finding that “terms in the underlying contract for necessaries are not automatically covered by the resulting lien” but that “a maritime lien under the [CIMLA] appears to only cover the price necessaries themselves plus interest”
How later courts described this case
- finding that “terms in the underlying contract for necessaries are not automatically covered by the resulting lien” but that “a maritime lien under the [CIMLA] appears to only cover the price necessaries themselves plus interest”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
TRAILER BRIDGE, INC. CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 22-5358
LOUISIANA INTERNATIONAL MARINE, LLC SECTION: “G”(5)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are Defendant Louisiana International Marine, LLC’s (“Defendant”)
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment1 and Motion for Attorney’s Fees.2 From December 16, 2024
through December 17, 2024, the Court held a bench trial in this matter.3 On May 9, 2025, the Court
entered judgment in favor of Defendant against the MEMPHIS BRIDGE and ATLANTA
BRIDGE, in rem.4 Defendant requests that the Court amend its judgment to include an award, in
personam, against Plaintiff for interest, costs, and attorney’s fees. Considering the motions, the
memoranda in support and in opposition, the reply memoranda, the record, and the applicable law,
the Court denies the Motion for Attorney’s Fees. The Court grants the Motion to Alter or Amend
Judgment in part and denies it in part.
1 Rec. Doc. 105.
2 Rec. Doc. 99.
3 Rec. Docs. 88 and 89.
4 Rec. Doc. 97.
I. Background
Plaintiff owned two deck barges, ATLANTA BRIDGE and MEMPHIS BRIDGE.5 On
August 4, 2020, Plaintiff and Work Cat Florida, LLC (“Work Cat”) executed a BIMCO Standard
Barge Charter Party Agreement (“the Trailer Bridge/Work Cat charter agreement”) for the time
charter of the barges to Work Cat.6 The charter agreement contained a no-lien and indemnity
provision.7 A copy of the charter agreement was maintained in the line lockers of the ATLANTA
BRIDGE and MEMPHIS BRIDGE and was available upon request.8
On November 12, 2020, Work Cat and Defendant entered into two identical BIMCO
Supplytime 2005-time charter party agreements for certain offshore service vessels (collectively
“the LIM/Work Cat charter agreements”), namely the LA COMMANDER and the LA INVADER
owned by Defendant.9
Beginning in January 2021, Work Cat, pursuant to the LIM/Work Cat charter agreements,
utilized the services of the LA COMMANDER and the LA INVADER to perform various services
including towage of the chartered barges owned by Plaintiff.10 Plaintiff was not a part of, did not
consent to, and lacked knowledge of these arrangements.11
5 Rec. Doc. 1 at 2.
6 Id. at 3.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 4.
11 Id.
2
Defendant regularly invoiced Work Cat for payment for the services rendered from January
16, 2021 through June 18, 2021.12 On May 18, 2021, Work Cat filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy
in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida – Tampa Division.13 On
June 22, 2021, Work Cat converted its bankruptcy proceedings from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7.14
On May 25, 2021, Defendant filed a proof of claim in the Work Cat bankruptcy
proceedings for the unpaid invoices to Work Cat totaling $1,364,214.17.15 Defendant alleged that
this amount was for “towage services and supplies” rendered to Work Cat for the use of the LA
COMMANDER and LA INVADER.16
On June 4, 2021, Defendant filed two claims of lien with the National Vessel
Documentation Center (“NVDC”) against the ATLANTA BRIDGE for $1,264,214.16 and against
the MEMPHIS BRIDGE for $1,362,214.16.17 Both claims of lien allege a maritime lien for
necessaries for towage against the respective barges.18
On August 1, 2022 and November 28, 2022, Plaintiff entered into Purchase and Sale
Agreements to sell the MEMPHIS BRIDGE and the ATLANTA BRIDGE.19 Both agreements
12 Id.
13 Id. at 5.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 6.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 7.
