The opinion
STATE OF LOUISIANA * NO. 2024-KA-0700
VERSUS *
COURT OF APPEAL
BARRY BOWIE *
FOURTH CIRCUIT
*
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*******
APPEAL FROM
CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 552-946, SECTION “D”
Judge Kimya M. Holmes,
******
Judge Rosemary Ledet
******
(Court composed of Chief Judge Roland L. Belsome, Judge Rosemary Ledet,
Judge Paula A. Brown)
BELSOME, C.J., CONCURS WITH REASONS
Holli Herrle-Castillo
LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT
P. O. Box 2333
Marrero, LA 70073-2333
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
Jason Rogers Williams
DISTRICT ATTORNEY, PARISH OF ORLEANS
Brad Scott
CHIEF OF APPEALS
Zachary M. Phillips
ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY
619 S. White Street
New Orleans, LA 70119
COUNSEL FOR THE STATE OF LOUISIANA/APPELLEE
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART; REMANDED IN PART
July 1, 2025
RML
PAB
This criminal appeal arises from the convictions of Barry Bowie (“Mr.
Bowie”) for second degree murder, felon in possession of a firearm, and
obstruction of justice. Mr. Bowie appeals, contending there was insufficient
evidence to sustain his convictions.
On review, we find two patent errors: (1) no compliance with the time
delays for sentencing; and (2) failure to assess a fine for the felon in possession of
a firearm conviction. Finding the first error regarding sentencing harmless, we
find sufficient evidence was presented. As the district court failed to comply with
the statutory requirement of assessing a fine for the conviction of a felon in
possession of a firearm, we remand for the assessment of same. Further, we find
insufficient evidence was presented to maintain Mr. Bowie’s conviction for
obstruction of justice. In all other respects, we affirm Mr. Bowie’s convictions and
sentences.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Henry James (“Mr. James”) and his fiancé, Sonya McClendon (“Ms.
McClendon”), were visiting with each other at the apartment complex located at
1937 St. Ann Street (“apartment complex”) in New Orleans where Mr. James
1
resided on June 7, 2021. During the visit, Mr. James and Mr. Bowie were involved
in a verbal altercation. Because this made Ms. McClendon uneasy, she requested
that Mr. James drive her to her residence in Michoud. Upon Mr. James’ return to
the apartment complex, he was involved in another verbal altercation with Mr.
Bowie, wherein Mr. Bowie shot Mr. James five times, killing him.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mr. Bowie was charged with one count of second degree murder in violation
of La. R.S. 14:30.1; one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in
violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1; and one count of obstruction of justice in violation of
La. R.S. 130.1. He pled not guilty. Following trial, the jury unanimously found
Mr. Bowie guilty as charged. Mr. Bowie then filed a motion for post-verdict
judgment of acquittal and a motion for new trial. The district court denied both
motions. The district court then imposed the mandatory life sentence without
benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for second degree murder;
twenty years imprisonment at hard labor, without the benefit of parole, probation,
or suspension of sentence, on the obstruction of justice conviction; and twenty
years imprisonment at hard labor, without the benefit parole, probation or
suspension of sentence on the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon
conviction. All sentences were to be served concurrently and with credit for time
served.
PATENT ERRORS
The record reveals two patent errors.
First, Mr. Bowie did not explicitly waive his right to the mandated twenty-
four hour delay between the denial of his motion for new trial and his sentencing.
On August 15, 2024, two months after the verdict, the district court denied
2
Mr. Bowie’s motion for new trial. The district court then requested that counsel
provide a date for sentencing. Instead of selecting a date for sentencing, the State
presented Ms. McClendon, Mr. Bowie’s fiancé, for victim impact testimony. Once
her testimony concluded, the district court proceeded to sentence Mr. Bowie.
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 873 provides:
If a defendant is convicted of a felony, at least three days shall elapse
between conviction and sentence. If a motion for a new trial, or in
arrest of judgment, is filed, sentence shall not be imposed until at least
twenty-four hours after the motion is overruled. If the defendant
expressly waives a delay provided for in this article or pleads guilty,
sentence may be imposed immediately.
The “[f]ailure of the trial court to observe the mandatory twenty-four hour delay
after denial of a motion for new trial, where such delay is not waived, requires the
sentence to be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing.” State v. Foster,
2002-0910, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/11/02), 834 So.2d 1188, 1191.
However, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the failure of the trial court
to observe the mandatory twenty-four hour rule was harmless where the sentence
imposed was mandatory in nature. State v. Seals, 1995-0305, p. 17 (La. 11/25/96),
684 So.2d 368, 380. Morever, “[w]here a defendant does not challenge his
sentence on appeal or raise the failure to observe the 24-hour delay as error, any
error is harmless.” Id. Also, “[t]his court has held that, where a defendant shows
no prejudice and does not challenge his sentence on appeal, any error in failing to
observe the twenty-four hour delay is considered harmless.” State v. Bentley, 97-
1552, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/21/98), 728 So.2d 405, 407. See also State v.
Jenkins, 2019-1024, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/30/20), 365 So.3d 55, 62.
Additionally, “[a] judgment or ruling shall not be reversed by an appellate
court because of any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect
3
substantial rights of the accused.” La. C.Cr.P. art. 921. The Louisiana Supreme
Court explained thusly, “[j]udicial efficiency . . . dictates that this court need not
follow the useless formality of remanding for reimposition of a sentence which has
not been challenged” where defendant raised no objection and demonstrated no
prejudice. State v. White, 404 So.2d 1202, 1204 (La. 1981).
In the present matter, the following colloquy occurred between the district
court judge and counsel for Mr. Bowie after sentencing:
COUNSEL:
Judge, I have an objection to sentence at this time, we do
have a couple of motions to file with respect to Mr.
Bowie. One is --
THE COURT:
Could you put the mic -- she can’t here [sic] you.
COUNSEL:
Sure, one is a Motion for Appeal and Designation of the
Record —
THE COURT:
I will grant that.
COUNSEL:
And the other is a motion to withdraw as Counsel of
Record and to appoint Appellate counsel, Judge.
THE COURT:
I will grant that, as well.
COUNSEL:
I have served those on the State. Judge, we also do have an
Outstanding Expert Funding Motion, which you’ve already granted,
but we need to file a motion to have the funds dispersed, which we
would plan to do next week, if that’s okay with the court.
4
Thus, Mr. Bowie’s counsel may have objected to sentencing after the fact, but did
not explicitly express same, as averred by the State. Furthermore, neither appellate
counsel for Mr. Bowie nor Mr. Bowie himself raised this as an error in their
respective appeal briefs.1 As neither brief demonstrated prejudice to Mr. Bowie
and we find no prejudice on the face of the record, we determine the error was
harmless, which does not mandate a remand. As the Louisiana Supreme Court
stated:
A remand would only serve to lengthen unnecessarily the
already substantial delays involved in this case and would in no way
further the goal of achieving a fair and just decision on either verdict
or sentence. It is illogical for this court to remand for the reimposition
of sentence merely because there is an “error” in the minutes' lack of
an affirmative waiver of the 24-hour delay. Just as non-prejudicial
violations of the accused’s statutory rights do not mandate reversal, an
error in procedure which does not affect the fundamental fairness of
the process does not necessarily require reversal and remand, unless
prejudice is shown.
White, 404 So.2d at 1204.
Secondly, the record reveals that the sentence imposed for Mr. Bowie’s
conviction for felon in possession of a firearm did not comply with the
requirements of the statute governing the offense.2 In sentencing Mr. Bowie on his
conviction for being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, the district court
failed to impose a fine as required by La. R.S. 14:95.1(B)(1), which states:
B. (1) Whoever is found guilty of violating the provisions of
this Section shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than five nor
more than twenty years without the benefit of probation, parole, or
suspension of sentence and be fined not less than one thousand dollars
nor more than five thousand dollars.
1 Appellate counsel for Mr. Bowie submitted an appellant brief, and Mr. Bowie submitted a pro
se supplemental brief.
2 This finding also applies to the sentence for obstruction of justice. However, because we later
vacate Mr. Bowie’s conviction for obstruction of justice, this discussion is pretermitted.
5
Recently, in State v. Williams, 2024-0105, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/9/24),
400 So.3d 1194, 1199, this Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction, but
remanded the case to the district court for imposition of the mandatory fine
required upon conviction for illegal possession of a firearm by a felon. This Court
noted that “a reviewing court must remand cases for the imposition of a
mandatory fine where the trial court failed to do so.” Id. (citing State v. Williams,
2003-0302, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/6/03), 859 So.2d 751, 753). Consequently,
this Court “concluded that our circuit is ‘constrained to follow the Fourth Circuit’s
prior jurisprudence directing that we remand for correction of the defendant’s
sentence where the trial court has failed to impose a statutorily mandated
fine.’” Id. (quoting State v. Dorsey, 2020-0029, pp. 4-5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/9/20),
312 So.3d 652, 656). Because the district court erred in failing to impose a
statutorily mandated fine, the case is remanded to the district court for imposition
of the mandatory fine required by law.
TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE
State’s Case
Sergeant Miles Guerreri
Sergeant Miles Guerreri (“Sgt. Guerreri”) was the homicide detective3 for
the New Orleans Police Department (“NOPD”) who took over Mr. James’ case
after the initial lead detective left the force. He testified that they canvassed the
apartment complex for witnesses following the shooting. Specifically, they
identified Jasmine Brown (“Ms. Brown”), a man4 living on the second floor with a
3 Sgt. Guerreri now works with the NOPD Public Integrity Bureau.
4 The man was identified on the second day of trial as Debayn Ghosh.
6
camera in his window, Chaquita Carter (“Ms. Carter”),5 who was also known as
“Badu,” and Lawrence Hardester (“Mr. Hardester”). Ms. Carter did not want to go
to the homicide office for fear of retaliation. The six-pack lineups shown to Ms.
Brown, Ms. Carter, and Mr. Hardester were admitted into evidence for record
purposes only.
Sgt. Guerreri stated that real time crime camera (“RTCC”) footage was
collected. He then described a series of RTCC videos played for the jury that
showed the progression of Mr. Bowie riding a bicycle from the area of his
residence to the apartment complex before the shooting. The RTCC footage then
depicts Mr. Bowie running from the apartment complex with a firearm in his hand
that he later tucks into his waistband. Not long after, he returns to the apartment
complex to retrieve his bicycle and leave. The person riding the bicycle was
deemed to be Mr. Bowie due to the black and gold “N.O.” hat he was wearing and
the COVID type face shield around his neck. Based on the evidence collected, Sgt.
Guerreri filed for an arrest warrant for Mr. Bowie.
Mr. Bowie was arrested, unarmed, in at a hotel in New Orleans East. The
NOPD searched the hotel room and two vehicles. No firearm was found in either
the hotel room or the two vehicles.
On cross-examination, counsel for Mr. Bowie attempted to show another
person was responsible for Mr. James’ murder by questioning Sgt. Guerreri about a
portion of the RTCC that showed a green vehicle drive up to the apartment
complex after Mr. Bowie left. A woman exited the vehicle and then reentered the
vehicle along with two men from the apartment complex. Counsel for Mr. Bowie
also questioned Sgt. Guerreri about a white Solara turning on the street next to the
5 Ms. Carter passed away on January 3, 2024.
7
apartment complex. Sgt. Guerreri testified that special cameras are required to pull
and run license plates, and the location was not equipped with the special camera.
Sgt. Guerreri further stated that no surveillance footage was obtained from the back
entrance of the apartment complex. Defense counsel then admitted a photo of the
small alcove showing the mechanical room at the apartment complex where Mr.
James’ body was located. Counsel asked Sgt. Guerreri if he could see a small red
light in the photo, implying another camera was present. Once Sgt. Guerreri
confirmed he could see the light, no further questions were asked.
Sgt. Guerreri was called to the stand again on the second day of trial in order
to admit video taken from the second floor resident, Debayn Ghosh.6 The video
depicted a partial view of the area where the murder occurred. Specifically, Mr.
James walked to the alcove under the stairs, which was where his apartment was
located. A person, dressed in black, walked down the stairs, following him. A few
seconds later, people on the second-floor balcony scattered and the person dressed
in black exited the complex through the driveway.
When called to the stand for rebuttal, Sgt. Guerreri testified that he met with
the owner of the apartment complex who informed him that the surveillance
cameras were not operational.
