INGRAM, III v. ABINGTON SCHOOL DISTRICT AUTHORITY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOHN INGRAM, III, :

Plaintiff, : Civil Action

:

v. : No. 24-cv-0174

:

ABINGTON SCHOOL DISTRICT :

AUTHORITY, :

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM

J. Younge July 3, 2025

Currently before the Court is an uncontested Motion for Summary Judgement filed by

Defendant, Abington School District Authority. The Court finds this Motion appropriate for

resolution without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78, L.R. 7.1(f).

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

A. Procedural History:

Plaintiff initiated this action on January 15, 2024. In his original complaint, Plaintiff

asserted that Defendant created a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 (hereinafter “Title VII”) through disparate treatment, retaliation, along with

associated violations of the ADA, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (hereinafter

“PHRA”) (Complaint, ECF No. 1.) Shortly thereafter, Defendant filed a partial Motion to

Dismiss the original complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) – seeking to

dismiss Counts I, II, and VII, and parts of Counts III and VI. (ECF No. 7.) Plaintiff subsequently

filed an Amended Complaint. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff removed all language related

to the theory that Defendant created a hostile work environment. Instead, Plaintiff now alleges

(1) disparate treatment based upon race/color and disability under Title VII (Count I); (2) failure

to accommodate under the ADA (Count II); (3) retaliation purportedly under the ADA (Count

III); and (4) claims under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA) restating Counts I

through III of the Amended Complaint as state law claims (Count IV).

Defendant subsequently filed a partial Motion to Dismiss which the Court granted in part

and denied in part. (Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, ECF 10.) Plaintiff’s claims for race

or color retaliation under Counts One and Four of the Amended Complaint were dismissed with

Prejudice. Currently, before the Court for Summary Judgement are Plaintiff’s claims for (1)

disparate treatment based upon disability under Title VII (Count I); (2) failure to accommodate

under the ADA (Count II); (3) retaliation purportedly under the ADA (Count III); and (4) claims

under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA) restating Counts I through III of the

Amended Complaint as state law claims (Count IV).

B. Relevant Factual History:

Plaintiff, John Ingram, III, is an African American former employee of Defendant.

Central to this Motion for Summary Judgement are Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant,

through its Director of Human Resources, Mrs. Williams, subjected him to

mistreatment/disparate treatment based on his race. (Amended Complaint ¶ 3 (hereinafter “AC”),

ECF No. 8.) Specifically, Plaintiff claims that during his time with Defendant, he received fewer

workplace accommodations compared to his Caucasian colleagues. (Id. at ¶ 3.) Plaintiff also

alleges that he was given disciplinary write-ups for “no-call/no-shows” that were not as stated

and that Caucasian bus drivers who committed similar or more severe infractions were not

disciplined in the same manner. (Id.) Plaintiff also brings a disability discrimination claim as well

as a retaliation claim under the Americans with Disability Act (hereinafter “ADA”). Claims pled

under the ADA are primarily based on allegations that Plaintiff suffered from a weakened

immune system caused by cancer and/or cancer treatment and purported complications cause by

the COVID-19 virus.

Plaintiff began working as a bus driver for Defendant in May 2017 and his employment

relationship continued until February 2021, although his final day of in-person, paid employment

was in March 2020, at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. (Id. at ¶ 3-4.) Many bus drivers,

including Plaintiff, made claims for unemployment insurance, but Defendant denied all claims.

(See Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (hereinafter “SMF”), ECF No. 20-1 at ¶ 19.) In

September 2020, Defendant instructed Plaintiff that all in-person work would resume. (AC, at ¶

3). Plaintiff thereafter communicated to Mrs. Williams that he was battling cancer, among other

health issues, which resulted in a compromised immune system, and which would require a

reasonable accommodation in the form of unpaid leave. (Id.)

