Sackey v. United States

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 24-1223C

(Filed: July 7, 2025)

)

SAMUEL SACKEY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. )

)

THE UNITED STATES, )

)

Defendant. )

)

ORDER

On August 9, 2024, pro se Plaintiff, Mr. Samuel Sackey, filed a complaint in this

Court, alleging that he is owed a whistleblower reward pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 5323(b)(1)

for information he gave to the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement

Network (“FinCEN”). See ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”). The government moves to dismiss

Mr. Sackey’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim on which

relief can be granted. ECF No. 14 (“MTD”). This Court grants the government’s motion

because this Court lacks jurisdiction over Mr. Sackey’s claim; 31 U.S.C. § 5323(f) vests

jurisdiction over § 5323 whistleblower claims solely in “the appropriate court of appeals

of the United States.” 31 U.S.C. § 5323(f)(2)(A). Furthermore, as FinCEN informed

Mr. Sackey, it has yet to issue regulations governing the processing of whistleblower

claims or the disbursement of funds under the statute. Id. § 5323(b)(1). In the absence of

any such regulations, this Court could not grant Mr. Sackey relief — even if the statute

did not have a jurisdictional bar.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 1

Between August 2023 and January 2024, Mr. Sackey provided whistleblower

information concerning the banking practices of JPMorgan Chase — his employer at the

time — to FinCEN. Compl. at 3. Mr. Sackey alleges that the information he provided

demonstrated that JPMorgan Chase was in violation of “title 31 of the United States

Code.” Compl. at 2. On August 8, 2023, Mr. Sackey received an email response from

FinCEN that advised him that FinCEN was “tracking [the] matter,” and provided him

with a specific “Tip, Complaint, or Referral code” to reference in future correspondence.

Id. at Ex. 1.

Two months after Mr. Sackey’s last alleged tip to FINCen — sometime between

March and May of 2024 — the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Commodity

Futures Trading Commission, and the Federal Reserve Board initiated enforcement

actions against JPMorgan Chase. Compl. at 2–3. Mr. Sackey has attached documentation

of the enforcement actions as Exhibits 4, 5, and 6 to his complaint in this Court.

Mr. Sackey argues that there are indicia that he “provided the information used for the

enforcements.” Id. at 3. Such indicia include: “the matching violation in the plaintiff’s

report and the multiple enforcements, the close time frame between the plaintiff’s

whistleblower report and the enforcement releases, statute of limitations pertaining to

the violation, and other undisclosed reasons.” Id.

On June 16, 2024, Mr. Sackey submitted a request for a monetary award to FinCEN.

FINCen’s response — which the government attached in an appendix to its motion to

dismiss — informed Mr. Sackey that “a response to and/or disposition of” his application

for an award “may not occur until after the promulgation of program regulations.” 2 MTD

at Def. App. 1.

1 Unless otherwise noted, the facts are taken from Mr. Sackey’s Complaint, ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”).

Complaint page numbers reference the PDF number at the top of the ECF document pages. For

purposes of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Court of Federal

Claims, this Court assumes that all non-conclusory facts in the operative complaint are true.

See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“[F]or the purposes of a motion to dismiss we must

take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true.” (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

2 As of the date of this order, the Department of the Treasury has not promulgated implementing

regulations, nor has the agency issued a notice of proposed rulemaking as contemplated by 31

U.S.C. § 5323(i). See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b).

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On August 9, 2024, Mr. Sackey filed a complaint against the government in this

Court, alleging that, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 5323(b)(1), he is entitled to collect a

whistleblower award in the amount of “approximately $134,000,000,” and “potential

punitive damages due to a breach of duty.” Compl. at 3. In his complaint, he also seeks

to “obtain Freedom of Information Act disclosure documents” to “help confirm the

plaintiff’s claim to the whistleblower monetary award.” Id. at 1. 3

On January 8, 2025, the government filed a motion to dismiss Mr. Sackey’s

complaint for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted, pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Rules of the United States Court of

Federal Claims (“RCFC”). MTD at 1. On February 3, 2025, Mr. Sackey filed a “motion to

strike” the government’s motion to dismiss, which this Court treated as Mr. Sackey’s

response. ECF No. 17 (“Pl. Resp.”). The government filed its reply on February 18, 2025.

ECF No. 20.

II. DISCUSSION: THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OVER MR. SACKEY’S COMPLAINT

Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, and this Court generally holds a pro se plaintiff’s

pleading to “less stringent standards.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per

curiam). The Court, however, “may not . . . take a liberal view of [a] jurisdictional

requirement and set a different rule for pro se litigants only.” Kelley v. Sec’y of Dep’t of

Labor, 812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987). In other words, even a pro se plaintiff “bears

the burden of proving that the Court of Federal Claims possesse[s] jurisdiction over his

complaint.” Sanders v. United States, 252 F.3d 1329, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also Colbert v.

United States, 617 F. App’x 981, 983 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“No plaintiff, pro se or otherwise,

may be excused from the burden of meeting the court’s jurisdictional requirements.”). In

the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court “must dismiss the action.” RCFC

12(h)(3); see also Kissi v. United States, 493 F. App’x 57, 58 (2012) (“If the Court of Federal

Claims determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the claim.”)

(citing RCFC 12(h)(3))).

Generally, “[t]he jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims is defined by the

Tucker Act, which gives the court authority to render judgment on certain monetary

3 The Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction over claims pursuant to the Freedom of

Information Act. Jarvis v. United States, 2017 WL 2735597 at *1 (Fed. Cl. June 26, 2017) (citing

Snowton v. United States, 216 F. App’x 981, 983 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). The Court does not address this

issue further.

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claims against the United States.” RadioShack Corp. v. United States, 566 F.3d 1358, 1360

(Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1)). The Tucker Act provides this Court with

jurisdiction to decide “actions pursuant to contracts with the United States, actions to

recover illegal exactions of money by the United States, and actions brought pursuant to

money-mandating statutes, regulations, executive orders, or constitutional

provisions.” Roth v. United States, 378 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see 28 U.S.C.

§ 1491(a)(1).

The Tucker Act, however, “does not create a substantive cause of action.” Fisher

v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Rather, “a plaintiff must

[also] identify a separate source of substantive law that creates the right to money

damages.” Id. (first citing United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216 (1983); and then citing

United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976)). Moreover, “[n]ot every claim invoking

the Constitution, a federal statute, or a regulation is cognizable under the Tucker

Act.” Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 216. With respect to “money-mandating” claims, the plaintiff

must identify a law that “can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the

Federal Government for the damage sustained.” Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 372

F.2d 1002, 1009 (Ct. Cl. 1967).

A. 31 U.S.C. § 5323 is a “Money-Mandating” Statute for Purposes of the

Tucker Act

A statute or regulation is money-mandating where it “can fairly be interpreted as

mandating compensation by the Federal Government . . . .” United States v. White

Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 472 (2003) (quoting Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 217). A

statute is money mandating if it “require[s] the payment of some award to claimants who

have met the statutory conditions for recovery.” Doe v. United States, 100 F.3d 1576, 1582

(Fed. Cir. 1996) (emphasis added) (holding that a moiety statute is money mandating

when it requires a minimum payment). “The fact that the Secretary retains some

discretion to determine the amount of an award, within prescribed limits, does not

preclude the statute from being money mandating.” Id. (citing Bradley v. United States,

870 F.2d 1578, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“Inasmuch as discretion is not unlimited, the statute

must be deemed to be a pay-mandating statute.”)). “A statute is not wholly discretionary

. . . when an analysis of congressional intent or the structure and purpose of the statute

reveal one of the following: (1) the statute has ‘clear standards for paying’ money to

recipients, (2) the statute specifies ‘precise amounts’ to be paid, or (3) the statute compels

payment once certain conditions precedent are met.” Doe v. United States, 463 F.3d 1314,

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1324 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (first citing Samish Indian Nation v United States, 419 F.3d 1355, 1363

(Fed. Cir. 2005), and then Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).