3
require Plaintiff to indemnify and defend the purchasers.20 On November 30, 2022, Defendant sent
a Notice of Lien and Demand for Payment to the purchaser of the MEMPHIS BRIDGE.21 On
December 16, 2022, the purchaser made demand to Plaintiff seeking defense and indemnity against
the claim asserted by Defendant.22
On December 20, 2022, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court against Defendant seeking
declaration that the claims of lien asserted by Defendant are invalid.23 On January 23, 2023,
Defendant filed an answer and counterclaim against Plaintiff seeking recognition of the liens and
judgment in rem against the barges.24
From December 16, 2024 through December 17, 2024, the Court held a bench trial in this
matter.25 At the close of Plaintiff’s case-in-chief, Defendant moved for Judgment of Partial
Findings that Defendant did not have actual notice of the no-lien provision, which was taken under
advisement.26 At the close of Plaintiff’s case-in-chief, Defendant moved for partial judgment
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(c), that Plaintiff had not met its burden of proving
actual notice.27 The Court took this matter under advisement.28 On day two of trial, the Court ruled
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 8.
23 Id. at 11.
24 Rec. Doc. 5.
25 Rec. Docs. 88 and 89.
26 Rec. Doc. 88.
27 Trial Transcript, Day One.
28 Id.
4
that Defendant did not have actual notice of the no-lien clause.29 After Defendant rested, Plaintiff
moved for Judgment as a Matter of Law on the claims asserted against Plaintiff in personam.30
Defendant conceded that it does not intend to assert a claim against Plaintiff in personam for
necessaries, and Plaintiff’s motion was granted in part and denied in part as to attorney’s fees.31
Second, Plaintiff moved for Judgment as a Matter of Law in its favor finding that the maritime
liens asserted by Defendant were invalid.32 This issue was taken under advisement.33 Third,
Plaintiff made an oral motion for reconsideration of the Court’s ruling that Defendant did not have
actual notice of the no-lien clause, which was taken under advisement.34 Fourth, Plaintiff moved
for Judgment as a Matter of Law as it relates to whether Defendant’s liens were incorrect and
invalid, which was taken under advisement.35 Fifth, Plaintiff moved for Judgment as a Matter Law
in its favor finding that LIM’s claims were discharged in bankruptcy court, which was denied by
the Court.36 Sixth, Plaintiff moved for Judgment as a Matter of Law as to the reasonableness of
the claim of lien asserted by LIM, which was denied.37 Seventh, Plaintiff moved for Judgment as
a Matter of Law in its favor finding that LIM did not rely on the credit of the vessels, which was
29 Rec. Doc. 89.
30 Trial Transcript, Day Two.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
5
denied.38
On May 9, 2025, the Court entered judgment against the MEMPHIS BRIDGE in the
amount of $863,162.50 and ATLANTA BRIDGE in the amount of $630,402.10, in rem, plus court
costs, reasonable attorney’s fees, and pre and post judgment interest.39 On May 23, 2025, Plaintiff
filed a Motion for Attorney’s Fees.40 On May 28, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal41 and a
Motion to Approve Security and Stay Execution of Judgment.42 On June 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed an
opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees.43 On June 6, 2025, Defendant filed a
Motion to Alter Judgment.44 On June 9, 2025, Defendant filed a reply memorandum in further
support of its Motion for Attorney’s Fees.45 On June 16, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the
Motion to Alter Judgment.46 On June 20, 2025, Defendant filed a reply memorandum in further
support of its Motion to Alter Judgment.47
38 Id.
39 Rec. Doc. 97.
40 Rec. Doc. 99.
41 Rec. Doc. 100.
42 Rec. Doc. 101.
43 Rec. Doc. 103.
44 Rec. Doc. 105.
45 Rec. Doc. 107.
46 Rec. Doc. 112.
47 Rec. Doc. 114.
6
II. Parties’ Arguments
A. Motion to Alter Judgment
1. Defendant’s Argument in Support of Motion to Alter Judgment
Defendant moves to alter or amend the May 9, 2025 Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 59(e), to reflect an award in personam against Plaintiff.48 Defendant contends the
Judgment correctly awarded Defendant the principal value of its maritime liens against the barges
in rem.49 Defendant explains, by virtue of an earlier Lien Escrow Agreement, the principal
amounts of Defendant’s maritime lien claims were transferred to an escrow fund.50 Defendant
contends the parties disagree on how interest, costs, and attorney’s fees should be awarded.51
Defendant avers the judgment should award interest, costs, and attorney’s fees in favor of
Defendant and against Plaintiff in personam,52 Defendant asserts that pre-judgment interest in the
amount of $351,806.07 should be awarded in its favor against Plaintiff, in personam.53
Defendant points out that jurisprudence has established that attorney’s fees are not
“necessaries”, and thus, are not lienable.54 Defendant contends the Court properly awarded
Defendant attorney’s fees as “prevailing party” under 46 U.S.C. § 31343(c)(2), but Congress did
48 Rec. Doc. 105-1 at 1.
49 Id. at 2.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 3.
53 Id. at 4.
54 Id.
7
not create a new maritime lien enforceable in rem for the prevailing party.55 Defendant argues that
because Plaintiff commenced this action as plaintiff, it subjected itself to in personam
jurisdiction.56 Defendant states that the issue of whether Defendant’s recovery of interest, costs,
and attorney’s fees would be limited by the escrow fund (in rem) or against Trailer Bridge (in
personam) is in dispute.57 Defendant points out that the Lien Escrow Agreement provides that
Defendant’s recovery is not limited to the lien escrow fund, and Defendant may look to Plaintiff
to satisfy its claim.58 Defendant argues as a matter of law and as a matter of contract, Plaintiff is
liable in personam for costs and attorney’s fees.59
Defendant contends that during trial, it did not agree to dismiss its in personam claims
against Plaintiff for interest, costs, or attorney’s fees.60 Defendant maintains that its claims for
maritime liens were in rem and its claims for interest, costs, and attorney’s fees were in
personam.61 Defendant states that this Court has not issued an order and judgment dismissing
Plaintiff in its capacity as in personam counter-defendant.62 Defendant clarifies that it only
intended to assert its maritime lien claims for necessaries in rem.63 Defendant prays that the Court
55 Id. at 5.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 6.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 7.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 8.
63 Id.
8
render a supplemental or amended judgment clarifying that the award of interest, costs, and
attorney’s fees is in personam against Plaintiff.64
2. Plaintiff’s Arguments in Opposition to Motion to Alter Judgment
Plaintiff, appearing as limited claimant of the MEMPHIS BRIDGE and ATLANTA
BRIDGE, opposes the motion to alter judgment.65 Plaintiff contends that any claims against it were
dismissed in their entirety during trial following Plaintiff’s oral Motion for Judgment as a Matter
of Law.66 Plaintiff argues Defendant has failed to submit any evidence warranting amendment of
the judgment.67 Plaintiff contends Defendant has not demonstrated manifest injustice pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59.68 Plaintiff asserts Defendant does not argue that dismissal of
Plaintiff from this lawsuit was improper, nor does Defendant argue that the Court improperly
granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law.69 Plaintiff points out that Defendant
concedes that attorney’s fees and costs cannot be rendered against the vessels in rem.70 Plaintiff
suggests that this Court’s Judgment should be amended to remove the award of attorney’s fees and
costs against the vessels.71
64 Id. at 9.
65 Rec. Doc. 112.
66 Id. at 2.
67 Id. at 3.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 3–4.
9
Plaintiff argues Defendant should be judicially estopped from changing its prior accepted
position that Defendant did not intend to assert a claim against Plaintiff in personam.72 First,
Plaintiff contends Defendant asserts a prior inconsistent position, and Defendant now moves to
relitigate in personam claims against Plaintiff.73 Next, Plaintiff argues the Court accepted
Defendant’s prior inconsistent position.74 Third, Plaintiff argues that it would be prejudiced and
Defendant would receive an unfair advantage if the Court allows the alleged inconsistencies to
proceed.75 Plaintiff argues because the Court dismissed all in personam claims during trial,
Plaintiff was not required to put on a defense.76 Plaintiff asserts the Court should deny Defendant’s
Motion to Alter Judgment.77
3. Defendant’s Arguments in Further Support of the Motion to Alter Judgment
Defendant contends Plaintiff appears to agree that a manifest error of law or manifest
injustice would occur if the Judgment is not amended or clarified.78 Defendant reiterates that the
Court should clarify the Judgment by specifying that the Court’s award for attorney’s fees and
costs are against Plaintiff in personam.79 Defendant points out that the minute entry from day two
of trial reflects that Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law as to whether Defendant
72 Id. at 4.
73 Id. at 5.
74 Id. at 6.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 7.
78 Rec. Doc. 114 at 1.
79 Id. at 2.
10
has a viable claim against Plaintiff and whether Defendant is entitled to attorney’s fees was granted
in part.80 Defendant clarifies it did not agree to dismiss its claims in personam related to attorney’s
fees.81
Defendant contends it is not utilizing the instant motion to relitigate issues.82 Defendant
explains that it moves to correct or prevent a manifest error of law or fact by asking the Court to
clarify that its award to Defendant of interest, costs, and attorney’s fees is against Plaintiff in
personam and not against the barges in rem.83 Defendant asserts it has maintained the same
position throughout this litigation.84 Defendant avers that Plaintiff’s contention that it was
dismissed as a party is incorrect.85 Defendant prays that the Court grant its motion and amend the
Judgment to clarify the award of interest, costs, and attorney’s fees.86
B. Motion for Attorney’s Fees
1. Defendant’s Arguments in Support of the Motion for Attorney’s Fees
Defendant requests that the Court fix the amount of attorney’s fees in the amount of
$186,717.50 against Plaintiff in personam.87 Defendant contends this amount is reasonable under
the applicable “lodestar” methodology, and the amount requested is considerably less than the
80 Id.
81 Id. at 3.
82 Id. at 4.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 5.
85 Id. at 6.
86 Id.
87 Rec. Doc. 99.
11
amount of attorney’s fees estimated by Plaintiff at trial.88 Defendant states its lead counsel, David
B. Sharpe, with over 35 years of legal expense, has an hourly rate of $300 to $350 an hour.89
Defendant states the hourly rate for the associates on its legal team was $225 an hour.90 Defendant
contends other courts in this District have found higher rates to be reasonable.91 Defendant
includes a table summarizing the hours spent by its litigation team following trial.92 Defendant
explains that it has attached invoices and declarations confirming the requested amounts.93
Defendant contends attorney’s fees and taxable court costs are not a part of a maritime lien
for necessaries.94 Defendant explains an award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing party according
to 46 U.S.C. § 31343(c)(2) is in personam and not in rem.95 Defendant avers it is well settled that
attorney’s fees are not “necessaries” and are not a part of a maritime lien for necessaries.96
Defendant asserts any award of costs and attorney’s fees to the prevailing party is to be awarded
88 Rec. Doc 99-1 at 1.
89 Id. at 3
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 5.
93 Id. at 6.
94 Id. at 7.
95 Id.
96 Id.
12
in personam.97 Defendant prays that the Court enter judgment awarding it taxable costs and
reasonable attorney’s fees against Trailer Bridge in personam.98
2. Plaintiff’s Arguments in Opposition to the Motion for Attorney’s Fees
Plaintiff opposes the motion solely as claimant of the MEMPHIS BRIDGE and ATLANTA
BRIDGE.99 Plaintiff argues this Court properly dismissed it as a party in this lawsuit.100 Plaintiff
contends the Judgment was not rendered against it.101 Plaintiff contends Defendant’s Motion for
Attorney’s Fees is not a Motion to Amend Judgment.102 Plaintiff avers the Judgment was against
the barges.103 Plaintiff contends that binding precedent has made clear that legal services are not
“necessaries” that were provided to the barges.104 Plaintiff asserts Defendant’s motion should be
denied because attorney’s fees cannot be rendered against a vessel in rem.105
Plaintiff argues even if the law permitted an award of attorney’s fees against the barges,
the amount sought is unreasonable.106 Plaintiff contends any affidavits from the fee-seeking
attorneys “must also speak to rates actually billed and paid in similar lawsuits,” and Defendant
97 Id. at 8.
98 Id.
99 Rec. Doc. 103 at 1.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 2.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 3.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 4.
106 Id.
13
here fails to do so.107 Plaintiff argues the total number of hours expended by Defendant’s five
attorneys is excessive and unreasonable, warranting a reduction.108 While Defendant suggests to
the Court that its attorneys expended 627.3 hours during litigation, Plaintiff argues Defendant must
display an exercise of billing judgment and Defendant’s billing records do not indicate that any
was exercised, how much or when.109 Plaintiff points out that Defendant fails to include invoices,
amounts billed for specific entries, or whether those entries were reduced.110 Plaintiff contends
almost every page of time entries contains a manual revision of time claimed.111 Plaintiff contends
the handwritten revisions call into question the accuracy of the time entry records.112
Plaintiff argues it is unreasonable for Defendant to request attorney’s fees related to
settlement discussions, evaluations, and participation through voluntary mediations.113 Plaintiff
contends settlement discussions account for 44.9 hours of time.114 Plaintiff requests that the Court
employ a whole reduction in any lodestar calculation.115 Plaintiff also requests a downward
107 Id. at 5.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 6 – 7.
111 Id. at 7.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 8.
115 Id. at 9.
14
adjustment to the attorney’s fee award.116 Plaintiff suggests that Defendant unnecessarily incurred
legal fees throughout this litigation which supports a downward adjustment.117
Plaintiff argues 46 U.S.C. § 31343(c)(2) does not provide Defendant a right to recover
attorney’s fees.118 Plaintiff explains that 46 U.S.C. § 31343(c)(2) provides for a declaratory action
to a vessel owner to establish that a claimant does not have a valid claim of lien.119 It is Plaintiff’s
position that neither party is a “prevailing party” since the underlying notices of lien were
withdrawn and the validity of said notices of lien were not addressed by the Court.120 Plaintiff
contends that because it was justified in its position that the notices of lien were unreasonable,
Defendant should be denied attorney’s fees.121 Plaintiff asserts the Motion for Attorneys Fees
should be denied and the Judgment should be limited to the maritime lien amounts alone.122
3. Defendant’s Arguments in Further Support of the Motion for Attorney’s Fees
Defendant contends it was declared the “prevailing party” according to the Judgment and
Order and Reasons issued by the Court.123 Defendant avers its request for costs and attorney’s fees
is de facto reasonable.124 Plaintiff contends its request for attorney’s fees in the amount of
116 Id.
117 Id. at 10.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 11.
121 Id. at 12.
122 Id.
123 Rec. Doc. 107 at 1.
124 Id. at 2.
15
$187,717.50 and taxable costs in the amount of $2,051.82 are reasonable because they are less
than Plaintiff’s pretrial estimates.125 Defendant points out that Plaintiff’s own hourly rates are
higher than those sought by Defendant, and in another matter in this District, Plaintiff included
fees for dispute resolution, which Plaintiff now asserts is improper here.126
Defendant contends its counsel worked on an hourly basis and submitted invoices paid by
Louisiana International Marine that reflect contemporaneous time entries.127 Defendant asserts the
Court has not dismissed Plaintiff from this lawsuit.128 Defendant avers the Court has yet to enter
Judgment against Plaintiff, and Defendant has requested that the Judgment be amended to award
interest, costs, and attorney’s fees in personam against Plaintiff.129 While Plaintiff asserts it is now
appearing solely on behalf of the barges, Defendant argues that the barges lack standing to
challenge an in personam judgment against Plaintiff.130 Defendant prays that it is awarded
$186,717.50 in attorney’s fees against Plaintiff in personam.131
III. Legal Standard
A. Motion to Alter/Amend Judgment
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) states that, “a motion to alter or amend a judgment
must be filed no later than 28 days after entry of judgment.” The Fifth Circuit recognizes that such
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 4.
