Henry T. Johnson v. Bradon Watwood, Warden

06/30/2025

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs June 24, 2025

HENRY T. JOHNSON v. BRADON WATWOOD, WARDEN

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lake County

No. 24-CR-11017 Mark L. Hayes, Judge

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No. W2024-01724-CCA-R3-HC

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The Petitioner, Henry T. Johnson, appeals from the Lake County Circuit Court’s summary

dismissal of his second petition for writ of habeas corpus. Specifically, the Petitioner

contends he raised cognizable claims for habeas corpus relief and asserts his judgment of

conviction of first degree murder is void because (1) the trial court failed to pronounce

judgment or sentence pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-20-101(a); (2) the

original judgment was not signed by the trial judge; and (3) the trial judge was without

jurisdiction to enter a corrected judgment because the original judgment had already

become final. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

STEVEN W. SWORD, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which TIMOTHY L. EASTER

and MATTHEW J. WILSON, JJ., joined.

Henry T. Johnson, Tiptonville, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Ryan Dugan, Assistant Attorney

General; and Danny H. Goodman, Jr., District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of

Tennessee.

OPINION

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case arises from the Petitioner’s August 19, 2009, convictions of the

aggravated robbery and first degree murder of the victim, Michael Zabik, for which he

received an effective life sentence. The Petitioner filed a timely direct appeal, challenging

the sufficiency of the convicting evidence for his conviction of first degree murder. State

v. Johnson, No. M2010-02452-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 1071809, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App.

Mar. 28, 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 16, 2012). Specifically, the Petitioner

argued the State failed to prove premeditation. Id. at *5. This court affirmed the judgments

of the trial court, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied review. Id. at *1.

Following his convictions, but before the completion of his direct appeal, the

Petitioner filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus relief, which the habeas corpus court

summarily dismissed. Johnson v. Parker, No. W2010-00563-CCA-R3-HC, 2010 WL

4882605, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 30, 2010), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 13,

2011). Id. On appeal, the Petitioner argued the habeas corpus court erred in summarily

dismissing his petition because “the indictment against him was defective” and subjected

him to double jeopardy. Id. This court affirmed the habeas corpus court’s summary

dismissal, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied review. Id.

Thereafter, the Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, alleging he received the

ineffective assistance of counsel. Johnson v. State, No. M2016-00820-CCA-R3-PC, 2017

WL 809883, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 1, 2017), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 7,

2017). Specifically, the Petitioner argued trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by

failing to effectively cross-examine certain witnesses to challenge the State’s proof of

premeditation. Id. at *4. The post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner

appealed, maintaining that trial counsel should have cross-examined the State’s medical

experts regarding “how the bullet path might have been accomplished, or as to what posture

or position the deceased may have been in when he received the gunshot,” which proof the

Petitioner asserted would have shown the victim’s murder was accidental. Id. at *6. This

court affirmed the post-conviction court’s denial of relief, and the Tennessee Supreme

Court denied review. Id. at *1.

The Petitioner then sought federal habeas corpus relief, raising claims of trial court

error, deficiencies in his indictment, prosecutorial misconduct, the insufficiency of the

convicting evidence, a violation of double jeopardy, the ineffective assistance of pre-trial,

trial, post-trial, and post-conviction counsel, and actual innocence based upon newly

discovered evidence. Johnson v. Genovese, No. 3:18-cv-00539, 2021 WL 3269954, at *5-

6 (M.D. Tenn. July 30, 2021). The federal district court denied relief on all the Petitioner’s

claims. Id. at *23.

On October 15, 2024, the Petitioner filed his second state petition for writ of habeas

corpus, challenging the legality of his judgment of conviction of first degree murder.

Specifically, the Petitioner asserted the judgment of conviction was illegal because the trial

court failed to pronounce judgment and render a sentence at the conclusion of his trial, in

violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-20-101(a), and did not validly approve

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the jury’s verdict pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(d). He also

contended the judgment was illegal because it was not signed by the trial judge, Judge John

H. Gasaway, III, but instead bore the signature of Judge Michael R. Jones. The Petitioner

asserted that Judge Jones was never authorized to act on the trial judge’s behalf. Finally,

the Petitioner argued the corrected judgment bearing the trial judge’s signature was also

illegal because it was filed after the original judgment had become final.1

On November 1, 2024, the habeas corpus court entered a written order summarily

dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus. The habeas corpus court concluded that

the trial transcripts indicated the trial court properly discharged the jury, thereby

presumptively approving the jury’s verdict. Additionally, though the Petitioner did not

include any order disposing of his motion for new trial with his petition, the habeas corpus

court presumed that the trial court approved the jury’s verdict “[i]n the absence of a grant

of a new trial.” The habeas corpus court further held that inasmuch as the Petitioner alleged

error in Judge Jones’s signing his original judgment of conviction, any error was remedied

by the entry of a corrected judgment signed by the trial court on November 10, 2009, noting

that the latter judgment was “a corrected judgment by its entry and operation,”

notwithstanding its stylization as an original judgment. The habeas corpus court

concluded the Petitioner had failed to establish he was “denied some substantive right

because a corrected judgment was filed in November.” The Petitioner timely appealed.