Sonya McClendon
Ms. McClendon testified that she was Mr. James’ fiancé and was visiting
66 The first day of trial, the district court deemed the videos from Mr. Ghosh inadmissible
without his testimony for authentication. Mr. Ghosh was the first witness called on the second
day of trial. He testified that on the day of the shooting he was living in a second floor apartment
at the apartment complex. Mr. Ghosh had installed a security camera that was aimed outside his
window facing towards the courtyard in order to keep an eye on his bicycle. Mr. Ghosh stated
that officers knocked on his door and he handed over footage, though the exact manner in which
he gave the NOPD his footage was unclear, i.e., by memory card, USB drive, etc. Mr. Ghosh
stated this was because of the passage of time coupled with the fact that the NOPD retrieved
video from him for more than one murder and other crimes. Following Mr. Ghosh’s testimony,
the district court deemed the videos admissible over Mr. Bowie’s objection.
8
Mr. James at the apartment complex on June 7, 2021, when Mr. Bowie and Mr.
James were involved in a verbal altercation in the middle of the apartment parking
lot near their black Mercedes. Afterwards, around “5 or 6” p.m., she asked that
Mr. James take her home to Michoud because she “didn’t trust that guy.” Ms.
McClendon stated that her home was about fifteen to twenty minutes from Mr.
James’ apartment and that Mr. James returned to the apartment complex after
dropping her off. She learned of Mr. James’ death from her cousin.
Nishia Hubbard
Nishia Hubbard (“Ms. Hubbard”) resided on the second floor of the
apartment complex at the time of the shooting. She lived with her boyfriend, Mr.
Hardester. Prior to the shooting, Ms. Hubbard testified that Mr. Bowie knocked on
her door to borrow a cigarette, which she gave him. After Mr. Bowie left, she and
Mr. Hardester walked out onto the porch where they heard gunshots and another
resident, Ms. Carter, known as “Badu,” screaming. Ms. Hubbard did not know Mr.
James, but, as she was the “candy lady,” she had sold him hot plates of food in the
past.
Lawrence Hardester
Mr. Hardester testified that he resided at the apartment complex at the time
of the shooting and that Ms. Hubbard was his girlfriend. Mr. Hardester saw Mr.
Bowie before the shooting. He did not witness the shooting, but heard a woman
screaming after the gunshots. Mr. Hardester stated he was friends with both Mr.
James and Mr. Bowie. However, Mr. Hardester admitted that he was “high that
day,” so he did not “really” remember the day.
Jasmine Brown
When questioned as to whether she was residing at the apartment complex at
9
the time of the shooting, Ms. Brown testified, “I was staying in a lot of places. I
was getting loaded.” Ms. Brown was asked if she was simply in the area that day
and she replied, “I don’t remember. I really don’t know.” Ms. Brown admitted that
she was questioned at homicide headquarters, but claimed she did not remember
anything. When counsel asked Ms. Brown if showing her the video and audio of
her interview would refresh her memory, Ms. Brown insisted “it would be a waste
of time. I don’t remember” because she “done a lot of drugs.” Ms. Brown was
shown a portion of her video interview. However, she testified the video did not
refresh her memory because she was unable to hear what she was saying and that
she was mumbling. She did not recall if she was presented with a six pack lineup.
Ms. Brown stated she was “cool friends” with Mr. James, and knew him for
two or three years. Lastly, Ms. Brown testified that her “hand was forced to be
here” because of a subpoena.
Detective Richard Daniel Nutt
Detective Richard Nutt (“Det. Nutt”) testified that in 2005 he was employed
as a robbery/homicide detective with the City of Arlington, Texas Police
Department. He served as the lead investigator of an armed robbery wherein Mr.
Bowie was developed as the suspect. Det. Nutt stated Mr. Bowie pled guilty and
received fifteen years for aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon in 2006.
State’s Expert Witnesses
Dr. Erin O’Sullivan is a forensic pathologist at the Orleans Parish Coroner’s
Office. She was qualified as an expert in forensic pathology and testified that she
performed Mr. James’ autopsy. Mr. James’ cause of death was multiple gunshot
wounds and was classified as a homicide.
Emma Skilbred works in the Orleans Parish Communications District in the
10
Public Records Department as Custodian of Records. She authenticated two 911
calls relative to Mr. James’ homicide. One caller stated that he heard six gun
shots.
Janeice Rogers (“Ms. Rogers”) was a crime scene technician with the NOPD
at the time of the shooting. She took crime scene photos at the apartment complex.
