Banks v. San Mateo County District Attorney's Office

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4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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7 CARRIE BANKS, Case No. 24-cv-08681-SI

8 Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

9 v. DISMISS FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT

10 SAN MATEO COUNTY DISTRICT

ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 33

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Defendants.

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14 Now pending before the Court is defendants’ motion to dismiss the First Amended

15 Complaint. The Court held a hearing on June 27, 2025.

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17 BACKGROUND

18 The factual background of this case is stated more fully in the Court’s prior order at Dkt. No.

19 29 and the Court does not repeat those facts in full here. For purposes of this motion to dismiss, the

20 Court treats as true the factual allegations as stated in plaintiff’s complaint and draws all reasonable

21 inferences in plaintiff’s favor. See Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987).

22 To summarize, on or about July 17, 2021, Fernando Altuna Mendoza raped plaintiff Carrie Banks

23 while she was unconscious in her home. Dkt. No. 30 (“FAC”) ¶ 10. In August 2021 Altuna

24 Mendoza was arrested and charged with multiple serious felonies including two counts of rape. Id.

25 ¶ 56. In October 2023, the morning that trial was supposed to begin, the San Mateo County District

26 Attorney’s Office (“SMCDA”) offered Altuna Mendoza “a sweetheart plea deal . . . without ever

27 consulting Plaintiff . . . .” Id. ¶ 13. When Altuna Mendoza was later arrested for a probation

1 probation officer consult with plaintiff before issuing his sentencing recommendation. Id. ¶¶ 78-79,

2 83. The First Amended Complaint alleges that “SMCDA and Probation Department officials

3 excluded and marginalized Plaintiff at nearly every juncture of her case, and the assigned prosecutor

4 demonstrated shocking callousness toward Plaintiff, bias against her, and unseriousness regarding

5 her case.” Id. ¶ 3. Plaintiff also alleges that when she advised District Attorney Wagstaffe about

6 these failures, not only did he fail to intervene or otherwise support plaintiff but “instead

7 compounded the violations of Plaintiff’s rights as the victim of a serious crime, revictimizing her in

8 the process.” Id. ¶ 4.

9 On December 3, 2024, plaintiff filed this suit in federal court. Dkt. No. 3. Plaintiff sued:

10 San Mateo County, the San Mateo County District Attorney’s Office, the San Mateo County

11 Probation Department, and various individuals within the District Attorney’s Office and Probation

12 Department. The complaint stated four claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for: violation of the

13 Fourteenth Amendment, Equal Protection; violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, Due Process;

14 supervisory liability under the Fourteenth Amendment; and Monell liability.1 Plaintiff also brought

15 five claims under California state law.

16 On April 18, 2025, the Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss. Dkt. No. 29. The Court

17 found the individual defendants were entitled to absolute immunity from the Section 1983 claims.

18 The Court dismissed the Section 1983 claims against the County that were brought on the basis of

19 supervisory liability. The Court dismissed the federal claims against the District Attorney’s Office

20 and the Probation Department because these municipal departments were improper defendants on a

21 Section 1983 claim. The Court dismissed the Fourth Claim for Monell liability against the County,

22 for failure to allege sufficient facts in support of this claim. The Court also dismissed plaintiffs’

23 claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. The Court granted plaintiff leave “to amend only the

24 Fourth Claim (Monell claim) and only against defendant County of San Mateo.” Id. at 13-14.

25 On May 9, 2025, plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint.2 Dkt. No. 30. Defendants

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1 See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

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1 now move to dismiss the Monell claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). They

2 also ask that the Court decline supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.

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4 LEGAL STANDARD

5 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint if

6 it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

7 dismiss, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

8 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This “facial plausibility” standard requires

9 the plaintiff to allege facts that add up to “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

10 unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although courts do not require

11 “heightened fact pleading of specifics,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544, a plaintiff must provide “more

12 than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not

13 do.” Id. at 555. The plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the

14 speculative level.” Id.

15 In deciding whether the plaintiff has stated a claim, the Court must assume that the plaintiff’s

16 allegations are true and must draw all reasonable inferences in his or her favor. Usher, 828 F.2d at

17 561. However, the Court is not required to accept as true “allegations that are merely conclusory,

18 unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” St. Clare v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 536

19 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008). “[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations

20 contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

21 If the Court dismisses the complaint, it must then decide whether to grant leave to amend.

22 The Ninth Circuit has “repeatedly held that a district court should grant leave to amend even if no

23 request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly

24 be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000)

25 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

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1 DISCUSSION

2 I. Monell Claim

3 County defendants move to dismiss the Monell claim. They argue that plaintiff fails to allege

4 a constitutional violation and that the FAC does not plausibly attribute any alleged constitutional

5 violation to County policy. Dkt. No. 33 (“Mot.”) at 2.

