Weller v. NYU Langone Health System

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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ALEXANDER WELLER,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER

23-CV-8056 (EK)(RML)

-against-

NYU LANGONE HEALTH SYSTEM, et al.,

Defendants.

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ERIC KOMITEE, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Alexander Weller worked as a physician in

the NYU Langone Health System (“NYU Langone”). Dr. Weller

alleges that he was fired in retaliation for having reported a

violation of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor

Act (“EMTALA”). His belief that NYU Langone violated EMTALA,

however, was incorrect. The statute regulates a hospital’s

right to “transfer” an individual who presents with an

unstabilized emergency condition, as well as a receiving

hospital’s right to decline such a transfer. But a transfer,

within the meaning of EMTALA, occurs when an individual is moved

“outside a hospital’s facilities” — and not, as was contemplated

here, from one NYU Langone facility to another operated by that

same hospital.

Because Dr. Weller has not plausibly pled an actual

EMTALA violation, and because EMTALA’s whistleblower protections

do not extend to those who report what they reasonably, but

inaccurately, believe to constitute a violation, his complaint

must be dismissed.

Background

The following facts are drawn from the third amended

complaint and are presumed true for purposes of this action.

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). Dr.

Weller began working as a part-time hospitalist physician at NYU

Langone Brooklyn Hospital (“NYU Brooklyn”) in January 2023.1

Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) ¶ 16, ECF No. 33. Dr. Weller

worked four to eight shifts per month. Id. ¶ 19. His

responsibilities included admitting, caring for, and discharging

adult medical patients. Id.

In July of 2023, NYU Brooklyn’s Medical Care Director

circulated a new policy regarding patient admissions from the

emergency department. Id. ¶ 32. Thereafter, Dr. Weller

complained to Dr. Kevin Eaton — chairperson of the Department of

Medicine at NYU Brooklyn, and a defendant here — that the policy

was “hazardous and imprudent.” Id. ¶¶ 9, 33. One day that

summer, Dr. Weller assessed an elderly patient who was suffering

1 Though not defined in the complaint, a hospitalist is a physician “who

specializes in providing and managing the care and treatment of hospitalized

patients.” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/hospitalist (last accessed June 23, 2025); accord

Ofoche v. Apogee Med. Grp., Virginia, P.C., 815 F. App’x 690, 691 n.1 (4th

Cir. 2020).

from complications of blood cancer. Id. ¶ 35. That patient had

presented to the emergency department at NYU Brooklyn after a

fall, and was admitted to a general medicine ward. Id. After

inheriting the patient from another hospitalist, Dr. Weller

reviewed the patient’s medical record. Id. ¶ 36. Dr. Weller

expressed concerns to another physician that the patient’s care

“deviated from” national standards for patients with blood

cancer. Id.

After “fruitless” discussions with this physician, Dr.

Weller reached out to the NYU Langone transfer center. Id.

¶¶ 37-38. An oncologist at NYU Langone Tisch (“NYU Tisch”) in

Manhattan accepted the transfer. Id. ¶ 38. In the subsequent

hours, however, Dr. Eaton and administrators at NYU Langone

canceled the transfer. Id. ¶ 39. The patient remained at NYU

Brooklyn. Id. Dr. Weller alleges that the patient’s condition

deteriorated thereafter, id. ¶ 42, though his allegations

concerning the patient’s subsequent demise have shifted

meaningfully over time.2

2 Dr. Weller initially pled that the patient was not transferred and

“died shortly thereafter.” First Am. Compl. ¶ 42, ECF No. 14. His counsel

reiterated this assertion at oral argument. Transcript of Proceedings on

Dec. 20, 2024 (“Oral Argument Transcript”) 33:19-34:11, ECF No. 22 (“What

happened, Your Honor, is that it was the order, the request for transfer was

cancelled and the patient died . . . [w]ithin days.”). Dr. Weller then

amended his complaint to allege more facts related to the patient’s treatment

and explained that after denial of the transfer, the patient died “a few days

later (less than five days).” Second Am. Compl. ¶ 42, ECF No. 23.

In response, defendants filed a letter explaining that the patient was

released from the hospital alive, twenty-one days after admission and fifteen

On July 14, Dr. Weller informed Dr. Eaton that he

believed the cancellation violated EMTALA. Id. ¶ 43. He then

sent Dr. Eaton the statute as well as a judicial opinion on

EMTALA. Id. Dr. Eaton responded, explaining that Dr. Weller

had failed to follow the hospital’s transfer process because he

had not obtained certain approvals. Id. ¶ 44. On July 21, Dr.

Weller met with Dr. Joseph Weisstuch — the Chief Medical Officer

at NYU Brooklyn — and another physician, and again complained

that NYU Langone had violated EMTALA. Id. ¶¶ 11, 46. The next

day, Dr. Weller made a complaint to the Centers for Medicare and

Medicaid services, copying New York state officials, alleging

that NYU Langone had violated EMTALA. Id. ¶ 48. On August 9,

Dr. Weller informed Dr. Weisstuch of this complaint. Id. ¶ 50.

Two days later, Dr. Eaton terminated Dr. Weller’s employment.

Id. ¶ 52.

Dr. Weller now brings suit against NYU Langone, NYU

Langone Hospital Long Island, NYU Grossman School of Medicine

(which operates NYU Langone), New York University, and Drs.

Eaton and Weisstuch. He alleges a violation of EMTALA’s

days after the transfer request. Barry Ltr. 1-2, ECF No. 27. Defendants

indicated that they had shared medical records and the patient’s obituary

with Dr. Weller, indicating that she was alive at the time this action was

commenced — several months after the cancellation of the alleged transfer

request. Id. Soon thereafter, Dr. Weller filed another amended complaint

that simply alleged upon information and belief that “the patient was

discharged to hospice.” TAC ¶ 42. These allegations formed the basis of a

pending motion for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11. Mot. for Sanctions, ECF

No. 37.

whistleblower protection provision and also brings five New York

state law claims.

Defendants have moved to dismiss all claims.

Discussion

A. Legal Standard

To overcome a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a

complaint must plead facts sufficient “to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

570 (2007). The Court must accept all factual allegations in

the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the

plaintiff’s favor. See Lundy v. Cath. Health Sys. of Long

Island Inc., 711 F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir. 2013).3 The Court “must

confine its consideration to facts stated on the face of the

complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or

incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of

which judicial notice may be taken.” Leonard F. v. Isr. Disc.

Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1999).

B. Plaintiff Has Not Plausibly Pled an EMTALA Violation

1. EMTALA’s Requirements

Congress enacted EMTALA in 1986. EMTALA combats

“patient dumping, the practice of refusing to provide emergency

medical treatment to patients unable to pay, or transferring

3 Unless otherwise noted, when quoting judicial decisions this order

accepts all alterations and omits all citations, footnotes, and internal

quotation marks.

them before emergency conditions are stabilized.” Hardy v.

N.Y.C. Health & Hosp. Corp., 164 F.3d 789, 792 (2d Cir. 1999).

To this end, EMTALA imposes obligations on hospitals that

participate in Medicare and have emergency departments. First,

these hospitals must provide an “appropriate medical screening

examination . . . to determine whether or not an emergency

medical condition . . . exists.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a). Second,

hospitals generally must “stabilize” the emergency medical

condition before transferring the patient “outside [the]

hospital’s facilities.” See id. §§ 1395dd(b) and (c)

(discussing stabilization and restrictions on transfer); id.

§ 1395dd(e)(4) (defining transfer).

EMTALA also addresses “reverse dumping,” which is

perhaps more pertinent to Dr. Weller’s contentions. Reverse

dumping occurs when a hospital refuses to accept a transfer of a

patient requiring its “specialized capabilities.” Id.

§ 1395dd(g). The statute provides that a “participating

hospital” with such capabilities “shall not refuse to accept an

appropriate transfer of an individual who requires such

specialized capabilities or facilities if the hospital has the

capacity to treat the individual.” Id.; see St. Anthony Hosp.

v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 309 F.3d 680, 686 (10th

Cir. 2002).4

EMTALA provides patients a private right of action for

violations. In addition, the statute includes certain

whistleblower protections:

A participating hospital may not penalize or take

adverse action [1] against a qualified medical

person . . . or a physician because the person or

physician refuses to authorize the transfer of an

individual with an emergency medical condition that

has not been stabilized or [2] against any hospital

employee because the employee reports a violation of a

requirement of this section.

42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(i). Dr. Weller seeks protection under the

second clause. See TAC ¶ 61.5 The first clause is inapposite,

as Dr. Weller does not allege that he “refuse[d] to authorize”

any transfer.

