Overton v. The Meadows at Summit for Nursing and Rehabilitation LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIKAYLA OVERTON, :

Plaintiff, : CIV. ACTION NO. 3:25-cv-870

v. (JUDGE MANNION)

THE MEADOWS AT SUMMIT FOR

NURSING & REHABILITATION

LLC, D/B/A THE GARDENS AT :

WYOMING VALLEY

Defendant. □

MEMORANDUM

Presently before the court is Defendant, The Meadows at Summit for

Nursing and Rehabilitation LLC, D/B/A The Gardens at Wyoming Valley’s,

motion to dismiss certain claims of hostile work environment, retaliation, and

race discrimination pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title

VII’), 42 U.S.C §1981 (“§1981”), and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act

(“PHRA’) brought by a terminated employee, Plaintiff Mikayla Overton.

Defendant moves to dismiss the claims brought against it arguing that

Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. For the

reasons discussed below, the court will GRANT IN PART and DENY IN

PART Defendant's motion to dismiss (Doc. 9).

I. BACKGROUND

The background of this case is taken from the factual allegations set

forth in Plaintiffs Complaint, (Doc. 1), which the court must accept as true on

motion to dismiss, as well as any matters of public record relevant to this

case.!

Defendant hired Plaintiff, an African American female, as a Nursing

Aide. (Doc. 1, 9]2).2 On August 19, 2023, Plaintiff alleges that a white co-

worker, Joan, referred to Plaintiff and another African American co-worker

as “black bitch,” and “nigger.” (/d. at 9/12). Plaintiff immediately reported

Joan’s behavior to Defendant’s Human Resources, requesting that she be

moved to a different shift to avoid working with her. (/d. at 4]]/13-14).

Defendant’s Human Resources did not grant Plaintiff's request to change

shifts but advised Plaintiff they would “speak to” Joan. (/d. at ]]]15-16).

1 “To decide a motion to dismiss, courts generally consider only the

allegations contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint and

matters of public record.” Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus.,

Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing 5A C. Wright & A. Miller,

Federal Practice and Procedure §1357, at 299 (2d ed.1990)).

2 Plaintiff alleges that she was hired “in or around September 2023,”

(Doc. 1, 11), a date which precedes the chronology of events central to her

claims. However, Defendant clarifies in their brief that the hiring took place

in July 2023. (Doc. 9, p. 2).

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The following day, Joan referred to Plaintiff as “black bitch” again,

leading Plaintiff to make the same report to Human Resources requesting to

no longer be scheduled to work with her. (Doc. 1, f]17-18). Defendant did

not fulfill Plaintiff's request, and continued to schedule her to work with Joan.

(id. at 1]]19-20). On or about September 12, 2023, Plaintiff requested an

assignment of per diem status, which would allow Plaintiff to schedule her

own shifts to avoid working with Joan. (/d. 7]]/21-22). The next day, Plaintiff

renewed her request for per diem status. (/d. at ]]]/23). However, Plaintiff

alleges that Defendant did not respond to Plaintiff and ceased scheduling

her all together, which was understood by Plaintiff as a termination. (/d. at

1124-25).

On or about April 9, 2024, Plaintiff filed a charge of racial discrimination

and retaliation with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(“EEOC”). (Doc 1, J]]26). On or about August 23, 2024, the EEOC issued

Plaintiff a right to sue letter related to the Complaint of Discrimination. (/d. at

11127). On November 19, 2024, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging violations of

Title VIl of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §1981, and the

Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. (Doc. 1). On February 28, 2025,

Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss these claims (Doc. 9, p. 1). On

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May 16, 2025, the case was transferred to the Middle District of

Pennsylvania. (Doc. 14). With all briefs submitted by the parties, the motion

is now ripe for disposition.

ll. LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint must set forth “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While a

complaint does not need “detailed factual allegations ... a plaintiffs obligation

to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than

labels and conclusions.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007). Factual allegations must raise a claimant's right to relief above a

speculative level, so that a claim is “plausible on its face.” /d. at 570. The

plausibility standard asks for “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant

has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A claim

has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” /qbal/, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

The Third Circuit uses a three-step process to evaluate the sufficiency

of a complaint. See Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d

Cir. 2016). A court must first “ ‘tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must

plead to state a claim.’ ” /d. (alterations in original) (quoting /qba/, 556 U.S.