Ms. Rogers also identified some casings, a hat, a key fob, and other evidence
collected at the scene.
Sean McElrath (“Mr. McElrath”) is the section head of the Forensic
Firearms Section for NOPD’s Crime Lab. Mr. McElrath testified as an expert in
firearm and tool mark examination. He examined six bullet specimens, but was
not provided with a firearm for comparison. Mr. McElrath stated that all the
casings were fired from the same weapon. However, the copper fragments and
projectiles were badly damaged and did not have enough individual markings for
testing.
Donald Julien, a technician for Securus, testified as the custodian of records
for the jail calls and authenticated the introduction of one jail phone call. The
fifteen-minute phone call to an unknown female included a statement by Mr.
Bowie that he ran from the apartment complex after the shooting.
Defense’s Case
Detective April Augustine (“Det. Augustine”) from the NOPD Violent
Crime Abatement Investigation Team testified that a known subject gave her the
name of a potential subject in Mr. James’ homicide: Barry. The subject stated that
“Barry” had a brother whose name sounded like “Tone.” She stated that the only
“Barry” she was familiar with was Barry South, who had a criminal record. Det.
Augustine stated she relayed her information to the detective investigating the
11
shooting.
Jill Prather, an expert as it relates to firearm and tool mark identification and
distance determination and scene reconstruction, testified that she visited the scene
of the shooting, as well as reviewed crime scene photos and evidence logs. She
observed a red light in one of the crime scene photos. Upon visiting the site
approximately three months before trial, she found that the light was likely
emanating from a now defunct camera.
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
Mr. Bowie’s sole assignment of error, both counselled and pro se, is that
insufficient evidence was presented to sustain his convictions.
The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence claim is
whether, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct.
2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). “The principal criteria of a Jackson . . .
review is rationality.” State v. Dukes, 2019-0172, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/2/19),
281 So.3d 745, 752 (citing State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1310 (La. 1988)). As
such, “ ‘irrational decisions to convict will be overturned, rational decisions to
convict will be upheld, and the actual fact finder’s discretion will be impinged
upon only to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due
process of law.’” State v. Wilson, 2009-0304, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/17/10), 68
So.3d 1031, 1033 (quoting Mussall, 523 So.2d at 1310).
This Court has adopted and summarized our role when reviewing claims of
insufficient evidence as follows:
12
Generally, when assessing the sufficiency of evidence to support a
conviction, the reviewing court must determine whether, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational fact
finder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 309, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2784,
61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
A sufficiency of evidence review must include the whole
record, as a rational fact finder does. State v. Gibson, 15-0682, p. 12
(La. App. 4 Cir. 1/27/16), 186 So.3d 772, 780. An appellate court’s
function is not to assess the witnesses’ credibility or to reweigh the
evidence. State v. Barbain, 15-0404, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/4/15),
179 So.3d 770, 776-77 (citation omitted). “[C]onflicting testimony as
to factual matters is a question of weight of the evidence, not
sufficiency.” State v. Rainey, 15-0892, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/27/16),
189 So.3d 439, 444 (citation omitted).
State v. Sterling, 2024-0160, pp. 5-6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/17/24), 398 So.3d 80, 88.
Simply, “[a]bsent internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with the physical
evidence, a single witness’s testimony, if believed by the fact finder, is sufficient to
support a factual conclusion.” State v. De Gruy, 2016-0891, p. 11 (La. App. 4 Cir.
4/5/17), 215 So.3d 723, 729.
As to cases based on circumstantial evidence:
The standard established in Jackson v. Virginia is applicable to
both direct and circumstantial evidence. Dukes, 2019-0172, p. 8, 281
So.3d at 752 (citing State v. Wade, 39,797, p. 7 (La. App. 2 Cir.
8/9/05), 908 So.2d 1220, 1224). When the conviction is based on
circumstantial evidence, La. R.S. 15:438 sets forth the rule that
“assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in
order to convict, [the circumstantial evidence] must exclude every
reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” However, La. R.S. 15:438 does
not establish a stricter standard of review than the more general
rational fact finder’s reasonable doubt formula; rather it serves as a
helpful evidentiary guide for the trier of fact when evaluating
circumstantial evidence. State v. Toups, 2001-1875, p. 3 (La.