2. Dr. Weller Has Not Alleged a Contemplated

Transfer

Dr. Weller contends that the decision to cancel the

patient’s transfer from NYU Brooklyn to NYU Tisch constituted a

refusal to accept a transfer by a hospital with specialized

capabilities and thus violated EMTALA. TAC ¶ 62. But Dr.

Weller has not plausibly alleged that NYU Brooklyn and NYU Tisch

are separate hospitals, as is necessary to establish that the

4 St. Anthony is the case that Dr. Weller sent to Dr. Eaton along with

the text of EMTALA after their meeting on July 14. See TAC ¶ 43.

5 Defendants do not contest that Dr. Weller is a “hospital employee,”

notwithstanding that his employment was part time and per diem. See TAC

¶ 16.

decision concerned a “transfer” under EMTALA. And the statute

does not cover movement within a hospital. Accordingly, Dr.

Weller has not plausibly alleged that he “report[ed] a

violation” of EMTALA.

EMTALA defines a “transfer” as:

[T]he movement (including the discharge) of an

individual outside a hospital’s facilities at the

direction of any person employed by (or affiliated or

associated, directly or indirectly, with) the

hospital, but does not include such a movement of an

individual who (A) has been declared dead, or (B)

leaves the facility without the permission of any such

person.

42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(4).

The key issue, then, is whether the proposed movement

of a patient from NYU Brooklyn to NYU Tisch was one “outside a

hospital’s facilities.” EMTALA does not separately define

“hospital.”6 However, “[a]s an amendment to the Social Security

Act, EMTALA incorporates the Act’s definition of a ‘hospital.’”

Rodriguez v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co. of Puerto Rico, 402 F.3d 45, 48

(1st Cir. 2005); accord Emergency Health Ctr. at Willowbrook,

L.L.C. v. UnitedHealthcare of Texas, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 2d 847,

852 (S.D. Tex. 2012). This is consistent with established rules

of statutory construction. “Courts presume that words and

provisions used in the original act were used in their same

6 EMTALA defines a “participating hospital” as a “hospital that has

entered into a [Medicare] provider agreement.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(2).

This does not, of course, state explicitly what a hospital is.

sense in an amendment.” 1A Sutherland Statutory Construction

§ 22:31 (8th ed.).7

The Medicare Act added the Social Security Act’s

original definition of “hospital” in 1965. Social Security

Amendments (Medicare Act) of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 1861(e),

79 Stat. 286, 314-315 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.

§ 1395x(e)). Under that provision, a “hospital” is an

“institution” that engages in specified medical services. 42

U.S.C. § 1395x(e). Other provisions in the Social Security Act

make it clear that a “hospital” can “encompass institutions with

multiple campuses and facilities.” Anna Jacques Hosp. v.

Burwell, 797 F.3d 1155, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Indeed, this

conclusion emerges directly from EMTALA’s definition of

“transfer,” which speaks to movement “outside a hospital’s

facilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(4). The use of the singular

possessive — “hospital’s” — to modify “facilities,” plural,

indicates that a single hospital can subsume multiple

facilities.

Additional support for this proposition appears

elsewhere in the Social Security Act. One provision refers to

7 Indeed, EMTALA broadened the Social Security Act’s definition of

“hospital” slightly, in a manner that confirms the applicability of that

definition. EMTALA established that the definition “includes a . . .

critical access hospital . . . and a rural emergency hospital.” Id.

§ 1395dd(e)(5) (emphasis added). Those two references — not relevant here

— extended EMTALA’s protection to certain hospitals excluded from the Social

Security Act’s definition of “hospital.” See id. §§ 1395x(mm)(1),

1395x(kkk)(2).

the number of beds “only in the facilities on the main campus of

the hospital.” Id. § 1395nn(h)(7)(B)(iv) (emphasis added); see

also id. § 1395nn(i)(3)(D) (“Any increase in the number of

operating rooms . . . may only occur in facilities on the main

campus of the applicable hospital.”) (emphasis added); id.

§ 1395g(e)(4) (“A hospital created by the merger or

consolidation of 2 or more hospitals or hospital campuses shall

be eligible to receive periodic interim payment . . . .”)

(emphasis added). Thus, a single hospital can subsume multiple

campuses. Such hospitals “often form as the result of a

hospital merger or joint venture.” Anna Jacques, 797 F.3d at

1159.8

Dr. Weller’s complaint and public documents make clear

that NYU Langone is an institution with multiple campuses. Dr.