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, the Petitioner argues the habeas corpus court erred by summarily

dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus and that he was entitled to the appointment

of counsel and a hearing on his claims. Specifically, the Petitioner contends he raised

cognizable claims for habeas corpus relief and asserts his judgment of conviction of first

degree murder is void because (1) the trial court failed to pronounce judgment or sentence

pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-20-101(a); (2) the original judgment was

not signed by the trial judge; and (3) the trial judge was without jurisdiction to enter a

corrected judgment because the original judgment had already become final. The State

responds that the habeas corpus court’s summary denial was appropriate because the

Petitioner failed to establish his judgment of conviction was facially void. We agree with

the State.

Habeas corpus relief is available to “[a]ny person imprisoned or restrained of liberty,

under any pretense whatsoever,” pursuant to certain statutory exceptions inapplicable to

1

The record indicates that the original judgment form was filed on September 3, 2009, and the

corrected judgment form, though also styled as an “original,” was filed on November 10, 2009.

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this case. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-101(a). The purpose of habeas corpus relief is to

provide a petitioner with a means of redress for a void judgment. Taylor v. State, 995

S.W.2d 78, 83 (Tenn. 1999). A void judgment is “one that is facially invalid because the

court did not have the statutory authority to render such judgment.” Summers v. State, 212

S.W.3d 251, 256 (Tenn. 2007). A petitioner seeking habeas corpus relief must establish

either “a lack of jurisdiction for the order of confinement on the face of the judgment or in

the record on which the judgment was rendered” or “that he is otherwise entitled to

immediate release because of the expiration of his sentence.” State v. Doane, 393 S.W.3d

721, 732 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2011) (first citing State v. Ritchie, 20 S.W.3d 624, 630 (Tenn.

2000), and then citing Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993)). A petitioner

must prove the invalidity of the challenged judgment or the illegality of his or her

confinement by a preponderance of the evidence. Wyatt v. State, 24 S.W.3d 319, 323

(Tenn. 2000). When a petitioner fails to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief

in his or her petition, the habeas corpus court may summarily dismiss the petition. Yates

v. Parker, 371 S.W.3d 152, 155 (Tenn. 2012); Hickman v. State, 153 S.W.3d 16, 20 (Tenn.

2004).

The right to petition for habeas corpus relief is guaranteed by the Tennessee

Constitution’s provision that “the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be

suspended, unless when in case of rebellion or invasion, the General Assembly shall

declare the public safety requires it.” Tenn. Const. art. I, § 15; see also Tenn. Code Ann.

§§ 29-21-101 et seq. (setting forth the procedural requirements and grounds for habeas

corpus relief). Whether to grant habeas corpus relief is a question of law; accordingly, we

review the habeas corpus court’s disposition of a petition for writ of habeas corpus de novo

with no presumption of correctness. Faulkner v. State, 226 S.W.3d 358, 361 (Tenn. 2007).

The Petitioner first contends his judgment is void because the trial court failed to

pronounce his judgment or sentence pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-20-

101(a), which provides that “[a]fter a verdict against the defendant, if the judgment is not

arrested or a new trial granted, the court shall pronounce judgment.” At the conclusion of

the Petitioner’s August 2009 trial, the foreperson of the jury announced that the jury had

unanimously found the Petitioner guilty of one count of aggravated robbery and one count

of first degree murder. Afterwards, the trial court polled the jury to confirm its verdicts

were unanimous for each count, dismissed the jury, and stated, “[The Petitioner] having

been convicted of – reported by the jury the Court sets a sentencing hearing date of October

first. A presentence report is ordered. Bond is revoked. Adjourn court.”