10/15/02), 833 So.2d 910, 912; State v. Chism, 436 So.2d 464, 470
(La.1983). When evaluating circumstantial evidence, the trier of fact
must consider:
the circumstantial evidence in light of the direct
evidence, and vice versa, [and] the trier of fact must decide
what reasonable inferences may be drawn from the
circumstantial evidence, the manner in which competing
13
inferences should be resolved, reconciled or compromised;
and the weight and effect to be given to each permissible
inference. From facts found from direct evidence and inferred
from circumstantial evidence, the trier of fact should proceed,
keeping in mind the relative strength and weakness of each
inference and finding, to decide the ultimate question of
whether this body of preliminary facts excludes every
reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
State v. Rose, 2005-0396, p. 2 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/13/07), 955 So.2d
270, 272, citing Chism, 436 So.2d at 469.
Dukes, 2019-0172, pp. 8-9, 281 So.3d at 752-53.
Second Degree Murder
Mr. Bowie contends insufficient evidence was presented to substantiate his
conviction for second degree murder because “no witness identified him as the
perpetrator, no physical evidence linking him to the crimes was presented, and the
circumstantial evidence upon which the convictions are wholly based failed to
exclude several reasonable hypotheses of innocence.” Illustratively, Mr. Bowie
avers that the photographic identifications made by Ms. Brown, Ms. Carter, and
Mr. Hardester were insufficient to prove he killed Mr. James because the
identifications only support that he was present at the apartment complex on the
day of the shooting rather than identifying him as the shooter. Mr. Bowie further
asserts that the crime camera videos and the video clips from Mr. Ghosh’s security
camera were insufficient to prove him guilty of murder because the footage did not
depict him firing a weapon. Mr. Bowie reiterates that there is no video of the
actual shooting.
“Second degree murder is the killing of a human being . . . [w]hen the
offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.” La. R.S.
14:30.1(A)(1). Additionally, “[w]hen . . . a defendant’s identity as the perpetrator
is at issue—as opposed to whether the crime was committed—the State bears the
14
burden of negating any reasonable probability of misidentification.” State v.
Sandifer, 2016-0842, p. 10 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/27/18), 249 So.3d 142, 152.
The State maintains that the video footage provided sufficient circumstantial
evidence that Mr. Bowie was the perpetrator. The footage depicts Mr. Bowie
arriving at the apartment complex shortly before the shooting and running from the
apartment complex immediately thereafter. Ms. McLendon, Mr. James’ fiancé,
testified that Mr. James and Mr. Bowie had an altercation earlier that day. Ms.
Brown, Ms. Hubbard and Mr. Hardester all stated that Mr. Bowie was present at
the apartment complex during the day.
While Mr. Bowie suggests that the video footage did not clearly depict him,
a review of the footage demonstrates otherwise. Mr. Bowie’s identity as the
person riding the bicycle to the apartment complex and entering same is clear from
the footage. A screenshot of the footage provides a clear image of Mr. Bowie
riding the bicycle. The footage also shows him running from the complex and
putting what appears to be a firearm in his pants. The jury viewed the crime
camera video and security camera video and was able to discern Mr. Bowie’s
identity as the shooter. Thus, the jury’s finding was within its province as the trier
of fact. In evaluating the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
we find a rational juror could have found that the State proved Mr. Bowie
committed the second degree murder of Mr. James beyond a reasonable doubt.
Felon in Possession of a Firearm
Mr. Bowie asserts the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to show that
he “possessed a firearm, that he had a previous conviction for one of the requisite
felonies, and that the cleansing period had not yet expired.” Conversely, the State
maintains that the RTCC footage depicts Mr. Bowie leaving the scene with a
15
firearm.
Pursuant to La. R.S. 14:95.1,7 it is unlawful for any person who has been
convicted of certain enumerated felonies to possess a firearm. For a violation of
La. R.S. 14:95.1, the State must demonstrate that: “(1) defendant possessed a
firearm; (2) defendant has been convicted previously of a crime of violence or
other enumerated felony; (3) defendant possessed the firearm within ten years of
the prior conviction; and (4) defendant had the general intent to commit the
offense.” State v. Sparks, 2018-1013, pp. 4-5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/8/19), 271 So.3d
308, 311. See also State v. Bienemy, 2023-0271, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/4/23),
382 So.3d 1011, 1016, writ denied, 2024-00050 (La. 6/19/24), 386 So.3d 673. Mr.
Bowie challenges the first prong.
