The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JEFFREY MICHAEL FAIRLEY, : Civil No. 1:25-CV-00700
:
Plaintiff, :
:
v. :
:
C.O. FERRONTI, et al., :
:
Defendants. : Judge Jennifer P. Wilson
MEMORANDUM
Before the court is a complaint filed by Jeffrey Michael Fairley (“Plaintiff”),
an inmate currently housed at the State Correction Institution at Houtzdale,
Pennsylvania (“SCI-Houtzdale”). (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff has also filed a motion to
proceed in this action in forma pauperis. (Doc. 2.) The court will grant the motion
to proceed in forma pauperis, screen the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), dismiss all claims against Defendant Gourley, and serve the
complaint on the remaining defendants.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a complaint with the court in April of
2025. (Doc. 1.) The court received and docketed the complaint on April 21, 2025.
(Id.) The complaint names five defendants: (1) Joseph Dolan (“Dolan”),
Corrections Officer at SCI-Camp Hill; (2) Ferronti, Lieutenant Officer at SCI-
Camp Hill; (3) Smith, Corrections Officer at SCI-Camp Hill; (4) Lowe,
Corrections Officer at SCI-Camp Hill; and (5) Michael Gourley (“Gourley”),
Superintendent at SCI-Camp Hill. (Doc. 1, pp. 2–3.)1 In the complaint, Plaintiff
alleges that while he was housed at SCI-Camp Hill in March of 2023 he was
forcefully extracted from his cell by Defendants Dolan, Ferronti, Smith, and Lowe
without cause because he needed a wheelchair. (Id., p. 4.) He alleges multiple
physical injuries resulting from force used during the cell extraction. (Id.) He
alleges this cell extraction violated his Eighth Amendment rights. (Id.)
On April 21, 2025, the court also received and docketed a motion to proceed
in forma pauperis. (Doc. 2.) The court will now address the pending motion and
screen the complaint.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
The court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1331, which allows a district court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction in civil
cases arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. Venue
is proper in this district because the alleged acts and omissions giving rise to the
claims occurred at SCI-Camp Hill in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, which is
located within this district. See 28 U.S.C. § 118(b).
1 For ease of reference, the court uses the page numbers from the CM/ECF header.
STANDARD
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), a court “shall dismiss” an in forma
pauperis case “at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted[.]” The legal standard for
dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 is
identical to the legal standard used when ruling on Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motions
to dismiss. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 109-10 & n.11 (3d
Cir. 2002).
In order “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible on its face “when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept all well pleaded allegations as
true and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Doe
v. Univ. of the Scis., 961 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2020). The pleadings of self-
represented plaintiffs are held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by attorneys and are to be liberally construed. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d. Cir. 2011). Self-
represented litigants are to be granted leave to file a curative amended complaint
even when a plaintiff does not seek leave to amend, unless such an amendment
would be inequitable or futile. See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224,
245 (3d Cir. 2008).
DISCUSSION
While Plaintiff names Gourley as a defendant in the complaint, he does not
allege any action on the part of Gourley in the statement of facts. (Doc. 1.)
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must meet two threshold
requirements. He must allege: 1) that the alleged misconduct was committed by a
person acting under color of state law; and 2) that as a result, he was deprived of
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). It is also well established that “[a]
defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged
wrongs to be liable, and cannot be held responsible for a constitutional violation
which he or she neither participated in nor approved.” See Baraka v. McGreevey,
481 F.3d 187, 210 (3d Cir. 2007). Here, by not alleging any action on the part of
Defendant Gourley, Plaintiff has not established personal involvement as required
under Baraka.
Any implied liability based on Defendant Gourley’s supervisory position as
Superintendent at SCI-Camp Hill will also not succeed based on the facts as
alleged. Supervisory liability under § 1983 utilizes the same standard as municipal
liability. See Carter v. City of Philadelphia,181 F.3d 339, 356 (3d Cir. 1999). A
supervisor will only be liable for the acts of a subordinate if he fosters a policy or
custom that amounts to deliberate indifference towards an individual’s
constitutional rights. See Id. at 357. To establish supervisory liability, a plaintiff
must show that (1) a superior officer failed to employ a specific supervisory
practice; (2) the existing custom created an unreasonable risk of injury in the
absence of the specified supervisory practice; (3) the supervisor was aware that the
risk existed; (4) the supervisor was indifferent to the risk; and (5) the underlying
violation resulted from the failure to employ the supervisory practice. Brown v.
Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Sample v. Diecks, 885
F.2d 1099, 1118 (3d Cir. 1989)). The facts set forth by Plaintiff do not address any
of the factors required to establish supervisory liability. Therefore, all claims
against Defendant Gourley will be dismissed without prejudice for lack of personal
involvement.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the court will grant Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma
pauperis, dismiss all claims against Defendant Gourley, and serve the complaint on
the remaining defendants.
An appropriate order follows.
s/Jennifer P. Wilson
JENNIFER P. WILSON
United States District Judge
Middle District of Pennsylvania
Dated: July 7, 2025