John Doe v. Jonathan McKernan

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 10, 2024 Decided July 1, 2025

No. 24-5049

JOHN DOE,

APPELLANT

v.

TRAVIS HILL, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ACTING

CHAIRMAN OF THE FDIC AND FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE

CORPORATION,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:24-cv-00488)

Alexandra Lichtenstein argued the cause for appellant.

With her on the briefs were Joanna K. Wasik, Kelsi Brown

Corkran, and Joseph W. Mead.

Sue Huhta was on the brief for amici curiae Community

Legal Services of Philadelphia, et al. in support of appellant.

Jane M. Lyons, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee. With her on the brief were Matthew M. Graves,

U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and Brian P.

Hudak, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

2

Before: MILLETT and RAO, Circuit Judges, and ROGERS,

Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge MILLETT.

MILLETT, Circuit Judge: This is an interlocutory appeal

from the district court’s denial of John Doe’s motion to proceed

in his lawsuit under a pseudonym. Dr. Doe challenges the

constitutionality of the Federal Deposit Insurance

Corporation’s ban on hiring those who have been convicted of

a felony. He moved to proceed under a pseudonym to avoid

reassociating himself with his sealed Ohio felony convictions.

The district court denied Dr. Doe’s motion.

We affirm. Because federal court proceedings are

presumptively open and transparent, proceeding under a

pseudonym is rarely granted. Although Dr. Doe has a

legitimate privacy interest in his sealed felony convictions, that

interest is insufficient in this case to overcome the strong

presumption against pseudonymous litigation.

I

A

The Banking Act of 1933 created the Federal Deposit

Insurance Corporation to “provide for the safer and more

effective use of the assets of banks[.]” Pub. L. 73-66, 48 Stat.

162 (1933). The FDIC maintains the stability of the nation’s

financial system by insuring deposits valued in the trillions of

dollars.

By law, those who have “been convicted of any felony”

are barred from working for the FDIC. 12 U.S.C.

3

§ 1822(f)(4)(E)(i); 12 C.F.R. § 336.4(a)(1). Congress

originally passed that prohibition to regulate hiring by the

Resolution Trust Corporation, an independent agency created

by Congress in response to the savings and loan crisis in the

late 1980s. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and

Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 501, 103 Stat.

183, 392-393. When Congress transferred the Resolution

Trust Corporation’s responsibilities to the FDIC in 1993, the

statutory bar on hiring convicted felons carried over as well.

Resolution Trust Corporation Completion Act, Pub. L. No.

103-204, § 19, 107 Stat. 2369, 2404 (1993).

B

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure create a presumption

against pseudonymous litigation. Civil complaints filed in

federal court must “name all the parties[,]” FED. R. CIV. P.

10(a), and the suit must be prosecuted in “the name of the real

party in interest,” id. 17(a)(1).

This presumption is grounded in “the ‘customary and

constitutionally-embedded presumption of openness in judicial

proceedings.’” United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d

1448, 1464 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d

180, 186 (5th Cir. 1981)). We generally require “parties to a

lawsuit [to] openly identify themselves * * * to protect[] the

public’s legitimate interest in knowing all of the facts involved,

including the identities of the parties.” In re Sealed Case, 971

F.3d 324, 326 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (“Sealed Case II”) (quoting

Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1463) (formatting modified).

Requiring parties to litigate under their real names serves

important values. Accurate party names allow citizens to

evaluate the nature of the claims raised and the interests at

stake, to assess “the real-world aftermath of a suit,” and to

4

determine for themselves whether “justice was done.” Doe v.

Massachusetts Inst. of Tech., 46 F.4th 61, 68 (1st Cir. 2022).

Knowing the identity of parties also makes it easier for citizens

to investigate abuses of the judicial process like judicial

conflicts of interest and ex parte contacts, and it promotes the

appearance of fairness. Id. at 68-69. “Secrecy breeds

suspicion[,]” and so “[s]ome may believe that a party’s name

was masked as a means of suppressing inconvenient facts and

that the court was either asleep at the wheel or complicit in the

cover up.” Id. at 69.

