The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
REBECCA A. SANSONETTE, ) CASE NO. 1:25-cv-1044
)
Plaintiff, ) JUDGE CHARLES E. FLEMING
)
v. )
)
DAVID B. WADSWORTH, et al., ) ORDER OF REMAND
)
Defendants. )
Before the Court is Plaintiff Rebecca Sansonette’s motion to remand to state court and
request for attorney’s fees and costs (“Motion to Remand”) (ECF No. 9). Defendants filed a timely
response. (ECF No. 10). For the reasons discussed below, the Motion to Remand is GRANTED
IN PART.
I. BACKGROUND
On April 16, 2025, Plaintiff filed a complaint in Medina County Court of Common Pleas
against Defendants David B Wadsworth, the Medina County Clerk of Courts, Medina County, and
the Medina County Board of Commissioners. (ECF No. 1-1). Plaintiff asserted three state-law
claims (disability discrimination, disability retaliation, and age discrimination under Ohio law) and
two federal claims under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) (FMLA interference and
FMLA retaliation). (Id. at PageID #9–14). On May 21, 2025, Defendants removed the case to the
Northern District of Ohio pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441 on the basis of the Court’s
federal question jurisdiction, citing Plaintiff’s claims under the FMLA. (ECF No. 1).
On June 13, 2025, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint that kept the three state-law claims
but eliminated the two FMLA claims. (ECF No. 8). The same day, Plaintiff filed the instant
Motion to Remand. (ECF No. 9). On June 26, 2025, Defendants filed a response to the Motion
to Remand. (ECF No. 10).
II. LAW & ANALYSIS
A. Motion to Remand
Plaintiff argues that this case should be remanded to state court because she amended the
complaint to remove all federal claims thereby removing the basis for the Court’s subject matter
jurisdiction over this action and necessitating remand to Medina County Court of Common Pleas.
(ECF No. 9, PageID #100–01). In support, Plaintiff cites the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 145 S. Ct. 41, 220 L. Ed. 2d 289 (2025).
(Id. at PageID #100). Defendants concede that remand is proper under controlling precedent
because Plaintiff has amended the pleadings to remove all federal claims and questions. (ECF
No. 10, PageID #114, 116, 118).
The Court agrees with the parties. As held by the Supreme Court in Royal Canin, when a
plaintiff amends her complaint following removal to eliminate the federal-law claims that enabled
removal, the district court is divested of federal question jurisdiction and supplemental jurisdiction
over the remaining state-law claims. 604 U.S. at 30, 33, 44. Because the amended complaint
eliminated the FMLA claims, which was the sole basis for removal and the Court’s federal question
jurisdiction, the Court is divested of subject matter jurisdiction over this action. As a result, the
case must be remanded to Medina County Court of Common Pleas.
B. Request for Attorneys’ Fees
Under 28 U.S.C 1447(c), “[a]n order remanding the case may require payment of just costs
and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.” “The
Supreme Court has instructed that fee awards are inappropriate unless ‘the removing party lacked
an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.’” Powers v. Cottrell, Inc., 728 F.3d 509, 515
(6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Martin v. Franklin Cap. Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141, 126 S. Ct. 704, 163 L.
Ed. 2d 547 (2005); citing Paul v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 701 F.3d 514, 523 (6th Cir. 2012)).
“A defendant lacks an objectively reasonable basis for removal when well-settled case law makes
it clear that federal courts lack jurisdiction to hear the case.” A Forever Recovery, Inc. v. Township
of Pennfield, 606 F. App’x 279, 281 (6th Cir. 2015). That said, an award is inappropriate when
“the defendant’s attempt to remove the action was ‘fairly supportable.’” See Chase Manhattan
Mortg. Corp. v. Smith, 507 F.3d 910, 913–14 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bartholomew v. Town of
Collierville, 409 F.3d 684, 687 (6th Cir. 2005)).
Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to attorney’s fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1447
because Defendants’ notice of removal lacked legitimate legal support. (ECF No. 9, PageID
#101). Defendants argue that attorney’s fees and costs should not be awarded because they had
an objectively reasonable basis for removal. (ECF No. 10, PageID #117–18). The Court finds
Plaintiff’s argument wholly without merit. As Plaintiff states several times, she is the master of
her complaint. In her original complaint, Plaintiff chose to assert two federal claims under FMLA.
(ECF No. 1-1, PageID #12–14). As a result, even though Plaintiff now characterizes these claims
as “tangential,” they provided the basis for Defendants to properly remove this action pursuant to
the Court’s federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441. While Plaintiff has
now amended her complaint to remove the federal claims and divest the Court of jurisdiction over
this action, Defendants did not lack an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal when they
filed their notice of removal. Accordingly, Plaintiffs request for attorneys’ fees under § 1447(c)
is DENIED.
I. CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (ECF No. 9) is GRANTED IN
PART. The Court REMANDS this action to the Medina County Court of Common Pleas and
DENIES Plaintiff's request for attorneys’ fees and costs.
IT ISSO ORDERED.
Date: June 30, 2025 “adi 4
flue
CHARLES E.FLEMING
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE