REN v. AilunUS

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

QUAN REN and KUI CAO,

Plaintiffs,

Civil Action No. 2:25-cv-730

v.

THE INDIVIDUALS, CORPORATIONS,

LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES,

PARTNERSHIPS, and UNINCORPORATED

ASSOCIATIONS IDENTIFIED ON

SCHEDULE A,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM ORDER OF COURT1

Robert J. Colville, United States District Judge

I. Background

In the above-captioned action, Plaintiffs Quan Ren and Kui Cao, who reside in the People’s

Republic of China, bring a claim for patent infringement against a number of Defendants, who, as

1 The Court notes that this Memorandum Order is, in many respects, substantively consistent with, if not identical to,

other Memorandum Orders entered in similar “Schedule A” cases contemporaneously herewith. The same can be

explained simply by the fact that, at least in this Court’s experience, Plaintiffs’ counsel’s filings in Schedule A cases

contain similar, if not identical, allegations, assertions, and arguments, and, at times, what are or can fairly be described

as “cut and paste” or “cookie cutter” filings. By way of example, Plaintiff’s Proposed Temporary Restraining Order

itself in this case, which involves a patent for a watch cover, makes reference to a “unique massager which it [sic]

subsequently registered with the United States Patent Office” in the proposed factual findings and conclusions of law.

See ECF No. 3-1 at ¶ 2. The Court believes that it is far more likely that the listing of a massager as opposed to a

watch cover indicates a “copy and pasted” paragraph from a previously utilized order in another case where counsel

merely forgot to replace “massager” with “watch cover.” While a seemingly small, simple, and not entirely

uncommon mistake to make, it points out a greater concern with the nature of “copy and pasted” pleadings, particularly

in this context. Were the Court to sign the proposed order as prepared and proffered, it would include a fundamental

misstatement about the product at issue. Such an order would likely be unenforceable without modification. It bears

noting that Plaintiffs’ current filings total more than 700 pages, each of which requires Court review before the

issuance of injunctive relief, which is sought by Plaintiff on an expedited basis. While the Court accepts its gatekeeper

role, it notes that, where a plaintiff seeks the “extraordinary remedy” of injunctive relief, including asset restraint, as

to many defendants, the Court expects the plaintiff’s filings to not contain material mistakes such as the one identified

herein.

alleged, “reside and/or operate . . . Seller IDs in the People’s Republic of China and other foreign

jurisdictions or redistribute products from the same or similar sources in those locations.”2 ECF

No. 1 at ¶ 16. Plaintiffs assert that each of the Defendants is manufacturing, distributing,

importing, offering for sale, and/or selling products that infringe upon Plaintiff’s patent for a

“watch cover.” ECF No. 3 at 1. According to Plaintiffs:

Defendants conduct business or assist in business conducted throughout the United

States (including within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and this Judicial

District) through the manufacturing, online advertising and offering for sale, and

importation and distribution of products that embody infringing versions of

Plaintiffs’ Watch Cover Patent.

ECF No. 1 at ¶ 17.

Along with the Complaint, Plaintiffs filed: (1) a Motion (ECF No. 3) and supporting brief

(ECF No. 4) seeking a temporary restraining order (“TRO”), an order to show cause why a

preliminary injunction junction should not issue, and an order allowing for expedited discovery;

(2) a Motion (ECF No. 2) seeking to seal this case and the filed documents pending the Court’s

ruling on the Motion seeking a TRO; (3) a Motion (ECF No. 5) and supporting brief (ECF No. 6)

seeking an order permitting Plaintiffs to serve the Defendants via email and electric publication;

(4) the Declaration of Plaintiff Quan Ren (ECF No. 7); (5) the Declaration of Plaintiff’s Counsel

Michael Mitchell (ECF No. 8); and (6) a Motion to Exceed Page Limit (ECF No. 9) as to the Brief

filed at ECF No. 4.3 Plaintiffs seek to enjoin Defendants from making, using, offering for sale,

selling, and/or importing Defendants’ allegedly infringing products. Plaintiffs also request a

temporary restraint of the Defendants’ assets. For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny

2 The fifty-one Defendants are identified in Schedule A of the Complaint (ECF No. 1).

3 As noted, Plaintiffs have already filed their brief, and the Court has reviewed it in its entirety. Accordingly, the

Motion to Exceed Page Limit is granted.

Plaintiffs’ requests for a TRO, for an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not

issue, and for expedited discovery.