Section 5323 of Title 31 of the United States Code is a money-mandating statute

pursuant to the Tucker Act. Section 5323 provides:

In any covered judicial or administrative action, or related

action, the Secretary, under regulations prescribed by the

Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney General and

subject to subsection (c), shall pay an award or awards to 1 or

more whistleblowers who voluntarily provided original

information to the employer of the individual, the Secretary,

or the Attorney General, as applicable, that led to the

successful enforcement of the covered judicial or

administrative action, or related action, in an aggregate

amount equal to—

(A) not less than 10 percent, in total, of what has been collected

of the monetary sanctions imposed in the action or related

actions; and

(B) not more than 30 percent, in total, of what has been

collected of the monetary sanctions imposed in the action

or related actions.

31 U.S.C. § 5323(b)(1) (emphasis added).

This statute provides clear standards for paying an award: the furnishing of

original whistleblower information that leads to the successful enforcement of the

“covered judicial or administrative action.” Id. Moreover, many statutory terms —

including “original information” and “action” — are further defined within the text of

the statute. 31 U.S.C. § 5323(a). The statute also provides the precise amount to be paid:

“not less than 10 percent” and “not more than 30 percent” of what has been collected of

the monetary sanctions imposed in the actions or related actions. 31 U.S.C. § 5323(b)(1);

see also Doe, 100 F.3d at 1581 (holding that a moiety statute is money mandating, even

when using a “sliding scale . . . [for] determining the appropriate amount of an award for

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an informant,” because “the statute continues to mandate the payment of some award”

(emphasis added) (quoting Lewis v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 59, 64 (1994)).

Finally, the statute compels payment (by the government) to someone meeting the

statutory standards. The government cites to 31 U.S.C. § 5323(f), see MTD at 3, 9, to

support the claim that this statute payment awards are entirely discretionary: “Any

determination made under this section, including whether, to whom, or in what amount

to make awards, shall be in the discretion of the Secretary.” 31 U.S.C. § 5323(f)(1). But the

government’s reading of the statute ignores other clear language mandating payment.

As explained above, the statute provides that the Secretary “shall pay an award or awards

to 1 or more whistleblowers who voluntarily provided original information . . .” 31

U.S.C. § 5232(b)(1) (emphasis added). Accordingly, once the Secretary has determined

that the whistleblower has met the statutory criteria for payment, the decision to award

money is no longer within the discretion of the Secretary. See Doe, 463 F.3d at 1325

(holding that statutorily provided discretion to award payment is limited “because once

a condition is met, namely that the head of an agency states that a position meets the

criteria listed . . . , the statute requires payment to employees with that position”). 4

In sum, because 31 U.S.C. § 5323 mandates payment (of at least some monetary

award) to a qualified whistleblower upon meeting the statutorily provided conditions, it

is a money mandating statute.

B. Although 31 U.S.C. § 5323 is Money-Mandating, Mr. Sackey’s Claim

Nevertheless Falls Outside This Court’s jurisdiction.

This Court’s determination that 31 U.S.C. § 5323 is money-mandating does not

fully resolve the jurisdictional issue, however. That is because, “[e]ven absent explicit

proscription of this court’s authority, . . . the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court of

4 This Court further notes that § 5323 is quite similar to 19 U.S.C. § 1619 (the “moiety statute”).

See Doe, 100 F.3d at 1580. Just like the moiety statute — whose purpose is “to establish an

incentive for persons with information useful to law enforcement to cooperate with the

authorities” in the context of customs fraud, id. — the purpose of 31 U.S.C. § 5323 is clearly to

incentivize those with information to provide it to the Department of the Treasury to aid its

enforcement arm. Reading the whistleblower award as purely discretionary would undermine

§ 5323’s purpose and would be inconsistent with the Federal Circuit’s decision in Doe. 100 F.3d

at 1580 (citing Wilson v. United States, 135 F.2d 1005, 1009 (3d Cir. 1943), for the proposition that

“[a]n informer would have little incentive to give original information . . . if his compensation

rested in the absolute discretion . . . of an executive officer”).