The Petitioner contends this statement was insufficient to pronounce his sentence as

required by Code section 40-20-101(a). Relatedly, he also asserts the trial court failed to

act as the thirteenth juror by approving or disapproving of the jury’s verdict pursuant to

Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(d). Even assuming, arguendo, the veracity of

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the Petitioner’s claims, neither would warrant habeas corpus relief because they would not

render his judgment facially invalid. See Taylor v. Watwood, No. W2023-01169-CCA-

R3-HC, 2024 WL 278355, at *1-2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 25, 2024), perm. app. denied

(Tenn. June 21, 2024) (affirming summary dismissal of a petition for writ of habeas corpus

where the petitioner asserted the trial transcript did “not reflect that the jury returned its

verdicts in open court or that the trial court pronounced the judgments” because “there is

nothing on the face of the judgments that indicates that the judgments are void.”); see also

State v. Ross, No. E2017-02087-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 2084958, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App.

May 4, 2018), no perm. app. filed (“[A] trial court’s failure to act as a thirteen[th] juror

merely renders a conviction voidable, not void.”) (collecting cases). The trial court is not

“required to provide a specific statement on the record to indicate his or her approval of

the jury’s verdict.” State v. Hall, 461 S.W.3d 469, 490 (Tenn. 2015). Furthermore, the

record indicates the Petitioner filed a motion for new trial on October 6, 2009, following

the imposition of his sentence, which the trial court heard and denied in a bench ruling on

November 4, 2010. The trial court also entered a written order denying the Petitioner’s

motion for new trial on November 29, 2010. In doing so, the trial court fulfilled its duty

as the thirteenth juror. See State v. Blanton, 926 S.W.2d 953, 958 (Tenn. 1996) (“[W]hen

a trial judge overrules a motion for new trial, this court may presume that the trial judge

has served as the thirteenth juror and approved the jury’s verdict.”). The Petitioner is not

entitled to relief on this claim.

Relatedly, the Petitioner next asserts his original judgment is void because it was

signed by Judge Jones rather than by the trial judge. The Petitioner asserts that because

Judge Jones did not preside over “a day of trial,” he “lacked jurisdiction to sign the

judgment because the actual trial judge was not absent [or] sick.” In support of his

argument that this renders his judgment void, the Petitioner cites to Tennessee Rule of

Criminal Procedure 32(e)(1)’s provision that “[a] judgment of conviction shall be signed

by the judge and entered by the clerk.” However, the “failure to comply with Rule 32(e)

amounts to a clerical error and does not require a conviction to be set aside.” State v.

Shelton, No. M2018-00319-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 5733132, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App.

Oct. 31, 2018), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 20, 2019) (citing State v. Carr, No. W2016-

01525-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 2493687, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 9, 2017), no perm.

app. filed). Because “mere clerical errors in the terms of a sentence may not give rise to a

void judgment,” the Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim. Coleman v. Morgan,

159 S.W.3d 887, 890 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004).

Finally, the Petitioner argues the trial judge lacked jurisdiction to enter a corrected

judgment bearing his signature on November 10, 2009, because the original judgment,

although void, had already become final. Again, even assuming the veracity of the

Petitioner’s claim that his initial judgment form became final prior to the filing of his

motion for new trial, thus rendering the motion for new trial untimely, this has no bearing

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on the validity of his judgment. Generally, judgments of conviction become final after

thirty days of entry, barring the filing of a timely notice of appeal or other posttrial motion.

State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 205-06 (Tenn. 2015); Tenn. R. App. P. 4(c). The trial

court is divested of jurisdiction to amend a defendant’s sentence following the finalization

of his judgment except under certain circumstances authorized by either statute or the rules

of criminal procedure. State v. Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2d 834, 837 (Tenn. 1996). Among

these certain circumstances is Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36, which provides

that the trial court “may at any time correct clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other

parts of the record, and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission.” As

explained above, Judge Jones’s signature on the original judgment amounted to a clerical

error, which was corrected by the entry of a corrected judgment bearing the trial court’s

signature. To that effect, the entry of the corrected judgment remedied the clerical error in

his original judgment of which the Petitioner now complains. Respectfully, if the Petitioner

wished to challenge the method in which the trial court did so, he should have done so by

filing a notice of appeal within thirty days after the entry of the corrected judgment. See

Tenn. R. App. P. 3(b), 4(a); Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36. The Petitioner is not entitled to relief on

this claim. Accordingly, because the Petitioner failed to state a cognizable claim for relief

in his petition for writ of habeas corpus, the appointment of counsel was not required, and

summary dismissal was appropriate.

III. CONCLUSION

Following our review of the record and based on the foregoing analysis, we affirm

the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

s/ Steven W. Sword________________

STEVEN W. SWORD, JUDGE

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