Defendant granted Plaintiff unpaid leave through November 30, 2020. On or around

November 1, 2020, Plaintiff requested an extension on his unpaid leave and was granted an

extension through February 2021. (Id. at ¶ 5.) On February 12, 2021, Plaintiff requested a third

extension, to which Defendant allegedly gave him an ultimatum that he should either return to

work or be terminated (Id.) Furthermore, on February 17, 2021, Plaintiff obtained a letter from

one of his doctors, recommending Plaintiff stay out of work until September 2021, the following

school year. (SMF, Ex. 1, ECF No. 20-6.) In response, Defendant requested that the Plaintiff

complete and submit a HIPAA authorization form to release his medical records. Plaintiff

declined to comply with Defendant’s request and has not returned to work.

In this litigation, Plaintiff advances a theory of constructive discharge and argues that

Defendant terminated its employment relationship with him. (AC, at ¶ 5.) Plaintiff’s

employment, however, was neither terminated by Defendant nor voluntarily terminated by

himself. (See SMF, at ¶¶ 59-60.) Plaintiff’s current status, of record, is that he is on an unpaid

leave of absence (Id. at ¶ 61.) Defendant claims that it is and was willing to grant reasonable

accommodations requested by Plaintiff’s primary care physician. (Id. at ¶ 62.) Plaintiff, himself,

made a request for a protective shield in the bus around the driver as an accommodation. (Ingram

Deposition, at p. 38, SMF, Exhibit E, ECF No. 20-6.) However, Defendant could not

accommodate the request due to the fact that the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation

(hereinafter “PDT”) denied all requests for installation of interior protective shields because the

PDT did not want to jeopardize passenger safety in an effort to protect drivers from the COVID-

19 virus. (SMF, ECF No. 20-7, at p. 5-6.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD:

Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows “that there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a). Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sweeney, 689 F.3d 288, 292 (3d Cir. 2012). To defeat a

motion for summary judgment, there must be a factual dispute that is both material and genuine.

See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202

(1986); Dee v. Borough of Dunmore, 549 F.3d 225, 229 (3d Cir. 2008). A material fact is one that

“might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A

dispute over a material fact is “genuine” if, based on the evidence, “a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.

The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of

a material fact. Goldenstein v. Repossessors Inc., 815 F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 2016). When the

movant is the defendant, they have the burden of demonstrating that the plaintiff “has failed to

establish one or more essential elements of her case.” Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 425

(3d Cir. 2013). If the movant sustains their initial burden, “the burden shifts to the nonmoving

party to go beyond the pleadings and come forward with specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.” Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 416 (3d Cir. 2015) (internal quotations

omitted) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct.

1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986)).

At the summary judgment stage, the court’s role is not to weigh the evidence and

determine the truth of the matter, but rather to determine whether there is a genuine issue for

trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; Jiminez v. All Am. Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 253 (3d

Cir. 2007). In doing so, the court must construe the facts and inferences in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party. See Horsehead Indus., Inc. v. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc.,

258 F.3d 132, 140 (3d Cir. 2001). Nonetheless, the court must be mindful that “[t]he mere

existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there

must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 252.

Failure to oppose a motion for summary judgement constitutes a “waiver of the

opponent’s right to controvert the facts asserted by the moving party in the motion for summary

judgement or the supporting material accompanying it.” Anchorage Assocs v. V.I. Bd. Of Tax

Review, 922 F. 2d. 168, 175-76 (3d Cir. 1990)). By failing to file a response within the specified

time, “the nonmoving party waives the right to respond to or to controvert the facts asserted in

the summary judgment motion.” Reynolds v. Rick’s Mushroom Serv., 246 F. Supp. 2d 449, 453

(E.D. Pa. 2003) (quoting Reed v. Nellcor Puritan Bennett, 312 F.3d 1190, 1195 (10th Cir. 2002).

By failing to respond to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment within the appropriate

timeframe, Plaintiff places this Court in the position of ruling on the motion without

consideration of Plaintiff’s perspective on any of the pertinent issues.

