The opinion
2025 IL App (1st) 240066
No. 1-24-0066
First Division
June 30, 2025
____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
____________________________________________________________________________
DAVID BARRON and MICHAEL LYNCH, ) Appeal from the
Individually and on Behalf of All Others
) Circuit Court of
Similarly Situated, ) Cook County.
)
Plaintiffs-Appellants, )
) No. 2022 CH 08557
v. )
)
THE CITY OF CHICAGO, a Municipal )
Corporation, )
) Honorable
Defendant-Appellee. ) Claire J. Quish,
) Judge, Presiding.
____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE COBBS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Lavin and Pucinski concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Plaintiffs-Appellants David Barron and Michael Lynch, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, appeal from the circuit court’s December 12, 2023, order granting the
defendant-appellee City of Chicago’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ amended complaint purporting
to assert a class action for violation of Chicago Fire Department (CFD) promotion procedures. On
appeal, plaintiffs argue that the circuit court erred in concluding that it lacked subject matter
No. 1-24-0066
jurisdiction, as plaintiffs’ claims were preempted by the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (5
ILCS 315/1 et seq. (West 2020)) and, thus, plaintiffs were required to pursue their claims in
arbitration. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 Plaintiffs are a group of firefighters employed by CFD. On August 30, 2022, they filed a
class action lawsuit against the City of Chicago (City). On October 6, 2022, the City filed a motion
to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint. On February 9, 2023, following a hearing, the circuit court
granted, in part, the City’s motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2020)), dismissed counts I and III of plaintiffs’
complaint, and allowed plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint.
¶4 On March 9, 2023, plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint, which is the subject of this
appeal. Therein, plaintiffs alleged the following. For multiple decades, the City’s practice for
promoting firefighters to lieutenants involved creating an eligibility list and, as lieutenant openings
occurred, promoting all firefighters on that list until all with a passing score of 70 or above had
been promoted. This practice was incorporated in the City’s 2013 Hiring Plan for firefighters. The
eligibility list ranked the firefighters according to their interview scores, test scores, and other
criteria. Firefighters on the list would then be offered, in rank order, the opportunity to be promoted
to the lieutenant position following the requisite training.
¶5 The City created an eligibility list in 2009, which included plaintiffs. The City did not begin
promoting firefighters from that list until all eligible candidates from the 1999 list had been
promoted. In March 2022, the City confirmed that there were 124 vacancies of officer positions
(including 80 lieutenant positions), and those positions would be filled in April, July, and
November of that year. In April, 41 of the 80 lieutenant vacancies were filled. Afterwards, instead
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of continuing to fill the lieutenant vacancies in July from the 2009 list, the City retired that
eligibility list with no stated justification for doing so. Plaintiffs alleged that “the next Firefighter
to be promoted [on the 2009 list] was a staunch political opponent of the Chicago Mayor” and the
City “retired the eligibility list to prevent the Mayor’s opponent from future promotion.” As a
result, plaintiffs alleged that they were denied promotions they had been waiting for more than 10
years. It was also alleged that plaintiff David Barron submitted a Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West 2020)) request for documentation of the justification for
retiring the list, and the City replied that there were no responsive documents to the request.
¶6 After plaintiffs Barron and Michael Lynch filed the initial complaint in this action, the City
reinstated the 2009 eligibility list and subsequently promoted the next 41 firefighters on that list to
lieutenant positions. The City did not promote the remaining 26 firefighters on the 2009 eligibility
list, despite there being open lieutenant positions. In early 2023, the City again retired the 2009
eligibility list and offered lieutenant training to firefighters on a new eligibility list ahead of the
remaining eligible firefighters from the 2009 list.
¶7 Plaintiffs are comprised of two groups: those who were promoted to the lieutenant position
in November 2022 from the 2009 eligibility list (promoted plaintiffs) and those who were on the
2009 eligibility list but had not yet been promoted to the lieutenant position, despite having a
passing score (unpromoted plaintiffs). 1 All plaintiffs scored a passing score of 70 or above on the
lieutenant examination. Both groups were allegedly damaged by the City’s actions through lost
pay, lost benefits, lost experience in the lieutenant position, and delay in further advancement in
1
Because some of the plaintiffs had been promoted, in its motion to dismiss, the City argued that
plaintiff’s claims were moot. Plaintiffs allege that some of the class have still not been promoted and
monetary damages could still be owed to those plaintiffs who were promoted. The City has not pursued
its mootness argument here on appeal, and we have no occasion to address it.
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CFD, which requires three years in the position of lieutenant. Plaintiffs alleged three counts against
the City: breach of contract for failing to fill the lieutenant vacancies from the 2009 eligibility list
in violation of the Hiring Plan (count I); breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing for the same (count II); and promissory estoppel (count III). Under each count, plaintiffs
request that (1) the City be directed to reinstate the 2009 eligibility list; (2) the unpromoted
plaintiffs be immediately allowed to attend lieutenant training and fill openings identified in 2022
and 2023; (3) the City be restrained from filling lieutenant openings other than in accordance with
the 2009 eligibility list; and (4) plaintiffs be awarded compensatory damages, lost benefits, and
attorney’s fees.
¶8 Attached to the complaint was CFD’s Hiring Plan for Uniformed Positions (Hiring Plan).
The Hiring Plan was developed by the City as required under section 1.F. of the settlement order
and accord in Shakman v. Democratic Organization of Cook County, No. 69 C 2145 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 20, 2007), https://www.chicago.gov/dam/city/depts/dhr/supp_info/ShakmanSettlement/
NoticeofSettlementAccord32007.pdf [https://perma.cc/D5WR-5QWT], in the United States
District Court of the Northern District of Illinois. Although not discussed in detail in the record or
either party’s brief, we briefly set forth pertinent details of the Shakman accord. Following a series
of lawsuits, consent judgments were issued in 1972 and 1983 in which the City agreed to eliminate
political considerations from employment decisions. Further litigation began in the early 2000s,
alleging violations of the consent decree. On May 31, 2007, an Agreed Settlement Order and
Accord (Accord) was entered. See id. Therein, the City was directed to create a “New Plan,” which
would “be fully incorporated by reference into the Accord.” The result was the current 2013 Hiring
Plan. The Accord was terminated in 2014 in response to the City’s demonstration of substantial
compliance. Notably, the Accord stated:
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“The Parties to the Accord recognize and agree that the City has collective bargaining
relationships with unions representing City employees, that the Illinois Public Labor
Relations Act, 5 ILCS 315, -
et-seq.