Weller alleges that NYU Langone is a “private hospital system,”

and that both NYU Brooklyn and NYU Tisch are part of that

system. TAC ¶¶ 7, 39, 41. In Anna Jacques, the D.C. Circuit

8 We recognize that the word “hospital” is also used in a more limited

fashion in colloquial conversation. One noteworthy example of such a usage

comes from the inimitable Leslie Nielsen:

Nielsen (as the doctor on board a commercial airliner): You’d better

tell the Captain. We’ve got to land as soon as we can. This woman has to be

gotten to a hospital.

Julie Hagerty (as the flight attendant): A hospital? What is it?

Nielsen: It’s a big building with patients. But that’s not important

right now. Tell the Captain I must speak to him.

Airplane!, at 37:58 (Paramount Pictures 1980) (emphasis added).

held that a hospital organization in southeastern Massachusetts

formed via the merger of three separate hospitals was one

“hospital” for purposes of the Medicare Act. Anna Jacques, 797

F.3d at 1158-59, 64-65.9 There too, the court relied on the fact

the campuses “operate[d] as a unified hospital.” Id. at 1162.

And while not dispositive here, the fact that NYU Langone

operated under a single Medicare provider agreement only serves

to reinforce this conclusion. See id. at 1164-65.10

Against this reading and precedent, Dr. Weller has not

plausibly alleged that NYU Brooklyn and NYU Tisch are different

hospitals. After oral argument in December of 2024, Dr. Weller

amended his complaint to add an allegation that the two

facilities had separate Medicare provider numbers and were

separately licensed and approved by the New York State

Department of Health. See Second Am. Compl. ¶ 18 & n.2, ECF No.

23. Soon thereafter, however, Dr. Weller re-amended his

complaint to remove these allegations — perhaps because public

9 While Anna Jacques concerned the calculation of Medicare’s wage index,

42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(3)(E)(i), it is relevant here, too, given the

“presumption that a given term is used to mean the same thing throughout a

statute.” Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994).

10 Courts “may take judicial notice of documents from official

government websites.” Rynasko v. New York Univ., 63 F.4th 186, 191 n.4 (2d

Cir. 2023); accord Wandel v. Gao, 590 F. Supp. 3d 630, 636 n.4 (S.D.N.Y.

2022). NYU Langone operated under one Medicare provider agreement at the

time of Dr. Weller’s employment. See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs.,

Q2 2023 Provider of Services File - Hospital & Non-Hospital Facilities

(available by searching for “NYU Langone” at https://data.cms.gov/provider-

characteristics/hospitals-and-other-facilities/provider-of-services-file-

hospital-non-hospital-facilities/data/q2-2023) (last accessed June 30, 2025).

records reveal them to be false.11 The operative complaint now

alleges only that “[u]pon information and belief,” NYU Tisch and

NYU Brooklyn are “distinct hospitals.” TAC ¶ 18. But this

constitutes a legal conclusion masquerading as a factual

conclusion and cannot support Dr. Weller’s claim. Smith v. Loc.

819 I.B.T. Pension Plan, 291 F.3d 236, 240 (2d Cir. 2002); see

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Finally, Dr. Weller’s allegation that

NYU Langone has one “centralized transfer center” further

supports that NYU Tisch and NYU Brooklyn are not distinct

hospitals. TAC ¶ 39.

Because NYU Brooklyn and NYU Tisch are one hospital,

Dr. Weller has alleged no contemplated “movement” “outside of a

hospital’s facilities” that could have violated EMTALA. 42

U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(4). At most, the patient would have been

moved between two of NYU Langone’s facilities.

That EMTALA does not cover this movement makes sense.

Dr. Weller’s complaint reads most naturally as a disagreement

about how a patient was treated by physicians within NYU

Langone.12 Extending EMTALA’s reach to transfers among a single

11 The Court takes judicial notice that the campuses share a New York

State Operating Certificate. See Rynasko, 63 F.4th at 191; N.Y. State Dep’t

of Health, Facilities Sharing Operating Certificate 7002053H,

https://profiles.health.ny.gov/hospital/opcert/7002053H (last accessed June

30, 2025).

12 At times, Dr. Weller’s argument seems to be that NYU Brooklyn itself

violated EMTALA by not transferring the patient to another hospital. See,

e.g., Oral Argument Transcript 26:5-26:7 (”There’s a duty on both sides.

hospital’s facilities would risk turning EMTALA into a “federal

medical malpractice statute” — which it is not. Brenord v.

