The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
GUILLERMO M.R., Case No. 25-cv-05436-RFL
Petitioner,
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
v. ORDER
POLLY KAISER, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 2
Respondents.
On June 30, 2025, Petitioner filed an ex parte motion for temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction (“Motion”) to enjoin the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) from re-arresting him. (Dkt. No. 2.)
Petitioner asserts that he was released on bond in March of 2023 and that Respondents plan to re-
detain him on July 1, 2025, at 8:00 a.m. (Id.) On June 30, 2025, at 3:30 p.m., the Court held an
emergency hearing via zoom on Petitioner’s Motion, at which Petitioner’s counsel and
Respondents’ counsel appeared. (Dkt. No. 8.) Prior to the hearing, the Court reviewed the
Petition, the Motion, and a declaration and related papers filed by Respondents immediately
before the hearing. (Dkt. No. 7.) At the hearing, the Court gave a tentative ruling, and heard
argument from both parties. (Dkt. No. 8.) The following Order incorporates and adopts the
tentative reasoning stated on the record at the hearing.
The additional authorities cited by Respondents at the hearing do not change the Court’s
determination. Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189 (9th Cir. 2022) presented a
fundamentally different issue than this case, for two reasons. First, Petitioner is subject to an
immigration detention provision that “lack[s the] process” available to petitioners in Rodriguez
Diaz. See 53 F.4th at 1202–03. While Rodriguez-Diaz found that “Section 1226(a) offers
substantial procedural protections to detained persons” subject to prolonged detention, id. at
1193, the same is not true of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), which provides no right to a bond hearing.
Second, Rodriguez-Diaz involved the liberty interests of those already in detention, rather than
those of an individual who has spent more than two years released on bond. Just as the liberty
interests of a parolee who is re-arrested differ from the interests of an inmate who seeks to have a
parole board review the terms of his incarceration, Petitioner has asserted liberty interests that
differ from the liberty interests of a detained person in Rodriguez Diaz, and yet he will be
afforded more limited process. There is a serious question as to whether that satisfies the
constitutional requirements of due process.
Uc v. Kaiser, No. 22-cv-04369, 2022 WL 9496434 (N.D. Cal. 2022), is likewise
unhelpful. The petitioner in Uc did not have a due process right to a second bond hearing
because his liberty interests were diminished after the BIA vacated on appeal the Immigration
Judge’s (“IJ”) order releasing him on bond. Id. at *3. A second bond hearing would thus
undermine the government’s interest in being able to “meaningfully appeal an IJ’s bond
determination to the BIA.” Id. at *4. Unlike the petitioner in Uc, Petitioner is not challenging
his initial bond decision following “routine and foreseeable appellate review,” because the
government never appealed Petitioner’s original bond determination. Id. at *3. Indeed, Uc
specifically distinguished the liberty interests at stake in re-arrests that “did not involve a
challenge to the initial detention or bond decision,” such as the one at issue here. Id.
Respondent further cites to 8 C.F.R. 241.13(d)(1) and (j) to support the proposition that
Petitioner will have sufficient opportunity to challenge his detention after he is re-arrested.
Section (d)(1) provides that “[a]n eligible alien may submit a written request for release to the
[ICE headquarters] asserting the basis for the alien’s belief that there is no significant likelihood
that the alien will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future,” and Section (j) allows
submission of a “request for review of his or her detention . . . six months after the Service’s last
denial of release under this section[.]” But neither process appears to involve a hearing, let alone
one before a neutral decisionmaker, and no timeline is specified by which the initial review of
Petitioner’s detention would occur. Nor have Respondents identified any other means by which
Petitioner may challenge his detention or bond revocation in the near future.
Moreover, the information provided at the hearing confirms that the balance of equities
tips sharply in Petitioner’s favor. Respondents waited over six weeks from the incident at issue
to try to arrest Petitioner, and when they determined to do so, they set up an appointment where
Petitioner received advanced notice of his planned detention. As Respondents’ counsel
conceded, ICE likely had the ability to obtain the police report when it learned of the arrest in
mid-May. Yet, Respondents either did not obtain the police report, or obtained it and did not
seek to arrest Petitioner, given the circumstances. Respondents’ course of conduct demonstrates
their lack of urgency, as does Respondents’ request for a more extended briefing and hearing
schedule than initially proposed by the Court in the event a temporary restraining order was
granted.
Having reviewed the additional authority cited by the parties, and for the reasons
described at the hearing, the Court enters the following temporary restraining order.
I. ORDER
For the forgoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for a
Temporary Restraining Order is GRANTED to preserve the status quo pending further briefing
and a hearing on this matter. Respondents, and all their officers, agents, servants, employees,
attorneys, successors, assigns, and persons acting in concert or participation with them, are
hereby ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from re-arresting and re-detaining Petitioner until July
14, 2025 at 5:00 p.m.
Respondents are ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE in-person at a hearing on July 14,
2025, at 1:00 p.m. why a preliminary injunction should not issue. Respondents shall file a
response to Petitioner’s Motion by no later than July 7, 2025, at 1:00 p.m. Petitioner may file a
reply by no later than July 10, 2025, at 1:00 p.m.
Petitioner shall serve this Order, the Petition, and the Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order by July 2, 2025, and file proof of service. No security bond is required.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: June 30, 2025 at 7:00 p.m.
RITA F. LIN
United States District Judge