- - (“Act”) governs those relationships, and that this Accord
will be construed and administered consistent with the Act, to the extent that the
construction or administration does not conflict with the United States Constitution or
federal civil rights laws.” Id.
¶9 Turning back to the Hiring Plan, Chapter IV of the Plan, titled “General Hire Process for
Uniformed Positions—Non-Interviewed Positions,” provides that a list of “Eligible Candidates in
rank order of all Applicants who completed all required portions of the examination” shall be
created and “[t]he [Department of Human Resources] Commissioner, in consultation with the Fire
Commissioner, shall order the establishment of a new Eligibility List.” Further, “[a]ll Eligible
Candidates shall be considered for vacancies in rank order from the applicable Eligibility List
unless otherwise provided for by the [collective bargaining agreement (CBA).]” Regarding the
retirement of eligibility lists, the Plan states:
“Eligibility Lists may be retired at the discretion of the Fire Commissioner, in consultation
with the DHR Commissioner, provided that no Eligibility List shall be used for longer than
eight (8) years after it has been established unless there is a lack of available funds for
testing and/or low utilization of the Eligibility List due to the lack of promotional
opportunities, in which case the Eligibility List will be retired as soon as practicable after
funding has been made available for a new examination. The Fire Commissioner’s
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justification for the retirement of the Eligibility List shall be documented in the hiring
file.” 2
¶ 10 On April 21, 2023, the City filed a combined motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ amended
complaint, pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2020)). Under
section 2-619(a)(1) (id. § 2-619(a)(1)), the City argued that all of plaintiffs’ claims should be
dismissed because the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and, instead, jurisdiction laid
exclusively with the Illinois Labor Relations Board because the claims involved a dispute that
requires the interpretation of the CBA between the City and the Chicago Fire Fighters Union, Local
2 of the International Fire Fighters Union (Union). Thus, according to the City, the Public Labor
Relations Act preempted plaintiffs’ claims. The City also argued that plaintiffs lacked standing,
plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, and the City has immunity from liability
on quasi-contractual theories. Under section 2-615, the City argued that plaintiffs failed to
sufficiently plead their claims for breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, and promissory estoppel. Attached to the City’s motion were a number of exhibits:
(1) the CBA, (2) an affidavit from Brian Helmold, (3) a collection of “First Step Grievances,” and
(4) the City’s Personnel Rules.
¶ 11 The CBA states that it is effective from July 1, 2017, through June 30, 2021, but remains
in effect while the parties negotiate a new agreement. There is no dispute that this CBA remained
2
We note that the Hiring Plan also contains Chapter IX, titled “Compliance and Governance,”
providing that it “grants oversight to the City’s Office of the Inspector General,” which established the
Hiring Oversight Section “to redress any and all issues regarding City hiring” and to receive “complaints
regarding the hiring process, including allegations of unlawful political discrimination and retaliation and
other improper influence in connection with any aspect of City employment.” This Hiring Oversight
Section “shall, when appropriate, refer complaints and other instances of non-compliance to the
Investigations Section” of the Office of the Inspector General. For reasons unknown to this court, neither
party addresses this section of the Hiring Plan or its applicability to the issues involved here.
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in effect at all times during this litigation. Relevant here, Article VI of the CBA, titled “Entire
Agreement,” states that “[t]his Agreement constitutes the complete and entire Agreement between
the parties and concludes collective bargaining (except as provided for in the grievance procedure)
for its term. Amendments and modifications of this Agreement may be made by mutual written
agreement of the parties to this Agreement.”
¶ 12 Article IX, titled “Seniority Rights,” contains section 9.3, which addresses vacancies and
promotions and states the following under subsection A:
“Promotional vacancies within the bargaining unit created as a result of death,
resignation, retirement and discharge for just cause, and which the Employer must fill to
maintain the minimum manning agreed to in this Agreement, shall be filled within forty-
five (45) days of the last day the employee actually worked on duty or was discharged.
Promotions which are required to fill vacancies shall be made from established lists
resulting from job related examinations given to the employees in the classification
immediately below the vacancy, and effective upon contract ratification, an employee who
was passed over on an eligibility list shall be permitted to take the examination and be
placed on the eligibility list for the rank above that for which the employee was passed
over (for example, a firefighter or engineer passed over for promotion to lieutenant shall
be permitted to take the captains examination and be placed on the eligibility list for
captains.) Effective upon contract ratification, the Employer shall provide to employees
while on duty, training for and the cost of certifications necessary for promotion.”
¶ 13 Subsection B.2. provides:
“Promotional vacancies shall be filled by the Commissioner from eligible
employees certified from the applicable promotional eligibility list. After each promotional
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examination, the City shall develop an eligibility list based upon employees eligible for
promotion based on their performance on the administered examination. No less than thirty
(30) days prior to any promotions, the City shall provide to the Union a copy of the
promotional eligibility list. Such list shall reflect each employee’s full name, seniority
number, race, gender, total score and rank on the list. Vacancies will customarily be filled
by employees in the order of their ranking on the eligibility list.
Employees who are passed over on an eligibility list strictly by operation of the
preceding paragraph and who otherwise would have been promoted had promotions been
made in rank order from the eligibility list shall have his or her name inserted at the top of
the new eligibility list in rank order as it appeared on the previous eligibility list for the
same promoted position, and shall be promoted from the new eligibility list to vacancies
which will customarily be filled by employees in the order of their ranking on the eligibility
list.
Additionally, that subsection provides that “no employee may be promoted to the position of
engineer or lieutenant, and shall be passed over on the eligibility list, without fifty-four (54) months
in the classification of firefighter and/or engineer.” It continues with a list of reasons why an
employee certified for a promotion may be passed over for a vacancy. Subsection B.4. addresses
the “performance selection process,” which provides that up to 16% of the promotions to the rank
of lieutenant may be made by the Fire Commissioner on the basis of performance and then lists
the necessary criteria for a performance promotion.