Cath. Med. Ctr. of Brooklyn & Queens, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 179,

185 (E.D.N.Y. 2001). EMTALA instead “fill[s] a lacuna in

traditional state tort law by imposing on hospitals a legal

duty . . . to provide emergency care to all.” Hardy, 164 F.3d

at 792-93; see also Bryan v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va.,

95 F.3d 349, 351 (4th Cir. 1996) (“[EMTALA’s] core purpose is to

get patients into the system who might otherwise go untreated

and be left without a remedy because traditional medical

malpractice law affords no claim for failure to treat.”). The

prudence of NYU’s decision to treat the patient at its Brooklyn

There’s a duty to send . . . or transfer and there’s a duty to receive.”);

Pl.’s Opp. Br. 12, ECF No. 19 (“NYU Langone Brooklyn Hospital had a duty to

transfer the patient . . . .”). This argument fails for similar reasons:

EMTALA does not cover transfers between a hospital’s facilities.

Furthermore, EMTALA “does not impose any positive obligation on a covered

hospital to transfer a critical patient under particular circumstances to

obtain stabilization at another hospital.” Fraticelli-Torres v. Hosp.

Hermanos, 300 F. App’x 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2008). Rather, it “restricts the

conditions under which a hospital may transfer an unstabilized critical

patient.” Id. Finally, to the extent Dr. Weller’s theory is that NYU

Brooklyn discharged the patient before she was stabilized, that argument

fails, too. That view presupposes that EMTALA’s protections extend beyond a

hospital’s decision to admit a patient — a minority view among the courts

addressing the question. See Cooper v. City of New York, No. 14-CV-3698,

2016 WL 4491719, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2016). Even assuming, arguendo,

that EMTALA’s protections did continue in that way, the operative complaint

does not sufficiently allege facts about the patient’s treatment and

discharge. Under EMTALA, a patient is “stabilized” when “no material

deterioration of the condition is likely, within reasonable medical

probability, to result from or occur during the transfer of the individual

from a facility.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(3)(B). The complaint only alleges

that “[u]pon information and belief the patient was discharged to hospice.”

TAC ¶ 42. But the complaint does not allege when the patient was discharged,

or set forth any factual content sufficient to establish that the patient’s

emergency medical conditions were not stabilized at the time of discharge.

campus instead of its Manhattan campus is thus one properly left

for state law.

C. EMTALA Does Not Protect Allegations Absent an Actual

Violation

Dr. Weller argues that even if EMTALA did not cover

the canceled movement, the statute’s whistleblower protections

barred his termination because he believed, reasonably and in

good faith, that it did. The assertion that EMTALA protects

such reasonable (but inaccurate) reporting has been adopted by

one circuit and several district courts. But it is inconsistent

with the statute’s text, and Dr. Weller therefore cannot prevail

on this basis.

The Third Circuit reads EMTALA’s whistleblower

protections to cover reports made “under a good faith,

reasonable belief that a violation existed.” Gillispie v.

RegionalCare Hosp. Partners Inc, 892 F.3d 585, 593 (3d Cir.

2018). But Gillispie did not meaningfully engage with EMTALA’s

text; instead, that court cited a case interpreting Title VII.

Id. (citing Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074,

1085 (3d Cir. 1996)). Various district courts — though none

within this Circuit — have followed the Third Circuit’s holding.

Those cases cite Gillispie or each other, and (like Gillispie)

do not engage with EMTALA’s text. See Vanderlan v. Jackson HMA,

LLC, No. 23-CV-258, 2025 WL 1180077, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 23,

2025) (describing this view as “seem[ing] to be universally

accepted,” and citing three district court cases); but cf. Nulph

v. Houston Healthcare Sys., Inc., No. 21-CV-423, 2025 WL 410083,

at *3 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 5, 2025) (assuming such a reading of EMTALA

but expressing skepticism, and ultimately finding no

violation).13

My reading of the provision in question and the

statute as a whole lead me to conclude that, unlike Title VII

and some other antiretaliation provisions, EMTALA’s

whistleblower provision does not include a “good faith” or

“reasonableness” standard. Indeed, the comparison with other

whistleblower provisions also supports this result.