Nonetheless, federal courts may grant “the rare

dispensation of pseudonymous status” when warranted to fairly

provide justice in a particular case. See Sealed Case II, 971

F.3d at 328. Exercise of that discretion is guided by a five-

factor balancing test that considers (1) the strength and

sensitivity of the privacy interests at stake, (2) the risk of

retaliation against a named plaintiff, (3) the sensitivity of the

party’s age, (4) the identity of the opposing party, and (5) the

risk of unfairness to the opposing party. In re Sealed Case,

931 F.3d 92, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“Sealed Case I”).

Those five factors are “non-exhaustive,” and the court’s

“flexible and fact driven” inquiry ultimately depends on the

totality of the circumstances of the case before it. Sealed Case

II, 971 F.3d at 326. Together, the five factors and any other

relevant considerations gauge the competing public and private

interests at stake in the litigation and guide the court’s

determination of whether the presumption against

pseudonymity has been overcome.

The moving party bears the burden of showing that the

interest in proceeding under a pseudonym outweighs the

“countervailing interests in full disclosure.” Sealed Case II,

971 F.3d at 326 (quoting Sealed Case I, 931 F.3d at 96). In

5

this circuit, requests to proceed under a pseudonym in the

district court are referred to the Chief Judge of the United States

District Court for the District of Columbia. D.D.C. Local Civ.

R. 40.7(f).

C

Dr. Doe was convicted of two Ohio felonies when he was

a young man in the early 1990s. Since then, Dr. Doe has lived

a law-abiding life, obtained a PhD, and become a federal public

servant with a security clearance. In 2009, he applied for and

received a pardon from the Ohio governor, and his felony

convictions were sealed by an Ohio court.

Under Ohio law, a governor’s pardon provides one basis

for an individual to seek sealing of his or her criminal

conviction. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.33(A)(3) (West

2025). When a criminal conviction is sealed, the conviction

generally “shall be considered not to have occurred[,]” and the

public record of the conviction is made inaccessible to the

public. Id. § 2953.32(D)(2)(b) (West 2025). Nonetheless, at

the time giving rise to the events of this case, Ohio law allowed

employers to ask about sealed felony convictions when the

“question bears a direct and substantial relationship to the

position for which the person is being considered.” Id.

§ 2953.33(B)(1) (West 2022). Individuals with a sealed

felony conviction did not have a right under state law to answer

as if the conviction had not occurred. 1

1

Ohio law now forbids employers from asking questions about

sealed felony convictions, and anyone with a sealed conviction may

answer as if the conviction never occurred. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

§ 2953.34(L)(1) (West 2025). There are, however, limited

exceptions for sensitive government positions like law enforcement.

See id. § 2953.34(A)(6) (West 2025).

6

In 2022, Dr. Doe applied to work at the FDIC. After

running a background check on Dr. Doe, the FDIC requested

information about his criminal record, and Dr. Doe informed

the FDIC about his sealed Ohio felony convictions. The FDIC

then denied his application because of the statutory bar against

hiring anyone who “has been convicted of any felony[.]” 12

U.S.C. § 1822(f)(4)(E)(i).

Dr. Doe then sued the FDIC, challenging the

constitutionality of the bar on hiring felons. Dr. Doe alleges

violations of his constitutional rights to equal protection,

substantive due process, and procedural due process under the

Fifth Amendment. U.S. CONST. Amend. V. He also alleges

a violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C.

§ 1681b(b)(3).

Simultaneously with filing his complaint, Dr. Doe moved

to proceed under a pseudonym. The district court denied Dr.

Doe’s motion. Doe v. McKernan, No. 24-CV-488, 2024 WL

1143932, at *3 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2024). The court credited Dr.

Doe’s arguments that he would experience psychological harm

if he were publicly reassociated with his felony convictions and

that his suit poses no risk of unfairness to the government

because it already knew or could easily learn his identity. Id.

at *2-3. The court thus held that factors two and five of the

Sealed Case I framework favored pseudonymity. Id. At the

same time, the district court concluded that a privacy interest

in a felony conviction is not akin to the traditional privacy

interests that warrant pseudonymity, and that Dr. Doe’s suit

against the federal government favors transparency, so that

factors one and four weighed against pseudonymity. Id. Dr.

Doe conceded that factor three does not favor pseudonymity

because Dr. Doe is not a minor. Id. at *3. After balancing all

of the factors, the district court concluded that Dr. Doe must

proceed under his real name. Id. This appeal followed.

7

II

The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Our jurisdiction arises pursuant to the collateral order doctrine.

Sealed Case I, 931 F.3d at 95.

We review “de novo the criteria used by a district court to

decide whether to grant a motion to proceed anonymously,”

and we review the “application of those criteria” to the facts of

a particular case for an abuse of discretion. Sealed Case I, 931

F.3d at 96. Neither party argues that the district court erred in

its choice of legal criteria or that other factors should have been

considered, so our review is limited to whether the district

court’s application of the criteria in this case was an abuse of

discretion. An error of law is “‘by definition’ an abuse of

discretion[.]” Jeffries v. Barr, 965 F.3d 843, 855 (D.C. Cir.

2020) (quoting Koch v. Cox, 489 F.3d 384, 388 (D.C. Cir.

2007)).

III

The district court did not commit legal error when

applying the Sealed Case I factors, and the court’s balancing of

the relevant considerations in this case was well within its

discretion. All agree that the third factor—age of the parties—

does not support pseudonymity, McKernan, 2024 WL

1143932, at *3, and we assume without deciding that the

district court appropriately concluded that the second (risk of

retaliatory physical or mental harm) and fifth (prejudice to the

opposing party) factors weighed in favor of anonymity. So

this case comes down to the court’s application of the first

(preserving privacy) and fourth (parties involved) factors.

Because the district court reasonably concluded that those

8

factors disfavor pseudonymity and outweigh the other factors,

we affirm.

A

The first factor concerns “whether the justification

asserted by the requesting party is merely to avoid the

annoyance and criticism that may attend any litigation or is to

preserve privacy in a matter of [a] sensitive and highly personal

nature[.]” Sealed Case I, 931 F.3d at 97 (citation omitted).

The district court appropriately exercised its discretion in

concluding that Dr. Doe’s felony convictions do not qualify as

“matter[s] of [a] sensitive and highly personal nature.” Id.

In judicial proceedings, the starting presumption is of

openness and public identification of the parties. Sealed Case

II, 971 F.3d at 325; Sealed Case I, 931 F.3d at 96. Dr. Doe’s

privacy interest does not weigh against that presumption for

three reasons.

First, a privacy interest rests “in part on the degree of

dissemination of the allegedly private fact[.]” Reporters

Comm., 489 U.S. at 763. A felony conviction is not

“practical[ly] obscur[e]” because felony trials and convictions

are matters of public record conducted in open court

proceedings. ACLU v. Department of Justice, 655 F.3d 1, 9

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Department of Justice v. Reporters

Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 762 (1989)). As

a result, “[i]f someone wants to know whether his neighbor or

potential employee has been indicted for, convicted of, or pled

guilty to a[n] * * * offense, he may well find out by simply

entering a Google search for that person’s name.” ACLU, 655

F.3d at 10. Even convictions that occurred before the internet

era may be easily discoverable as newspapers upload their

9

archives. This accessibility reduces the weight of a privacy

interest in a felony conviction for purposes of pseudonymity.

Dr. Doe argues that, even if felony records are usually

public, his efforts to keep his records secret should matter. Dr.

Doe has paid for monitoring services and has requested his

Identity History Summary from the FBI.

Yet the types of privacy interests for which pseudonymous

proceedings have commonly been permitted have not turned on

individualized efforts to suppress otherwise publicly accessible

information. Instead, courts consider whether the information

is of a kind that, by its very nature, is likely to be withheld from

and inaccessible to others. The privacy interests that

traditionally warrant pseudonymity—“intimate issues such as

sexual activities, reproductive rights, bodily autonomy,

medical concerns, or the identity of abused minors[,]” Sealed

Case II, 971 F.3d at 327—concern very sensitive information

that the public has recognized as insulated from public scrutiny

through legal norms and custom.

Felony convictions are not in that category as they have

long been a legitimate matter of inquiry for public employment

and other positions of trust. The law has historically allowed

the government to place such positions off limits for those who

have “violated the criminal laws[.]” Hawker v. People of New

York, 170 U.S. 189, 191 (1898); see NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S.

134, 152 (2011) (“Like any employer, the Government is

entitled to have its projects staffed by reliable, law-abiding

persons[.]”)

While individual resources and efforts can help make

private information less accessible, such efforts do not require

the court to give more weight to the asserted privacy interest.

Nor does the absence of such expenditures diminish the

10

inherently private character of an interest. After all, it would

not be fair to the public or to other parties for the court to treat

resources expended as a relevant measure of the intensity of

someone’s privacy interest in information.

Second, the Ohio court’s sealing of the record of Dr. Doe’s

convictions does not materially alter the privacy balance in this

case. To be sure, sealed cases “raise[] greater privacy

concerns than the disclosure of information regarding public

convictions[.]” ACLU, 655 F.3d at 17.

But not so here. Dr. Doe’s sealing was based on an

executive pardon. Applications for an executive pardon in

Ohio are submitted to the Ohio parole board which must

conduct and publish “a thorough investigation into the

propriety of granting a pardon[.]” OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

§ 2967.07 (West 2025); Reports, OHIO DEP’T OF REHAB. &

CORR., https://drc.ohio.gov/about/resource/reports/1-reports?

keyword=clemency (last visited May 23, 2025).

The Ohio Constitution also mandates that all granted

pardons be publicly reported to the Ohio legislature. OHIO

CONST. ART. III, § 11 (“The Governor shall communicate to the

general assembly, at every regular session, each * * * pardon

granted, stating the name and crime of the convict, the

sentence, its date, and the date of the * * * pardon[.]”).

This means that, in addition to the public court proceeding

underlying the convictions, the very process that enabled Dr.

Doe to seal his records resulted in at least two more public

processes and records publicly disclosing his felony

convictions—one from the parole board and one from the

Governor.

11

To be sure, these records may later have been sealed along

with the underlying court records. But while Dr. Doe was

seeking a court order sealing all records associated with his

conviction, these new records were publicly available. At that

time, information about Dr. Doe’s convictions could have been

accessed, preserved, or publicized by any member of the

public. That, in fact, may have occurred in this case because

the FDIC discovered Dr. Doe’s criminal convictions using a

“commercial investigative service.” App. 11.

Third, Dr. Doe relies upon cases brought under the

Freedom of Information Act that concern whether the

government must disclose to FOIA requesters private

information about other persons. See Reporters Comm., 489

U.S. at 757; ACLU, 655 F.3d at 3-4. While FOIA cases help

to elucidate Dr. Doe’s privacy interest in his sealed criminal

record, FOIA’s relevance largely stops there.

Specifically, FOIA’s statutory balancing of privacy and

public interests is not the same as the historic presumption in

favor of open and transparent judicial proceedings. See

Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564-569

(1980) (tracing the presumption of open judicial proceedings

back to the Middle Ages). After all, FOIA vindicates the

public interest in understanding only the operations and

activities of the Executive Branch, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii),

and does so within the caveated and qualified disclosure

requirements of the statute, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) & (c).

In addition, while FOIA’s purpose is to open Executive

Branch operations to public view, that is a qualified and

caveated goal. FOIA carefully balances the private and public

interests implicated in a records request because disclosure is

“not always in the public interest,” CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159,

167 (1985), when “private interests [can] be harmed,” FBI v.

12

Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 621 (1982). In fact, FOIA permits

the government to withhold personnel files and other records

of private information if disclosure “would” or “could” result

in an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(b)(6) & (7)(C). To overcome FOIA’s privacy

exception for law enforcement records, a FOIA requester

generally must identify specific “misfeasance” by the

executive branch and provide “credibl[e]” evidence of it.

National Archives & Records Administration v. Favish, 541

U.S. 157, 173 (2004); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(2)

(prohibiting agencies from disclosing information about

private citizens when a FOIA exemption applies).

As a result of FOIA’s numerous exceptions to disclosure

and privacy protections, the withholding of information from

public view, in whole or in part, is common under FOIA. See

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 2024 ANNUAL FOIA REPORT

SUMMARY 9 (2025) (reporting that only 22.84% of requests led

to records released in full).

By contrast, exceptions to openness in judicial

proceedings are “rare.” Sealed Case II, 971 F.3d at 328. Of

course, FOIA and its protections against the disclosure of

private citizens’ information do not apply to the Judicial

Branch at all. 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(1). Instead, judicial

proceedings traditionally start with a presumption of openness,

transparency, and full disclosure of party filings and, unlike

FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) & (c), there is no long list of

exceptions. The public’s historic and presumptive right to

monitor whether federal courts are doing justice between

parties, and how parties are using the courts to vindicate their

own interests, have led courts to enforce across-the-board rules

of disclosure concerning the parties’ filings, including the

parties’ identities and facts about them that are salient to the

resolution of their case. Only limited exceptions are allowed.

13

As a result, at both the starting and ending points, the judicial

rules of public transparency and disclosure are far less yielding

than the qualified disclosure scheme Congress created with

FOIA.

In sum, although Dr. Doe has some legitimate privacy

interest in his thirty-two-year-old felony convictions, and their

sealed status somewhat increases the weight of that interest, he

has not shown that his interest in confidentiality qualifies as the

type of compelling, sensitive, and highly personal privacy

interest that would tilt the first factor in his favor. 2

B

Dr. Doe also objects to the district court’s assessment of

the fourth factor, which Sealed Case I described as “whether

the action is against a governmental or private party[.]”

Sealed Case I, 931 F.3d at 97 (citation omitted). According to

Dr. Doe, the district court turned factor four into a catch-22 by

using a test that weighs factor four against pseudonymity both

when the suit is against a private party and when it is against

the government. Relying on the Fifth Circuit’s decision in

Southern Methodist University Association of Women Law

Students v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1979), Dr.

Doe argues that factor four is concerned exclusively with

reciprocal risk to reputation. In Wynne & Jaffe, the Fifth

2

In reaching our conclusion, we need not (and so do not) decide

that information in sealed criminal records is always insufficient for

factor one to favor pseudonymity. For example, substantially

different considerations could be at play if a record were sealed

because of exoneration. The Supreme Court has indicated that there

is a very strong privacy interest in criminal records where the

individual’s association with the record is due to “mere

happenstance.” Favish, 541 U.S. at 166.

14

Circuit held that when a private party sues another private

party, it is unfair for one private party to have its reputation put

at risk by having its name in the case caption while the other

private party escapes reputational risk by proceeding under a

pseudonym. 599 F.2d at 713. That concern does not apply

when the government is a party, the court reasoned, because

the government’s reputation is unaffected by litigation. Id.

In other words, according to Dr. Doe, factor four should always

weigh in favor of pseudonymity when the other side is the

government. Because the district court here held that factor

four considers the public interest in the litigation and therefore

disfavors pseudonymity in this lawsuit against the government,

Dr. Doe says that approach makes the factor always weigh

against appearing under a pseudonym.

The catch-22 that Dr. Doe perceives is a product of his own

misunderstanding of factor four’s role. That consideration

looks to the identity of the opposing party as a tool for

measuring the public interest in transparent litigation.

Reputational harm can be one relevant public interest because

a lack of reputational reciprocity can create unfairness in

litigation strategies, risks, and tactics.

But that is not the only relevant concern. The nature of

the claim raised against a party can also affect the extent of the

public interest in transparent litigation. See generally Sealed

Case II, 971 F.3d at 329. For example, constitutional claims

can only be pressed against a government or a close

governmental affiliate, and yet they have much more far-

reaching consequences for the public interest than most private

litigation. On the other hand, class actions or private antitrust

actions seeking broad or structural relief against private

businesses could trigger a more significant interest in

transparency than one person’s claim for an individual

monetary payment from the government.

15

In other words, factor four is not a binary factor that always

tips one way or the other based on the identity of the non-

moving party. Rather, depending on the nature of the claims

raised and relief sought, the identity of a party can materially

change the public interest in open and evenhandedly

transparent litigation.

The particular claims pressed by Dr. Doe against the

government are at the apex of public interest in litigation in two

respects.

First, Dr. Doe asks this court to invalidate as facially

unconstitutional a provision of federal law—the statutory

provision prohibiting the FDIC from hiring persons with felony

records, 12 U.S.C. § 1822(f)(4)(E)(i). Declaring

unconstitutional a statutory provision duly enacted by both

Houses of Congress and signed into law by the President is the

“gravest” ruling a court can issue. United States v. Nassif, 97

F.4th 968, 974 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 552 (2024)

(quoting Hodge v. Talkin, 799 F.3d 1145, 1157 (D.C. Cir.

2015)). That is because such facial challenges invalidate laws

across the board no matter to whom they are applied.

Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican

Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008). In so doing, facial

challenges “threaten to short circuit the democratic process by

preventing laws embodying the will of the people from being

implemented in a manner consistent with the Constitution.”

Id. at 451. Given the far-reaching consequences of the relief

Dr. Doe seeks, the public interest in understanding the genesis

and generator of the litigation is great.