Det. Nutt testified that Mr. Bowie pled guilty to aggravated robbery with a
deadly weapon and was sentenced, in 2006, to fifteen years in prison. See La. R.S.
7 La. R.S. 14:95.1 provides, in pertinent part:
A. (1) It is unlawful for any person who has been convicted of, or has been found
not guilty by reason of insanity for, a crime of violence as defined in R.S. 14:2(B)
which is a felony or simple burglary, burglary of an inhabited dwelling,
unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling, felony illegal use of weapons or
dangerous instrumentalities, manufacture or possession of a delayed action
incendiary device, manufacture or possession of a bomb, or possession of a
firearm while in the possession of or during the sale or distribution of a controlled
dangerous substance, or any violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous
Substances Law which is a felony, or any crime which is defined as a sex offense
in R.S. 15:541, or any crime defined as an attempt to commit one of the above-
enumerated offenses under the laws of this state, or who has been convicted under
the laws of any other state or of the United States or of any foreign government or
country of a crime which, if committed in this state, would be one of the above-
enumerated crimes, to possess a firearm or carry a concealed weapon. (internal
footnote omitted).
* * *
C. The provisions of this Section prohibiting the possession of firearms and
carrying concealed weapons by persons who have been convicted of, or who have
been found not guilty by reason of insanity for, certain felonies shall not apply to
any person who has not been convicted of, or who has not been found not guilty
by reason of insanity for, any felony for a period of ten years from the date of
completion of sentence, probation, parole, suspension of sentence, or discharge
from a mental institution by a court of competent jurisdiction.
16
14:95.1(C). The jury in the present matter viewed the evidence and determined
that the evidence proved Mr. Bowie possessed a firearm. Given the videos
presented, a rational juror could have found that Mr. Bowie was convicted in 2006
of aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon and that he possessed a firearm during
and after the Mr. James’ homicide. Accordingly, we find the State presented
sufficient evidence as required to sustain the conviction for possession of a firearm
by a felon.
Obstruction of Justice
Mr. Bowie contends the State failed “to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that [he] intentionally altered, moved, or removed evidence from a location he had
reason to know would be the subject of investigation, with the specific intent of
distorting the results of any criminal investigation.” We agree.
Obstruction of justice is defined in La. R.S. 14:130.1, in pertinent part, as
follows:
A. The crime of obstruction of justice is any of the following when
committed with the knowledge that such act has, reasonably may,
or will affect an actual or potential present, past, or future criminal
proceeding as described in this Section:
(1) Tampering with evidence with the specific intent of distorting the
results of any criminal investigation or proceeding which may
reasonably prove relevant to a criminal investigation or
proceeding. Tampering with evidence shall include the intentional
alteration, movement, removal, or addition of any object or
substance either:
(a) At the location of any incident which the perpetrator knows or
has good reason to believe will be the subject of any
investigation by state, local, or United State law enforcement
officers.
“[T]he knowledge requirement in La. R.S. 14:130.1(A) is met if the perpetrator
merely knows that an act ‘reasonably may’ affect a ‘potential’ or ‘future’ criminal
17
proceeding.” State v. Powell, 2015-0218, p. 11 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/28/15), 179
So.3d 721, 728. See also State v. Jones, 2007-1052, p. 9 (La. 6/3/08), 983 So.2d
95, 101. “The defendant must also have tampered with evidence ‘with the specific
intent of distorting the results’ of a criminal investigation.” Powell, 2015-0218, p.
11, 179 So.3d at 728 (quoting La. R.S. 14:130.1(A)(1)). However, “[n]othing
beyond ‘movement’ of the evidence is required by the statute if accompanied by
the requisite intent and knowledge.” Id. (citing Jones, 2007-1052, p. 10, 983
So.2d at 101).
In State v. White, 2024-0385, p. 12 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/14/25), ___ So. 3d
___, ___, 2025 WL 1415587, at *23, this Court stated:
“ʽSpecific intent’ is the state of mind that exists when
circumstances indicate the offender actively desired prescribed
criminal consequences to follow his act.” State v. Scott, 2023-0022, p.