6 Local governments are “persons” subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where official

7 policy or custom causes a constitutional tort. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. To establish an official

8 policy that would give rise to Monell liability, a plaintiff must allege facts to support one of the

9 following to survive dismissal of her claim: (1) an unconstitutional custom or policy behind the

10 violation of rights; (2) a deliberately indifferent omission, such as a failure to train or failure to have

11 a needed policy; or (3) a final policy-maker’s involvement in, or ratification of, the conduct

12 underlying the violation of rights. Clouthier v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1249-50 (9th

13 Cir. 2010) (synthesizing authorities), overruled on other grounds by Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles,

14 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016). Plaintiff’s Monell claim is based on three theories, which she

15 explains significantly overlap with each other: an unconstitutional policy or custom, a failure to train

16 regarding victims’ rights, and ratification.

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18 A. Policy or Custom

19 The Court agrees with defendants that the FAC inadequately alleges the existence of a

20 municipal policy or custom for Monell liability. As the Court previously cautioned, Dkt. No. 29 at

21 11, “[i]t is difficult to discern from the caselaw the quantum of allegations needed to survive a

22 motion to dismiss a pattern and practice claim.” See Gonzalez v. Cnty. of Merced, 289 F. Supp. 3d

23 1094, 1099 (E.D. Cal. 2017). Proof of random acts or isolated incidents of unconstitutional action

24 by a non-policymaking employee is insufficient to establish the existence of a municipal policy or

25 custom. Rivera v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 745 F.3d 384, 398 (9th Cir. 2014); McDade v. West, 223

26 F. 3d 1135, 1142 (9th Cir. 2000); Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996).

27 Here, plaintiff points to no official policy in support of her claim. Rather, she premises her

1 permissible: a plaintiff may establish Section 1983 municipal liability by alleging “that a [municipal]

2 employee committed the alleged constitutional violation pursuant to a formal governmental policy

3 or a ‘longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local

4 governmental entity.’” Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Jett v.

5 Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

6 The FAC alleges,

7 On information and belief, the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights was

part of a continuing, persistent, and widespread custom and practice

8 by the County, SMCDA, and the Probation Department of failing to

comply with Marsy’s Law when the victim is female and/or a victim

9 of gender-based violence, including with respect to Plaintiff.

10 FAC ¶ 164.

11 The problem here is that the FAC does not plausibly allege a custom or practice of failing

12 to comply with Marsy’s Law -- the Victims’ Bill of Rights Act of 2008, Cal. Const. art. I, § 28 --

13 when the victim is female or the crime is one of gender-based violence. With respect to the case

14 against plaintiff’s attacker, Altuna Mendoza, the FAC alleges that defendants violated Marsy’s

15 Law by, among other things, discouraging plaintiff from speaking in court when the plea deal was

16 entered (SMCDA), failing to notify her when Altuna Mendoza was arrested on a probation

17 violation (Probation Department), and failing to consult with plaintiff before issuing a sentencing

18 recommendation on the probation violation (Probation Department).

19 To establish a countywide custom or practice, the FAC highlights “[o]ther troubling cases

20 [that] are similarly illustrative of the County’s inadequate handling of gender-based violence

21 cases[.]” FAC ¶ 97. However, the incidents highlighted in that paragraph—two from 2019, one

22 from 2020, and two 2023 homicides—contain no allegations regarding compliance with Marsy’s

23 Law. See id. The FAC then alleges additional instances where victims of gender-based violence in

24 San Mateo County had their Marsy’s Law rights violated: an incident from 2010; an incident

25 involving the same prosecutor from an unknown year, in which the prosecutor was suspended by

26 the DA’s Office in September 2012, “privately reproved” by the California Bar in 2013, and publicly

27 disciplined in 2017; a case from 2019; a case from 2013; and a March 2025 plea deal for a homicide

1 To summarize, apart from the allegations involving the plaintiff herself, the FAC identifies

2 five cases involving Marsy’s Law violations for a victim of gender-based violence during a 15-year

3 period from 2010 to 2025. Two of the cases involved the same prosecutor, who was subsequently

4 disciplined by the San Mateo County District Attorney’s Office for “dishonesty.” See id. ¶ 98.

5 Those allegations are therefore of questionable utility in evaluating the existence of a countywide

6 custom or policy. To be sure, all the cases outlined in the FAC are tragic and at times gruesome.

7 Nevertheless, the Court finds the alleged Marsy’s Law violations are too few and far between to put

8 plaintiff’s assertion that there is a countywide practice over the line from “possible” to “plausible.”

