The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION
BRIYAN MARTINEZ, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) CASE NO. 2:24-cv-758-JTA
) (WO)
JIM BISHOP CABINETS, INC., )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint. (Doc. No.
14.) Defendant seeks dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Id.) For
the reasons that follow, Defendant’s motion is due to be denied.
I. JURISDICTION
The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action based on federal question
jurisdiction because Plaintiff brings claims pursuant to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.,
and the Americans with Disabilities Amendment Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. See
28 U.S.C. § 1331; (Doc. No. 1). The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction over this
action or venue, and the Court finds sufficient allegations to support both in the Middle
District of Alabama.
The parties consented to the exercise of dispositive jurisdiction by a United States
Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Doc. No. 17.)
II. ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff Briyan Martinez alleges he worked for Defendant Jim Bishop Cabinets, Inc.
as a line worker starting in April 2023. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 21.) While working for Defendant,
Plaintiff avers he experienced harassment due to his sexual orientation. (Id. at ¶ 23.) Plaintiff
asserts he developed respiratory issues, including debilitating nosebleeds, from the working
conditions. (Id. at ¶ 27.) Plaintiff avers he requested to move to a different part of Defendant’s
production line and provided medical documents indicating his health issues stemmed from
his assigned work area. (Id. at ¶¶ 36, 37.) Plaintiff maintains Defendant terminated him around
July 25, 2024, after he informed his supervisor he was feeling dizzy and needed a break. (Id.
at 40, 43.) Plaintiff alleges he was terminated because of his disability or perceived disability,
respiratory distress, and for reporting/opposing sex and disability discrimination. (Id. at ¶ 43.)
From these allegations, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. (Doc. No. 1-2 at 1.) On August 30, 2024, the EEOC issued to
Plaintiff a Determination and Notice of Rights letter. (Doc. No. 1-2 at 3.)
On November 26, 2024, Plaintiff timely filed a complaint against Defendant. (Doc.
No. 1.) From his alleged termination, Plaintiff brings four claims: (1) sex discrimination in
violation of Title VII; (2) a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Amendment Act of
2008 (ADAA); (3) Title VII retaliation; and (4) ADAA retaliation. (Id. at 8–12.)
On January 15, 2025, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 14.) After an
extension of time, Plaintiff timely filed a response on February 13, 2025. (Doc. No. 20.)
Defendant filed a reply on February 27, 2025. (Doc. No. 21.)
This matter is ripe for review.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When evaluating a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), the Court takes the facts alleged in the complaint as true and construes them in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1321–22
(11th Cir. 2012). To avoid dismissal, the complaint must “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially
plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). That is, “[f]actual allegations
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all
the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
(internal citations omitted).
IV. DISCUSSION
Defendant argues Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed because (1) Defendant
never employed Plaintiff; (2) Defendant was not properly served with the EEOC charge; and
(3) Plaintiff failed to file a signed EEOC charge that was verified with his signature. (Doc.
No. 14 at 5–7.) Plaintiff responds these are questions of fact that cannot be resolved at the
motion to dismiss stage. (Doc. No. 20 at 4–5.) The undersigned addresses each argument in
turn.
A. Employment and Service of EEOC Charge
Defendant alleges it never employed Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 14 at 7.) Defendant further
asserts it never received Plaintiff’s EEOC charge, responded to the charge, had notice of the
charge, nor had the opportunity to participate in the EEOC’s conciliation process. (Id. at 6.)1
Plaintiff maintains he was employed by Defendant and fulfilled all conditions precedent to
the institution of this action. (Doc. No. 20 at 3; Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 6, 21.)
Defendant attached an affidavit of its HR Director, Mary Barlow, to support its
contentions. As a threshold matter, the Court must first address whether it may consider the
affidavit at the motion to dismiss stage.
When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a court generally may not consider matters
outside of the pleadings without treating the motion as a motion for summary judgment.”
Johnson v. City of Atlanta, 107 F.4th 1292, 1298 (11th Cir. 2024) (citing to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(d)). There are two exceptions to this rule: “(1) the incorporation-by-reference doctrine and
(2) judicial notice.” Id. (citing Baker v. City of Madison, Ala., 67 F.4th 1268, 1276 (11th Cir.