II. Applicable Legal Standards

With respect to the standard for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the United States

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained:

The decision to issue a preliminary injunction is governed by a four-factor test:

To obtain an injunction, the plaintiffs had to demonstrate (1) that

they are reasonably likely to prevail eventually in the litigation and

(2) that they are likely to suffer irreparable injury without relief. If

these two threshold showings are made the District Court then

considers, to the extent relevant, (3) whether an injunction would

harm the [defendants] more than denying relief would harm the

plaintiffs and (4) whether granting relief would serve the public

interest.

K.A. ex rel. Ayers v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., 710 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Tenafly

Eruv Ass’n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 157 (3d Cir. 2002)). The requirements for a

temporary restraining order are the same as those for a preliminary injunction. Saluck v. Rosner,

C.A. No. 98-5718, 2003 WL 559395, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 2003). “Preliminary injunctive relief

is ‘an extraordinary remedy’ and ‘should be granted only in limited circumstances.’” Kos Pharms.,

Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting American Tel. & Tel. Co. v.

Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1427 (3d Cir. 1994)). “[O]ne of the goals of

the preliminary injunction analysis is to maintain the status quo, defined as the last, peaceable,

noncontested status of the parties.” Kos Pharms., 369 F.3d at 708 (quoting Opticians Ass’n of Am.

v. Indep. Opticians of Am., 920 F.2d 187, 197 (3d Cir. 1990)). The court may issue a preliminary

injunction only on notice to the adverse party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 (a)(1).

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, district courts are authorized to exercise

personal jurisdiction over non-residents to the extent permissible under the law of the state in

which the district court is located. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e); North Penn Gas Co. v. Corning Nat. Gas

Corp., 897 F.2d 687, 689 (3d Cir. 1990). In exercising personal jurisdiction, the court must first

ascertain whether jurisdiction exists under the forum state’s long-arm jurisdiction statute and then

determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with the due process clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Van Buskirk v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 760 F.2d

481, 489-90 (3d Cir. 1985). This inquiry has been collapsed in Pennsylvania, as the Pennsylvania

long-arm statute provides that: “the jurisdiction of the tribunals of this Commonwealth shall extend

to all persons . . . to the fullest extent allowed under the Constitution of the United States and may

be based on the most minimum contact with this Commonwealth allowed under the Constitution

of the United States.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5322(b); Van Buskirk, 760 F.2d at 490. The reach of the

Pennsylvania long-arm statute is thus “coextensive” with the due process clause. North Penn Gas,

897 F.2d at 690. The due process clause permits the court to assert personal jurisdictional over a

nonresident defendant who has “certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the

maintenance of [a] suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”

International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quotations omitted).

“A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country)

[defendants] to hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so

‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.” BNSF Ry.

Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1558 (2017) (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 126

(2014)). The “paradigm” forums where a corporate defendant is at home are the corporate

defendant’s place of incorporation and its principal place of business. BNSF Ry. Co., 137 S. Ct.

at 1558 (citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires

Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011)). “The exercise of general jurisdiction is not

limited to these forums; in an ‘exceptional case,’ a corporate defendant’s operations in another

forum ‘may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that

State.’” Id. (quoting Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 n.19). General jurisdiction has not been established

in this case.

Specific jurisdiction is appropriate only if the plaintiff’s cause of action arises out of a

defendant’s forum-related activities, “such that the defendant ‘should reasonably expect being

haled into court’” in that forum. Vetrotex Certainteed Corp. v. Consolidated Fiber Glass Prod.

Inc., 75 F.3d 147, 151 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Worldwide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.

286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980)). The Third Circuit has explained the three-part

analysis for specific jurisdiction. “First, the defendant must have ‘purposefully directed [its]

activities’ at the forum. Second, the litigation must ‘arise out of or relate to’ at least one of those

activities. And third, if the prior two requirements are met, a court may consider whether the

exercise of jurisdiction otherwise ‘comport[s] with fair play and substantial justice.’” O’Connor

v. Sandy Lane Hotel, 496 F.3d 312, 317 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted). To find that a

plaintiff’s claims “arise out of or relate to” the defendant’s contacts with the forum state, the Third

Circuit requires “a closer and more direct causal connection than that provided by the but-for test.”

Id. However, the required causal connection is looser than the tort concept of proximate causation.

Id. (citing Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 99-100 (3d. Cir. 2004)). The appropriate

analysis is fact-intensive, focusing on the “reciprocity principle upon which specific jurisdiction

rests” -- whether the defendant received the benefits and protections of a state’s laws to the extent

that it should, as a quid pro quo, submit to the burden of litigation in the state. Id. at 323.