9 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

10 Here, the FAC fails to plausibly allege the existence of a longstanding custom or practice

11 within the District Attorney’s Office of disregarding Marsy’s Law when the victim is female or

12 when the crime is one of gender-based violence. Notably, the FAC is silent on compliance with

13 Marsy’s Law with respect to male victims. And as defendants note, the FAC is devoid of any

14 instances outside of plaintiff’s case in which the Probation Department is alleged to have violated

15 Marsy’s Law. “Only if a plaintiff shows that his injury resulted from a ‘permanent and well settled’

16 practice may liability attach for injury resulting from a local government custom.” Thompson v.

17 City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1444 (1989) (citations omitted); see also Gant v. Cnty. of Los

18 Angeles, 772 F.3d 608, 618 (9th Cir. 2014) (liability may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic

19 incidents; “it must be founded on practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that

20 the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out policy”). The Court finds the custom

21 or policy allegations insufficiently stated.

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23 B. Failure to Train

24 The FAC also alleges:

25 On information and belief, the County has failed to issue policies and

have failed to train, supervise, and discipline its employees within

26 SMCDA and the Probation Department to ensure they comply with

Marsy’s Law in a manner that (a) protects the due process rights of

27 female victims and victims of gender-based violence, and (b) does not

1 FAC ¶ 165.

2 In “limited circumstances,” a municipal policy may be based upon the local government’s

3 decision not to train certain employees about their legal duty to avoid violating citizens’ rights.

4 Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011). But the local government’s liability under § 1983 is

5 at “its most tenuous” when the claim is based on a failure to train. Id. Moreover, “a municipality’s

6 failure to train its employees in a relevant respect must amount to ‘deliberate indifference to the

7 rights of persons with whom the [untrained employees] come into contact.’” Id. (quoting Canton v.

8 Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)). Deliberate indifference is a “stringent” standard, “requiring

9 proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Board of

10 Cnty. Comm’rs. of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997).

11 A “pattern of similar constitutional violations” by untrained employees is ordinarily

12 necessary to establish that the failure to train or supervise is a deliberate policy. Connick, 563 U.S.

13 at 62. Indeed, constitutional violations must be “so predictable” that the failure to train amounts to

14 a “conscious disregard” for those constitutional rights. Id. at 71. Thus, evidence of the failure to

15 train a single employee is ordinarily insufficient to establish that the failure to train was a

16 municipality’s deliberate policy. Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 484-85 (9th Cir.

17 2007) (absent evidence of a “program-wide inadequacy in training,” any shortfall in a single

18 officer’s training was classified as negligence rather than deliberate indifference, therefore plaintiff

19 did not meet his burden to withstand summary judgment).

20 For the reasons stated above regarding custom or policy, the FAC also fails to show a pattern

21 of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees. As noted, the FAC alleges no failures

22 by the Probation Department to comply with Marsy’s Law, outside of the allegations related to

23 plaintiffs’ own case. The allegations regarding the District Attorneys’ Office recount five cases

24 with Marsy’s Law violations, over the course of 15 years, outside of what happened to plaintiff.

25 Two of those instances involved the same prosecutor, whom the District Attorney’s Office

26 subsequently disciplined.

27 Moreover, the FAC fails to meet the “stringent” standard for deliberate indifference. See

1 entered a plea deal but before he was sentenced—plaintiff met with defendant Wagstaffe and

2 defendant Chang, the District Attorney and Assistant District Attorney, respectively. FAC ¶¶ 30-

3 31, 74. “Plaintiff communicated that she believed her Marsy’s Law rights had been violated as a

4 result of Defendant Lee’s and Defendant Adams’ handling of her case, that the rape trauma crisis

5 center was unable to timely provide services to her, and that she hoped they would intervene and

6 prevent the plea deal from going forward. No such intervention or other support occurred,

7 however.” Id. ¶ 74. Plaintiff also alleges that defendant Wagstaffe refused to meet with her in May

8 2024, citing plaintiff’s submission of a letter to the Department of Justice.3 Id. ¶ 90. Defendant

9 Wagstaffe has also made public comments about the case since the filing of this federal lawsuit,

10 including statements that “We believe that the allegations of misconduct by my prosecutors are not

11 accurate” and that “If I were to go into detail with the problems in the [Altuna Mendoza] case, I

12 would be personally attacking her.” Id. ¶ 92. The FAC further states that a news outlet reported

13 that “Wagstaffe declined to cite the purported issues with the case but said that, to his knowledge,

14 the DA’s Office committed no misconduct and maintained that she [plaintiff] was informed of the