2023)). Under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine, a court may properly consider a
document not referred to or attached to a complaint if “the document is (1) central to the
plaintiff’s claims; and (2) undisputed, meaning its authenticity is not challenged.” Johnson,
107 F.4th at 1300.
Here, whether Defendant employed Plaintiff and exhausted administrative remedies
are central to Plaintiff’s claims. Nonetheless, Plaintiff disputes the contents of the affidavit
1 Defendant asserts these are “preconditions” that must be affirmatively shown or alleged to bring a
Title VII action. (Doc. No. 21 at 4.) This assertion is based on a misguided reading of Harris v. Board
of Trustees University of Alabama. In Harris, the court concluded the plaintiff had not exhausted her
administrative remedies against one defendant because she did not name it in her EEOC charge.
Harris, 846 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1240 (N.D. Ala. 2012). Because the defendant had not been named in
the plaintiff’s EEOC charge, it was not served with the EEOC charge nor participated in the
conciliation process. (Id. at 1239). Here, Plaintiff attached an EEOC charge which clearly named
Defendant. (Doc. No. 1-2.)
and maintains Defendant employed him and he fulfilled all conditions precedent to bringing
this action. (Doc. No. 20 at 3.) Accordingly, the affidavit of Mary Barlow does not meet the
incorporation-by-reference doctrine requirements and cannot be considered by the Court at
the motion to dismiss stage. The Court must take the facts alleged in the complaint as true and
construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Resnick, 693 F.3d at 1321–22.
Plaintiff alleges Defendant employed him and that he fulfilled all conditions precedent to the
institution of this action. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 6, 21.) Thus, the Court will accept the allegations
as true for the purposes of this motion.
To consider Mary Barlow’s affidavit, the Court must convert the motion to dismiss into
a motion for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). “Critically, such a conversion
requires notice to the parties and an opportunity for mutual discovery.” Adinolfe v. United
Tech. Corp., 768 F.3d 1161, 1168 (11th Cir. 2014). Here, there has been no notice to the parties
nor opportunity for discovery. Accordingly, the Court declines to convert the motion to
dismiss to a motion for summary judgment. See Lovejoy v. Elmore Cnty., No. 2:12-cv-91-
WKW, 2012 WL 5382305, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 1, 2012) (declining to convert a motion to
dismiss to a motion for summary judgment because the record lacked “the comprehensiveness
needed for a well-reasoned summary judgment decision”).
B. Unsigned EEOC Charge
Defendant contends this action should be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to file a
signed and verified EEOC charge and thus failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. (Doc.
No. 14 at 3.) Plaintiff responds this is an issue of fact that can only be “sussed out” through
discovery. (Doc. No. 20 at 5.) The undersigned agrees.
“EEOC regulations require an EEOC charge to be signed and verified.” Houston v.
Army Fleet Serv., LLC, 509 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1041 (M.D. Ala. 2007); see also 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(b) (“Charges shall be in writing under oath or affirmation”); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.9 (“A
charge shall be in writing and signed and shall be verified”). Failure to verify an EEOC charge
“may bar a plaintiff from litigating [his] claim pursuant to Title VII.” Houston, 509 F. Supp.
2d at 1041; see also Vason v. City of Montgomery, 240 F.3d 905, 907 (11th Cir. 2001)
(affirming summary judgment when it was undisputed that the plaintiff did not file an EEOC
charge under oath or affirmation). Defendant cites to both Houston and Vason in support of
its argument, but neither apply to its motion to dismiss. Procedurally, both cases concern a
motion for summary judgment, where the parties had the benefit of discovery. See Houston,
509 F. Supp. 2d at 1041–42; Vason, 240 F.3d at 907. At the motion to dismiss stage, when
there has been no discovery conducted, the Court must rely on the facts alleged in the
complaint. Considering Plaintiff alleges he “fulfilled all conditions precedent to the institution
of this action under Title VII” (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 6) and taking the facts alleged as true and
construing them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court concludes dismissal is not
proper at this stage.
V. CONCLUSION
Because the Court cannot consider the affidavit of Mary Barlow at the motion to
dismiss stage and must take the facts alleged in the complaint as true, Defendant’s motion to
dismiss is due to be denied.
A separate order will issue.
DONE this 7th day of July, 2025.
JERUSHA T. ADAMS
UNIZED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE