission of

the original child-porn image). 1

1 As a result of these new law violations, Appellee’s probation

was revoked, and he is currently serving fifteen years in prison for

the initial child-sex crime. This record did not develop the potential

argument that a probationer’s home can be fair game for even a

warrantless search. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122

(2001) (noting that a warrantless search of a probationer’s home is

6

At the hearing on Appellee’s motion to suppress all of the

evidence, the TPD investigator—experienced in child pornography

investigations—testified that child-porn perpetrators keep their

materials on multiple devices, and that emulators can be used to

create access to the pornographic materials across other platforms

and devices (such as from cell phone to desktop or laptop, or vice-

versa, meaning Snapchat images could have been accessed from

both kinds of devices). He also testified at length about why it is

necessary to access all possible devices and media that could

contain or reflect the transmission of child pornography.

Suppression Order

The trial court did not watch the arresting officer’s BWC video

during the hearing, instead indicating he would watch it later,

which the order on appeal rendered a couple of weeks later

indicates he did. Appellee’s counsel asserted in the motion to

suppress that the second officer’s BWC was produced in discovery.

Counsel argued that the second video showed the arresting officer

writing the warrant ten minutes after entering the house,

finishing in about an hour, and then reading the warrant itself to

Appellee. Appellee’s counsel did not assert that either officer

searched the premises or any devices before the warrant issued.

However, the second officer’s video was not admitted into evidence,

and we do not have it.

The trial court rendered an order that expressly rejected most

of Appellee’s arguments. The court held that Appellee’s apartment

was a separate abode subject to a knock-and-talk, that the

encounter was not a custodial interview, and that TPD had the

right to ask the questions that were asked. The court also held that

the initial Snapchat image did constitute child pornography; that

the State established probable cause from Appellee’s use of the

reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if supported by

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and authorized by a

probation condition).

7

Snapchat app—typically a cell-phone app—through use of an

emulator/VPN, which was connected to Appellee’s accounts; and

that there was probable cause to believe that the image could be

found on multiple electronic storage devices. The court rejected

Appellee’s additional arguments that the actual search of seized

items was stale. The trial court also found that “there is sufficient

evidence of both venue and identification as to at least one crime,

even after suppression.”

The trial court based its suppression order on the TPD officer’s

“unlawful” warrantless entry into Appellee’s apartment, and the

officer’s remaining in the apartment with Appellee while writing

the warrant application and waiting for the warrant. The trial

court found that the State failed to demonstrate that the warrant

was not informed by the search and that law enforcement would

have obtained the warrant even without the warrantless entry and

sweep. The trial court reasoned that the officer “had the

opportunity to survey the electronic devices available in the

apartment” and “had the opportunity to specifically check during

the time the affidavit was being written to add devices to be

searched or clarify items to look for and then quickly grab those

items after the warrant was approved.” 2 The court said that the

officer’s gaze “paus[ed]” when looking at the two screens in the

room. The trial court could not conclude that the officer would have

obtained the warrant “regardless of information learned in the

warrantless entry.”

The court further reasoned as follows:

Had the apartment been just a mattress and ramen

noodles with no electronic devices of any kind, then it

seems unlikely law enforcement would have obtained a

warrant. Further, the assertion law enforcement could

have obtained the warrant with the information they had

is belied by the fact that they did not. In other words, the

2 The court noted that the BWC from the second officer, which

would have portrayed the affidavit-writing part of the process, was

not submitted into evidence—though the prosecutor had

mentioned it at the hearing and offered to provide it if needed.

8

fact that the law enforcement entered the apartment

without a warrant suggests that the officer wanted to

check before writing the affidavit to see what potential

evidence there was or be sure he was not going to waste

his time with a warrant if there was nothing to be gained.

Indeed, the officer asked for permission to enter the

apartment during the consensual encounter, and the

Defendant refused that request. Thus, the Court finds

that law enforcement wanted entry into the apartment

before writing the affidavit to obtain the warrant,

concludes that the affidavit is tainted by the illegal entry

into the apartment, and that the independent source

doctrine does not apply as an exception to the

exclusionary rule.

Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

We have jurisdiction to review orders “suppressing before trial

. . . evidence obtained by search and seizure.” Fla. R. App. P.

9.140(c)(1)(B). Our standard of review is de novo for the trial

court’s legal determinations; and we review the trial court’s factual

findings for competent, substantial evidence. State v. Hineline, 159

So. 3d 293, 296 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (citing Pagan v. State, 830 So.

2d 792, 806 (Fla. 2002)). When the supporting evidence is

something more than after-the-fact testimony—such as the video

recording in this record—this deferential standard does not apply

fully. Id. Our review is much less deferential when we have the

same video recording on which the trial court relied. See Black v.

State, 59 So. 3d 340, 344 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).

Analysis

We are required to “follow the United States Supreme Court’s

interpretations of the Fourth Amendment and to provide no

greater protection than those interpretations.” Perez v. State, 620

So. 2d 1256, 1258 (Fla. 1993); Art. I, § 12, Fla. Const. (“This right

shall be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the

United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States

Supreme Court.”).

9

As a general rule, evidence obtained unlawfully is

inadmissible. However, the independent source doctrine is an

exception to that exclusionary rule. Rodriguez v. State, 187 So. 3d

841, 845 (Fla. 2015). The independent source doctrine “applies

when evidence is discovered as a result of unlawful police activity

but is also discovered independently through a lawful

investigation that occurs either before or after the illegal activity,

so long as the independent investigation is ‘untainted by the initial

illegality.”’ Jackson v. State, 1 So. 3d 273, 278 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)

(quoting Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988)). As we

have noted, “the fact that police obtained evidence in a manner

that violated a defendant’s right against unreasonable searches

and seizures does not necessarily require that a trial court exclude

it.” Wingate v. State, 289 So. 3d 566, 568 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020), cause

dismissed, No. SC20-871, 2020 WL 3265112 (Fla. June 17, 2020).

Murray established that when applying the independent

source doctrine to an unlawful entry, the question is “whether the

search pursuant to warrant was in fact a genuinely independent

source of the information and tangible evidence.” 487 U.S. at 542.

The Murray court emphasized that the doctrine means to balance

deterrence of unlawful police conduct against the public interest in

utilizing all probative evidence of a crime. Id. at 537. Significantly

for this case, Murray also emphasized that the goal is to avoid

putting police in a worse position than if they had avoided a

potentially improper search. Id.

Murray requires a two-pronged test for determining whether

the evidence obtained had an untainted independent source:

(1) whether the officer’s decision to seek the warrant was prompted

by what was observed during the initial entry, and (2) whether any

information obtained during that entry was presented to the

warrant judge and affected the decision to issue the warrant. Id. If

the officer would have sought a warrant even without having

entered the place in question, “his decision to seek the search

warrant is supported by an ‘independent source,’ and the evidence

seized under the warrant is admissible regardless of whether the

initial entry violated the Fourth Amendment.” United States v.

Noriega, 676 F.3d 1252, 1260–61 (11th Cir. 2012).

10

The record before us answers both of the Murray questions

“no.” This officer clearly intended to seek a warrant before entering

the apartment to sweep it, and said so as evidenced by a video

recording in the record. He also did not disclose to the warrant

judge any information obtained during the entry.

Murray (1): Sweep Did Not Prompt Warrant.

First, the evidence showed that the protective sweep did not

inform the warrant. The officer told Appellee in advance of entry

that he was going to get a search warrant, and testified

consistently with that sequence of events at the suppression

hearing. On its face, the probable cause portion of the search

warrant application did not include any information that the

officer did not already know before entering the apartment.

Further, the application did not disclose the two blank screens or

anything else the officer observed during the sweep.