1. EMTALA’s Text and Similar Whistleblower

Provisions

As noted above, EMTALA’s whistleblower provision

protects hospital employees against adverse action for

“report[ing] a violation of a requirement of this section.” 42

U.S.C. § 1395dd(i). The text does not refer to “reasonable” or

“good faith” reports. And “[i]t is not the province of the

13 One of the district court cases that Vanderlan cites for its

“universally accepted” premise is Milner v. Team Health, No. 19-CV-2041, 2020

WL 5658903 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 23, 2020). Milner parrots the “good faith,

reasonable belief” language from another of these three district court cases,

id. at *6, but does not appear actually to apply that standard. Instead,

Milner appears to require an actual violation. See id. (“Furthermore, as

the court has already found, Milner did not properly allege an EMTALA

violation arising out of the 2017 incident. Accordingly, any claim under

EMTALA's whistleblower protection provision fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted.”).

courts to add words to statutes that Congress has enacted.”

Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. U.S. Citizenship

& Immigr. Servs., 30 F.4th 318, 331 (2d Cir. 2022).

“Atextual judicial supplementation is particularly

inappropriate when Congress has shown that it knows how to adopt

the omitted language or provision,” as it has done here. Lackey

v. Stinnie, 145 S. Ct. 659, 669–70 (2025). Congress has shown

that if it wanted EMTALA’s whistleblower protection to sweep

more broadly, it knew how to do so. First, in a nearby

provision to enforce civil penalties under EMTALA, Congress

directed the Secretary, “[i]n considering allegations of

violations,” to consult with certain organizations. 42 U.S.C.

§ 1395dd(d)(3) (emphasis added).

Other federal whistleblower statutes explicitly lay

out the more sweeping standard Dr. Weller seeks. One notable

example is a whistleblower provision enacted by the same

Congress that enacted EMTALA. See W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v.

Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 88-90 (1991) (repeatedly emphasizing fee-

shifting statutes enacted in the same session while interpreting

42 U.S.C. § 1988, the 1976 statute under consideration). The

Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act bars state and local

educational agencies from discriminating against a person “in

any way” for providing information “relating to a potential

violation of this subchapter to any other person.” 15 U.S.C.

§ 2651(a) (emphasis added). Elsewhere, the Seaman’s Protection

Act — enacted a few years before EMTALA — prohibits retaliation

after a “seaman in good faith has reported [to federal

officials] . . . that the seaman believes that a violation of

[maritime law or regulation] has occurred.” 46 U.S.C.

§ 2114(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). And the Civil Service Reform

Act of 1978 — enacted almost a decade before EMTALA — prohibits

retaliation after certain “disclosure of information . . . which

the employee or applicant reasonably believes evidences any

violation of any law, rule, or regulation.” 5 U.S.C.

§ 2302(b)(8)(A)(i) (emphasis added).

More recent statutes are similarly explicit. For

example, the Federal Railroad Safety Act (“FRSA”) protects,

among other things, an “employee’s lawful, good faith act done

. . . to provide information, directly cause information to be

provided, or otherwise directly assist in any investigation

regarding any conduct which the employee reasonably believes

constitutes a violation of federal law.” 49 U.S.C.

§ 20109(a)(1) (emphasis added). When legislators want to

protect a putative whistleblower’s erroneous, but good-faith,

reporting, they clearly know how to extend that margin of error

around the protection they enact.

2. Comparisons to Title VII Are Unavailing

Dr. Weller points to Title VII for his argument that

EMTALA protects good-faith, reasonable reporting. Pl.’s Opp.

Br. 7, ECF No. 19; Pl.’s Ltr. Br. 1-3, ECF No. 32. Title VII

bars adverse action if an employee “has [1] opposed any practice

made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or [2]

because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or

participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or

hearing under this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Courts

have read in a good faith or reasonableness standard to this

first clause, even in the absence of statutory text. See, e.g.,

Manoharan v. Columbia Univ. Coll. of Physicians & Surgeons, 842

F.2d 590, 593 (2d Cir. 1988).

Notably, the Supreme Court has never adopted such a

reading. See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167,

187 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Although this Court has

never addressed the question, no Court of Appeals requires a

complainant to show more than that he had a reasonable, good-

faith belief that discrimination occurred to prevail on a

retaliation claim.”). And the Second Circuit opinion that first

adopted this reading of Title VII offers no methodological

guidance that might be transferred to EMTALA. See Manoharan,

842 F.2d at 593.

Other appellate courts adopting this reading relied

largely on Title VII’s remedial purpose. For example, the Ninth

Circuit explained that “elimination of discrimination in

employment is the purpose behind Title VII and the statute is

entitled to a liberal interpretation.” Sias v. City

Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1978); see

also Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1019

(D.C. Cir. 1981) (“[M]aking the protected nature of an

employee’s opposition to alleged discrimination depend on the

ultimate resolution of his claim would be inconsistent with the

remedial purposes of Title VII.”); Payne v. McLemore’s Wholesale

& Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1139 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept.