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the United States have frequently held that when a ‘specific and comprehensive scheme

for administrative and judicial review is provided by Congress, the Court of Federal

Claims’ Tucker Act jurisdiction over the subject matter covered by the scheme is

preempted.’” Norman v. United States, 126 Fed. Cl. 277, 280 (2016) (first citing Vereda, Ltda.

v. United States, 271 F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001), and then St. Vincent’s Med. Ctr. v.

United States, 32 F.3d 548, 549–50 (Fed. Cir. 1994)); see also, e.g., United States v. Fausto, 484

U.S. 439, 453–54 (1988) (holding that the Civil Service Reform Act precluded Tucker Act

jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims). In other words, “the Tucker Act ‘is displaced’ when ‘a

law assertedly imposing monetary liability on the United States contains its own judicial

remedies.’” Maine Cmty. Health Options v. United States, 520 U.S. 296, 326 (2020)

(quoting United States v. Bormes, 568 U.S. 6, 12 (2012)).

Section 5323 requires whistleblower claimants to file initial claims with the

Secretary of the Treasury: “Any determination made under this section, including

whether, to whom, or in what amount to make awards, shall be in the discretion of the

Secretary.” 31 U.S.C. § 5323(f)(1). The statute also provides that any appeal of an agency

decision should be directly appealed to the relevant court of appeals: “Any determination

. . . may be appealed to the appropriate court of appeals of the United States not more than

30 days after the determination is issued by the Secretary.” 31 U.S.C. § 5323(f)(2)(A)

(emphasis added). Because this statute creates a specific and comprehensive

administrative and judicial scheme of relief — including appeals directly to a circuit court

— the Court of Federal Claims lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over claims invoking

§ 5323. See Vereda, 271 F.3d at 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that the Controlled

Substances Act contains a ”statutory scheme” that “evinces Congress’ intent to preempt

any Tucker Act jurisdiction over a money claim that challenges the propriety of an in rem

administrative forfeiture of property seized under 21 U.S.C. § 881”); see also Ricks v. United

States, 159 Fed. Cl. 823 (2022) (“It is well settled that even where Congress has not

expressly stated that statutory jurisdiction is ‘exclusive,’ . . . a statute which vests

jurisdiction in a particular court cuts off original jurisdiction in other courts in all cases

covered by that statute.” (quoting Telecomms. Rsch. & Action Ctr. v. F.C.C., 750 F.2d 70

(D.C. Cir. 1984))).

To the extent that Mr. Sackey’s complaint can be read as seeking an order that the

Treasury Department promulgate regulations pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 5323(i), this Court

lacks jurisdiction over that claim, too. A plaintiff may bring a claim to “compel agency

action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed” pursuant to § 706(1) of the

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). 5 U.S.C. § 706; see also, e.g., Am. Anti-Vivisection

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Soc’y v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 946 F.3d 615, 620–21 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (holding that

plaintiffs may seek to force an agency to take “discrete action” that the law requires it to

take, such as issuing regulations). But this Court lacks jurisdiction over freestanding APA

claims and has no power to issue an injunction to direct an agency to issue regulations.

Curry v. United States, 787 F. App’x. 720, 723 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (noting that the Court of

Federal Claims “lacks jurisdiction over claims alleging violations of the Administrative

Procedure Act” (citing Martinez v. United States, 333 F.3d 1295, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).

Because the claim at issue is not within the jurisdiction of this Court, this decision

does not reach the remaining issues raised in the government’s motion to dismiss, nor

does this Court opine on the merits of Mr. Sackey’s whistleblower award claim.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS the government’s motion

to dismiss pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1), ECF No. 14. Plaintiff’s complaint is hereby

DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Clerk of the Court is directed to

enter JUDGMENT for the government, dismissing this case pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Matthew H. Solomson

Matthew H. Solomson

Chief Judge

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