128 Id. at 5.
129 Id. at 6.
130 Id. at 7.
131 Id. at 8.
16
a motion “is not the proper vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal theories, or arguments that could
have been offered or raised before the entry of judgment.”132 “Under Rule 59(e), amending a
judgment is appropriate (1) where there has been an intervening change in the controlling law; (2)
where the movant presents newly discovered evidence that was previously unavailable; or (3) to
correct a manifest error of law or fact.”133
B. Motion for Attorney’s Fees
Courts in the Fifth Circuit engage in a two-step process to assess attorney’s fees.134 First,
a lodestar is calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by an appropriate
hourly rate in the community for such work.135 “[T]here is a strong presumption that the lodestar
figure is reasonable.”136 After calculating the lodestar, a district court may decrease or enhance the
amount of attorneys’ fees based on the twelve factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway
Express, Inc.137 Those factors are as follows: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and
difficulty of the issues in the case; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal services properly; (4)
the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary
fee charged for those services in the relevant community; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent;
(7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the
132 Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Simon v. United States, 891 F.2d
1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1990)).
133 Alexander v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 867 F.3d 593, 597 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Demahy v. Schwarz
Pharma, Inc., 702 F.3d 177, 182 (5th Cir. 2012)).
134 Combs v. City of Huntington, 829 F.3d 388, 390 (5th Cir. 2016).
135 Id.
136 Id. at 553–54.
137 Id. (citing Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F. 2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974)).
17
results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the undesirability
of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12)
awards in similar cases.138 The lodestar may not be adjusted due to a Johnson factor if the creation
of the lodestar award already took that factor into account.139 Such reconsideration is
impermissible double-counting.140
IV. Analysis
Defendant requests that the Court award it attorney’s fees in the amount of $186,717.50,
and Defendant also requests that the Court amend the Judgment, awarding attorney’s fees, interest,
and costs against Plaintiff in personam. In opposition, Plaintiff argues that attorney’s fees are not
available against the vessels in rem, and Plaintiff asserts Defendant’s request for attorney’s fees is
unreasonable.
Defendant argues the Court made a manifest error of law in the May 9, 2025 Judgment
because attorney’s fees were awarded to Defendant in rem against the MEMPHIS BRIDGE and
ATLANTA BRIDGE. With respect to attorney’s fees, the Commercial Instruments and Maritime
Liens Act, 46 U.S.C. § 31343(c)(2) provides that in maritime lien proceedings, “[t]he court may
award ... attorneys fees to the prevailing party, unless the court finds that the position of the other
party was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of ... attorney’s fees
138 Id. at 390, n.1.
139 Saizan v. Delta Concrete Prods. Co, 448 F.3d 795, 800 (5th Cir. 2006).
140 Id.
18
unjust.”141 A suit in rem to enforce a maritime lien is limited to the value of the lien itself.142 In
Gulf Marine & Industrial Supplies, Inc. v. GOLDEN PRINCE M/V, the Fifth Circuit held that
attorney’s fees were beyond the scope of necessaries because they are not necessary for the ship
to carry on its normal functions and not something essential to the vessel’s operations.143 “The
only object of the proceeding in rem, is to make [the right to the maritime lien] available—to carry
it into effect. It serves no other purpose.”144 Moreover, maritime liens are governed by the principle
of “stricti juris and will not be extended by construction, analogy or inference.”145 Both parties
agree that an award for attorney’s fees in rem for “necessaries” was improper in these
circumstances. Thus, the Court finds that the Judgment should be amended to correct a manifest
error of law.
Defendant argues the Judgment should be amended to reflect an award of attorney’s fees,
interest, and costs in personam against Plaintiff. Plaintiff argues any in personam claims against it
were dismissed when the Court granted its oral Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, and the
Judgment should be amended to remove the award for attorney’s fees and costs against the vessel.
141 46 U.S.C. § 31343(c)(2).
142 Bradford Marine, Inc. v. M/V Sea Falcon, 64 F.3d 585, 588 (11th Cir. 1995).
143 230 F.3d 178 (5th Cir. 2000).
144 The Rock Island Bridge, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 213, 215, 18 L.Ed. 753 (1867) (“The lien and the proceeding
in rem are, therefore, correlative—where one exists, the other can be taken, and not otherwise.”); see also J.P. Provos
Maritime S.A. v. M/V Agni, No. 99-26 c/w 99-29, 99-47, 99-106, 1999 WL 558151 at *2 (E.D. La. 1999) (denying an
in rem claimant in a maritime lien case an award of contractually-agreed upon attorneys’ fees because legal services
do not benefit the vessel; Triton Marine Fuels Ltd., S.A. v. M/V Pacific Chukotka, 671 F. Supp. 2d 753, 760-61 (D.
Md. 2009) (finding that “terms in the underlying contract for necessaries are not automatically covered by the resulting
lien” but that “a maritime lien under the [CIMLA] appears to only cover the price necessaries themselves plus
interest”).
145 Piedmont & Georges Creek Coal Co. v. Seaboard Fisheries Co., 254 U.S. 1, 12, 41 S.Ct. 1, 4, 65 L.Ed.
97 (1920).
19
The parties disagree on whether Plaintiff was dismissed as a party to this suit. The trial transcript
provides as follows:
MR. KEAN: Okay, Trailer Bridge pursuance to Rule 52(c) moves this court for
judgment as a matter of law on various issues because there’s no reasonable fact
finder would find in favor of LIM based on the evidence presented on the following
issues. The first being that Louisiana International Marine has no viable claims
against Trailer Bridge in-person number. Trailer Bridge is a named defendant in
this lawsuit, but LIM’s claims sound in admiralty and are based in rem against the
barges. They have presented no facts or evidence viable claim against defendant
Trailer Bridge. They have presented nothing to find that Trailer Bridge itself is
liable for the in rem necessaries claims to which they claim a lien on, Your Honor.
They reference specifically I’ll point the Court towards Record Document No. 5
count 1 of document No. 5 which is the counterclaim. And it specifically says in
paragraph 14 there exists a valid maritime lien on the barges MEMPHIS BRIDGE
and ATLANTA BRIDGE for outstanding necessaries. There is no reference to
Trailer Bridge. And there has been no evidence that Trailer Bridge incurred a lien
itself. So, Your Honor, we ask for a judgment of recall finding that there is no viable
claim of lien as against Trailer Bridge itself.
…
MR. SHARPE: May it please the Court David Sharpe for defendant LIM. Thank
you. To be clear, LIM is not asserting a maritime lien claim against Trailer Bridge.
It is an in rem claim that sounds only against the barges since Trailer Bridge sold
the barges and by agreement with LIM we confected an escrow agreement security
in lieu of the recordation of liens, these barges were never arrested. So LIM’s lien
claims now will be satisfied out of this escrow agreement. So we actually don’t
disagree.
THE COURT: So you agree.