III. DISCUSSION:

Plaintiff brings this employment discrimination action based on theories of racial and

disability discrimination, retaliation for exercising his rights under the ADA, and failure to

accommodate and engage in the interactive process. Plaintiff offers no direct evidence of

Defendant’s bias to support his employment discrimination claims. In an employment

discrimination lawsuit based on direct evidence of bias, the plaintiff must point to evidence that

“directly reflect[s] the alleged discriminatory attitude” and be “so revealing of discriminatory

animus that it is not necessary to rely on any presumptions of the prima facie case to shift the

burden of production.” Buchsbaum v. Univ. Physicians Plan, 55 F. App’x 40, 45 (3d Cir 2002).

“If the trier of fact must infer discrimination from the employer’s remarks or actions, then the

evidence is not direct evidence of discrimination.” Weightman v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., 772

F. Supp. 2d 693, 702 (W.D. Pa. 2011).

Since Plaintiff has failed to come forward with direct evidence of bias, legal theories

asserted by Plaintiff are subject to the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

See Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2008) (applying McDonnell Douglas to Title

VII racial discrimination claims); Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 342 (3d Cir.

2006), as amended (Sept. 13, 2006) (applying McDonnell Douglas to retaliation claims). In the

absence of direct evidence of disparate treatment, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting

framework applies. Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973)).1

1 Employment retaliation claims are subject to the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis,

wherein the plaintiff employee must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. To establish a prima

To proceed on a theory of racial discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas

framework, plaintiff must “establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that: (1)

[he] is a member of a protected class; (2) [he] was qualified for the position [he] sought to attain

or retain; (3) [he] suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the action occurred under

circumstances that could give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.” Id. (citing

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). The McDonnell Douglas burden-sifting framework

applies with equal force to employment disability discrimination claims based on circumstantial

evidence. Shaner v. Synthes, 204 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 2000). To establish a prima facia case

for disability discrimination under the ADA based on circumstantial evidence, Plaintiff must

satisfy the elements of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Id. At the summary

judgment stage, this means Plaintiff must present sufficient evidence to show: (1) that she is a

disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) that she is otherwise qualified to perform the

essential functions of her job with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) that she

suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability. Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch.

Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 306 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Sulima v. Tabyhanna Army Depot, 602 F.3d 177,

185 (3d Cir. 2010).

At the summary judgment stage, a Plaintiff cannot rely on unsupported allegations in the

pleadings; rather, he/she must come forward with evidence to establish by a preponderance of the

evidence that genuine issues of material fact exist for disposition at trial. Solomon v. Soc’y of

facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) protected employee activity; (2) adverse action

by the employer either after or contemporaneous with the employee’s protected activity; and (3) a causal

connection between the employee’s protected activity and the employer's adverse action. Moskowitz v.

Neshaminy Sch. Dist., No. 20-cv-5016, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165102, 2022 WL 4225398, at *9 (E.D.

Pa. Sept. 13, 2022) (quoting Krouse v, American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1997)). Id. A

plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s adverse employment decision would not have occurred “but for”

the plaintiff’s protected conduct. Univ. of Texas v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 361 (2013).

Auto. Eng’rs, 41 Fed. Appx. 585, 586 (3d Cir. 2002) (affirming district court’s rejection of claims

based solely on the plaintiff’s own testimony, stating “a plaintiff cannot rely on unsupported

assertions, speculation, or conclusory allegations to avoid a motion for summary judgment.”)

(citing Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)); see also Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v.

N.E., 172 F.3d 238, 252 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding same).

1. Plaintiff Fails to Come Forward with Evidence to Support His Circumstantial

Claims of Employment Discrimination and Retaliation:

Theories of racial and disability discrimination asserted by Plaintiff along with his claims

for retaliation fail because Plaintiff cannot establish that he suffered an adverse employment

action. Plaintiff is completely unable to establish that he suffered an adverse employment action

which is a prerequisite for establishing a prima facia case under the test espoused in McDonnald

Douglas. An adverse employment action is one in which a reasonable person could find that

plaintiff’s conditions of employment were substantially worsened. Dilenno v. Goodwill Indus. of

Mid–Eastern Pa., 162 F.3d 235, 236 (3d Cir.1998).