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at 675). Second, a court should “identify allegations that, because they are

no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.’ ” /d. at

789 (quoting /qbal, 556 U.S. at 679). Third, a court must evaluate the

“plausibility of the remaining allegations. That involves assuming their

veracity, construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and

drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor.” Lutz v. Portfolio

Recovery Assocs., 43 F.4th 323, 327 (3d Cir. 2022); see also Connelly, 809

F.3d at 787. Thus, a court’s inquiry is broken into three parts: “(1) identifying

the elements of the claim, (2) reviewing the complaint to strike conclusory

allegations, and then (3) looking at the well-pleaded components of the

complaint and evaluating whether all of the elements identified in part one of

the inquiry are sufficiently alleged.” Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563

(3d Cir. 2011).

After completing this process, if the complaint “alleges ‘enough fact[s]

to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the

necessary elements of a claim, then it plausibly pleads a claim.” Lutz, 49

F.4th at 328 (alterations in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); see

also Connelly, 809 F.3d at 789. The doors of discovery are not unlocked for

“a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” /qba/, 556 U.S. at

678-79. Furthermore, a well-pleaded complaint may proceed “even if it

pe

strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. But where the “well-pleaded facts do not permit

the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint

has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]'—'that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ °

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (alterations in original) (quoting Fed R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).

The court should generally grant leave to amend a pleading before

dismissing it as merely deficient. See, e.g., Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote

Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir. 2007); Shane v.

Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116-17 (3d Cir. 2000). However, dismissal without

leave to amend is justified on the grounds of bad faith, undue delay,

prejudice, or futility. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 236 (3d Cir. 2004).

“Futility means that the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim

upon which relief could be granted.” /n re Merck & Co., Inc. Sec., Derivative

& ERISA Litig., 493 F.3d 393, 400 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing In re Burlington Coat

Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997)).

lll. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs complaint asserts seven counts, each reflecting distinct

statutory claims: Counts |, II, IV, and V allege hostile work environment and

retaliation under Title VIl and §1981; Count Ill raises a standalone race

discrimination claim under Title VIl; and Counts VI and VII bring race

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discrimination and retaliation claims under the Pennsylvania Human

Relations Act (PHRA). (Doc. 1, /28-66). The court will discuss each of

Plaintiff's claims in turn.

A. Plaintiff's claims pursuant to the PHRA are time barred.

When alleging Title VIl and PHRA violations, a plaintiff has a 300-day

deadline for their Title VIl claims and a 180-day deadline for their PHRA

claims. See Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 164 (3d Cir.

2013). Plaintiff had 180 days after the alleged act of discrimination to file a

complaint pursuant to the PHRA. 43 Pa. Stat. §959(h). Plaintiff alleges she

was effectively terminated on or around September 13, 2023. (Doc.1 at

1123-25). Plaintiff needed to file her charge by March 11, 2024 to be within

180 days of the alleged act of discrimination. However, Plaintiff filed her

charge on April 9, 2024, (/d. at 77/26), over 180 days after, rendering the filing

untimely.

Accordingly, because Plaintiffs PHRA claims are time barred, the

Court will dismiss those claims with prejudice, since allowing leave to amend

would be futile.

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B. Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to sustain her race

discrimination claim under Title VII.

When assessing a complaint, the court must first identify the required

elements of the claim. See Malleus, 641 F.3d at 563. Employment

discrimination claims are “subject to the same analysis as discrimination

claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” Castleberry v. STI

Group, 863 F.3d 259, 263 (3d Cir. 2017); see also Brown v. J. Kaz, Inc., 581

F.3d 175, 181-82 (3d Cir. 2009). In order to establish a prima facie case of

Title VII discrimination, courts look to four elements:

(1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she satisfactorily

performed the duties required by her position, (3) she suffered

an adverse employment action, and (4) either similarly-situated

non-members of the protected class were treated more favorably

or the adverse job action occurred under circumstances that give

rise to an inference of discrimination.

See Wallace v. Federated Dept. Stores, 214 F. App’x 142, 144-45 (3d

Cir. 2007); see also Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir.

2003).

Stray remarks by non-decision makers that are not linked to a

decisionmaker cannot support an inference of discriminatory animus. See

Gomez v. Allegheny Health Services, Inc., 71 F.3d 1079, 1085 (3d Cir.

Le.

1995); see also Carnilli v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 67 F. App’x 133, 135 (3d

Cir. 2003) (holding that the plaintiff failed to link evidence of numerous stray

remarks by non-decision makers to his firing so as to reasonably support an

inference of discriminatory intent).

Here, Plaintiff does not allege any conduct by Defendant that supports

an inference of discriminatory intent. In Plaintiffs complaint, the only

discriminatory conduct alleged are the remarks from Joan, a co-worker of

Plaintiff. Although these remarks are grossly offensive, there is nothing to

suggest Joan was a decisionmaker in any capacity and, therefore, her

offensive comments are similar to the non-decision makers in Gomez and

Carilli. Accordingly, those remarks cannot be shown to have any connection

to the Defendant’s adverse action.

Plaintiff's complaint fails to allege any facts suggesting that Defendant

terminated her because of her race. Rather, Plaintiff simply asserts the legal

conclusion that she was fired “because of her race’—a conclusory claim that

courts must disregard under Twombly and /qbal. Without any factual support,

Plaintiffs discriminatory discharge claim falls short of plausibility.

Accordingly, her race discrimination claim (Count Ill) must be dismissed

without prejudice.

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C. Plaintiff sufficiently pleads a hostile work environment claim

under Title VII and §1981.

A §1981 hostile work environment claim is “analyzed in the same

manner as under Title VII.” Miller v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 908 F.

Supp. 2d 639, 653 (E.D. Pa. 2015). The Third Circuit addresses five

elements when assessing a hostile work environment claim:

To succeed on a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must

prove: 1) the employee suffered intentional discrimination

because of his/her [race], 2) the discrimination was severe or

pervasive, 3) the discrimination detrimentally affected the

plaintiff, 4) the discrimination would detrimentally affect a

reasonable person in like circumstances, and 5) the existence of

respondeat superior liability.

Mandel, 706 F.3d at 167 (emphasis in original). An employer is not

always liable for a hostile work environment, and it must be shown the

employer knew or should have known of harassment but failed to take

remedial action. See Kunin v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 175 F.3d 289, 293

(3d Cir. 1999) (finding that because the defendant reasonably failed to

discover the harassment alleged by the plaintiff, respondeat superior liability

cannot be shown and the plaintiff's claim must fail); see also Andrews v. City

of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1486 (3d Cir. 1990) (“liability exists where the

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defendant knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take

prompt remedial action.”).

For the purposes of their motion to dismiss only, Defendant admits

Plaintiff adequately alleged the first, third, and fifth prong of the five-prong

test for a hostile work environment claim under Title VII. See (Doc. 9 at p.

11, note 5). However, Defendant contends that Plaintiff's complaint fails to

contain allegations sufficient to meet the second and fourth prong of a hostile

work environment claim; in effect, that “the discrimination was severe or

pervasive” and that it “would detrimentally affect a reasonable person in like

circumstances.” (/d. at pp. 11-13; see Mandel, 706 F.3d at 167). The Court

disagrees.

To allege the second prong of severe or pervasive, the discrimination

must alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive

working environment. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22

(1993); see also Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270 (2001);

Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998). The Supreme

Court has held that “isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not

amount to discriminatory changes in the ‘terms and conditions of

employment.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788 (emphasis added). It is also

important that any inappropriate comments are directed at the employee,

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and not just made in general. See Nitkin v. Mainline Health, 67 F.4th 565,

571 (3d Cir. 2023) (granting summary judgment for the defendant because

the plaintiff needed to present more than vague statements).

The Third Circuit has expanded upon what constitutes an “extremely

serious’ incident in Castleberry v. STI Grp., where the plaintiffs, two African-

American men, were told by their supervisor that if “they ‘nigger-rigged’ the

fence, they would be fired.” 863 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2017). The Third

Circuit emphasized that the standard for alleging a hostile work environment

requires either severe or pervasive discrimination, meaning an isolated

incident of discrimination can suffice to state a claim of harassment if severe

enough. /d. at 265. The Third Circuit in Castleberry held that the plaintiffs

subjected to the “n-word” even in a single incident established the prima facie

elements of a hostile work environment—finding that the isolated use of a

racial epithet was severe enough to survive dismissal. /d. at 266. The use of

the “n-word” has been found to be particularly “odious and offensive” in the

workplace. See Thomas v. Bronco Oilfield Services, 503 F.Supp.3d 276, 299

(W.D. Pa. 2020). Courts within the Third Circuit, as well as our sister circuits,

recognize its profound impact and objective offensiveness. See E.E.0.C v.

Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc., No. 09—CV-1872, 2010 WL 598641 (M.D. Pa.

Feb. 17, 2010) (stating the use of the “n-word” can quickly change the

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atmosphere, environment, and culture of a workplace from positive to

poisonous); see also Nuness v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 3d

535, 547 (D.N.J. 2018) (expressing its sincere hope that little need be said

to establish the objective offensiveness, and the severity of that offense, of

the “n-word”); Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1034

(9th Cir. 1998) (holding the “n-word” as highly offensive and demeaning,

evoking a history of racial violence, brutality, and subordination); Spriggs v.

Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 185 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding the “n-word”

to be perhaps the most offensive and inflammatory racial slur in English).

However, not all discriminatory remarks are treated the same. Off-

handed comments or mere offensive utterances are not enough for hostile

work environment claims. See Chandler v. La-Z Boy, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 3d

568, 573 (E.D. Pa. 2022). In Chandler, the plaintiff was called a “colored girl”

by her manager once, and “sick” and “lazy” by her co-workers on a daily

basis. 621 F. Supp. 3d at 572. The court dismissed the complaint because

the manager's comment was deemed not severe enough and no facts

suggest the comments by the co-workers were racially-based. /d. at 574,

576.

Here, Plaintiff plausibly alleges the second prong, which is that the

discrimination she faced was severe. Being called the “n-word” along with

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back-to-back days of being called “black bitch” clearly meets the severity

threshold required to survive a motion to dismiss. This parallels Castleberry,

where even a single use of the “n-word” by a supervisor was held “severe”

enough to state a hostile work environment claim and avoid dismissal. 863

F.3d at 266, 268. Accordingly, Plaintiff alleges both repeated and escalating

racial slurs—far more egregious than the isolated “colored girl’ remark

rejected in Chandler, 503 F.Supp.3d at 299—offering sufficient factual

details that elevate her claim beyond mere speculation and render it facially

plausible.

Additionally, due to the severity of the “n-word,” such a discriminatory

remark would detrimentally affect a reasonable person satisfying the fourth

prong of the hostile-work-environment test. As stated in Nuness, little need

to be said about the objective offensiveness and severity of the “n-word.” 325

F. Supp. 3d at 547. Here, Plaintiff's co-worker’s discriminatory remarks are

objectively offensive, and any reasonable person similarly situated would be

harshly impacted.

In sum, Plaintiff plausibly alleges enough facts to establish all the

elements of a hostile work environment claim under Title VIl and §1981 to

survive a motion to dismiss.

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D. Plaintiff sufficiently pleads a claim of retaliation under Title VII

and §1981.

Retaliation claims pursuant to Title VIl and §1981 are governed by the

same standards. See Patel v. CF Fresh LLC, 2024 WL 957973, at *3 (3d Cir.

2024); see also Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 193 (3d Cir.

2015). When assessing retaliation claims, the Third Circuit requires a plaintiff

show “(1) she engaged in a protected activity, (2) she suffered an adverse

employment action, and (3) there was a causal connection between the

participation in the protected activity and the adverse action.” Carvalho-

Grevious v. Del. State Univ., 851 F.3d 249, 257 (3d Cir. 2017). A plaintiff may

rely on a “broad array of evidence” to demonstrate a causal link between his

protected activity and the adverse action taken against him. See Marra v.