The sight of two blank screens in the apartment provided no

more useful information than the officer already had—that

Appellee had electronic devices with internet access. The TPD

officer already had Appellee’s sex offender registration

information, and knew that Appellee had a phone number (and

thus a phone), an e-mail address, and internet, which the knock-

and-talk confirmed in addition to revealing Appellee’s smart

watch, operational and used in plain view, which had to be paired

with a cell phone. The officer testified that he had checked on

Appellee’s earlier charges, and thus he already knew that the very

offense for which Appellee was on probation involved use of a

computer and traveling to meet a minor (which the officer testified

he confirmed to have been a young male) for a sexual encounter.

The information the officer knew prior to and completely

independent of the protective sweep was all he disclosed in the

warrant application, and was sufficient to support the warrant.

This record does not support the trial court’s conclusion that

law enforcement could not have obtained a warrant if, as the order

reasoned, “the apartment [had] been just a mattress and ramen

noodles with no electronic devices of any kind.” On the contrary,

as a practical matter even such a hypothetically barren apartment

could hold electronic devices and other evidence of child

11

pornography, making a search advisable and justifiable. But more

to the present point, the record simply does not support the

inference or the conclusion that the sweep informed the warrant

application. The warrant application was intended, planned, and

announced in advance; and it did not disclose a single piece of

information gained in the sweep.

As to the scope of the warrant application, the officer testified

without contradiction that it is standard practice for such

warrants to be broad because of the nature of electronic devices

and transmissions, coupled with the nature of child pornography

and typical behavior of those who view and share it. It is standard

practice in these types of investigations to include all computers,

electronics, and related items that could store digital data, because

many different types and sizes of devices can store media and

images. In fact, the officer testified here that it would be negligent

not to include other devices in a warrant application, because

based on his experience child-sex offenders use multiple devices.

The officer’s testimony was unimpeached.

Consistent with that testimony, the warrant application

appears to consist primarily of menu-driven text—one envisions a

computerized menu from which to choose what to include—listing

or describing every conceivable kind of equipment and other

evidence potentially relevant to exactly this kind of investigation.

Certainly no individual officer could compose it from scratch on the

fly in less than an hour. It is obviously standard, broad language

intended to cover all appropriate circumstances. Notably, the scope

of the warrant was consistent with common practices followed in

child-pornography investigations. Cf. State v. Sabourin, 39 So. 3d

376, 379–92 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (approving probable cause for

warrant to search of home for computers, electronic storage

devices, and photography equipment containing pornographic

photographs of the child victim); State v. Peltier, 373 So. 3d 380,

383 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023) (approving probable cause for warrant to

search home for electronic devices, under which over a dozen were

seized). The warrant application here appears entirely consistent

with that routinely used in comparable cases, not tailored to

anything the officer could have seen in the apartment. There

appears to be no precedent indicating that language such as that

12

used in this warrant application has ever been ruled improper. We

do not conclude it was used improperly on this record.

Murray (2): No Information Provided to Warrant Judge.

Turning to the second Murray test—whether any information

obtained during the warrantless entry was transmitted to the

warrant judge and affected entry of the warrant—our conclusion

is the same. There is no such evidence. The trial court

acknowledged as much in the order on appeal. While the officer

appropriately disclosed the occurrence of the protective sweep in

the warrant application, he did not disclose any information

obtained during his sweep of the apartment.

Nor was there anything newly or uniquely forensically

significant to disclose. The BWC video showed that Appellee

owned at least two video screens of a non-portable size, but the

video also showed that the officer did not look for, look at, touch,

or search whatever electronic devices were attached to the screens

(which is what really counts)—nor anything else. Both screens

were black, showing nothing at all. Nothing from the BWC or the

officer’s testimony indicated that the officer relied on his

observations from looking around the room to get the warrant.

Although the trial court found it significant that these screens

were viewed during the sweep, the evidence establishes without

contradiction that the TPD officer assumed ahead of time that

there was at least a computer in the apartment, based on

Appellee’s earlier charges and the application of common sense,

common knowledge, and actual experience in child pornography

cases about how the newly charged transmission of pornography

could have occurred.