The undisputed facts of record establish that Plaintiff did not quit his job as a bus driver

and Defendant did not fire him. (SMF ¶¶ 58-60.) Plaintiff was granted a leave of absence and

there is no evidence to show he was terminated or constructively discharged by Defendant. In

fact, Plaintiff is still listed as an employee of Defendant on unpaid leave. (SMF ¶ 87.) For

Plaintiff to claim an adverse employment action based on a theory of constructive discharge he

must establish that “he was discriminated against by his employer to the point where a

reasonable person in his position would have felt compelled to resign.” See Green v. Brennan,

578 U.S. 547, 555-556 (2016). Additionally, he must show that he actually resigned from the

position. Id. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot establish wrongful termination or constructive discharge.

The Supreme Court has explained that:

A claim of constructive discharge . . . has two basic elements. A plaintiff must

prove first that he was discriminated against by his employer to the point where a

reasonable person in his position would have felt compelled to resign. But he must

also show that he actually resigned. In other words, an employee cannot bring a

constructive-discharge claim until he is constructively discharged. Only after both

elements are satisfied can he file suit to obtain relief.

An ordinary wrongful discharge claim also has two basic elements: discrimination

and discharge. See St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506, 113 S.Ct.

2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993); 1 B. Lindemann, P. Grossman, & C. Weirich,

Employment Discrimination Law 21–33 (5th ed. 2012) (Lindemann) (“The sine

qua non of a discharge case is, of course, a discharge”). The claim accrues when

the employee is fired.

See Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. 547, 555-556 (2016). Therefore, Plaintiff cannot establish that

he was the victim of an adverse employment action based on a theory of wrongful termination or

constructive discharge.

In this case, Plaintiff requested a leave of absence, and it is undisputed that Defendant

permitted Plaintiff to take the leave of absence that he requested. (See SMF, ¶¶ 28, 32, 46, 61-

62.) The voluntary taking of a leave of absence is not an adverse employment action. See

Obermeyer v. McDonough, 2024 WL 3890686 at *7 (S.D. Ohio August 21, 2024) (rejecting the

claim that a voluntary leave of absence is an adverse employment action). See also, Blum v.

Schlegel, 18 F.3d 1005, 1012 (2d Cir. 1994) (affirming district court’s holding that there was no

adverse action where Plaintiff consented to postponing his tenure review); Brigette Bodie-

Jernigan v. School Board of Broward County, Florida, 2024 WL 3806880 *3 (S.D. Fla. July 30,

2024) (electing to take an extended unpaid leave of absence is not adverse employment action);

Perez v. N.Y. Presbyterian/Weill Cornell Med. Ctr., 2024 WL 1514216 at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8,

2024) (no adverse employment action where hospital permitted Plaintiff to take leave for the

entire period during which she otherwise would have had to be vaccinated).

Plaintiff first requested an accommodation for his medical issues in February 2021. (See

Facts ¶ 71.) To the extent Plaintiff suffered any unnecessary strict review of his work or disparate

discipline, it all occurred prior to March 2020. Therefore, these incidents could not have been in

retaliation for a requested accommodation. Plaintiff’s allegation that a denial of his request for

an accommodation was Defendant’s retaliation against him for requesting an accommodation is,

therefore, simply “a ‘repackaging’ of his failure-to accommodate claim and, as such, fails as a

matter of law.” Gardner v. SEPTA, 410 F. Supp. 3d 723, 745 (E.D. Pa. 2019). With respect to the

assertion that Defendant challenged his claim for unemployment, it is undisputed that Plaintiff

filed his unemployment claim in the Summer of 2020 and that all of the bus drivers were filing

such claims and that the Defendant opposed every single claim for unemployment. (See Facts ¶¶

19-20.) This conduct pre-dated Plaintiff’s first request for leave based on his own medical

issues. Moreover, Plaintiff has not provided evidence that any actions the Defendant took in

connection with Plaintiff’s unemployment application were, in any way, causally connected to

his request for an accommodation. Finally, Plaintiff has not provided evidence to show that any

actions the Defendant took concerning his son’s truancy was causally connected to his request

for an accommodation. (See Facts ¶¶ 66-69.)

Plaintiff presents no evidence that Defendant acted under circumstances that could give

rise to an inference of intentional discrimination. A central focus of the McDonnell Douglas

framework is whether the employer is treating some people less favorably than others because of

their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789,

798 (3d Cir. 2003). Common circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful

discrimination include the hiring of someone not in the protected class as a replacement or the

more favorable treatment of similarly situated employees outside the plaintiff’s protected class.

See Smith v. Sec'y U.S. Navy, 843 F. App’x 466, 469 (3d Cir. 2021); May v. PNC Bank, 434 F.

Supp. 3d 284, 298 (E.D. Pa. 2020). Here, Plaintiff has no evidence that the Defendant treated

anyone more favorably than Plaintiff. Plaintiff was given all the leave he requested, including an

open-ended leave of absence. Plaintiff has no evidence that anyone else was treated more

favorably than he was treated. As such, Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facia case under the

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

2. Plaintiff Cannot Prevail on Claims for Failure to Accommodate and/or to Engage in

the Interactive Process in Good Faith:

To establish an ADA failure-to-accommodate claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) he was

disabled, and his employer knew it; (2) he requested an accommodation or assistance; (3) his

employer did not make a good faith effort to assist; and (4) he could have been reasonably

accommodated. Capps v. Mondelez Global, LLC, 847 F.3d 144, 157 (3d Cir. 2017). Employers

cannot assume employees are disabled and need accommodations. Conneen v. MBNA Am. Bank,

N.A., 334 F.3d 331, 331 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[N]either the law nor common sense can demand

clairvoyance of an employer.”). A request for an accommodation does not need to be in writing

“or formally invoke the magic words ‘reasonable accommodation,’” but “the notice nonetheless

must make clear that the employee wants assistance for his or her disability.” Taylor, 184 F.3d

296 at 313. Participation in the process “is the obligation of both parties, however, so an

employer cannot be faulted if after conferring with the employee to find possible

accommodations, the employee then fails to supply information that the employer needs or does

not answer the employer’s request for more detailed proposals.” Id. at 317. Finally, employers

will not incur liability for failing to provide a reasonable accommodation that was never

requested. LaGatta v. Pa. Cyber Charter Sch., 726 F. Supp. 2d 578, 589 (W.D. Pa. 2010).

In this case, Plaintiff cannot prevail on theories of failure to accommodate and engage in

the interactive process because: (1) his doctor provided a medical certification which stated that

he was not permanently disabled and Plaintiff provided no evidence to the contrary; (2) he was

provided with all of the leave his doctor’s notes requested; (3) Plaintiff failed to engage in the

interactive process when he failed to respond to requests for medical certifications; and (4)

assuming Plaintiff made a request for installation of an internal shield around the driver as a

reasonable accommodation for his alleged disability, such an accommodation was not legally

permissible.

First, Plaintiff’s doctor submitted a medical certification to Defendant which stated that

Plaintiff was not disabled and that he did not need a reasonable accommodation to perform the

essential functions of his job. (See SMF ¶¶ 44-45.) Plaintiff came forward with no evidence to

establish that he is in fact permanently disabled or that he needs a reasonable accommodation to

perform the essential functions of his job. Under the ADA, disability means “a physical or

mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities ....” 42 U.S.C. §

12102(1). Plaintiff alleges that he is “a cancer survivor with various ailments.” (See AC, at ¶ 1.)