¶ 14 Article X, titled “Grievance Procedure,” sets forth the manner in which “[a]ny grievance
or dispute which may arise between the parties, including the application, meaning or
interpretation of this Agreement” will be settled.
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¶ 15 Finally, Article XIV, titled “Management Functions,” provides:
“It is the right of the Employer to unilaterally determine matters of inherent
managerial policy and to implement decisions with respect thereto, which include, but are
not limited to, the following: the right to determine services to be offered by its agencies;
to establish its overall budget; to direct its employees; to determine the content of
examinations, the necessary requirements to participate in the examination process, and the
minimum qualifications for all positions; to discipline or discharge employees for proper
cause; to relieve its employees from duty because of lack of work or for other legitimate
reasons; to maintain and improve efficiency of governmental operations; to determine the
methods, means and personnel by which government operations or a unit thereof are to be
conducted; to determine the content of job classifications; to take all necessary actions to
carry out its mission in emergencies; and to exercise control and discretion over its
organization and the technology of performing its work.
This Agreement shall be construed however as requiring the Employer to follow
the provisions of this Agreement in the exercise of the foregoing rights.”
¶ 16 A July 30, 2020, letter agreement attached to the CBA confirmed the City and Union’s
agreement that, “in the event the City utilizes performance selection promotions from eligibility
lists derived from examinations administered after January 1, 1997, the City will forgo making
such promotions on the last promotional order before the eligibility list is retired.” The City also
agreed that “the last promotional order will include at least 16% of the total promotions previously
made from that eligibility list, and that the last promotions will be in strict rank order from the
eligibility list.”
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¶ 17 In an affidavit, Brian Helmold, deputy fire commissioner, administrative services, averred
that he was familiar with plaintiffs’ allegations and set forth the timeline regarding the retirement,
adoption, and readoption of the 2009 and 2019 eligibility lists, as laid out above. He also identified
a number of grievance reports filed by plaintiffs and noted that each of them was denied by the
City and none were “elevated to arbitration.”
¶ 18 Also included as an exhibit was a collection of plaintiffs’ grievance reports filed with the
City between July 2022 and February 2023. Almost all of them stated that there was a violation of
section 9.3 of the CBA. Several of them also claimed violation of the Hiring Plan. Additionally,
there was a grievance report filed by the Union with the City on October 29, 2022. That grievance
claimed that the City improperly passed over members from the 2019 eligibility list in favor of the
canceled 2009 eligibility list when it was “reinstated,” citing a violation of section 9.3 of the CBA.
The grievance explained: “Based on the language found in the CBA ***, the City has unfairly
passed over members on a promotional eligibility list for reasons other than what is specified in
the [CBA].”
¶ 19 On June 14, 2023, plaintiffs filed their response to the City’s motion to dismiss, arguing,
inter alia, that their complaint was not brought under the CBA and, instead, the issues arise from
the Hiring Plan, which is “a separate agreement between the Plaintiffs and the City.” Attached to
their response were several exhibits, including an affidavit from Barron. Therein, Barron averred
that he filed a grievance with the Union on July 14, 2022, and, on July 28, 2022, he received a
letter from CFD denying the grievance. On August 10, 2022, he attended a Union meeting, with
approximately 10 other plaintiffs, to discuss the grievance with a panel of his peers, and the panel
members informed them that the matter should be pursued in court because it was not related to
the CBA. Barron was later advised that the Union would not take the grievance to arbitration, and
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he subsequently appeared before the executive board on August 16, 2022, to request arbitration.
Once again, Barron and several other plaintiffs were advised that the Union would not take the
grievance to arbitration because it did not involve the CBA. On September 1, 2022, another letter
from CFD was received, denying the grievance a second time. Finally, he averred that other
plaintiffs had filed similar grievances, were similarly denied, and were advised that the grievances
did not fall under the CBA. Also attached to the response were several documents from the
grievance process. In particular, there were a number of letters from the Union to grievants, stating
that their “grievance has not been sustained” because “[t]he complaint or remedy you asked for is
not a contractual obligation in the present agreement.”
¶ 20 On July 13, 2023, the City filed its reply in support of its motion to dismiss plaintiffs’
complaint. On September 7, 2023, the circuit court held a hearing on the City’s motion, a transcript
of which is not contained in the record. On September 20, 2023, plaintiffs filed a post-hearing
supplemental brief. On October 4, 2023, the City filed a response to the supplemental brief.
¶ 21 On December 12, 2023, the circuit court entered an order, granting the City’s motion to
dismiss plaintiffs’ amended complaint with prejudice, “finding that Plaintiffs’ claims are
preempted by the Public Labor Relations Act and this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.” The
court noted that plaintiffs’ claims properly lie with the Illinois Labor Relations Board and cited
Sims v. Dart, 2022 IL App (1st) 210890-U, as well as Glasper v. Scrub Inc., 2021 IL App (1st)
200764, for support of its conclusion. Plaintiffs did not file a motion for reconsideration.
¶ 22 This timely appeal followed.
¶ 23 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 24 On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the circuit court erred in concluding that the Public Labor
Relations Act preempted their claims and plaintiffs had to pursue their claims in arbitration.
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According to plaintiffs, the CBA does not specifically address the issue in this case, and thus, they
are not required to arbitrate their claims. Accordingly, they request that this court reverse the circuit
court’s dismissal of their amended complaint and remand for further proceedings.
¶ 25 Section 2-619.1 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-219.1 (West 2020)) provides for a combined
motion under sections 2-615 and 2-619 (id. §§ 2-215, 2-619)). A section 2-615 motion to dismiss
challenges the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s pleadings. Id. § 2-615. A motion to dismiss
pursuant to section 2-619 admits the sufficiency of the complaint, but asserts that an affirmative
matter, such as a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, nonetheless defeats the claim. Id. § 2-
619(a)(1). We review a circuit court’s dismissal of a complaint under section 2-619.1 de novo.
Hampton v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2018 IL App (1st) 172074, ¶ 19. Under this standard, we
may affirm the circuit court’s decision on any basis supported by the record, but we begin with the
court’s basis for dismissal: lack of subject matter jurisdiction. When reviewing the grant of a
section 2-619 motion to dismiss, we accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the complaint and
interpret the pleadings and supporting documents in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id.
¶ 20.
¶ 26 Subject matter jurisdiction refers to “the power of a court to hear and determine cases of
the general class to which the proceeding in question belongs.” Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota
Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 334 (2002). The Illinois Constitution has vested the
circuit court with original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters, except in certain circumstances.
Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 9. However, the legislature is empowered to vest original jurisdiction in
an administrative agency and may do so where it enacts a comprehensive statutory scheme creating
rights and duties not found in common law or in equity. J&J Ventures Gaming, LLC v. Wild, Inc.,
2016 IL 119870, ¶ 23.
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¶ 27 Here, the dispute involves a public employee labor dispute, which is governed by the Public
Labor Relations Act. Section 2 of the Public Labor Relations Act provides, in pertinent part: “It is
the purpose of this Act to regulate labor relations between public employers and employees,
including the designation of employee representatives, negotiation of wages, hours and other
conditions of employment, and resolution of disputes arising under collective bargaining
agreements.” 5 ILCS 315/2 (West 2020). Section 5 confers upon the Illinois Labor Relations Board
(Board) jurisdiction over all collective bargaining matters. Id. § 5(a-5). Section 8 provides:
“The collective bargaining agreement negotiated between the employer and the exclusive
representative shall contain a grievance resolution procedure which shall apply to all
employees in the bargaining unit and shall provide for final and binding arbitration of
disputes concerning the administration or interpretation of the agreement unless mutually
agreed otherwise.” Id. § 8.
Finally, the Public Labor Relations Act provides that any CBA executed pursuant to the statute
“shall supersede any contrary statutes, charters, ordinances, rules or regulations relating to wages,
hours and conditions of employment and employment relations adopted by the public employer or
its agents.” 5 ILCS 315/15(b) (West 2010). 3
¶ 28 In accordance with these statutory provisions, this court has repeatedly found that the
Board, not the circuit court, has exclusive jurisdiction over disputes concerning CBAs or requiring
interpretation thereof. See Sims, 2022 IL App (1st) 210890-U; Cessna v. City of Danville, 296 Ill.
3
The 2010 version of this statute is cited because the 2014 amendment to this section, along with
the entirety of Public Act 98-599 (eff. June 1, 2014) (which reformed the Illinois Pension Code (40 ILCS
5/1-101 et seq. (West 2012))), was held unconstitutional in In re Pension Reform Litigation, 32 N.E.3d 1,
30 (Ill. 2015). The relevant portion of the 2010 version cited here was unchanged by the 2014
amendment.
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App. 3d 156 (1998); Gantz v. McHenry County Sheriff’s Department Merit Comm’n, 296 Ill. App.
3d 335 (1998); Stahulak v. City of Chicago, 291 Ill. App. 3d 824 (1997). This is so because
concurrent jurisdiction in the circuit courts would “frustrate the legislature’s intent to provide a
uniform body of law in the field of labor-management relations to be administered by those who
have the required expertise in this area” and would allow for “forum shopping and inconsistent
judgments in similar factual settings.” Cessna, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 168. To this end, the statute
requires that members on the Board have “5 years of experience directly related to labor and
employment relations in representing public employers, private employers or labor organizations;
or teaching labor or employment relations; or administering executive orders or regulations
applicable to labor or employment relations.” 5 ILCS 315/5(a-5), (b) (West 2020).
¶ 29 Here, plaintiffs argue that their claims against the City are based on the Hiring Plan, a
separate agreement from the CBA. According to plaintiffs, their claims do not arise out of the CBA
and do not require interpretation of the CBA for resolution; as such, the circuit court does have
jurisdiction over their claims as they are not preempted by the Public Labor Relations Act. In
response, the City contends that the circuit court’s dismissal of the amended complaint was proper
because the claims necessitate interpretation of the CBA’s terms. The City asserts that the CBA
addresses the topic of plaintiffs’ claims at length, specifically citing section 9.3 of the CBA as well
as the management-rights section. The City also points out that the Hiring Plan itself frequently
cites and refers to the CBA. Like the circuit court, the City largely relies on Sims, 2022 IL App
(1st) 210890-U, a non-precedential order of this court, as well as Glasper, 2021 IL App (1st)
200764.
¶ 30 “The ultimate purpose of a CBA is to express the common understanding of the terms and
conditions of employment” (Matthews v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2016 IL 117638, ¶ 72), and
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a CBA “defines the rights and liabilities of the parties subject to the agreement and the manner in
which contractual obligations may be enforced” (Zelenka v. City of Chicago, 152 Ill. App. 3d 706,
714 (1987)). A CBA is a contract and thus is interpreted in accordance with principles of contract
law. Board of Education of Du Page High School District No. 88 v. Illinois Educational Labor
Relations Board, 246 Ill. App. 3d 967, 975 (1992). “[O]nce a contract containing a valid arbitration
clause has been executed, the parties are irrevocably committed to arbitrate all disputes arising
under the agreement.” Board of Managers of the Courtyards at the Woodlands Condominium
Ass’n v. IKO Chicago, Inc., 183 Ill. 2d 66, 74 (1998). “Before an issue can properly be referred to
an arbitrator, therefore, the particular dispute must be of the type that the parties have agreed should
be submitted to arbitration.” United Cable Television Corp. v. Northwest Illinois Cable Corp., 128
Ill. 2d 301, 306 (1989).
¶ 31 Arbitration is favored in Illinois courts, and, generally, “the parties to an agreement are
bound to arbitrate only the issues which they have agreed to arbitrate, as shown by the clear
language of the agreement and their intentions expressed in the language of the agreement.”
Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 241 v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2014 IL App (1st) 122526,
¶ 20. However, in the context of a public employee labor dispute, “the legislature has reversed the
presumption that a particular matter is arbitrable only if the parties expressly agree to submit the
matter to arbitration.” City of Rockford v. Unit Six of the Policemen’s Benevolent & Protective
Ass’n of Illinois, 351 Ill. App. 3d 252, 256-57 (2004). Rather, as stated above in section 8, all
disputes “concerning the administration or interpretation” of the CBA shall be submitted to
arbitration “unless mutually agreed otherwise.” 5 ILCS 315/8 (West 2020). Accordingly, there is
a presumption in favor of arbitration under the Public Labor Relations Act such that “all matters
are arbitrable unless the parties agree otherwise.” The relevant inquiry then is “whether the parties,
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through their written agreement, showed an intent to exclude from arbitration the disputed matter.”
