Cox v. Mignon Faget, LTD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SHELBY WEBB COX CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS No. 24-1068

MIGNON FAGET, LTD SECTION I

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is a motion1 filed by plaintiff Shelby Webb Cox (“plaintiff”)

for liquidated damages pursuant to the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29

U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(iii). Defendant Mignon Faget, Ltd. (“defendant”) filed a

response in opposition.2 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant terminated plaintiff’s employment on February 16, 2023.3 Plaintiff

thereafter filed a complaint that alleged several causes of action: pregnancy

discrimination in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; pregnancy discrimination

in violation of Louisiana Revised Statute § 23:342; FMLA interference in violation of

29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1); and FMLA retaliation in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2).4

1 R. Doc. No. 68. Since the original briefing in connection with the instant motion did

not cite to the trial transcript, the Court ordered the parties to file supplemental

memoranda with appropriate citations. See R. Doc. No. 79. In compliance with the

Court’s order, the parties filed supplemental memoranda with appropriate citations.

See R. Doc. No. 88 (plaintiff’s supplemental memorandum in support). For ease and

simplicity, the Court will cite only to the supplemental memoranda.

2 R. Doc. No. 70; R. Doc. No. 91 (supplemental opposition).

3 R. Doc. No. 1, ¶ 20.

4 See id. at 5–8.

Plaintiff’s prayer for relief included damages for back pay and benefits, compensatory

damages, and punitive damages.5

After a four-day trial,6 the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff on all

claims.7 With respect to her FMLA damages, the jury found that plaintiff sustained

$92,000 of damages in back pay.8 However, the jury also found that plaintiff’s

damages for back pay should be reduced by $39,500 for plaintiff’s failure to mitigate.9

In total, the jury awarded plaintiff $52,500 in back pay.

The Court thereafter issued an order and reasons granting in part and denying

in part defendant’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law.10 Relevant here,

the Court denied the motion with respect to the plaintiff’s claims for FMLA

interference and FMLA retaliation.11 However, the Court reduced the back-pay

award to $10,096.15.12

II. STANDARD OF LAW

Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(iii), an employee who has suffered a

violation of her FMLA rights may recover liquidated damages. The amount of

liquidated damages is equal to the amount of compensation that the employee lost by

reason of the FMLA violation plus interest at the prevailing rate. See

5 See id. at 8–9.

6 See R. Doc. Nos. 58–61.

7 R. Doc. No. 63.

8 Id. at 3.

9 Id.

10 R. Doc. No. 98.

11 Id. at 18–20.

12 Id. at 25.

§ 2617(a)(1)(A)(iii). However, if an employer that has committed an FMLA violation

“proves to the satisfaction of the court” that its violation “was in good faith and that

the employer had reasonable grounds for believing” that its actions would not violate

the FMLA, the Court may, in its discretion, reduce the award of liquidated damages

to which the employee would otherwise be entitled. See id.

Awarding the full amount of liquidated damages is “the norm under the

FMLA.” See Nero v. Indus. Molding Corp., 167 F.3d 921, 929 (5th Cir. 1999). “The

good faith defense is an exceptional one, and the defendant faces a substantial burden

to prove it is properly invoked.” Landgrave v. ForTec Med., Inc., 581 F. Supp. 3d 804,

816 (W.D. Tex. 2022) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Although the

FMLA does not define ‘good faith,’ courts have held that to establish good faith, an

employer should demonstrate that it took active steps to ascertain the dictates of the

FMLA and attempted to comply with the statute.” Martin v. Penske Logistics, LLC,

No. 23-cv-0574, 2025 WL 1223565, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2025) (cleaned up)

(citation omitted). “Good faith requires some duty to investigate potential liability;

and an employer cannot rely on ignorance alone as reasonable grounds for believing

that its actions were not in violation of the [FMLA].” Landgrave, 581 F. Supp. 3d at

816 (cleaned up) (citation omitted). “Courts should consider whether an employer had

a subjective intent to comply with the FMLA and whether it acted objectively

reasonable in its application of the FMLA.” Martin, 2025 WL 1223565, at *4 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).

“Even assuming that [the employer] acted in good faith, the decision to award

liquidated damages is still within the discretion of the trial court.” Nero, 167 F.3d at

929. “The district court’s discretion to reduce the liquidated damages must be

exercised consistently with the strong presumption under the statute in favor of”

awarding the full amount of liquidated damages. See id.

III. ANALYSIS

Upon review of the motion, the opposition, and the record, the Court finds that

plaintiff is entitled to the full amount of liquidated damages. Each of defendant’s

arguments fails to carry defendant’s burden to demonstrate good faith and reasonable

belief.

First, defendant argues that it acted in good faith because Nicholas Cope

(“Cope”), defendant’s CFO during the relevant time period, consulted legal counsel.13

However, such testimony is to the effect that Cope consulted legal counsel when he

was preparing the severance agreement.14 Consulting legal counsel after the decision

to terminate plaintiff was made does not establish that the defendant acted in good

faith when it decided to terminate plaintiff’s employment.15

13 R. Doc. No. 91, at 3–5.

14 Day 2 Trial Tr. 145:14–145:18.

15 The case on which defendant principally relies, Hill v. J. C. Penney Co., 688 F.2d

370 (5th Cir. 1982), is distinguishable. There, the employer’s challenged policy “was

taken on the advice of counsel.” See id. at 375. To the contrary, the evidence shows

that Cope consulted legal counsel after the decision to terminate plaintiff’s

employment was made and that Cope consulted legal counsel with respect to the

severance agreement rather than as to whether defendant could terminate plaintiff’s

employment consistently with the FMLA.