1981) (citing Sias).

The Supreme Court has since cautioned against using

the sort of broad, remedial-purpose reasoning to expand a

statute’s coverage or narrow its exceptions. It is now “error”

to treat “the proposition that remedial statutes should be

interpreted in a liberal manner . . . as a substitute for a

conclusion grounded in the statute’s text and structure.” CTS

Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 12 (2014). After all, no

statute pursues its ends “at all costs.” Rodriguez v. United

States, 480 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1987). And “almost every statute

might be described as remedial in the sense that all statutes

are designed to remedy some problem.” Waldburger, 573 U.S. at

12; see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The

Interpretation of Legal Texts 364 (1st ed. 2012) (“Is any

statute not remedial?”).

When interpreting statutes, district courts are bound

by the rules of construction as they are today. And the Supreme

Court’s recent guidance on construction of so-called “remedial”

statutes disfavors anything but a plain reading. For example,

“[u]ntil recently, it was a rule of statutory interpretation

that a court should narrowly construe an exemption to the [Fair

Labor Standards Act (‘FLSA’)] in order to effectuate the

statute’s remedial purpose.” Flood v. Just Energy Mktg. Corp.,

904 F.3d 219, 228 (2d Cir. 2018). The Supreme Court rejected

this rule in Encino Motorcars v. Navarro, instructing that these

exceptions should be given their “fair reading” — regardless of

purpose. 584 U.S. 79, 88-89 (2018); see also id. at 89 (“The

narrow-construction principle relies on the flawed premise that

the FLSA pursues its remedial purpose at all costs.”).

Thus, Title VII provides no reason to depart from a

plain reading of EMTALA’s text and structure.

3. Other Retaliation or Whistleblower Laws

Dr. Weller points to several other retaliation or

whistleblower protection laws that protect employees even when

the underlying conduct is not a violation. Pl.’s Ltr. Br. 1, 3.

None make for persuasive comparisons. Some are anti-

discrimination statutes — like the Americans with Disabilities

Act and Age Discrimination in Employment Act – which have long

been interpreted in tandem with Title VII given the similarity

of their retaliation provisions. Both the ADA and ADEA include

the same “practice made unlawful” language as Title VII. See

42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (ADA); 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (ADEA). The same

issue plagues Dr. Weller’s comparison to the Family and Medical

Leave Act. Pl.’s Ltr. Br. 1 n.1; see 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2).

Other statutes Dr. Weller cites explicitly include

words like “good faith” or “reasonably believe” and are

therefore not analogous to EMTALA. See Pl.’s Ltr. Br. 3 (citing

FRSA); supra Section II(C)(1) (discussing FRSA); Pl.’s Ltr. Br.

3 (discussing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7201 et seq.);

18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (barring certain companies from taking

adverse action against an employee who “provide[s] information,

cause[s] information to be provided, or otherwise assist[s] in

an investigation regarding any conduct which the employee

reasonably believes constitutes a violation of [securities

laws.]” (emphasis added)).

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the defendants’

motion to dismiss Dr. Weller’s EMTALA cause of action is

granted. Having dismissed the federal claim, I decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 388 F.3d 39,

56 (2d Cir. 2004).14 The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed

to close this case.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Eric Komitee

ERIC KOMITEE

United State

s District Judge

D ated: June 30, 2025

Brooklyn, New York

14 Defendants’ motion for sanctions, which is predicated primarily on

the pleading of misleading or incorrect facts regarding the patient’s

treatment and death, is denied. Though plaintiff’s counsel’s diligence has

at times been wanting, it does not meet Rule 11’s objective unreasonableness

standard. See McCabe v. Lifetime Ent. Servs., LLC, 761 F. App’x 38, 41 (2d

Cir. 2019). And even if the Court were to grant this motion, dismissal with

prejudice of Dr. Weller’s EMTALA claim, which is occurring here for merits-

related reasons anyway, would be one available remedy. See Dodson v. Runyon,

86 F.3d 37, 39 (2d Cir. 1996) (“The remedy of dismissal is pungent, rarely

used, and conclusive.”).