Our review of the BWC video shows that the officer simply

conducted a sweep of the apartment in a manner that indicated he

was making sure no one was there who could destroy potential

evidence. His concern was justified because Appellee delayed

answering the door; then after initially being receptive to letting

the officers inside, Appellee quickly withdrew that offer, stepped

outside and shut the door immediately after receiving and reading

a message on his smart watch; and became increasingly defensive

as the interview proceeded. The officer’s concern was particularly

13

justifiable given that the evidence was electronic, which many

cases illustrate can be destroyed very quickly and completely,

thwarting law enforcement’s efforts to redress these crimes. See,

e.g., United States v. Babcock, 924 F.3d 1180, 1194 (11th Cir. 2019)

(recognizing that because electronic files can be destroyed so

quickly, exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant

requirement is “particularly compelling”); United States v.

Bradley, 488 F. App’x 99, 103 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Courts have doubted

the wisdom of leaving the owner of [an] easily-destructible

[electronic device containing incriminating material] in possession

of that [electronic device] once the owner is aware that law-

enforcement agents are seeking a search warrant.”); State v.

Darter, 350 So. 3d 370, 384 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) (citing these cases

and upholding seizure of cell phone from child-pornography

suspect who appeared to be in the process of deleting material

files), review denied, No. SC22-1792, 2023 WL 2017393 (Fla. Feb.

15, 2023).

The trial court’s ruling improperly put police in a worse

position than if no entry had occurred, because they had enough

information without the sweep to support issuance of the

warrant—and in fact obtained the warrant without disclosing

anything observed in the apartment. See Murray, 487 U.S. at 537.

Contrary to Appellee’s argument, the record establishes that the

officer already knew about the user name “MarcusQ,” because he

mentioned it before Appellee did. The officer’s testimony and the

context of the BWC footage show that police also already knew

both Appellee’s known username and the suspect username from

the cyber tip. Notably, the cyber tip username was similar to

Appellee’s known e-mail as well, and both usernames contained

elements of Appellee’s name. And in any event, the warrant

application did not mention that fact. Absolutely no evidence

obtained during the sweep of the apartment or in Appellee’s post-

Miranda statements was included in the warrant application. On

this record, suppressing the evidence was error.

Limits on the Exclusionary Rule.

Finally, we address whether suppression was required simply

because the officer entered the apartment without a warrant. The

trial court said this in the order: “[T]he fact that the law

14

enforcement [sic] entered the apartment without a warrant

suggests that the officer wanted to check before writing the

affidavit to see what potential evidence there was or be sure he

was not going to waste his time with a warrant if there was nothing

to be gained.” As we have already demonstrated, this is speculation

or theory, and is contrary to the only evidence before the trial

court, including the officer’s testimony. See State v. Williams, 119

So. 3d 544, 545 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (“Testimony that is not

impeached, discredited, or controverted, nor is self-contradicting

or physically impossible, must be accepted by the trial court.”).

Even more significantly as a matter of law, the Supreme Court in

Murray expressly rejected the reasoning that suppression is

required if law enforcement allegedly tried to “check” for potential

evidence before seeking a warrant. See Murray, 487 U.S. at 542

(“while the government should not profit from its illegal activity,

neither should it be placed in a worse position than it would

otherwise have occupied”).

As we have noted recently, to show probable cause there must

be a showing that “particular evidence of a particular crime will

probably be found in a particular place . . . And that determination

simply asks whether a reasonably prudent person would think the

allegation probable.” Malden v. State, 359 So. 3d 442, 445 (Fla. 1st

DCA 2023). The facts before us taken together establish probable

cause to believe Appellee was in possession of child pornography.

Even if the warrant had contained information obtained during

the protective sweep—which it did not—the officer had probable

cause sufficient to obtain a warrant to search Appellee’s apartment

for child pornography absent anything he observed during the

protective sweep.

The TPD officer arrived with the intention to obtain a search

warrant, and told Appellee before the sweep that he was going to

secure the property in anticipation of getting a search warrant.

This evidence was undisputed and unimpeached; in fact, it was

bolstered at the hearing with evidence of the officer’s considerable

experience and understanding of similar cases. To the extent that

the trial court’s reasoning was rooted in the belief that there was

insufficient evidence to obtain a search warrant, the record is to

the contrary. TPD had enough evidence to obtain a warrant

without entering the apartment, and in fact obtained a warrant

15

without disclosing to the warrant judge anything about the pre-

entry encounter with Appellee or what was observed upon entry.

Because the warrant was issued wholly on the basis of information

known before entry, the evidence was admissible under the

independent source doctrine. See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S.

796, 799 (1984) (“[T]he evidence discovered during the subsequent

search of the apartment the following day pursuant to the valid

search warrant issued wholly on information known to the officers

before the entry into the apartment need not have been

suppressed.”).

REVERSED.

RAY, J., concurs; ROBERTS, J., dissents with opinion.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or

9.331.

_____________________________

ROBERTS, J., dissenting.

A person’s home—whether it is a mansion behind iron gates,

a three-bedroom ranch house, an apartment, or a travel trailer—

is the area most protected by the Fourth Amendment. With very

few exceptions, a search warrant signed by a neutral and detached

magistrate is always required before entering a person’s home.

We should affirm Judge Hawkes’ order of suppression here.

The Search

Tallahassee Police Department (TPD) received a cyber tip

from the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children

(NCMEC) that a suspected child pornography image had been

transmitted to/from a Snapchat account. The tip identified a date

of birth, an email address, a phone number, a Snapchat username,

and an IP address. A preliminary investigation led TPD to believe

the account belonged to Appellant, a registered sex offender. A

16

TPD Detective went to Appellant’s address for a knock-and-talk to

verify his residence and his online identity.

Appellant answered the door, and Detective Osborn told him

that they needed to speak with him about his sex offender

information. Appellant stepped outside the apartment; he did not

let the officers go inside. Detective Osborn asked Appellant to

verify his information including his date of birth, phone number,

email, and internet identifiers. After verifying the information,

Detective Osborn felt confident the Snapchat account from the

cyber tip belonged to Appellant and believed he had probable cause

to arrest Appellant and get a search warrant.

Detective Osborn did not immediately seek a search warrant.

After seizing and handcuffing Appellant outside his home,

Detective Osborn performed “a sweep” of the apartment “to ensure

that no one else was inside the residence who could destroy any

evidence of this investigation[.]” In his body-worn camera footage,

Detective Osborn can be see scanning the interior of the home,

pausing to take note of computers and other electronic devices.

After the sweep, Appellant was brought inside. Detective Osborn,

Appellant, and another officer sat at a card table in the kitchen

while Detective Osborn typed out his warrant application and

submitted it electronically to the duty judge. When asked why they

remained in Appellant’s home for the typing and waiting for the

search warrant to be approved, Detective Osborn said it was to

remain in a comfortable location. After an hour and a half,

Detective Osborn received the approved search warrant from the

judge, executed the “search,” and seized the evidence that was

eventually suppressed by trial court.

The Trial Court’s Suppression Order

On August 7, 2023, the trial court heard two motions to

suppress evidence, two motions to dismiss, and a motion in limine,

all filed by Appellant. The trial court denied all motions, except the

motion to suppress at issue in this appeal. That motion sought to

suppress the evidence seized in the home after the “card table

warrant” on the argument TPD had entered Appellant’s home

illegally and searched prior to receiving a valid search warrant. In

the order granting the motion, the trial court stated, “The State

conceded that remaining in the apartment to write the warrant

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and wait for its approval, a process that took approximately an

hour-and-half, was improper, but that the suppression should not

be ordered because of the independent source doctrine.” The order

also noted the State conceded “that the entry/lingering was not

under exigent circumstances” and it would not “seek to uphold the

search under the inevitable discovery doctrine.” The court granted

the motion to suppress, concluding the “affidavit is tainted by the

illegal entry into the apartment, and that the independent source

doctrine does not apply as an exception to the exclusionary rule.”