Second, Dr. Doe also brings an as-applied constitutional

challenge arguing that, at a minimum, the law is

unconstitutional as applied to the facts of his case. See

16

Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167 (2007) (explaining that

as-applied challenges consider the specific context of the

plaintiff’s claim). The very nature of such a claim, however,

turns upon individualized factors and information about Dr.

Doe’s circumstances and relevant characteristics. And that

could well include Dr. Doe’s identity in a case like this that

seeks to invalidate a law because it seeks information about the

individual. In other words, information about the plaintiff’s

identity and his trustworthiness notwithstanding his felony

convictions sits at the heart of Dr. Doe’s as-applied

constitutional challenge.

Critically, the statutory provision that Dr. Doe seeks to

invalidate is one that protects the operation and integrity of the

Nation’s financial system by barring those convicted of a

felony from working at the FDIC. 12 U.S.C.

§ 1822(f)(4)(E)(i). A past conviction for violating the very

laws that the FDIC enforces, for example, could present a very

different as-applied constitutional question from a past

conviction for a non-financial felony, like removing

paleontological resources from federal land, 16 U.S.C.

§ 470aaa-5(a)(1), or transporting a lottery ticket across state

lines, 18 U.S.C. § 1301. Even assuming (without deciding)

that Congress could not proscribe hiring felons based on some

circumstances, Congress might still appropriately forbid

wolves from guarding the henhouse by banning those

convicted of financial felonies from working at the FDIC. Cf.

FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 241 (1988) (holding there is a

“significant” public interest in suspending “indicted bank

officers”). Tellingly, even under the law governing Ohio’s

sealing of Dr. Doe’s conviction record at the time he applied to

the FDIC, Ohio employers could still consider his criminal

record if it bore “a direct and substantial relationship to the

position for which” he applied. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

§ 2953.33(B)(1) (West 2022); see generally Nelson, 562 U.S.

17

at 152 (government may consider criminal history when

making employment decisions); Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S.

924, 932 (1997) (holding there is a “significant interest in

immediately suspending” an official “when felony charges are

filed against them”).

These considerations create a substantial public interest

not only in the case, but also in the identity of the proponent of

an as-applied claim and the circumstances surrounding his

felony conduct. Those are the same factors that will provide

the decisional basis for the court’s constitutional ruling, and

shielding those critical factors from public view will reduce

transparency in a case of public consequence and will make it

more difficult for the public to understand and to trust the

court’s ruling.

Dr. Doe argues that applying factor four in this way will

chill litigants from suing the government for constitutional

violations. That argument overlooks the peculiar nature of Dr.

Doe’s constitutional challenge to a law about employees’

trustworthiness. The argument also forgets that the fourth

factor is just one of five non-exclusive considerations for courts

to weigh in deciding whether pseudonymity is warranted. See

Sealed Case I, 931 F.3d at 97; Sealed Case II, 971 F.3d at 326-

327. The problem for Dr. Doe is that so few of those factors

favor pseudonymity in his case—including the diminished

nature of his privacy interest—and he has not identified other

relevant factors the district court should have, but did not,

include in its analysis.

Dr. Doe’s argument also fails to accord any meaningful

weight to the public interest and its presumptive right to

transparent judicial proceedings in cases of far-reaching public

consequence. A byproduct of government transparency is that

those who seek to alter public law by using the federal courts

18

must, in all but truly exceptional cases, reveal their identity so

that the public can understand the issues before the court, the

consequences of the court’s ruling, and the manner in which

the court reached its decision. After all, secrecy in court

proceedings was one of the evils of concern at the Founding.

See Federal Farmer, Letter XV (Jan. 18, 1788), reprinted in 2

THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 320 (Herbert Storing ed.

1981) (decrying “secret and arbitrary proceedings” and

extolling public trials as “the means by which the people are let

into the knowledge of public affairs—are enabled to stand as

the guardians of each others’ rights, and to restrain, by regular

and legal measures, those who otherwise might infringe upon

them”).

*****

In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion in

weighing the relevant factors and then denying Dr. Doe’s

motion to proceed under a pseudonym. Although the

government challenges the district court’s analysis of factor

two (risk of harm), this court need not address that argument

given our denial of Dr. Doe’s appeal.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district

court denying Dr. Doe’s motion to proceed under a pseudonym

is affirmed.

So ordered.