(Emphasis added.) City of Rockford, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 257. We note that “[w]hether an arbitration
[clause] encompasses a particular issue is to be determined without consideration of the merits of
the issue claimed to be arbitrable.” United Cable Television Corp., 128 Ill. 2d at 307.
¶ 32 In determining the arbitrability of a dispute, our supreme court has made clear that
sometimes that decision may properly lie with the court and other times it may properly lie with
an arbitrator, and this issue becomes particularly difficult where the agreement contains a broad
arbitration clause. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Futures, Inc. v. Barr, 124 Ill. 2d 435, 444 (1988);
see Salsitz v. Kreiss, 198 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (2001) (following the approach set forth in Donaldson). We
recognize that Donaldson was not a collective bargaining case, but nothing in the decision reflects
an intent to restrict the arbitrability test to commercial cases and several decisions from this court
have utilized the following approach in collective bargaining cases. See Thompson v. Policemen’s
Benevolent Labor Committee, 2012 IL App (3d) 110926, ¶ 18; City of Rockford, 351 Ill. App. 3d
at 256; Jupiter Mechanical Industries, Inc. v. Sprinkler Fitters & Apprentices Local Union No.
281, 281 Ill. App. 3d 217, 223 (1996). Where it is clear on the face of the agreement that the parties
agreed to arbitrate the issue, the court should order arbitration. City of Rockford, 351 Ill. App. 3d
at 256 (citing Donaldson, 124 Ill. 2d at 449). Where, instead, it is clear that the parties did not
agree to arbitrate the issue, the court should deny arbitration. Id. Finally, “[i]n unclear cases, the
question of arbitrability should be referred to the arbitrator.” Id.; see Bourbonnais Township v.
International Union of Operating Engineers of Chicago, Illinois Vicinity Local No. 399, 2022 IL
App (3d) 210409-U, ¶ 15 (finding that “it is unclear or ambiguous whether [the] dispute falls
within the arbitration clause” and must therefore be “referred to the arbitrator to decide
arbitrability”); City of Naperville v. Illinois Fraternal Order of Police, Labor Council, F.O.P.
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Lodge No. 42, 2013 IL App (2d) 121071, ¶ 15. This third option is “consistent with the purpose of
arbitration, employing the arbitrator’s skilled judgment to resolve the ambiguity.” City of
Naperville, 2013 IL App (2d) 121071, ¶ 15.
¶ 33 In the instant case, we conclude that plaintiffs’ claims that the City violated promotional
procedures are subject to arbitration where it is clear that, when read in conjunction, the CBA, the
Hiring Plan, and the Public Labor Relations Act require interpretation and application of the CBA
for resolution of plaintiffs’ claims, and disputes over promotions and eligibility lists were not
specifically excluded from arbitration. In construing a contract, such as the CBA, we must
“ascertain and give effect to the intention of the parties,” and “[t]he best indication of the parties’
intent is the plain language of the contract.” City of Rockford, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 257.
¶ 34 The CBA, Article X, titled “Grievance Procedure,” provides that “[a]ny grievance or
dispute which may arise between the parties, including the application, meaning or interpretation
of this Agreement” must be settled in accordance with the procedure set forth therein (Emphasis
added.). This is in accordance with section 8 of the Public Labor Relations Act (5 ILCS 315/8
(West 2020)), which requires such a grievance statement be included in any CBA. To determine
whether “application, meaning or interpretation” of the CBA is necessary, we must first examine
plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs point out that the CBA is not mentioned anywhere in their complaint,
and they seek to distill down their specific dispute to whether the City was required to provide a
justification for retiring the 2009 eligibility list. Although that may be an issue to be resolved, our
reading of the amended complaint reveals that the overarching claim is that plaintiffs were
improperly passed over for promotions to lieutenant positions. If the only issue to be resolved was
that the City did not provide a justification for retiring the list, then the remedy would simply be
for the City to provide the requisite justification. Rather, plaintiffs request that, because the City
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did not provide a justification, they must be automatically promoted to lieutenant and receive
backpay. Clearly, plaintiffs’ larger concern is that they were not promoted. The resolution of that
issue requires application and interpretation of the CBA, where it specifically includes numerous
provisions on promotion procedures.
¶ 35 Section 9.3 of the CBA governs the promotion process and includes numerous provisions
that are germane to the dispute here. In particular, it provides that promotions “shall be made from
established lists resulting from job related examinations” and “an employee who was passed over
on an eligibility list shall be permitted to take the examination and be placed on the eligibility list
for the rank above that for which the employee was passed over.” As an example, the CBA
provides that a firefighter passed over for promotion to lieutenant shall be permitted to take the
examination for captain and be placed on the eligibility list for captains. Section 9.3 also states that
promotional vacancies shall be filled from the applicable eligibility list and these lists shall be
generated by the City following the requisite examination. The City will rank employees on the
list according to their scores and shall provide the list to the Union prior to any promotions.
According to this section, “[v]acancies will customarily be filled by employees in the order of their
ranking on the eligibility list.” If an employee is passed over for promotion, that employee shall
have his or her name inserted at the top of the new eligibility list in rank order and “shall be
promoted from the new eligibility list to vacancies which will customarily be filled by employees
in the order of their ranking on the eligibility list.” Additionally, section 9.3 requires that a
firefighter cannot be promoted to the position of lieutenant without serving 54 months as a
firefighter and states that an employee can be passed over for promotion for the following reasons:
injury leave, major disciplinary infraction, or compliance with an order of a court, administrative
agency, administrative law judge, hearing officer, or arbitrator. Finally, section 9.3 includes a
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section on the “performance selection process,” which provides that up to 16% of the promotions
to the rank of lieutenant may be made by the Fire Commissioner on the basis of performance and
then lists the necessary criteria for a performance promotion.