Phil. Hous. Auth., 497 F.3d 286, 302 (3d Cir. 2007). Additionally, an

“unusually suggestive” proximity in time between the protected activity and

the adverse action may be enough on its own to establish the causation

element. /d.

A plaintiff in a retaliation case “need not prove the merits of the

underlying discrimination complaint.” Daniels, 776 F.3d at 193-94 (quoting

Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 344 (3d Cir. 2006)). However,

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she must have “act[ed] under a good faith, reasonable belief that a violation

existed.” /d.

Causation is the element of a plaintiff's prima facie case, not temporal

proximity itself. See Kachmar v. SunGard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 178

(3d Cir. 1997). Temporal proximity merely “provides an evidentiary basis

from which an inference can be drawn”. /d. There are no parameters for what

constitutes an unusually suggestive amount of time to constitute temporal

proximity, and instead are decided within the context of the particular

circumstances. /d.

Temporal proximity requires a very short period of time between the

protected employee action and the adverse employer action. Killen v. Nw.

Hum. Servs., Inc., 2007 WL 2684541, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 7, 2007). In Killen,

the court found seventeen days not “unusually suggestive” enough to

establish causation for the heightened summary judgment standard. /d.

However, in Shellenberger v. Summit Bancorp, Inc., ten days has been found

to be enough to establish causation when combined with employers’ remarks

which suggested the plaintiff was fired for taking the “legal route.” 318 F.3d

183, 189 (3d Cir. 2003).

An unusually suggestive time frame may give rise to the inference of

causation, but it is not legally conclusive and other types of circumstantial

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evidence are to be considered. Marra, 497 F.3d at 302. In Marra, the court

affirmed judgment for the plaintiffs after reviewing the evidence they

presented at trial, clarifying they are mindful of the procedural posture of the

case when assessing causation. /d. at 302, 309.

A plaintiff need not prove all the elements of their case to survive a

motion to dismiss, but rather raise a reasonable expectation that discovery

will reveal evidence of those elements, even if it seems unlikely that she will

prevail. Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 793 (3d Cir. 2016)

(finding the plaintiff alleged facts that “raised a reasonable inference that

discovery will reveal evidence of the elements necessary to establish her

claims.”).

Here, Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts to support a reasonable

expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of causation. Unlike in Killen,

where the court evaluated a fully developed factual record at the summary-

judgment stage, the current motion to dismiss faces a significantly lower

burden—requiring only that the complaint’s allegations be accepted as true

and construed in the plaintiff's favor. Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that

Defendant effectively terminated her employment roughly three weeks after

the initial incident—coinciding with her request for per diem status following

Defendant's failure to address her coworker’s misconduct—thereby creating

ESy7 -

a plausible causal link that merits further factual development. Although

twenty-three days is a longer interval than the 10-day period found “unusually

suggestive” in Shellenberger, such proximity may support an inference of

causation when accompanied by additional evidence uncovered in

discovery.

In Connelly, the Third Circuit applied the favorable Twombly-stage

standard, holding that causation may be established through temporal

proximity and contextual evidence—even where success on the merits

seemed initially uncertain. Connelly, 809 F.3d at 793. By contrast, Marra

involved a full evidentiary record at trial, which is inapplicable here. 497 F.3d

at 302. Plaintiff has not reached summary judgiment or trial—she remains at

the pleading stage and should be allowed disicovery to marshal evidence,

even if proving causation may ultimately prove? challenging. Accordingly, at

this stage of the proceedings, her retaliation cliaims include sufficient factual

detail to survive a motion to dismiss and proce ed to discovery.

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IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court will GRANT IN PART and DENY IN

PART Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 9). Count III is dismissed without

prejudice and Counts VI, and VII are dismissed with prejudice. All remaining

claims will proceed to discovery. An appropriate order follows.

/ 4el| E. MANNION

United States District Judge

DATE: Ves

25-870-01