Second, defendant argues that it acted in good faith when it terminated

plaintiff’s employment because it did so for legitimate business reasons.16 The Court

has already rejected this argument when it denied defendant judgment as a matter

of law with respect to plaintiff’s FMLA claims.17 To reiterate, there is substantial

evidence that defendant terminated plaintiff in retaliation for exercising her FMLA

rights rather than for a legitimate business reason.18

Third, defendant argues that plaintiff is not entitled to recover both punitive

damages in connection with her Title VII claim for pregnancy discrimination and

liquidated damages in connection with her FMLA claims.19 Defendant reasons that

allowing defendant to recover both punitive damages and liquidated damages would

constitute an impermissible double recovery.20 Defendant cites not a single case in

support of this contention.21 Defendant’s lack of authority is indicative of the extent

to which its argument is plainly meritless.

Although this lawsuit concerns a single act—defendant’s termination of

plaintiff’s employment—that act incurred several distinct harms. It violated both

plaintiff’s right not to be discriminated against because of her pregnancy pursuant to

Title VII and her rights pursuant to the FMLA. Accordingly, the punitive damages

awarded pursuant to Title VII and the liquidated damages awarded pursuant to the

16 R. Doc. No. 91, at 5–8.

17 R. Doc. No. 98, at 16–20.

18 See id.

19 R. Doc. No. 91, at 9.

20 See id.

21 See id.

FMLA concern different rights protected by different statutes. Atchley v. Nordam

Grp., Inc., 180 F.3d 1143, 1151–52 (10th Cir. 1999) (“The misconduct under Title VII

was against Ms. Atchley in comparison to non-pregnant employees, whereas the

misconduct under the FMLA was for failing to comply with the statutory mandate of

restoring Ms. Atchley to her prior position.”). Since the awards concern distinct

harms, the award of both does not constitute an impermissible double recovery.

Atchley, 180 F.3d at 1151–52; cf. Miller v. Raytheon Co., 716 F.3d 138, 147 (5th Cir.

2013) (holding that the award of punitive damages pursuant to one statute and the

award of liquidated damages pursuant to another did constitute an impermissible

double recovery because both statutes protect against age discrimination).

Fourth and finally, defendant argues that plaintiff failed to mitigate her back-

pay damages, for which reason the issue of liquidated damages is immaterial.22 When

it denied defendant’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, the Court

rejected defendant’s argument that plaintiff was not entitled to any back pay.23

However, the Court did reduce plaintiff’s back-pay award to $10,096.15.24

Accordingly, that is the relevant amount for calculating the liquidated damages

award.

Having determined that defendant has not proven its good-faith defense, the

Court turns to address a dispute between the parties regarding the applicable

22 Id. at 9–10.

23 R. Doc. No. 98, at 21–22.

24 Id. at 25.

interest rate. Plaintiff contends that Louisiana law governs the interest rate because

the Court is exercising supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state-law claim.25

Defendant argues that the federal prime rate applies.26 The Court agrees with

defendant.

“Most district courts apply the current prime rate published by the Federal

Reserve System Board of Governors as the appropriate pre-judgment interest rate in

FMLA cases.” Stanton v. Jarvis Christian Coll., No. 18-cv-479, 2020 WL 5269439, at

*1 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 2020); see also Felix v. Mary Kay, Inc., No. 20-cv-0683, 2023

WL 11957492, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2023). Accordingly, the Court will apply the

federal prime rate even though there is a state-law claim in this case. Accord Stanton,

2020 WL 5269439, at *1 (applying the federal prime rate even though the case also

involved a state-law claim). The Court will award plaintiff prejudgment at the federal

prime rate from the date on which plaintiff’s employment was terminated (February

16, 2023) to the date of judgment. Accord id.; Felix v. Mary Kay, Inc., 2023 WL

11957492, at *1; see also Thomas v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 297 F.3d 361, 372 (5th

25 R. Doc. No. 88, at 2–3. The case on which plaintiff relies, to 5G Studio Collaborative,

LLC v. Dallas Uptown Hosp., LLC, No. 15-cv-2719, 2017 WL 4750697 (N.D. Tex. Oct.

20, 2017), is inapposite. There, the Court applied state law to determine the

prejudgment interest rate with respect to a state-law claim over which the court

exercised supplemental jurisdiction. See id. at *2. Contrarily, the instant motion

concerns the prejudgment interest rate with respect to a federal claim over which this

Court has original jurisdiction.

26 R. Doc. No. 91, at 2.

Cir. 2002) (“District courts generally should calculate interest on back pay and past

damages based on the date of the adverse employment action.”).27

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that plaintiffs motion is GRANTED. The Court will award

plaintiff $10,096.15 in liquidated damages pursuant to the FMLA plus interest at the

federal prime rate from February 16, 2023 to the date of entry of judgment,

New Orleans, Louisiana, July 7, 2025.

An

UNITED STATKS DISTRICT JUDGE

27 The Court notes that, in its motion, defendant does not ask this Court to depart

from the general rule and award prejudgment interest from a date other than the

date of plaintiffs termination. See id.