¶ 36 Additionally, in an addendum to the CBA in the form of a letter agreement, the CBA
reconfirmed the City and the Union’s agreement that, “in the event the City utilizes performance
selection promotions from eligibility lists derived from examinations administered after January
1, 1997, the City will forgo making such promotions on the last promotional order before the
eligibility list is retired.” The City also agreed that “the last promotional order will include at least
16% of the total promotions previously made from that eligibility list, and that the last promotions
will be in strict rank order from the eligibility list.” It is unclear to this court whether this letter
agreement contributed to the underlying conflict regarding promotions and the eligibility lists;
however, that only further proves our point that the expertise of the Board should be relied upon
in the circumstances before us. See Semmens v. Board of Education of Pontiac Community
Consolidated School District No. 429, 190 Ill. App. 3d 174, 178 (1989) (“matters which require
specialized or technical expertise [should] be decided by a tribunal possessing those qualities”).
¶ 37 Based on the foregoing, it is clear to this court that the CBA provides both the method in
which eligibility lists are created and firefighters are promoted to lieutenants, as well as the reasons
firefighters would not be promoted from the eligibility list and the remedy when firefighters are
passed over. In deciding whether the City erred in failing to promote plaintiffs and, if so, what
remedy should be available for that error, it is necessary to interpret and apply the provisions of
the CBA. See Walton v. Roosevelt University, 2022 IL App (1st) 210011, ¶ 22 (CBAs “may
include express and implied terms [citation], and it is up to an arbitrator, not a state court, to define
the scope of the parties’ agreement”); see also Mahoney v. City of Chicago, 293 Ill. App. 3d 69,
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72 (1997) (though no hiring plan or similar agreement was at issue, this court found that plaintiffs’
challenge to “the City’s method of filling promotional vacancies” was a question of “the City’s
compliance with the collective bargaining agreement” and plaintiffs were required to exhaust their
remedies under that agreement).
¶ 38 Plaintiffs, nonetheless, contend that it is only necessary for this court to look at the Hiring
Plan to resolve their dispute because the Hiring Plan specifically addressed the method in which
eligibility lists will be retired and the CBA is “silent” on the matter. Specifically, the Hiring Plan
provides:
“Eligibility Lists may be retired at the discretion of the Fire Commissioner, in
consultation with the DHR Commissioner, provided that no Eligibility List shall be used
for longer than eight (8) years after it has been established unless there is a lack of available
funds for testing and/or low utilization of the Eligibility List due to the lack of promotional
opportunities, in which case the Eligibility List will be retired as soon as practicable after
funding has been made available for a new examination. The Fire Commissioner’s
justification for the retirement of the Eligibility List shall be documented in the hiring file.”
The Hiring Plan, thus, provides the established practices for retirement of eligibility lists, and those
practices are not addressed in such detail in the CBA. However, the Hiring Plan provides no
remedy for violation of these retirement procedures, whereas the CBA provides remedies for when
a firefighter is passed over for promotion and sets forth the procedure for when new eligibility lists
are generated. For those reasons, the CBA would nonetheless need to be consulted in resolving
plaintiffs’ dispute.
¶ 39 Regardless of whether the Hiring Plan resolves any aspects of plaintiffs’ dispute, the Public
Labor Relations Act and the CBA, itself, explicitly state that the CBA controls. The Public Labor
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Relations Act states that any CBA executed pursuant to the statute “shall supersede any contrary
statutes, charters, ordinances, rules or regulations relating to wages, hours and conditions of
employment and employment relations adopted by the public employer or its agents.” 5 ILCS
315/15(b) (West 2010). The CBA states in Article VI: “This Agreement constitutes the complete
and entire Agreement between the parties and concludes collective bargaining (except as provided
for in the grievance procedure) for its term. Amendments and modifications of this Agreement
may be made by mutual written agreement of the parties to this Agreement.” The combined effect
of these provisions indicates that the CBA controls over any other contradictory provision in any
other source where “wages, hours and conditions of employment and employment relations” are
involved and that any additional or modified term must be mutually agreed upon by the parties,
i.e. the July 30, 2020, letters accompanying the CBA. Notably, promotional procedures affect
“conditions of employment,” and therefore the promotional procedures in the Hiring Plan, if
construed as rules or regulations, are superseded by those in the CBA. See City of Belvidere v.
Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 209 (1998) (“a change in the condition of
employment *** may also encompass the loss of potential work or promotional opportunities”).
Thus, the Union and the City clearly engaged in collective bargaining over the promotion process,
and therefore any “separate agreements” exceeding or altering those terms set forth in the CBA
are precluded. See Matthews, 2016 IL 117638, ¶¶ 100-01 (where the Chicago Transit Authority
engaged in collective bargaining over retiree health care benefits, any “implied in fact” agreements
or “ ‘outside’ promises” exceeding those terms set forth in the CBA are precluded under Illinois
law).
¶ 40 Additionally, as the City points out and the circuit court noted, in sections addressing
promotional opportunities, the Hiring Plan expressly references the CBA. Specifically, a section
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titled “Use of Eligibility List” provides that all eligible candidates “shall be considered for
vacancies in rank order from the applicable Eligibility List unless otherwise provided for by the
CBA,” and a section titled “Performance Selection Process” states that any selections made under
this process “shall be made in accordance with the procedures set forth in the CBA.” This implies
that the City intended the Hiring Plan to comply with the CBA and, where contradictory, to be
superseded by the CBA. Additionally, the Shakman Accord, which prompted the creation of the
Hiring Plan, specifically acknowledged the existence of CBAs and the Act and stated that it should
be “construed and administered consistent with the Act.” Because the Hiring Plan was born out of
the Accord and was “fully incorporated [therein] by reference,” this also suggests that there was
never an intention for the Hiring Plan to control over the Act or any CBA. Accordingly, the CBA
controls in this instance, and the dispute should, therefore, be submitted to arbitration in
accordance therewith. See Walton, 2022 IL App (1st) 210011, ¶ 26 (“When workers unionize and
agree to be bound by a collective agreement, they forgo the right to raise some of their grievances
on an individualized basis in state court.”).