As noted, each of the Defendants is alleged to be a foreign entity. Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 4(k)(2) provides:

(2) Federal Claim Outside State-Court Jurisdiction. For a claim that arises under

federal law, serving a summons or filing a waiver of service establishes personal

jurisdiction over a defendant if:

(A) the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state’s courts of

general jurisdiction; and

(B) exercising jurisdiction is consistent with the United States Constitution

and laws.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2). Accordingly, in order for a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a

foreign defendant pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2):

(1) there must be a claim arising under federal law; (2) the defendant must be

beyond the jurisdictional reach of any state court of general jurisdiction; and (3) the

defendant must have sufficient contacts with the United States as a whole so that

the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant comports with the

due process requirements of the Constitution or other federal law.

Skold v. Galderma Labs., L.P., 99 F. Supp. 3d 585, 603 (E.D. Pa. 2015). “Rule 4(k)(2) was adopted

to ensure that federal claims will have a U.S. forum if sufficient national contacts exist.” Synthes

(U.S.A.) v. G.M. Dos Reis Jr. Ind. Com de Equip. Medico, 563 F.3d 1285, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2009)

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2) advisory committee notes to 1993 amendment).

III. Analysis

As to the first factor, likelihood of success on the merits, “a sufficient degree of success for

a strong showing exists if there is a reasonable chance or probability[ ] of winning.” Xie v.

GUANHE Home essentials, No. 2:25-CV-00265, 2025 WL 1039233, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 2025)

(quoting Ramsay v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 968 F.3d 251, 256 (3d Cir. 2020)). “Because

Plaintiff will ultimately have to establish personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence,

the precise question before the Court now is whether Plaintiff has established ‘a reasonable

probability’ that [Plaintiff] will be able to establish personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the

evidence.” Xie, 2025 WL 1039233, at *2 (citing Control Screening LLC v. Tech. Application &

Prod. Co. (Tecapro), HCMC-Vietnam, 687 F.3d 163, 167 (3d Cir. 2012)).

“In the context of e-commerce, ‘the mere operation of a commercially interactive web

site’—even if accessible in the relevant forum—is insufficient to establish minimum contacts and

therefore personal jurisdiction.” Xie, 2025 WL 1039233, at *2 (citing Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step

Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 454 (3d Cir. 2003)). Rather, the plaintiff must show that that the

defendant has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum

state “by directly targeting its web site to the state, knowingly interacting with residents of the

forum state via its web site, or through sufficient other related contacts.” Id.

At this juncture and on this record, Plaintiffs have not met their burden of establishing a

reasonable probability that they will eventually be able to establish, by a preponderance of the

evidence, personal jurisdiction over the Defendants. Initially, the Court rejects any argument by

Plaintiffs that the maintenance of a commercial website through which Defendants advertise and

sell products worldwide, including in Pennsylvania, alone is sufficient to establish minimum

contacts. See Xie, 2025 WL 1039233, at *4 (“[T]he operation of an online storefront from which

Pennsylvania residents can make purchases if they so choose—standing alone—is insufficient to

establish minimum contacts with Pennsylvania.”). In their briefing, see ECF No. 4 at 5-6, this is

Plaintiffs’ primary argument in support of personal jurisdiction, and it is one that has been roundly,

and repeatedly, rejected by courts, including this one.

That said, Plaintiffs also allege that the Defendants maintain such websites and that the

Defendants “have transacted business with consumers located in the U.S., including Pennsylvania,

for the sale and shipment of the Infringing Products.” ECF No. 1 at ¶ 15 (emphasis added).

Plaintiff further alleges that “each of the Defendants is committing tortious acts in Pennsylvania

via offering for sale and/or sale of their infringing goods through their online marketplaces, is

engaging in interstate commerce, and has wrongfully caused Plaintiffs substantial injury in the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.” Id. at ¶ 28 (emphasis added). The Court finds this equivocal

language to be telling.4 The Defendants sell products to U.S. customers, and possibly in

Pennsylvania, which is in the U.S. The Defendants also offer to sell and/or sell their products to

Pennsylvania residents. The second seemingly guarded allegation, potentially, betrays Plaintiffs’

true basis for asserting personal jurisdiction, Defendants’ online storefronts. See ECF No. 4 at 6

(“Therefore, this Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because they have intentionally

advertised and sought out to do business in Pennsylvania utilizing their Store IDs and websites to

offer for sale and/or sell infringing products” (emphasis added)); ECF No. 7 at ¶ 7 (“We have

identified numerous fully interactive e-commerce stores, including those operating the Seller IDs,

which were offering for sale and/or selling infringing products embodying the Asserted Patent to

consumers in this Judicial District and throughout the United States.” (emphasis added)).5

With respect to these allegations, Plaintiffs have not clearly pled that each and every

Defendant transacts actual business in this state. See FORCEL MEDIA LIMITED, Plaintiff, v.