15 decision.” Id. At the hearing, plaintiff’s counsel was unable to clarify a question left open by the

16 FAC: whether plaintiff is alleging that the County does not train on Marsy’s Law at all or what

17 precisely plaintiff is alleging the training lacked. These allegations simply do not suffice to

18 constitute “deliberate indifference to a known risk.” See Connick, 563 U.S. at 67 (rejecting theory

19 that “prosecutors were not trained about particular Brady evidence or the specific scenario related

20 to the violation in [t]his case,” explaining “[t]hat sort of nuance simply cannot support an inference

21 of deliberate indifference here”); Bell v. Williams, 108 F.4th 809, 825-26 (9th Cir. 2024) (narrow

22 gaps in training program did not demonstrate “deliberate indifference” on a failure-to-train theory

23 of Monell liability).

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25 C. Ratification

26 Plaintiff also pursues a ratification theory. She alleges that ratification is evidenced by

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1 Wagstaffe’s comments to the media following filing of this lawsuit and by Wagstaffe and Chang

2 explicitly failing to follow up regarding plaintiff’s concerns which she shared with them directly.

3 FAC ¶¶ 92, 166, 170.

4 “To show ratification, a plaintiff must show that the ‘authorized policymakers approve a

5 subordinate’s decision and the basis for it.’” Herd v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 311 F. Supp. 3d

6 1157, 1169 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (quoting Lytle v. Carl, 382 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2004)).

7 “Ratification, however, generally requires more than acquiescence.” Sheehan v. City & Cnty. of

8 San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211, 1231 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d in part on other grounds, cert. dismissed

9 in part sub nom. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, Calif. v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600 (2015). “The

10 policymaker must make a ‘conscious, affirmative choice to approve [the subordinate’s] actions and

11 adopt them as official policy.’” Kaur v. City of Lodi, 263 F. Supp. 3d 947, 985 (E.D. Cal. 2017)

12 (quoting Clouthier, 591 F.3d at 1253).

13 Here, the FAC fails to allege facts that would allow plaintiff’s ratification theory to move

14 forward. At most, what plaintiff has alleged is that Wagstaffe “concluded that the defendant

15 [prosecutor’s ] actions were in keeping with the applicable policies and procedures.” See Lewis v.

16 Nanos, 766 F. Supp. 3d 905, 938 (D. Ariz. 2024) (quoting Garcia v. City of Imperial, No. 08cv2357

17 BTM, 2010 WL 3911457, at *2 (S.D. Cal. 2010)). This will not suffice to support a ratification

18 theory based on the District Attorney’s actions. See id. Moreover, the FAC contains no ratification

19 allegations as to defendant Keene of the County Probation Department.

20 ***

21 To summarize, the Court will dismiss the Monell claim for failure to sufficiently allege that

22 any constitutional violation occurred pursuant to County policy. In light of this ruling, the Court

23 does not reach defendants’ alternative argument that the FAC fails to allege the violation of a

24 constitutional tort.4 Likewise, the Court need not reach the question today of whether defendant

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4 Plaintiff did not respond to this argument in her opposition, although defendants fully

briefed the matter and the Court previously cautioned that the question of a constitutional tort

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remained at issue. See Opp’n at 5 n.1; Dkt. No. 29 at 12 (“If plaintiff successfully cures the above

1 Wagstaffe was acting as a State or County actor, see Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 715 F.3d 750

2 (9th Cir. 2013), as this issue is not determinative given the factual deficiencies in the FAC. Because

3 || plaintiff has already had the opportunity to amend her Monell claim, and the Court previously

4 || cautioned that it would not be inclined to grant further opportunities to amend, see Dkt. No. 29 at

5 11, dismissal of the Monell claim at stage is with prejudice.

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7 | IL State Law Claims

8 Defendants also seek dismissal of plaintiffs’ state law claims, for lack of supplemental

9 || jurisdiction. Having found above that the only remaining federal claim in this case should be

10 || dismissed, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. See

11 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Plaintiffs state law claims are dismissed without prejudice to her re-filing

12 || them in state court.

CONCLUSION

3 15 The rights that Ms. Banks seeks to vindicate are not to be taken lightly. Still, the question

a 16 || before the Court today is whether she has stated a federal civil rights claim against the County. For

3 17 the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes she has not. As the Ninth Circuit has observed,

18 || plaintiffs “remedy, if any, lies in the state courts or through the political process.” See Dix, 963

19 || F.2d at 1301.

20 The Court GRANTS defendants’ motion to dismiss. The Fourth Claim for Monell liability

21 is dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims are dismissed without prejudice.

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23 IT IS SO ORDERED.

24 Dated: July 1, 2025 Site WU tee

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6 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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