¶ 41 Finally, we find that even if the claims involved the exercise of the City’s managerial
authority, they would nonetheless be preempted. Article XIV of the CBA provides that the City
has the right to “unilaterally determine matters of inherent managerial policy and to implement
decisions with respect thereto,” including, inter alia, the right
“to direct its employees; to determine the content of examinations, the necessary
requirements to participate in the examination process, and the minimum qualifications for
all positions; *** to maintain and improve efficiency of governmental operations; to
determine the methods, means and personnel by which government operations or a unit
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thereof are to be conducted; *** and to exercise control and discretion over its organization
and the technology of performing its work.”
It continues that, even in the exercise of managerial rights, the City must still follow the provisions
of the CBA. Notably, claims may still be preempted, even where they arise under the management
rights clause in the relevant CBA, which provides an agency with “broad authority” to manage the
department, direct the workforce, and set the rules of employment. Id. ¶ 22. Thus, even if plaintiffs’
dispute falls under “managerial functions,” it is nonetheless preempted and should be determined
by an arbitrator. See id. ¶ 25 (whether the union, either expressly or implicitly, consented to the
collection and use of biometric data through the management rights clause is a question reserved
for arbitration); Staunton Community Unit School District No. 6 v. Illinois Educational Labor
Relations Board, 200 Ill. App. 3d 370, 378 (1990) (presence of a management rights clause in the
contract did not render the dispute inarbitrable).
¶ 42 The City, and the circuit court below, properly relied on Sims, 2022 IL App (1st) 210890-
U, for support, as we also find it instructive here. In Sims, the plaintiffs (correctional officers
employed by defendant, the Sheriff of Cook County) filed a class action lawsuit against the
defendant for underpayment of wages in violation of the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection
Act (Wage Act) (820 ILCS 115/1 et seq. (West 2020)). Sims, 2022 IL App (1st) 210890-U, ¶ 2.
They alleged that there was an “implicit employment agreement” with the defendant that they
would continue to be paid according to a higher pay scale. Id. ¶ 9. The circuit court dismissed the
claim, finding that it would require analysis of the relevant CBA and was therefore preempted,
depriving the court of jurisdiction. Id. ¶ 13. On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that their “right to
payment” was based on an independent agreement and did not require interpretation of the CBA.
Id. ¶ 17. This court affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal, finding that “the claim raised by the
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plaintiffs cannot be resolved without undertaking some substantive interpretation of the terms of
the applicable CBA.” Id. ¶ 22. The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ attempt to overcome
preemption with its allegation of a separate and independent “implied agreement” because “for a
court even to resolve the issue of whether an implied agreement existed that was independent of
the CBA and controlled over the express terms of the CBA addressing the same subject matter,
the court would have to interpret the terms of the CBA.” Id. ¶ 23.
¶ 43 Plaintiffs here do not argue that there is an implied agreement, as in Sims; instead, they
assert that the Hiring Plan is a separate written agreement that governs all aspects of the promotion
process and eligibility lists. Notwithstanding this distinction, we nonetheless are guided in our
analysis by the reasoning in Sims. The disputed issue here involves the promotional process, which
is laid out in the CBA, and, thus, necessarily involves interpretation of the CBA’s terms.
Additionally, the enforceability and applicability of any practices and procedures set forth in the
Hiring Plan would nonetheless require interpretation of the CBA’s terms—for instance, whether
the CBA permits separate agreements on the issue of promotions and, if so, whether the procedures
in the Hiring Plan conflict with those in the CBA. See Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 308 v.
Chicago Transit Authority, 2012 IL App (1st) 112517, ¶¶ 16-18 (finding that, any action on the
negotiated side agreement, including its validity and the parties’ intent, “would necessarily involve
interpretation of the CBA” and “examination of the customs and practices of the workplace that
the CBA governs *** to maintain consistency and fairness); Jones v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 241
Ill. App. 3d 129, 137 (1993) (finding that, in determining whether the plaintiffs’ termination
violated the apprenticeship agreement, “the nature of the relationship between the apprenticeship
agreement and the [CBA] must necessarily be examined”); Schacht v. Caterpillar, Inc., 213 Ill.
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App. 3d 169, 175 (1991) (finding that the apprenticeship agreements were made within the context
of the CBA and the plaintiffs’ employment nonetheless remained subject to the CBA).
¶ 44 Similarly, in Glasper , 2021 IL App (1st) 200764, ¶¶ 4, 13, the plaintiff was employed by
the defendant as a janitor at the airport; was a member of a union, which was covered by a CBA;
and alleged a breach of contract claim as to an “implied” agreement, as well as a claim under the
Wage Act. The circuit court dismissed the complaint because the claims were preempted. Id. ¶ 24.
The Sixth Division of this court affirmed, finding that the CBA was the controlling agreement,
where the Wage Act “must give deference to the CBA” and “[t]he fact finder would have to refer
to the CBA” to resolve numerous questions regarding wages and overtime pay. Id. ¶¶ 43-51; see
Tito v. Scrub, Inc., 2021 IL App (1st) 201081-U, ¶ 27 (following Glasper and finding that “no
‘implied’ agreement regarding the same terms can exist where a written agreement between the
parties was in place”). Additionally, in Glasper, the court pointed out that the CBA prohibited the
plaintiffs from negotiating or creating contracts independent of the CBA and thus any alleged
implied contract violated the CBA. Glasper, 2021 IL App (1st) 200764, ¶ 40; see Tito, 2021 IL
App (1st) 201081-U, ¶ 28. Based on a plain reading of the CBA, we, like the panels in Glasper
and Tito, conclude that independent agreements are not authorized and, in any case, the terms of
the Hiring Plan would nevertheless need to defer to the CBA.
¶ 45 The court in Sims, as well as the circuit court, rejected some of the same cases on which
plaintiffs rely for support. We, too, find those cases inapposite for the following reasons.
¶ 46 Daniels v. Board of Education of Chicago, 277 Ill. App. 3d 968 (1996), and Byrne v. Hayes
Beer Distributing Co., 2018 IL App (1st) 172612, are distinguishable, as they involved disputes
that the associated CBAs did not reach. Instead, the precise subject matter in those cases were
expressly and solely governed by statute, specifically the Wage Act. See Sims, 2022 IL App (1st)
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No. 1-24-0066
210890-U, ¶¶ 26-27 (distinguishing Daniels and Byrne). In Daniels, the plaintiffs sought
compensation for vacation days accrued but not taken during their former employment with the
Board of Education of the City of Chicago, and their claim was brought pursuant to the Wage Act.