DecYI, et al., Defendants., No. 2:25-CV-750, 2025 WL 1665586, at *2 (W.D. Pa. June 12, 2025)

(“Without a showing that sales and shipments of Defendants’ infringing products at issue here

were made to Pennsylvania, the Court would not be satisfied that personal jurisdiction exists.”).

Plaintiffs are represented by sophisticated and experienced counsel, who is more than capable of

clearly pleading the basis for personal jurisdiction in this case. If, on information and belief,

4 It bears noting that the Court has pending before it at least two other lawsuits involving Plaintiffs’ counsel wherein

substantively identical equivocal allegations are set forth in each of the complaints.

5 See also ECF No. 4 at 6 (“Whether a Defendant physically shipped Infringing Products into Pennsylvania is not

determinative of whether personal jurisdiction exists, as courts in this Circuit examine a given defendant’s online

interactions with consumers in considering whether a particular defendant has transacted business in the forum state.”).

Plaintiffs believed that each and every Defendant had sold products into this state, Plaintiffs should

have so stated, and done so unequivocally.

Further, the attachments to Plaintiffs’ Complaint at ECF Nos. 1-8 through 1-9 are not

evidence of sales, but rather screenshots of online shopping carts that indicate that the Defendants

would ship to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania if an order were placed. They are not receipts, and, again,

the Court believes that these images are indicative of Plaintiffs’ belief that maintaining an online

storefront that could allow shipment to this District alone would be sufficient to establish

jurisdiction. Again, it is not. See Xie, 2025 WL 1039233, at *4. Even if these documents were

all receipts for purchases by a Pennsylvania customer, it appears likely to this Court that these

screenshots were produced by Plaintiffs or counsel for purposes of establishing jurisdiction, given

the general consistency in ZIP Codes in the documents.6 Such a practice is insufficient to establish

personal jurisdiction:

Moreover, the screenshots attached to the complaint do not reflect that these are

arms-length sales. If [plaintiff] or its counsel or agents simply ordered these

products to create personal jurisdiction, that doesn’t work. See Nifty Home Prods.

Inc. v. Ladynana US, No. 23-1332, 2024 WL 4987245, at *3 (3d Cir. Dec. 5, 2024)

(finding, in context of review of district court’s denying motion to vacate default

judgment, a “colorable argument” that single sale from each defendant into

Pennsylvania—set up by plaintiff in each instance—was insufficient to show

purposeful availment); Toys “R” Us, Inc., 318 F.3d 446 at 454-55 (two sales

orchestrated by the plaintiff insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction because

these two sales “appear to be the kind of ‘fortuitous,’ ‘random,’ and ‘attenuated’

contacts that the Supreme Court has held insufficient to warrant the exercise of

jurisdiction”); Herbal Brands, Inc. v. Photoplaza, Inc., 72 F.4th 1085, 1095 (9th

Cir. 2023) (finding personal jurisdiction over defendants using their Amazon

storefronts to make sales to residents in forum state, but requiring that such sales

“must occur in the defendant's regular course of business”).

6 The Court identified three total ZIP Codes that were listed as the potential shipping address in the nearly 244 pages

of shopping cart screenshots. Nearly all other possible identifying information has been redacted from these

documents.

FORCEL MEDIA, 2025 WL 1665586, at *2. In short, Plaintiffs have not established a reasonable

probability that they will be able to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that all of the

Defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5322.

Plaintiffs likewise fail to make a sufficient showing that they will be able to establish

personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence under Rule 4(k)(2) as to all Defendants.

Under that Rule, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant is beyond the jurisdictional reach of

any state court of general jurisdiction. Given the general allegations in Plaintiffs’ Complaint

respecting sales into the U.S., it seems entirely likely that many of the Defendants, if not all of

them, would be subject to jurisdiction in at least one forum. While it is not clear that Pennsylvania

is an appropriate forum, it is equally unclear, on this record, that Plaintiffs are likely to establish

by a preponderance of the evidence that each of the Defendants is beyond the jurisdictional reach

of any other state. Given that this is a threshold issue, the Court finds that the issuance of a TRO

or an order directing Defendants to show cause as to why a preliminary injunction should not issue

is not appropriate.

Further, the Court agrees with the analysis set forth in the recent Memorandum Order

entered by Judge Ranjan in FORCEL MEDIA, wherein he discussed sincere concerns respecting

misjoinder in a similar Schedule A case. See FORCEL MEDIA, 2025 WL 1665586, at *2-4. In

that case, Judge Ranjan explained:

The Court questions the propriety of joinder of 103 defendants under Rule 20. Rule

20(a)(2) allows a plaintiff “to join all defendant sellers in one action if the claims

arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or

occurrences.” Viking Arm AS v. P’hips & Unincorporated Ass’ns Identified on

Schedule A, No. 24-1566, 2024 WL 2953105, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 6, 2024). Under

Rule 21, the Court “may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 21.

As courts in the Northern District of Illinois have “time and again” held in the

context of similar Schedule A cases, “it is not enough for a plaintiff to simply allege

that multiple defendants have infringed the same patent or trademark to meet Rule

20’s requirements.” Estee Lauder Cosms. Ltd. v. P’ships & Unincorporated Ass'ns

Identified on Schedule A, 334 F.R.D. 182, 187 (N.D. Ill. 2020). This is because,

absent some sort of connection among the defendants, “one defendant’s alleged

infringement does not arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of

transactions of occurrences as another defendant’s unrelated infringement.” Id.

FORCEL MEDIA, 2025 WL 1665586, at *2.

“It is well established . . . that ‘simply committing the same type of violation in the same

way does not link defendants together for the purposes of joinder.’” Viking Arm AS v. Partnerships

& Unincorporated Associations Identified on Schedule A, No. 24 C 1566, 2024 WL 2953105, at

*2 (N.D. Ill. June 6, 2024) (quoting Bose Corp. v. P’Ships & Unincorporated Ass’ns Identified on

Schedule A, 334 F.R.D. 511, 514 (N.D. Ill. 2020)). Plaintiffs in this case advance just such an

unsupportable argument. See ECF No. 4 at 16 (“The allegations in Plaintiffs’ Complaint in the

instant case demonstrate that the Defendants are acting in almost identical manner and during the

same or substantially similar time frame to sell infringing products—collectively in the same

occurrence of mass harm—and thus show a logical relationship between them that supports

joinder.”). Like the plaintiff in FORCEL MEDIA, the Plaintiffs in this case assert that joinder is

appropriate for the following reasons:

(1) Defendants often operate under multiple fictious aliases and/or appear to be an

interrelated group of infringers, (2) Defendants’ internet stores share same or

similar registration patterns, accepted payment methods, check-out methods, prices

and quantities, keywords, stock images, infringing product descriptions, (3)

Defendants’ infringing products bear similar irregularities that suggest they came

from a common source, (4) infringers typically communicate with each other

through group chats and websites to discuss tactics for operating multiple accounts

and evading detection, and (5) infringers commonly operate under multiple seller

aliases to evade enforcement efforts and conceal their identities.

FORCEL MEDIA, 2025 WL 1665586, at *3; see ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 36-42.

While the complaint in FORCEL MEDIA is not currently publicly available for review on

the online docket, the Court believes it is at least possible, if not entirely likely, that the joinder

allegations in both this case and FORCEL MEDIA are substantively, if not entirely, identical.7 As

Judge Ranjan held, these generally pled allegations are conclusory assertions unsupported by

sufficient facts. FORCEL MEDIA, 2025 WL 1665586, at *3. The Court is, on this record,

unconvinced that there is a connection between the Defendants, let alone one that is shared by all

of them. As noted by Judge Ranjan, courts in the Northern District of Illinois have routinely

rejected arguments such as those raised by Plaintiffs in support of joinder in this case. See id.

(“[E]xperience has shown that, while some individual defendants may operate several online

stores, and while some individual defendants may coordinate with other defendants before or after

the filing of the infringement action, rarely, if ever, have all defendants named in a Schedule A

case worked together.” (quoting Dongguan Juyuan Precision Tech. Co., Ltd. v. The P’ship and

Unincorporated Ass’s Identified on Schedule A, No. 24-cv-11301, ECF 5 at 1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4,

2024))). Similarly, the Court finds that the exhibits attached to Plaintiffs’ Complaint are not

sufficient to support an inference that there is any relationship between all fifty-one of the

Defendants. Id.

“[E]ven where joinder is permissible under Rule 20, a Court may exercise its discretion to

sever or drop defendants if it concludes that doing so would further the interests of judicial

economy without prejudice to any party.” FORCEL MEDIA, 2025 WL 1665586 at *4 (quoting

Malibu Media, LLC v. Surgent, No. 12-3905, 2013 WL 1704289, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 19, 2013)).

The Court again agrees with Judge Ranjan’s holding in FORCEL MEDIA that “allowing joinder

in this case would undermine judicial economy, is not in the interest of justice, and hampers the

Court’s ability to conduct meaningful review of the merits of the case,” and finds that it is equally

true in this case involving fifty-one seemingly unrelated Defendants. In short, Plaintiffs have not

7 The joinder allegations in two other Schedule A cases (25-cv-184 and 25-cv-790) pending before the undersigned

and filed by Plaintiffs’ counsel contain identical joinder allegations to those set forth in this case.

established a likelihood of success in this case because it appears that the Defendants cannot and/or

should not be joined in this matter.

Finally, the Court finds that the balancing of the equities factor does not support the

issuance of a TRO on this record. “Irreparable harm is presumed when a clear showing of patent

validity and infringement has been made.” Impax Lab’ys, Inc. v. Aventis Pharms., Inc., 235 F.

Supp. 2d 390, 395 (D. Del. 2002). Plaintiffs have made a sufficient showing, at least at this stage

of the proceedings, that they maintain a valid patent and that Defendants have infringed that patent.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs have sufficiently established irreparable harm at this stage.

That said, “[t]he more likely a plaintiff is to succeed on the merits, the less the balance of

the equities needs to tip in her favor.” Xie, 2025 WL 1039233, at *10. This Court has already

concluded that Plaintiffs have failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits for two

distinct and important threshold reasons. While Plaintiffs are likely to sustain lost sales, which

can clearly be remedied by the payment of damages, and potential loss of reputation and goodwill

in the marketplace, the Court is not convinced that the scales tip in Plaintiffs’ favor at this time.

A preliminary injunction would impede Defendants from operating their businesses. See

FORCEL MEDIA, 2025 WL 1665586 at *4 (“Also problematic is that the requested TRO not only

enjoins Defendants from using Forcel’s trademarks, but also directs the online marketplace

platforms to freeze all accounts connected to Defendants’ seller aliases. This relief would greatly

interfere with Defendants’ business operations and is far too broad, particularly given the number

of Defendants in this case and the lack of information about the proportion of non-infringing sales

to infringing sales as to each Defendant.”). Further, while Plaintiffs have generally argued that the

Defendants “are likely to move assets into offshore accounts outside of the Court’s jurisdiction,

there isn’t a sufficient basis to support [the] ‘all-encompassing claim that all of the listed

defendants are . . . similarly situated in the context of possible asset transfers.’” Id. at *5 (quoting

Tang v. Individuals, P’ships & Unincorporated Ass’ns Identified on Schedule A, No. 21-14431,

2022 WL 1664116, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2022). In a case where it is possible, if not likely,

that this Court lacks jurisdiction over the Defendants and that the Defendants cannot be properly

joined, the Court finds that the relief sought by way of the Motion for TRO represents the greater

of the harms. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of denying Plaintiffs’ request for a

preliminary injunction.

Conclusion and Order of Court

For the reasons discussed above, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:

1) Plaintiffs’ Motion (ECF No. 3) seeking a TRO, an order to show cause why a

preliminary injunction junction should not issue, and an order allowing for expedited

discovery is denied.

2) Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exceed Page Limit (ECF No. 9) is granted.

3) Plaintiffs’ Motion (ECF No. 2) seeking to maintain this case under seal is granted to

the extent that the Court will maintain the current filings, with the exception of this

Memorandum Order, under seal at this time, pending the Court’s consideration of the

upcoming briefing on the threshold jurisdictional and joinder issues discussed herein.

4) Plaintiffs’ Motion (ECF No. 5) seeking an order permitting Plaintiffs to serve the

Defendants via email and electric publication is denied without prejudice, again

pending the Court’s consideration of the upcoming briefing on the threshold

jurisdictional and joinder issues discussed herein.

5) Plaintiffs are hereby ordered to show cause as to why this case should not be severed

or dismissed for misjoinder by July 28, 2025. In the alternative, Plaintiffs may file an

amended complaint by the same date in an attempt to cure the deficiencies discussed

in this Memorandum Order.

BY THE COURT:

/s/Robert J. Colville

Robert J. Colville

United States District Judge

DATED: July 7, 2025

cc: All counsel of record