15 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/30/23), 372 So.3d 42, 54, writ denied, 2023-
01317 (La. 3/19/24), 381 So.3d 707, and writ denied, 2023-01318 (La.
3/19/24), 381 So.3d 707 (quoting La. R.S. 14:10(1)). Further,
“ʽ[s]pecific intent [to commit obstruction of justice] need not be
proven as fact but may be inferred from the circumstances of the
transaction and the actions of defendant.’” Id. (quoting State v.
Harvey, 2021-0730, p. 10 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/25/22), 345 So.3d
1043, 1050.
* * *
However, more than the mere removal of evidence from a
crime scene is required to support a conviction for obstruction of
justice; “the State must also prove that such removal was done with
‘the specific intent of distorting the results of any criminal
investigation or proceeding that may reasonably prove relevant to a
criminal investigation or proceeding.’” Scott, 2023-0022, p. 15, 372
So.3d at 54. While specific intent may be inferred from a defendant’s
actions, this Court has held that the act of removing a firearm from a
crime scene, without more, is insufficient “to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that [the defendant] possessed the specific intent to
distort the police investigation.” Id., 2023-0022, p. 16, 372 So.3d at
55.
In Scott, 2023-0022, p. 16, 372 So.3d at 55, the record reflected
that the video evidence depicted “[the defendant] fleeing the scene,
yet there is no footage of Defendant leaving the rifle at the scene.”
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This Court stated there was no corroborating evidence that defendant
intended to distort an investigation, opining:
The hypothesis that Defendant had the specific intent to
distort the results of the police investigation when he left the
crime scene is contradicted by the fact that he left behind shell
casings (instead of collecting the shell casings ejected from his
rifle), video surveillance (instead of destroying the video
surveillance that documented his presence in the neighborhood
shooting at the SUV), and witnesses (instead of harming the
witnesses that were outside on the street at the time of the
shooting incident). From this evidence, a rational juror could
have inferred that, in taking the firearm with him, Defendant
gave no thought to interfering with the results of a criminal
investigation or proceeding.
Id., 2023-0022, pp. 16-17, 372 So.3d at 55. As such, this Court
vacated defendant’s conviction for obstruction of justice. Id., 2023-
0022, p. 17, 372 So.3d at 55.
After Scott, this Court re-examined the issue in State v.
Alexander, 2023-0540, p. 17 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/23/24), 401 So.3d 105,
115-16, writ denied, 2024-00665 (La. 12/11/24), 396 So.3d 968,
wherein the defendant deleted the record of a single phone call from
his phone, in addition to removing the murder weapon from the scene,
which would have revealed that he called a taxi cab “requesting to be
transported to the area [of the crime scene shortly before] the murder
occurred.” This Court found that the totality of defendant’s actions
indicated his specific intent to destroy evidence of his presence at the
crime scene, notwithstanding his admission to detectives that he called
the taxi during subsequent questioning. Id., 2023-0540, pp. 17-18, 401
So.3d at 116.
Applying these precepts, in White, this Court found the State failed to
establish that the defendant intended to obstruct justice. 2024-0385, p. 13, ___
So.3d at ___, 2025 WL 1415587, at*25. In White, the defendant “left numerous
witnesses at the scene unharmed, he did not attempt to obscure cameras, and he did
not attempt to collect any projectiles.” Id. Based on these circumstances this
Court opined “this case does not reflect any additional action by [defendant] to
impede or distort the investigation aside from his apparent removal of the firearm
he brandished from the scene of the shooting.” Id.
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As in White, Mr. Bowie made no attempts to obscure cameras, collect
projectiles, or harm witnesses. Other than allegedly absconding with the murder
weapon, the State failed to show Mr. Bowie intended to “impede or distort” the
investigation. Accordingly, we find the State’s evidence of Mr. Bowie’s intent
lacking. Therefore, we vacate Mr. Bowie’s conviction and sentence for
obstruction of justice.
DECREE
For the above-mentioned reasons, we remand Mr. Bowie’s sentence for
being a felon in possession of a firearm for the imposition of the mandatory fine.
We vacate Mr. Bowie’s conviction for obstruction of justice. In all other respects,
Mr. Bowie’s convictions and sentences are affirmed.
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART; REMANDED IN PART
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