Analysis

The majority notes that the officer was “secur[ing] the

apartment in anticipation of obtaining a search warrant.” The

opinion gives a narrative of what is seen on the body-worn camera

while the officer enters the apartment and conducts his search.

The opinion notes that while the officer did search the bathroom

and utility closet, he did not “open any cabinets, drawers, or

anything else that could function as a container.” All of this sounds

nice, but it totally brushes by the fact that at that time, the officer

had no legal authority to enter the dwelling. Appellant’s arrest

occurred outside the home. There is no general authority to enter

a home of someone arrested outside to determine if there are other

people in the home.

Standard of Review

The majority correctly notes that our standard of review is de

novo for the trial court’s legal determinations, and we review the

trial court’s factual findings for competent, substantial evidence.

State v. Hineline, 159 So. 3d 293, 296 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). The

majority cites Hineline for the proposition that we do not owe

deference to the trial court’s findings of fact where the trial court

is in no better position to evaluate the evidence than we are. See

id. (recognizing deference to a trial court’s findings of fact does not

fully apply when the findings are based on evidence that is

presented in essentially the same form to the appellate court).

Were the body-worn camera footage the only evidence that the trial

court considered in making its factual determinations, that would

be entirely correct. But the trial court also received live testimony

from Detective Osborne. Our review of the transcript of that

testimony is not the same. Sometimes, how something is said by a

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witness is as important as the words that are spoken. With live

testimony, we owe deference to the trial court’s factual findings.

The Independent Source Doctrine

There is no question that the officers were without legal

authority to enter Appellant’s apartment prior to applying for and

receiving the search warrant. The State conceded this point, and

the trial court so found. However, the “independent source”

doctrine permits the introduction of evidence initially discovered

during, or as a consequence of, an unlawful search but later

obtained independently from lawful activities untainted by the

initial illegality. See Rodriguez v. State, 187 So. 3d 841, 845 (Fla.

2015); Jackson v. State, 1 So. 3d 273, 278 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). To

determine whether an independent source is untainted, the trial

court, citing Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988), properly

recognized its analysis required the following inquiries: “(1) was

the warrantless entry disclosed in the application for the warrant;

(2) did observations from the warrantless entry inform the

application for the warrant; and (3) would the government have

applied for a warrant apart from the warrantless entry.”

The court found the first factor weighed for the State. But the

court found the two remaining factors weighed against the State.

On the second factor, the court found that when TPD illegally

entered, the officers “had the opportunity to survey the electronic

devices available in the apartment, and in fact, did so as is

apparent on the body [worn] camera submitted in evidence, with

the officer’s gaze pausing over electronic devices twice in areas

where no person could be hiding.” This impropriety was

compounded “exponentially” because Detective Osborn wrote the

affidavit while sitting in the apartment and then executed the

search. On the third factor, the court found the “fact that law

enforcement entered the apartment without a warrant suggests

that the officer wanted to check before writing the affidavit to see

what potential evidence there was[.]” The trial court made these

findings based on viewing the body-worn camera footage,

reviewing the warrant application, and evaluating the in-court

testimony of Detective Osborn.

In Murray, the Supreme Court rejected the contention of the

Court of Appeals that “there was no causal link whatever between

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the illegal entry and the discovery of the challenged evidence.” Id.

at 543. The Court stated, “[I]t is the function of the District Court

rather than the Court of Appeals to determine the facts” and

specifically remanded to the Court of Appeals with instructions

that it remand to the District Court for determination whether the

warrant was independent. Here, the trial court made the

appropriate findings to conclude the independent source doctrine

did not apply as an exception to the exclusionary rule. We must

defer to those findings.

For these reasons, I would affirm.

_____________________________

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Benjamin L. Hoffman,

Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Melissa Joy Ford, Assistant Conflict Counsel, Office of Criminal

Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel, Region One, Tallahassee, for

Appellee.

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