However, Plaintiff has no evidence that being a cancer survivor substantially limits one or more

major life activities of Plaintiff. Indeed, Plaintiff’s doctor at Fox Chase Cancer Center advised

the Defendant that Plaintiff is not disabled and did not need any accommodation to perform the

essential functions of his job. (See SMF ¶¶ 44-45.) As a result, Plaintiff has no evidence that he is

actually disabled within the meaning of the ADA and fails to establish the first element of a

failure to accommodate claim.

Second, Plaintiff was granted all sick leave requested in the various doctor’s notes that he

provided to Defendant. (See SMF ¶¶ 46, 61-62.) Employers can show their good faith in a

number of ways, such as taking steps like the following: meet with the employee who requests

an accommodation, request information about the condition and what limitations the employee

has, ask the employee what he or she specifically wants, show some sign of having considered

the employee’s request, and offer and discuss available alternatives when the request is too

burdensome. These steps are consistent with the recommendations in the EEOC’s interpretive

guideline. Taylor, 184 F.3d at 317 (citing 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. § 1630.9). Courts have found

that where an employer provides the accommodations which are requested in a doctor’s note, it

has engaged in the interactive process in good faith. Fischer v. Pepper Hamilton LLP, 2016 WL

362507, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2016) (adjusting schedule to comport with various doctor’s

notes establish good faith). Moreover, it is undisputed that Plaintiff failed to provide Defendant

with the medical certifications it was requesting. (See SMF ¶¶ 50, 55-58.) “[A]n employer cannot

be faulted if...the employee...fails to supply information that the employer needs.” Taylor, 184

F.3d at 317. See also, Fischer, 2016 WL 362507, at *14 (finding that the employee failed to

engage in the interactive process in good faith when the employee did not timely provide the

medical information the employer requested).

Finally, Plaintiff now claims that he requested an accommodation in the form of an

interior shield installation around the driver’s compartment in the school bus. (See SMF ¶ 76.)

However, Plaintiff has offered no evidence that he requested the installation of the shield as a

means of providing him with “assistance for his [] disability.” Taylor, 184 F.3d at 313. Plaintiff

claims that he requested a shield during a meeting of the entire transportation department after

COVID when he and 15 to 20 other drivers indicated that they would like a shield installed

around the bus driver. (See SMF ¶ 77.) Plaintiff also claimed that he made the request during an

unemployment hearing. (See Id. at ¶ 78.) However, Plaintiff has provided no evidence to indicate

that he was making either request as a reasonable accommodation for “assistance for his []

disability.” Taylor, 184 F.3d at 313. Moreover, even if Plaintiff did make requests for installation

of an interior shield around the bus driver compartment, such a modification was not possible.

Defendant provided evidence to establish that the Pennsylvania State Police directed a

neighboring school district to remove interior shields that had been installed around the driver

compartment in its school buses. (See SMF ¶¶ 97-80.) In fact, during the summer of 2020, the

Pennsylvania Department of Transportation turned down several requests to waive state

regulations to permit the installation of such shields. (See SMF ¶ 81.) See also 67 Pa. Code §

171.58(1) (“The interior of every school bus shall be free of unnecessary projections likely to

cause injury.”).

In a failure to accommodate case, plaintiff has the burden to identify reasonable

accommodations that would help plaintiff perform his or her essential job functions. Walton v.

Mental Health Ass’n. of Se. Pennsylvania, 168 F.3d 661, 670 (3d Cir. 1999). In this case, Plaintiff

provided no evidence to establish that a single school bus within the Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania had internal barriers installed around drivers. (See SMF at ¶ 82.) Moreover,

Plaintiff never asked his doctors about whether an internal shield would be an effective safety

measure for his condition; he simply assumed that having a shield would be beneficial. (See SMF

at ¶¶ 83-84.) Furthermore, Plaintiff did not definitely state he would return to work had such a

shield been installed. (See SMF ¶ 85.)

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff cannot prevail on the theory that Defendant failed to

accommodate and/or make a good faith attempt to engage in the interactive process.

IV. CONCLUSION:

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is Granted. An

appropriate order shall follow.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ John Milton Younge

Judge John Milton Younge