MR. SHARPE: Yeah, we do. There’s one thing that we disagree about a nuance,
excuse me. When Trailer Bridge brought this action it’s kind in the nature of a
declaratory judgment action under the maritime lien act I think it’s 31314c but it’s
late in the day. That’s the provision that allows a party like Trailer Bridge to come
into court and ask for a judgment either directing the National Vessel
Documentation Center to remove the lien or declaring that there’s no lien at all. So
that’s kind of how this whole case got kicked off. And that provision that statutory
provision in the lien act has what I call a loser pays provision, and that is that the
district court in its discretion can award attorney’s fees and costs to the prevailing
party. So of the three kind of major components of LIM’s claim, principal value of
maritime lien for towage services which includes the day rate and the fuel, that we
can only recover from the escrow fund. We don’t claim we can recover in
personam. So that’s not in dispute. Second part, prejudgment interest, well, my
automatic I think is the Fifth Circuit’s term for it. If we should prevail and the court
20
in its discretion awards prejudgment interest that would also be in the nature of an
in rem claim. If the total award exceeds the value of security, too bad for LIM. So
we are capped for those two parts of the claim. The maritime lien and prejudgment
interest. If the Court were to award LIM attorney’s fees and costs according to the
statute, that’s in personam. They brought the suit and whoever the prevailing party
is the Court has discretion to award fees. So that’s the only claim before the Court
that kind of sounds in personam. But we do not have any contracts at issue directly
between LIM and Trailer Bridge. I hope that’s cleared it up.
THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MR. KEAN: Your Honor, for clarification purposes, my motion -- I have a separate
motion that I will make as to the attorney’s fees but we can talk about that now just
for clarity purposes.
…
THE COURT: Thank you. For the purpose of this motion, I think it’s fair to say
that you all agree or you’ll stipulate to the fact that the intent is that this is an in rem
action, and you’re not -- for purposes of the lien action right pursuing Trailer Bridge
itself or individually.
MR. SHARPE: Correct.
THE COURT: And so we’ll leave out the with the exception of I'll have to interpret
the attorney’s fees but with regard to the lien itself right your motion is granted with
those provisions or limitations.146
Based on the trial transcript, the Court granted Judgment as a Matter of Law as to the in
personam maritime lien claim for necessaries against Plaintiff, but the Court did not make a ruling
as to the issue of attorney’s fees. While Defendant argues that attorney’s fees and costs should be
awarded against Plaintiff in personam, Defendant provides no authority, nor can the Court locate
any, wherein attorney’s fees and costs were awarded in personam when the underlying prevailing
claim was in rem. “When a maritime lien attaches, the plaintiff may pursue an in rem action against
the vessel involved.”147 Besides an in rem action against the vessel, “[t]he plaintiff also has the
option of bringing an in personam action against any party that is directly liable in contract, tort,
146 Unedited Trial Transcript, Day 2.
147 Dowell Div. of the Dow Chem. Co. v. Franconia Sea Transp., Ltd., 504 F.Supp. 579, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1980),
aff'd, 659 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1981).
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or some other substantive law.”!4® However, if there is no “separate basis of substantive liability,”
the in personam liability does not attach “merely because a maritime lien has come into
existence.”!? Based on this persuasive authority and the overall posture of this litigation, upon
further consideration, the Court finds it equitable that each party bears its own attorney’s fees and
°° The Court will issue an amended judgment reflecting the same.
V. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, the Court finds that amendment of the May 9, 2025 Judgment
is necessary to correct a manifest error of law. Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney’s Fees is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion to Amend/Alter Judgment is
GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The motion is GRANTED to the extent it
requests that the Judgment be amended. The motion is DENIED to the extent it requests that
attorney’s fees and costs be awarded in personam. An amended judgment shall issue separately.
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this 8th day of July, 2025.
NANNETTE JOQUAVETTE BROWN (ou
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
18 Td.
149 Id: see also Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, Rule C Supplemental Rules for Admiralty and
Maritime Claims of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (noting that “no action in personam may be brought when the
substantive law imposes no personal liability”).
190 See e.g., Three Fifty Markets Ltd. v. M/V ARGOS M, 2024 WL 2746797 (E.D. La. May 29, 2024).
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