277 Ill. App. 3d at 968. The circuit court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, as the plaintiffs failed to exhaust remedies under the CBA. Id. at 970. The Sixth
Division of this court reversed, finding that the Wage Act specifically addressed “compensating
former full-time employees for accrued vacation days,” whereas the CBA did not. Id. at 974. In
Byrne, the Teamsters Union and the defendant, Hayes, a beer distributing company, entered into a
CBA governing delivery drivers, but the plaintiff driver’s claims “derived solely” out of the Wage
Act and did “not require interpretation of any provision of the CBA.” 2018 IL App (1st) 172612,
¶¶ 5, 32. Although the CBA addressed “drivers’ duties to rotate product to maintain freshness[,]”
it did not describe “how that provision [would] be enforced and whether [the defendant] [could]
deduct from drivers’ compensation for stale beer.” Id. ¶ 35. Thus, the plaintiff was not required to
exhaust contractual remedies. Id. ¶ 36.
¶ 47 Here, plaintiffs are not seeking to enforce a statutory right that is not covered by the CBA;
rather, they allege that the City was required to utilize a certain eligibility list and to promote
firefighters in accordance with a particular procedure, set forth in the Hiring Plan, which is separate
from the CBA but is not a statute. Moreover, in contrast to Byrne and Daniels, the CBA is not
silent on the issue of promotion procedures and whether the procedures set forth in the Hiring Plan
are enforceable or applicable requires the interpretation of the CBA. Thus, neither case is
applicable here. We similarly reject Semmens, 190 Ill. App. 3d at 176-77, on which plaintiffs also
rely, where arbitration was denied as the teachers claimed that they had been unlawfully denied a
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No. 1-24-0066
lunch period and the relevant CBA had a section entitled “Lunch Period,” which was completely
blank.
¶ 48 Plaintiffs additionally rely on Lodge No. 822, International Ass’n of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers Union v. City of Quincy, 137 Ill. App. 3d 425 (1985), and Duldulao v. Saint
Mary of Nazareth Hospital Center, 115 Ill. 2d 482 (1987), which we also find inapposite. In Lodge
No. 822, the Union requested that the circuit court direct the City to resolve a dispute through
arbitration and cited a “Working Agreement” for support of their complaint. Lodge No. 822, 137
Ill. App. 3d at 425. The Fourth District of this court recognized that arbitration clauses in CBAs
are to be given a broad interpretation, but, nonetheless, “the mere existence of a dispute between
the employer and the collective bargaining representative of the employees is insufficient to make
the matter in dispute subject to arbitration.” Id. at 429. The court also stated that “some nexus
between the dispute and the provisions of the agreement is necessary.” Id. at 431. Ultimately, the
court concluded that the employees’ claims were not preempted, noting that “[t]he agreement
contains nothing about the propriety of hiring temporary workers.” Id. at 430. The circumstances
before us, however, do not present the “mere existence of a dispute” between the City and the
Union. Rather, plaintiffs’ dispute involves promotional procedures that are addressed in detail in
the CBA, i.e., a nexus.
¶ 49 In Duldulao, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant terminated her employment in violation
of procedures set forth in an employee handbook, which she argued “created enforceable
contractual rights,” and the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant.
Duldulao, 115 Ill. 2d at 484. Our supreme court affirmed the appellate court’s reversal of the circuit
court’s decision and held that the handbook did create “an enforceable right to the particular
disciplinary procedures described therein.” Id. at 490. Notably, there was no other agreement or
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No. 1-24-0066
any applicable statute that related to the plaintiff’s employment. Our decision would obviously be
different if the sole document addressing promotions, or rights of firefighters in general, was the
Hiring Plan, but that is simply not the case. As such, Duldulao has little bearing here.
¶ 50 Our conclusion that arbitration is appropriate here is bolstered by the grievances filed by
many of the class action plaintiffs, wherein they asserted that the City violated the CBA.
Specifically, it appears that nearly all of the grievance reports in the record filed by individual
plaintiffs cited section 9.3 in arguing that there was a violation of the CBA. Interestingly, the City
repeatedly denied arbitration under the guise that plaintiffs’ claim did not implicate the CBA;
however, now, the City requests that this court affirm the trial court’s dismissal of this matter
because it should be resolved via arbitration. It seems to us, then, that plaintiffs initially sought
arbitration for resolution of their grievances and the City now claims arbitration is the correct
forum. Thus, both parties should be satisfied with our conclusion that plaintiffs’ recourse for their
grievances should be through the arbitration process. We recognize that this decision may
implicate concerns of “judicial economy, duplication of effort, or possibly inconsistent result,” but
those concerns are outweighed by Illinois public policy’s preference for arbitration in labor
disputes. Bass v. SMG, Inc., 328 Ill. App. 3d 492, 507 (2002).
¶ 51 Finally, where an agency has exclusive jurisdiction to hear an action, as we have
determined here, parties must exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking relief in the
courts. Employers Mutual Cos. v. Skilling, 163 Ill. 2d 284, 288 (1994). A plaintiff’s complaint
must allege on the face of the pleading that grievance procedures were followed and exhausted.
Cessna, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 165. As the City points out, plaintiffs have not exhausted all
administrative remedies before turning to the courts for review, and plaintiffs do not allege that
they have done so. As such, the circuit court’s dismissal was proper.
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¶ 52 Because we have determined that dismissal of the amended complaint was proper due to a
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to section 2-619, it is not necessary for this court to
address any of the arguments arising under section 2-615.
¶ 53 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 54 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 55 Affirmed.
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No. 1-24-0066
Barron v. City of Chicago, 2025 IL App (1st) 240066
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 22-CH-
8557; the Hon. Claire J. Quish, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys Ruth I. Major, Law Offices of Ruth I. Major, P.C., of Chicago,
for for appellants.
Appellant:
Attorneys Mary B. Richardson-Lowry, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago
for (Myriam Zreczny Kasper, Suzanne M. Loose, Daniel E.
Appellee: Alperstein, and Julian N. Henriques, Jr., Assistant Corporation
Counsel, of counsel), for appellee.
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